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ABSTRACT

Agricultural co-operative businesses are the focus of considerable academic
research overseas, particularly from the perspective of agricultural economics.
Research on Australian agricultural co-operatives, however, is very limited. This
exploratory study investigates agricultural co-operatives at two inter-related levels.
Firstly, the thesis examines the broader political economy shaping the agricultural
co-operative sector, specifically policy and institutional arrangements affecting
agricultural co-operatives. Secondly, the thesis considers how this external world
influences the internal behaviour of the agricultural co-operative business. The study
adopts a qualitative research methodology, principally using the case study method.
Over 50 in-depth interviews were conducted with actors associated with the
agricultural co-operative sector, including the United Farmers Co-operative
Company (UFCC).
The thesis argues that neoliberal influenced restructuring of the agricultural
industry has, in the last decade and a half, stimulated a renewed interest in the
agricultural co-operative model in Western Australia. The research also identifies
that, paradoxically, neoliberalism sets limits on the evolution of commercially
successful agricultural co-operatives.

Neoclassical economic theory, based on

notions of individualism and profit maximisation, undermines the collective and
democratic nature of co-operative principles, fundamental to the viability of the cooperative business structure.

Furthermore, the co-operative business model is

frequently misconstrued or misunderstood by powerful gate keepers who, influenced
by neoclassical economic theory, privilege the corporate business structure over the
co-operative model.

These factors potentially threaten the standing of the co-

operative model in the market place and therefore diminish the benefits of the cooperative model for the agricultural industry.
The inter-relatedness of Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the UFCC
illustrates this double effect of neoliberalism on the agricultural co-operative model.
For over six decades, the Westralian Farmers Co-operative was the archetypal
expression of the co-operative movement in Western Australia. Yet, over time,
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Westralian Farmers Co-operative evolved into a corporation, Wesfarmers.

This

conversion process set up the conditions for market failure that triggered the
formation of the UFCC. However, the commercial success of Wesfarmers as a
corporation has reinforced a widely held perception that a co-operative is an
immature business structure that, if successful, inexorably progresses to the mature
status of a corporate structure. In recent years, this belief has influenced some actors
within the UFCC Board and management to consider strategies designed to emulate
the success story of Wesfarmers, thereby potentially undermining the co-operative
basis of the UFCC.
The UFCC case study illustrates the theoretical and applied strengths of the
agricultural co-operative business structure in a period of agricultural restructuring.
One of the conclusions of the thesis is that the agricultural co-operative model is
particularly suited to a market economy to moderate the excesses of the free market
as well as take advantage of new opportunities arising from restructuring. The thesis
also concludes that notions based on neoliberalism challenge the philosophical
orientation of maturing agricultural co-operatives. The thesis concludes that the
agricultural co-operative model has much to offer the agricultural industry and that
the need for agricultural co-operatives is as evident in contemporary times as any
other period in the agricultural industry.
This thesis points to several areas for additional research. The first is for the
field of agricultural industry public policy development. Identifying the key factors
associated with successful agricultural co-operatives in Australia will provide
directions for government agencies to develop public policy to grasp new
opportunities within the agricultural supply chain and concurrently address the
downside of industry deregulation. A second area of research is the comparison of
the attitudes and motivations of agricultural co-operative members with farmers who
choose not to join these organisations. This research will assist policy makers and
the peak body to develop strategies to build the Western Australian agricultural cooperative sector. The third area is in the field of rural community economic
development.

Research findings from this thesis suggest that agricultural co-

operatives can have a positive impact on the social and economic well-being of rural
communities adjusting to the effects of significant rural and agricultural industry
restructuring.
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CHAPTER ONE

The Agricultural Co-operative Business Structure in Western Australia

A Mini-Revival in Agricultural Co-operatives?
Western Australia experienced a notable upsurge in co-operative business
registrations in the last few years of the 20th century and into the new millennium. Of
the estimated 55 ‘active’ 1 co-operatives in Western Australia in that period, over 30
were formed after 1996 (Booth, 2004). The majority of these newly established cooperatives were regionally based with a direct relationship with the agricultural
industry.
Several factors contributed to this new wave of agricultural and regionally
based co-operative business ventures. A significant element in the co-operative
revival in recent years is the United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC),
formed in the early 1990s. It has evolved as the most significant agricultural cooperative success story in Western Australia since the conversion of the Westralian
Farmers Co-operative into a publicly listed corporation, Wesfarmers, in the mid
1980s. UFCC’s success and rapid membership growth to over 3000 members,
approximately half of Western Australia’s grain growers (Madden, 2003b), is also a
significant factor contributing to the subsequent mini-boom of co-operative
registrations identified in the late 1990s.
Industry deregulation is clearly another key theme in recent co-operative
formation. Following the dismantling of legislation underpinning the Western
Australian Meat Marketing Corporation (WAMMCO), which was a Statutory

1 ‘Active’ co-operatives are defined as co-operatives that are registered with the regulatory body, the
Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection and are actively trading.
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Marketing Authority (SMA), 2 a co-operative business structure was created to
assume the activities of the former SMA (Clarke, 1999). The co-operative model was
recommended for other SMAs facing review, such as those involved in the marketing
of potatoes and eggs (Interviewee 686, 2003; Potato Marketing Corporation of
Western Australia, 2003; Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 2002a).
Farmers adopted the co-operative model as a consequence of government initiated
deregulation of several regionally based water irrigation statutory bodies (Booth,
2004; Roberts & Henneveld, n.d.).
The Australian Wheat Board (AWB), a former national statutory marketing
body, underwent a highly publicised restructuring in which the co-operative model
was discussed as an alternative to a publicly listed company at a number of well
attended farmer meetings throughout Western Australia (Booth, 2004; Interviewee
660, 2002). While the AWB did not pursue the co-operative business model, the
farmer meetings provided Western Australian growers with an opportunity to
understand the co-operative business structure. 3
Dairy industry deregulation in 2001 stimulated the birth of the Challenge
Dairy Co-operative. Challenge Dairy Co-operative was the first newly established
dairy co-operative in Western Australia for several decades (Booth, 2004;
Interviewee 652, 2003; Interviewee 679, 2002). These examples demonstrate that the
deregulation of SMAs has positively influenced the uptake of the co-operative model
in these agricultural sectors. However, as the National Competition Policy process to
review SMAs in Western Australia is almost complete, this avenue of potential cooperative development is now nearly exhausted.
Debate about the appropriateness of the co-operative structure as a long-term
strategy is another theme in the mini-revival. Co-operative Bulk Handling (CBH),

2 The Productivity Commission (2000) describes SMAs as bodies established by legislation that have
monopoly selling powers which may include both domestic and export sales of an agricultural
commodity, although some SMAs are restricted to export sales. The SMA also referred to as singledesk marketer. The potential impact of deregulating SMAs on the agricultural co-operative sector is
discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
3 In 1998, the business activities of the Australian Wheat Board were corporatised and transferred to a
new corporation, AWB Limited, and a number of subsidiaries; AWB International, AWB Australia,
and AWB Finance. In 1999, AWB Limited, privatised and wheat growers became the new
shareholders. In August 2001, AWB Limited listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Growers retain
about 80 per cent of AWB Limited’s share base. Under the Commonwealth Wheat Marketing Act
1989, the AWBI has the authority to export bulk shipments of wheat from Australia, commonly
referred to as the ‘single desk’ (Australian Wheat Board, n.d.).
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with around 7000 grain industry members, raised the profile of the co-operative
model when it unsuccessfully conducted a campaign in the year 2000 to convert from
an agricultural co-operative business structure to a publicly listed company (Wasley,
2003), with the estimated financial windfall to members of $100,000 each (Bolt,
2004). Rumblings among some grains industry farmers, confirmed by comments
from a retiring chairman that CBH was still considering this option (Slater, 2004),
has kept debate alive among its membership and in the rural media about the merits
or otherwise of the co-operative structure (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 655, 2003). The
CBH Board finally acknowledged member disquiet about a possible restructure and
confirmed that it would remain a co-operative (Bolt, 2005b). Member concerns with
corporatisation related to the loss of farmer control, the likelihood that the new
corporation would focus on profits rather than providing a benefit to members via
high quality storage and handling network for grain and foregoing tax exemptions for
agricultural co-operatives under the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act
1936 (Bolt, 2006b). The outcome of the CBH exploration of alternative business
structures has been a reaffirmation of the merits the agricultural co-operative model
in the contemporary agricultural industry.
Institutional responses are also evident in stimulating the new groundswell of
agricultural co-operatives. The activities of the Western Australian Department of
Agriculture are part of this institutional involvement. The Department initiated and
financially contributed to several international study tours of agricultural cooperatives in the late 1990s. Scores of Western Australian farmers, agribusiness and
co-operative sector actors 4 participated in New Generation Co-operative (NGC) 5
study tours in the United States and other international agricultural co-operative
study tours, developing their knowledge of co-operative business structures. The
Western Australian Department of Agriculture also invited a United States academic,
Professor Michael Cook, who had a special interest in the NGC model, together with
4 The generic term ‘co-operative actor/s’ is adopted throughout the thesis to refer collectively to
people (either individually or as a group) who have direct knowledge of the co-operative structure or
exert influence over its viability in Western Australia. Many of these actors were interviewed for this
thesis.
5 The NGC model is a hybrid between the traditional agricultural co-operative model and the Investor
Owned Firm (IOF) corporate model. It focuses on value-added processing and only accepts a
predetermined amount of product from its members (Stefanson, Fulton, & Harris, 1995). See
Appendix 5 for further information. The United States Department of Agriculture report (2002, p
25ff) also summarises the similarities and differences between the traditional agricultural co-operative
model and the NGC model.
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the CEO of an American NGC, to Western Australia to deliver several seminars
about NGCs. One outcome of the study tours and seminars was the initiative of the
Western Australian Department of Agriculture, in conjunction with Edith Cowan
University, to obtain funding for this PhD research project on agricultural cooperatives. The Department also assisted one of its officers to study a PhD on
agricultural co-operative economics in the United States, under the supervision of
Professor Cook. 6
Further, some officers within the Western Australian Department of
Agriculture have been actively encouraging the adoption by farmers of the cooperative structure as a viable strategy in response to agricultural restructuring.
These individuals have been pressing for several years to enable Western Australian
agricultural co-operatives to access a special Commonwealth government provision for
agricultural co-operative loans under Section 120(1)(c) in the Income Tax Assessment
Act 1936. In 2004, as a result of a Western Australian government review into the impact
of dairy industry deregulation on dairy farmers, a mechanism was proposed and accepted
by the government (Government of Western Australia, 2004). Officers from the
Department have subsequently promoted this facility to agricultural co-operatives,
developing the knowledge base of farmers about the benefits of the agricultural cooperative model in a contemporary agricultural industry setting. Furthermore, the review

into the viability of the Western Australian dairy industry recommended that the
Western Australian government conduct an analysis of the role of co-operatives in
addressing market failure issues in the dairy industry. These activities suggest the
beginnings of an institutional response to promote the benefits of and stimulate the
uptake of the agricultural co-operative model by farmers.
The decision of the peak body, the Co-operative Federation of Western
Australia, the CFWA, to employ a full-time Executive Officer in 1996 is another
institutional element contributing to the increased uptake of the co-operative
structure. 7 This event coincided with the spurt of new co-operative formation. A
knowledgeable and accessible peak body employee in this period was a significant
resource for these embryonic co-operatives during their vulnerable start-up phases.

6 See Plunkett (2005).
7 Chapter Five examines the role of the CFWA in the agricultural co-operative sector. Prior to the
appointment of the Executive Officer in a full-time capacity, for several decades the CFWA executive
support was outsourced on a part-time basis to an accounting firm.
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Furthermore, individuals seeking co-operative information and advice, along
with relevant government agencies responding to co-operative initiatives, were able
to contact the CFWA Executive Officer who had the expertise and time to address
these queries. 8
An additional institutional aspect of the recent revival of interest in cooperatives has been the status of the long anticipated new Western Australian cooperative legislation. The drive for new legislation is part of an agreement by all
Australian State governments to introduce co-operative legislation that is essentially
the same in each jurisdiction (National Co-op Update, 2000; New South Wales
Government Information Service, 1997). The issue has been bubbling along for
several years in Western Australia without resolution, although some progress was
anticipated in 2006. The lack of updated Western Australian co-operative legislation
is reaching a critical phase and the need to finalise this issue is again contributing to
the awareness of the co-operative structure by actors in the agricultural industry.
Lastly, these multiple triggers occurred within a relatively concentrated time
span and predominantly in a specific geographic area and sector, that is, in rural
Western Australia and the agricultural industry. There is a convergence of chance in
these events. If they had occurred over a longer period, or in an unrelated manner or
across different industries, then their impact would not have been as evident. These
separate events have symbiotically and mutually reinforced each other and, in the
process, sustained existing or developed new industry knowledge about agricultural
co-operatives as a legitimate business structure for their particular circumstances.
This wave of agricultural co-operative development does not appear to be
unique to Western Australia. Australia generally has experienced a quiet but
persistent growth in co-operative activity over the last decade (Australian Centre for
Co-operative Research and Development, n.d.-b). Nationally there are approximately
2,500 registered co-operatives and Western Australia has around 3 per cent of these
(Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, n.d.-b). Research
suggests that during these past ten years or so, co-operatives have had an 81 per cent

8 Other factors outside of Western Australia may also have contributed to the CFWA role in the minirevival. These include promoting the International Co-operative Alliance initiative of the www.coop
domain, the formation of the research centre, Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and
Development (ACCORD) and the annual Monash University Agribusiness Co-operative Leadership
and Governance Forums which commenced in 1998.
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increase in turnover and almost 70 per cent increase in asset growth (Australian
Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, n.d.-b). The CFWA estimates
that the co-operative sector in Western Australia has an aggregate annual turnover of
approximately $2 billion. With a combined membership of around 50,000 members, 9
many of whom operate their own businesses; co-operatives create direct employment
for some 3,000 staff, lifting the total employment pool and annual turnover of entities
linked to co-operatives many times over (Co-operative Federation of Western
Australia, 2005a). Agricultural and regionally based co-operatives account for much
of this activity.
Clearly, something worthy of note is occurring in the Western Australian
agricultural co-operative sector.

The agricultural co-operative sector, however,

functions in a broader political and economic environment. Over the last three
decades, Commonwealth and Western Australian governments have overtly
implemented orthodox economic policies in a range of industry sectors. Agricultural
public policy during this period has exhorted farmers to implement strategies and
mechanisms based on neoclassical economic theory and concepts found within
neoliberalism (Botteril, 2003; Lawrence, 1992; Lawrence & Hungerford, 1994).
Notions of small government, privatisation, individualism, and the pursuit of profit
via the company business structure, characterise these strategies. As a result, the
agricultural industry has experienced significant restructuring with uneven outcomes
for farmers and rural communities. Ironically, agricultural industry restructuring,
with its focus on the individual, has partly contributed to a farmer response based on
a collective business structure.
However, agricultural restructuring has a dual impact for the co-operative
structure. While on one hand new agricultural and rural co-operatives are forming
and registering as legal entities, on the other hand, there is evidence of internal
grumblings in some agricultural co-operatives as they mature as organisations.
Additionally, the impact of market forces has contributed to weakening the historical
institutional arrangements surrounding the agricultural co-operative sector. Perhaps
orthodox economic policies also have the potential to set limits on the recent
achievements emanating from the mini-revival in the agricultural co-operative sector.
9 As members may belong to multiple co-operatives, this aggregate membership may overstate the
total number of members.
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The Research Problem
The mini-revival in Western Australia’s co-operatives may not be a full-scale
renaissance, but it does merit a reconsideration of the business structure by actors
connected with the agricultural industry. A tension develops between strategies in
agricultural industry public policy emanating from a neoclassical economic tradition
that favours individualist approaches and the profit maximising corporate business
model and the reality of a preference by many producers to adopt a collaborative
business model. This tension is in essence the research problem. The key question
that follows from this tension is:
How do contemporary agricultural co-operatives contend with a neoliberal
influenced political and economic environment?
Several supplementary questions evolve from this question:
1. Why did the agricultural industry initially embrace the co-operative
business structure over alternative business structures?
2. Why has the agricultural co-operative been such a persistent business
structure in the agricultural industry?
3. Does the agricultural industry have unique characteristics that are
particularly suited to the co-operative structure?
4. If so, have these unique qualities been overlooked in the development
of agricultural policy based on orthodox economic theory to the
detriment of the agricultural co-operative structure?
5. Are agricultural co-operatives an instrument that can assist in the
preservation of family farming in a capitalist market economy?
6. Have contemporary institutional arrangements enhanced or impeded
the development of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative
sector?
These questions reinforce the paradox - the co-operative model continues to
be employed by some actors in agriculture as a collective response to the broader
economic policy framework that favours individualism and the corporate business
structure. Ironically, the agricultural co-operative model is one of the strategies some
farmers adopt in order to adapt to a restructured agriculture.
7

Methodology
Chapter Two reveals that the literature tends to favour an economic analysis
of agricultural co-operatives and hence often employs quantitative research
methodology.

The methodology adopted in this thesis to explore the tension

identified above adopts a qualitative research approach, essentially built around case
studies. Qualitative research operates from a different platform and mindset to
quantitative research approaches.

It is embedded in understanding individuals’

experiences of their worlds and how they make sense of these. Thus, an appreciation
of an individual’s perspective of the agricultural co-operative business structure and
behaviour is an end in itself (Patton, 1990), whether or not one can generalize from
these personal experiences to all agricultural co-operatives.

Nevertheless, these

individual reflections can provide insights that are pertinent to others involved in
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia.
A report by Patrie (1998) guided the orientation and methodology for this
research. Patrie, in analysing why a particular form of agricultural co-operative, the
NGC, evolved in North Dakota, identified that in addition to the internal behaviour
and business strategies of an agricultural co-operative, a range of external factors can
affect the viability of the co-operative business model. 10 He acknowledged the role
of a number of institutions in stimulating the uptake of the NGC model. These
organisations included, for example, government funded business development
agencies, banks and other financial institutions, management and agribusiness
consultants, legal firms and accounting firms. Patrie also referred to the North
Dakota State government in the development of a whole-of-State strategic plan,
Vision 2000.

He noted, too, the importance of other factors stimulating the

formation of co-operatives, such as favourable legislation for co-operatives and low
interest financial loans specifically for co-operative business start-ups, as well as a
young generation of well-educated farmers who could evaluate the co-operative
business structure on its economic and organisational merits (Patrie, 1998).
Similarly, this thesis does not merely focus on the internal dynamics of an
individual agricultural co-operative case study. The methodology enables the various
institutional sectors surrounding agricultural co-operatives to also be viewed as
10 Chapter Two explores other literature that comments on the interplay of external influences on the
internal behaviour of the co-operative business.
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specific ‘cases’. The following organisations or sectors formed the basis of the case
studies:
•

United Farmers Co-operative Company.

•

The Western Australian government sector.

•

The Western Australian co-operative movement.

•

The professional management, financial, legal and tertiary education
industries servicing the Western Australian agricultural co-operative
sector and industry.

Over 55 interviews were conducted between 2002 and 2004 with
representatives from these organisations or sectors. Interviews were generally for a
minimum of one hour, but frequently longer. Individuals were very generous with
their time and provided insights on various issues associated with the agricultural cooperative business structure.
sessions.

Some of these interviews comprised two or more

Hand written notes of the interviews (rather than transcribed tape

recordings) were drafted into documents over the next few days to ensure that as
much information as possible was retained. The latter were then returned to those
interviewees whose individual input was especially important to the thesis to enable
them to comment, amend or supplement the notes if required.
These extensive interviews provide a narrative about the evolution and status
of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector at the beginning of the 21st
century.

Collectively, they reveal the relationship between Western Australian

farmers and the enduring nature of the agricultural co-operative business model,
particularly within the broader context of Australian agricultural public policy and
agricultural restructuring.
Three individuals are very significant in this research. These are Mr Rod
Madden, inaugural chair of the United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC), Mr
John Booth, Executive Officer of the Co-operative Federation of Western Australia
(CFWA) from 1996 to 2004 and Mr Don Munro, who was closely associated with
the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector from the 1960s to the early
1990s. As these individuals are, or have been, major figures within the Western
Australian agricultural co-operative sector and hence easily identifiable, their names
are used in this thesis with their permission. Other interviews were conducted on the
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basis of confidentiality and every effort has been made to honour this commitment. 11
Where interviewees, including Madden, Booth and Munro, have been quoted or
referred to, it is on the understanding that they do not officially represent or speak on
behalf of their associated organisations. Rather, their views are acknowledged as
personal views or perceptions of a particular issue.
The interviews and case studies are supported by a selective literature review
of agricultural co-operative theory and agricultural restructuring theory. This review,
contained in Chapter Two, provides a framework for the understanding of the issues
surrounding the tensions faced by agricultural co-operatives functioning within a
neoliberal public policy environment. To enhance the thoroughness of the research,
other sources of information in the public domain are also used, such as annual
reports, webpage information, newsletters from co-operatives and peak co-operative
bodies and newspaper articles. 12 These supplementary sources of information aid in
the process of triangulation of information arising in the interviews, providing
additional rigour to the research.
Nevertheless, despite this effort, much of what is captured in the thesis is
based solely on the information provided by the interviewees, and sometimes by just
one interviewee. The thesis retains the uncorroborated information arising from
these interviews, as this work is exploratory and seeks to develop a better
understanding of the perspectives and experiences of various individuals and
organisations, directly or indirectly, involved in or related, to the Western Australian
agricultural sector.
Significant changes occurred in several of the case study organisations during
the four years of this research. Firstly, the focus of the thesis shifted from a study of a
particular type of agricultural co-operative structure, the NGC model, to a broader
examination of the agricultural co-operative sector in Western Australia, as the
proposed NGCs did not eventuate. 13 Mr Rod Madden, the inaugural chair of the
United Farmers Co-operative Company, resigned from the position of Chair in late

11 For reasons of confidentiality, the version of this thesis held by Edith Cowan University has
removed identifying information about the interviewees. However, when the thesis was examined,
general information regarding interviewees was provided to the examiners.
12 Rural media reports were particularly useful in following developments in the UFCC.
13 Appendix One explains the circumstances leading to the refocus of the research from a specific
study of New Generation Co-operatives to a broader analysis of the Western Australian agricultural
co-operative sector.
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2003, and in early 2004, also resigned from the Board of Directors. The Co-operative
Federation of Western Australia (CFWA), the peak body, restructured in 2004 and
Mr John Booth’s position of Executive Officer was made redundant. As part of the
restructure, the CFWA re-badged itself as Co-operatives WA. 14 There were also
several staff changes within key government departments. While occurring prior to
research on this thesis, Westralian Farmers Co-operative, an agricultural co-operative
which figures very strongly in this thesis, converted in the mid 1980s to a corporation
and renamed itself as Wesfarmers.
Due to the ongoing evolution in the case studies of issues identified in this
thesis, a cut off date of early 2004 was established, although where appropriate,
significant developments after this date have been taken into account. To some
extent, these ongoing changes have complicated the overall narrative of the thesis.
They also demonstrate that organisations and the agricultural co-operative sector
itself are organic and evolving, and over relatively a short period can present an
entirely different snapshot of the sector. Therefore, the thesis actually represents a
time bound document that can potentially transform into a historical document in a
very short period.
Significance of the Study
This thesis, to the best knowledge of the researcher, is the most extensive
piece of contemporary research on the agricultural co-operative sector in Australia.
The study of co-operative theory and practice in Australia is important in a period of
wide ranging economic reform leading to declining market power of producers in the
supply chain. As such, the thesis is of significance to academic research related to
business structures, agricultural restructuring and agricultural economics. The study
contributes to these areas of study by commenting on orthodox economic theory and
examining the co-operative business model as a possible alternative to the more
familiar investor owned corporate structure.
In terms of application, this study will enhance understanding of agricultural
co-operative behaviour within the Australian context. This will contribute to the
knowledge base for policy makers within government, and to those working in the
14 In order to minimise these name changes, the thesis retains the name CFWA for Co-operatives
WA. Further, the CFWA is the incorporated name of this organisation.
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agricultural industry, the agri-political sector and the wider Australian co-operative
movement. The study also highlights issues related to the internal organisational
behaviour of co-operative businesses as these organisations adjust to unfolding
changes in the agricultural supply chain, particularly the relationship between the
Boards of Directors and senior management, and the setting of business strategies for
co-operatives.
Employing qualitative research methodology, specifically in-depth interviews
for the case studies, as an alternative to the more commonly applied quantitative
method, is also another contribution to the field of agricultural co-operative study.
This approach enables the ‘voice’ of actors from within agricultural co-operatives
and other institutions influencing the agricultural co-operative sector to be
distinctively heard throughout the thesis.
Although the thesis gives some background information on the history of the
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia, the case studies focus primarily on
agricultural co-operative and institutional behaviour at the beginning of the 21st
century. The case studies therefore provide a valuable base line for future research.
The thesis also demonstrates that agricultural co-operatives in Australia are
organisations that merit further academic research and industry support.
Insofar as the thesis is concerned only with the Western Australian
agricultural co-operative sector and the way it interfaces with political and economic
factors based on neoliberalism, it has some limitations. The thesis does not address
the behaviour of the agricultural co-operative sector in other parts of Australia or
internationally. It is not concerned with non-agricultural co-operatives incorporated
under the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943.

It does not

consider similar structures such as housing co-operatives, non-profit co-operatives,
credit unions, building societies, friendly societies or franchises.

Interviewees

consulted for this thesis, with one exception, have been men; therefore, the thesis
also has not addressed the views and experiences of women in relation to the
agricultural co-operative structure. Lastly, the thesis makes only passing reference to
the potential role of the agricultural co-operative structure to rural community
economic development. This is a subject worthy of further investigation.
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Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis consists of nine chapters. This introductory chapter introduced the
notion of a tension between agricultural industry restructuring based on neoliberal
theory and a possible uptake of agricultural co-operatives as a response to economic
reform. This tension guided the study to the research problem and questions. The
chapter also briefly outlined the research methodology and significance of the
research.
Chapter Two selectively reviews the international literature on co-operative
theory and agricultural co-operatives to introduce theoretical concepts and empirical
research. The reviewed literature on agricultural co-operatives focuses mainly on
North America, where it is a strong area of academic research and many of the issues
are similar to those confronting the Australian agricultural industry. The literature
review demonstrates a deficit in Australian research on agricultural co-operatives,
with minimal work conducted on Western Australian agricultural co-operatives.
Chapter Three examines contemporary Australian agricultural public policy
and strategies, with particular attention to the compatibility between agricultural
policy and the agricultural co-operative structure. The chapter highlights a possible
double effect of neoliberalism on the agricultural co-operative model. Chapter Four
discusses the history of Western Australian agricultural co-operatives, particularly
the conditions leading to the formation of the prominent Westralian Farmers Cooperative. In the mid 1980s, this co-operative converted to a corporation,
Wesfarmers. The chapter argues that the subsequent success of Wesfarmers, to the
benefit of its farmer shareholders, has created a rural mythology that the most
appropriate trajectory for a commercially viable agricultural co-operative is to
eventually become a corporation.
Chapter Five analyses the CFWA, the peak body for the co-operative
movement in Western Australia. The chapter focuses on the tensions within the peak
body in providing member benefits and services while concurrently building
relationships with government and other influential agencies to positively affect
public policy for co-operatives. The chapter analyses the peak body’s commitment to
a ‘co-operative logic’ or alternatively, if it is motivated by a more pragmatic
approach to the co-operative as a business model.
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Chapter Six reviews the public policy environment for agricultural cooperatives in Western Australia and the role of government in shaping public policy.
This chapter also reviews public policy issues associated with the dismantling of
Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs) and the implications of this for the
agricultural co-operative sector. The chapter argues that there are strong ‘public
good’ and ‘public benefit’ arguments to support a public policy position favourable
toward agricultural co-operatives.
Chapter Seven introduces the United Farmers Co-operative Company
(UFCC) case study. It reviews the economic and social factors leading to the
formation of the UFCC and its subsequent evolution as an influential agricultural cooperative. This success hints at some pressures that point to a repetition of the early
Westralian Farmers Co-operative development. Chapter Eight reviews the UFCC as
a mature co-operative, with a particular focus on its internal dynamics. The chapter
argues that there is evidence that the importation of corporate management has
started to undermine its co-operative logic, with the potential outcome of a
conversion to a corporate entity.
Chapter Nine is the concluding chapter. The preceding chapters collectively
suggest that the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector is confronting an
uncertain future. Nevertheless, the thesis argues that the agricultural co-operative
model has much to offer the agricultural industry and rural communities in Western
Australia as they adapt to the outcomes of contemporary agricultural policy.
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CHAPTER TWO

Review of the Literature: Major Approaches to Co-operative Theory and
Agricultural Co-operative Theory

Introduction
A substantial body of international academic literature and empirical research
about the behaviour of agricultural co-operatives is available. This chapter, through
a selective reference to some of this literature, examines co-operative and
specifically agricultural co-operative theory to help answer the research question and
understand what is occurring in the Western Australian agricultural co-operative
sector. 15 The chapter firstly defines several terms specific to this thesis. It then
reviews the literature to determine a definition of an agricultural co-operative; sets
out some differences between the co-operative structure and the Investor Owned
Firm (IOF) 16 and concludes by summarising key conceptual developments in
agricultural co-operative theory.
In the context of agricultural co-operative literature, this review focuses
predominantly on North American work, as it is a strong area of academic research
on agricultural co-operative theory development. 17 North American agricultural cooperative research is highly relevant, as much of Australia’s engagement with
neoliberal theory emanates from the United States. 18 Therefore, many of the issues
facing North American agricultural co-operatives provide insights that are pertinent
to the evolution of Australian agricultural co-operatives.

15 This chapter introduces key research and theoretical concepts relevant to this thesis. However,
other chapters, where relevant, introduce additional theoretical concepts and literature to assist in
understanding specific issues under discussion.
16 Cobia (1989) employs the term ‘Investor Owned Firm’ (IOF) to differentiate co-operatives from
other types of ‘for-profit’ business structures.
17 The thesis is concerned with the behaviour of agricultural co-operatives in Western industrialised
countries adapting to a neoliberal environment. It does not explore the activities of agricultural cooperatives in developing countries or transitional economies.
18 Chapter Three contains an analysis of neoliberal theory as it is applied to Australian agricultural
industry policy development and the implications of this for the agricultural co-operative structure.
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Defining Terms Associated with the Agricultural Co-operative Sector
‘Co-operative Movement’ and ‘Agricultural Co-operative Sector’
This thesis frequently refers to the ‘co-operative movement’ 19 and the
‘agricultural co-operative sector’. At one level, the terms are almost interchangeable.
Chapter Four, in exploring the evolution of the agricultural co-operative model in
Western Australia, demonstrates that the early history of Western Australia’s
experience with the co-operative structure, dating back over 100 years, is essentially
one tied directly to the beginnings of the Western Australia agricultural industry
(Sandford, 1955). Agricultural co-operatives in present day Western Australia still
comprise the largest industry sector adopting the co-operative structure (Western
Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, 2005a), contribute
the greatest percentage to the annual co-operative movement turnover (Booth, 2004),
and arguably exert the most influence over the Western Australian co-operative
movement.
Nevertheless, the phrase ‘Western Australian co-operative movement’ is an
overarching concept with a wider meaning than that encapsulated by the term
‘agricultural co-operative sector’. The Western Australian co-operative movement
encompasses the collective efforts of former and present day individuals and groups
who championed the development of a co-operative ethos and appropriate
infrastructure to enable a business structure different from the corporate model to
function throughout Western Australia. Historically this was essentially in regional
Western Australia but the phrase encompasses a wider range of co-operative business
structures than just agricultural co-operatives. Evolving over the last few decades in
Western Australia, non-agricultural metropolitan based co-operatives and consumer
or retail oriented co-operatives have registered under the Western Australian
Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943. The Capricorn Society (which sources
products and services for co-operative members in the vehicle smash repair and
service station industries) and Travellers Choice (a travel industry co-operative that
obtains wholesale travel packages on behalf of its retail travel agent members) are

19 Although Lewis (1992) correctly argues that Australia has not had a ‘co-operative movement’ per
se, the early history of the agricultural co-operative structure in rural and regional Western Australia is
consistent with the concept of a social movement which can be construed as a ‘co-operative
movement’.
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examples of non-agricultural metropolitan co-operative sector activity in
contemporary Western Australia.
The expression ‘agricultural co-operative sector’ specifically refers to cooperatives that supply agricultural inputs and services, or handle, market or add value
to agricultural commodities. The member base of these co-operatives is
predominantly engaged in the agricultural industry as farmers. Included loosely in
this definition are some remnant country town retail co-operatives, which were
originally formed to service farm enterprises and supply domestic goods to farm
families. 20
The Family Farm
Family farms are significant in this thesis as they have historically employed
agricultural co-operative structures as an institutional link to the agricultural supply
chain 21 and the wider market place. The agricultural co-operative represents a wellestablished strategy for family farms to engage assertively with the supply chain.
The vast majority of Western Australian farms are family based enterprises.
By definition, the family farm is a business that is owned and operated by a family.
The family provides most of the land, labour, and capital required to resource the
farm, and farm management decisions are made within the family unit (Tonts &
Black, 2001). The importance of the family in committing a substantial proportion of
the total on-farm labour requirement is evident in this definition. Madden (2003b),
the inaugural UFCC Chair and a grain farmer, argues that, in Western Australia,
family farming will remain the dominant structure of on-farm production. He
maintains that corporate farming in Western Australia will be held in check by the
thin profit margins that render on-farm production an unattractive prospect for the
corporate farming model.
Tonts and Black (2001) note a small trend towards corporate farming in some
sectors of agriculture, such as the pastoral and dairy industries and intensive farming
sectors such as poultry and pig industries. The literature identifies two main forms of

20 The term ‘agricultural co-operative sector’ could perhaps also include co-operatively owned farm
enterprises engaged in the production of commodities. However, apart from a few cases of cooperatively owned farm businesses promoted or formed in the 1970s and subsequently disbanded, this
form of agricultural co-operative is rare in Western Australia and is not usually seen by most cooperative sector actors as included under the heading of an agricultural co-operative.
21 The concept of a ‘supply chain’ is discussed in the following section.
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non-family farming which can be defined as ‘corporate farming’ (McDougall, 1986;
Tonts & Black, 2001). The first definition describes a farm owned by a group of
diverse non-farming shareholders who can sell their shares at any time. The second
form of corporate farming involves a form of legal contract between a family farm
and other enterprises operating in other links of the supply chain. This form of
corporate farming is also referred to as ‘contract farming’ (Hendrickson, Heffernan,
Howard, & Heffernan, 2001; Stefanson & Fulton, 1997).
A third form of ‘corporate farming’ outside the definitions above was
identified in the interviews for the present study. This encompasses large family
farms which have achieved economies of scale by purchasing nearby farms and
adopting corporate management practices, such as employing farm managers
(Interviewee 680, 2003). This is part of a now well established trend of fewer and
larger farm enterprises resulting from agricultural industry restructuring (Hooper,
Martin, Love, & Fisher, 2002). It is debatable if these types of farms are actually a
form of corporate farming. However, the perception by some actors within the
agricultural co-operative sector that this category of farm structure is a corporate
farm demonstrates the need to be cautious about the definitions of terms. In this
thesis, these larger farms still owned by a (possibly intergenerational) family are
deemed ‘family farms’.
Supply Chain
The concept of a ‘supply chain’ is relatively new and entered Australian
agricultural industry discourse following several Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia (AFFA) reports (Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry - Australia, 2000a,
2000b, 2001) and Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC)
research reports (Thompson, 2001). A supply chain can be defined as:
…all stages of production, processing and distribution [which] are
bound tightly together to ensure reliable, efficient delivery of highquality products. The glue that binds together neighbouring links of
the chain ranges from production contracts to outright ownership, or
vertical integration. (Drabenstott, 1999, p 35)
In the context of the agricultural industry, the supply chain links every
activity and enterprise that contributes to the final presentation of an agricultural
commodity to the consumer. The supply chain is conceptualised as a sequential
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series of interlocking parts, commencing with pre-farm services, such as fertiliser,
seed and new technologies, followed by the on-farm production link, then post-farm
activities such as handling, processing and retailing, on to the final link of the end
consumer. An agricultural supply chain may range from relatively few to many
linkages (Drabenstott, 1999). Drabenstott (1999) also notes that the most powerful
actor in the chain usually initiates the formation of and controls the supply chain. As
the next chapter demonstrates, the on-farm production link, that is the family farm, is
typically the least powerful link in the supply chain. However, the co-operative
structure can help counter this power differential (Cobia, 1989). Agricultural cooperatives usually operate in the links of the supply chain adjoining both sides of the
on-farm production link; that is the input supply link and the post-farm link of
handling, marketing or some form of value adding such as processing.
Definition of a Co-operative: International Co-operative Alliance 22
The literature reveals some diversity in defining an agricultural co-operative.
It is valuable, therefore, to differentiate between definitions of a ‘co-operative’ and
the specific form of ‘agricultural co-operative’. Evolving from the co-operative
principles penned by the founders of the original Rochdale co-operative 23 (Birchall,
1994), the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) has redefined the values,
principles and philosophy underpinning a co-operative. The 1995 Centennial
Congress of the ICA adopted a Statement on the Co-operative Identity that provides
a widely accepted definition of a co-operative as:
an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their
common economic, social and cultural need and aspiration through a
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise. (International
Co-operative Alliance, 1995)
The ICA values state that:
Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility,
democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. In the tradition of their
founders, co-operative members believe in the ethical values of
honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others.
(International Co-operative Alliance, 1995)
22 The ICA is the peak organisation of the international co-operative movement.
23 The Rochdale principles were open membership, democratic control (one member, one vote),
distribution of the surplus to the members in proportion to their transactions, limited interest on
capital, political and religious neutrality, cash trading, and promotion of education (Birchall, 1994).
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The new principles are guidelines by which co-operatives put their values
into practice and are as follows:
1. Voluntary and open membership - Co-operatives are voluntary
organisations, open to all persons able to use their services and
willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without
gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination.
2. Democratic member control - Co-operatives are democratic
organisations controlled by their members, who actively
participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men
and women serving as elected representatives are accountable
to the membership. In primary co-operatives members have
equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives
at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner.
3. Member economic participation - Members contribute
equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their
co-operative. At least part of that capital is usually the
common property of the co-operative. Members usually
receive limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as
a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for
any or all of the following purposes: developing their cooperative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at
least would be indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to
their transactions with the co-operative; and supporting other
activities approved by the membership.
4. Autonomy and independence - Co-operatives are autonomous,
self-help organisations controlled by their members. If they
enter into agreements with other organisations, including
governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so
on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and
maintain their co-operative autonomy.
5. Education, training and information - Co-operatives provide
education and training for their members, elected
representatives, managers, and employees so they can
contribute effectively to the development of their cooperatives. They inform the general public — particularly
young people and opinion leaders — about the nature and
benefits of co-operation.
6. Co-operation among co-operatives - Co-operatives serve their
members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative
movement by working together through local, national,
regional and international structures.
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7. Concern for community - Co-operatives work for the
sustainable development of their communities through policies
approved by their members. (International Co-operative
Alliance, 1995)
The co-operative values and principles are a distinctive feature of the cooperative model and an essential element in understanding the unique nature of the
co-operative structure. The extent to which agricultural co-operative definitions
incorporate the ICA co-operative principles demonstrates some diversity in views
about the centrality of some or all of these co-operative values in an agricultural cooperative. The uniqueness of these co-operative values becomes more significant in a
later section of the chapter that contrasts the co-operative business structure with an
IOF structure, a term used by Cobia (1989) to refer to business firms other than cooperatives.
Other Definitions of a Co-operative
The University of Wisconsin Co-operative Centre adopts the ICA definition
of a co-operative and adds a complementary one of a co-operative as a ‘business
voluntarily owned and controlled by its member patrons and operated for them and
by them on a non-profit or cost basis. It is owned by the people who use it’
(University of Wisconsin Centre for Co-operatives, n.d.). Craig (1993, p 11) from a
social sciences perspective, firstly defines co-operation as a verb, as ‘any joint or
collaborative behaviour that is directed towards some goal and in which there is a
common interest or hope of reward’. He expands on this definition to incorporate an
organisational structure in a later part of his work, as follows:
Co-operation is the free and voluntary association of people to create
an organisation which they democratically control, providing
themselves with goods, services and/or a livelihood rather than
profiting from others, with an equitable contribution of capital and
acceptance of a fair share of risks and benefits generation by the joint
activity. To sustain their endeavour they must develop individuals and
build a solidarity relationship with other co-operators and like minded
people. (Craig, 1993, p 43)
Similarity and overlap in terms enable common themes to emerge in these cooperative definitions. Firstly, it is apparent that a co-operative has an associative
organisational structure, often with an economic element, usually as a business.
Further, members form and jointly own and control their co-operative. Profits are
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distributed among the members. Craig’s definition contains an implied values base
and a social element.
The economic elements of a co-operative captured by the above definitions
are also incorporated in definitions of the agricultural co-operative. In the context of
agricultural co-operatives, the literature reveals some diversity in definitions (see, for
example, Barton, 1989; Hind, 1997; Nilsson, Kyriakopoulos, & Van Dijk, 1997;
Staatz, 1987). Staatz (1987) acknowledged the difficulty in defining an agricultural
co-operative, arguing that it was problematical to develop a definition which can be
applied to all agricultural co-operatives. Such a definition, he conceded, was unlikely
to be comprehensive. However, he did develop a definition of a co-operative based
on three elements that he considered would be found in most agricultural cooperatives. According to Staatz, an agricultural co-operative is:
…. a business with the following characteristics:
1) The stockholders, who are farmers, are the major users of the
firm’s services.
2) The benefits a stockholder receives from committing capital to a
co-operative are tied largely to patronage. There are three
reasons for this:
a) The business pays a strictly limited dividend on equity
capital invested in the organisation.
b) Net margins are distributed among stockholders in
proportion to their patronage with the business rather than in
proportion to their equity ownership in the firm.
c) Stock of co-operative firms does not appreciate because
there is a very limited or non-existent secondary market for
it. Therefore capital gains are not a major benefit of stock
ownership in co-operatives, in contrast to IOFs.
3) The formal governance of the business by the stockholders is
structured “democratically” in the sense that:
a) Voting power is not proportional to equity investment. The
limitation of “voting one’s equity” may be in the form of
one-member/one-vote rule, or voting may be proportional to
patronage or stock ownership but subject to some limit such
as restricting any one member from having more than 5 per
cent of the total votes.

22

4. There are strict limitations on the number of non-stockholders
who may serve on the board of directors. (Staatz, 1987, p 3435)
Staatz composed this definition in the late 1980s as part of a commissioned
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) report to advance agricultural cooperative theory (Royer, 1987). The ‘definition’ is akin to a description, as it is
highly detailed, providing considerable information about an agricultural cooperative as a business entity. The definition demonstrates the incursion of ‘business’
language into defining an agricultural co-operative, and contains no explicit
reference to the ICA co-operative values. While the definition reflects the sentiment
of the first four ICA co-operative values, it does not capture the latter ones
concerning education and training, co-operation among co-operatives and concern
for community. This neglect of the latter ICA principles occurs also in most other
definitions of agricultural co-operatives.
Barton (1989) also argued that there was significant disagreement over what
constituted the ‘correct’ set of principles for agricultural co-operatives. He suggested
that further evolution was anticipated in co-operative values if agricultural cooperatives were to continue as effective economic institutions. Barton’s definition
differentiated four sets of co-operative principles adopted by agricultural cooperatives, which he labelled as:
i.

Rochdale

ii.

Traditional

iii.

Proportional

iv.

Contemporary co-operative values.

The fourth set of principles identified by Barton, namely contemporary cooperative values, consisted of three factors, which were:
•

voting by member-users is on a democratic or proportional basis;

•

equity is provided by patrons;

•

net income is distributed to patrons as patronage refunds on a cost
basis.

Unlike the ICA definition, with its focus on the social and cultural as well as
the economic needs of members, supplemented by a statement of principles, Staatz
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and Barton’s definitions of an agricultural co-operative reflect a pragmatic and
economic approach. This trend continued with the USDA (1987) agricultural cooperative definition, and subsequently adopted by Cobia. Cobia defined a cooperative as:
a user-owned and user-controlled business that distributes benefits on
the basis of use. More specifically, it is distinguished from other
businesses by three concepts or principles:
First the user-owned principle. Persons who own and finance
the co-operatives are those that use it.
Second, the user-control principle. Control of the co-operative
is by those who use the co-operative.
Third, the user-benefits principle. Benefits of the co-operative
are distributed to its users on the basis of their use. The user
benefits principle is often stated as business-at-cost. (Cobia,
1989, p 1)
According to Reynolds (2000), the 1987 USDA restatement of the cooperative principles confirmed the central user basis of agricultural co-operatives and
removed those which were deemed operational rather than actual principles. He
asserted that the USDA interpretation of the co-operative principles encouraged
members to maintain a longer-term connection with their agricultural co-operative
(Reynolds, 2000). A subsequent USDA publication (United States Department of
Agriculture, 2002, p 1) underlined this definition by reconfirming the 1987 report
that an agricultural co-operative is characterised by the three core principles of userowner, user-control, and user-benefits. It further stated that:
a co-operative is a business that is owned and controlled by the people
who use its services and whose benefits (services received and
earnings allocations) are shared by the users on the basis of use. Only
an enterprise conforming to the spirit and intent of this definition
should be labelled a co-operative. (United States Department of
Agriculture, 2002, p 1)
The USDA definition appears to be the most cited definition in United States
papers on agricultural co-operatives in both the academic and non-academic
literature. The difficulty in developing an agreed definition of an agricultural cooperative to encompass all variations in activity perhaps explains the ubiquity in the
United States of the USDA definition. van Bekkum and Nilsson (2000) chose to use
the USDA 1987 definition of an agricultural co-operative in a European context.
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Clearly, the USDA definition is sufficiently broad and acceptable to
academics to define agricultural co-operatives across western industrialised
countries. 24 Australian literature on agricultural co-operatives provides limited
definitions. Lyons (2001a) adopted a legislative definition of a co-operative as an
organisation incorporated under State or Territory co-operative legislation. The
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 described an agricultural cooperative for taxation purposes in Sections 117 through to 120 of the Act
(Hildebrand, 2002). The Australian Agricultural Council (1988, p 4), cited in
Krivokapic-Skoko (2002a, p 3), defined agricultural co-operatives as ‘associations of
primary producers who have come together to achieve some common commercial
objectives more successfully than they could as individuals’. Australian academics
have also implicitly defined agricultural co-operatives by describing their functions,
such as a supply co-operative or a marketing co-operative (see, for example,
Langdon, 1991) or by analysing their current or potential role in the agricultural
industry or rural Australia (e.g. Lawrence, 1987; Pritchard, 1996).
O'Connor and Thompson (2001) and Clarke (1999) have used the term
‘traditional’ to describe Australian agricultural co-operatives. In this context
‘traditional’ differentiates existing agricultural co-operatives from a relatively recent
development in agricultural co-operative models that incorporate features more
commonly found in IOFs, such as the NGC model. Some Australian agricultural cooperatives have also experimented with elements of IOFs, such as innovative share
and capitalising arrangements adopted by Tatura Milk Industries Ltd (Plunkett &
Kingwell, 2001), Dairy Farmers Group (Greenwood, 2001) and Challenge Dairy Cooperative (Interviewee 652, 2003), and the Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company in
New Zealand (Frampton, 2001). 25
The discussion concerning a definition for an agricultural co-operative
indicates that there is considerable diversity in definitions. The scope in definitions is
linked to how strongly the ICA co-operative principles have been embedded into the
24 The expansiveness of the agriculture co-operative definition can also embrace hybrid co-operative
structures. The New Generation Co-operative (NGC) model fits this definition and is therefore
deemed an agricultural co-operative (Bielik, 1999) despite perhaps not being consistent with a number
of the original Rochdale principles or the ICA statement of co-operative values.
25 Despite these examples in Australia of some agricultural co-operatives exploring hybrid cooperative structures, it appears that the more common Australian experience with alternative options
to the traditional agricultural co-operative model is direct conversion to a corporate structure (Cronan,
1995).
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definition. Agricultural co-operative definitions have veered towards a pragmatic
interpretation of the co-operative values. The majority of agricultural co-operative
definitions are also framed in business or economic language, reflecting the
academic disciplines of various writers and the economic focus of agricultural cooperatives. The UFCC case study presented later in this thesis provides insight to the
relevance of the co-operative values in its evolution and perception of itself as a
business entity.
Defining a ‘Co-operative’ in this Thesis
This thesis principally adopts the USDA definition of an agricultural cooperative.

However, a legal definition of a co-operative is also central to an

Australian understanding of a co-operative.

In this thesis, a co-operative is a

business registered under the present Western Australian Corporations (Cooperative) Act 1943 or is successor legislation. 26 It is acknowledged that there are
entities in Western Australia that have characteristics of co-operatives but these
organisations cannot register as co-operatives due to the nature of the current
legislation. The several housing ‘co-operatives’ functioning in Western Australia, for
example, are not recognised as co-operatives under the Western Australian
legislation despite identifying with the concept of the co-operative model and its
principles (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 659, 2003). Additionally, credit unions and
building societies, while embracing the co-operative principles of mutuality, operate
under separate legislation and are not deemed ‘co-operatives’ under the Western
Australian Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943. There are also many informal
farmer groups in Western Australia which display some features of co-operative
values and business philosophy in their behaviour (Murray-Prior, Ducie, Burnside, &
Flanagan, 1997). Although these informal groups do not fall under the legal
definition of a co-operative, they are often the breeding ground of new agricultural
co-operatives that subsequently register under the Western Australian legislation.
The types of agricultural co-operatives examined in this thesis are involved in
some form of farm supply input or post-farm activity. The United Farmers Cooperative Company is an example of a supply co-operative that sources and imports
agricultural chemicals and fertilisers on behalf of its farmer members. Post-farm
26 The issue of the legislation for co-operatives in Western Australia is discussed in Chapters Five
and Six and Appendix Two. Some Western Australian co-operatives are also registered under the Cooperative and Provident Societies Act 1903.
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agricultural co-operatives can be involved in the handling, transport and marketing of
members’ agricultural commodities, such as Co-operative Bulk Handling in the
grains industry. Challenge Dairy Co-operative is an example of a post-farm
agricultural co-operative concerned with the collection of members’ raw milk, and
the processing, value adding and wholesaling of these milk products into the
international market.
The research has revealed that Western Australian farmers have not generally
embraced the concept of ‘on-farm production co-operatives’, in which farmers
amalgamate their on-farm production activities and resources to produce a
commodity. 27 On-farm co-operative activities were promoted in South Australia in
the 1970s (Chatterton, 1976) and Lawrence (1987) discussed on-farm syndication as
a strategy to address rural issues. A group of Western Australian grain farmers
contemplated the model in the 1980s but did not pursue the initiative (Interviewee
655, 2003).

More recently, four farmers in New South Wales informally

amalgamated their landholdings and resources to farm collectively (Hughes, 2003).
Hildebrand (2002) recommended that the Queensland sugar industry explore the
possibility of on-farm sugar production co-operatives. Despite these few examples,
this model has not become a mainstream pursuit within the Western Australian
agricultural co-operative sector. 28
Investment Owned Firms (IOFs) and Agricultural Co-operatives
A co-operative business is one of several forms of legal business structure. In
Australia, other legal structures are unincorporated sole trader, partnership,
unincorporated and incorporated non-profit associations and a range of company
structures, classified according to the degree of liability of company members (Ford,
Austin, & Ramsay, 1997). The co-operative legal structure is also a form of company
incorporated under a State based co-operatives act, such as the Western Australian

27 Group Settlements were established in the wheatbelt and southwest of Western Australia in the
1920s. This large-scale assisted program of immigration from Britain was designed to open up
farming lands and strengthen British culture and identity in Western Australia. Groups were formed
with twelve to fourteen families. While successful in opening up farming land, the scheme itself was
flawed by poor planning and the inexperience of the settlers (Brayshay and Selwood 2002). The
Groups Settlements were not a form of on-farm production co-operatives.
28 Two interviewees (Interviewee 687, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002) believed that the members of a
Christian sect operated a group of farms in the Western Australian wheatbelt in a co-operative
manner.
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Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. A co-operative business is an unlisted public
company and is unable to list its shares on the Australian Stock Exchange. In most
Australian States, co-operatives can be either commercial or non-profit organisations
(Australian Capital Territory, 1999); however, in Western Australia the existing
legislation prohibits the incorporation of non-commercial co-operatives. 29

Co-

operative legislation disallows the use of the noun ‘co-operative’ in the registered
name of any organisation not incorporated under co-operative legislation.
Commercially oriented co-operatives, in several aspects, are similar to
companies. 30 They undertake comparable functions and follow many of the same
business practices to ensure longevity. As with companies, profitability of the cooperative is essential. Both business structures are incorporated and have a legal
status separate from that of their membership or shareholders with limited liability.
While there are many similarities between them, several distinctive features of a cooperative differentiate it from an IOF structure. The philosophical values contained
within the co-operative principles cause the co-operative model to treat the purpose,
ownership, control and distribution of benefits differently from an IOF.
The underlying philosophies of IOFs and co-operatives partly explain these
differences. The theory of the firm, based on neoclassical economic theory, posits
that the main objective of an IOF is profit maximisation on behalf of its shareholders
(Cobia, 1989). In contrast, co-operative theory determines that a co-operative may
have other objectives, such as maximising a benefit or service to the members who
own and control it and rewarding them with a patronage rebate, rather than simply
pursuing profit maximisation (Cobia, 1989). This close connection between the roles
of member, owner and user is a distinctive feature of a co-operative. In addition to
economic benefits, the co-operative principles also promote social objectives such as
democracy, member participation and education.

31

These multiple objectives may

be internally contradictory for the co-operative, unlike the singular profit
maximisation objective of the IOF (Mooney & Gray, 2002).

29 The proposed legislation for co-operatives will enable both trading (commercial) and non-trading
(non-profit) co-operatives. Appendix Two discusses legislation for co-operatives.
30 Corporations or companies in this thesis are also referred to as Investor Owned Firms or IOFs.
31 The co-operative pursuit of a benefit or service/good rather than ‘profit’ does not suggest that the
co-operative should operate at a loss. A co-operative must be economically and financially sound to
achieve its benefits; however, profit is not its primary objective.
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The variation in objectives between the two models can lead to different
business strategies. As an agricultural co-operative seeks to maximise member farm
business profitability, rather than its own profitability, it may pay as high a price as
possible when purchasing member commodities (Cobia, 1989). Alternatively, a
supply co-operative will seek to sell farm inputs, such as chemicals and fertiliser, to
its members at cost (Cobia, 1989). An IOF, by contrast, will set a high price when
selling a product, or seek to minimise the costs of purchasing a product, in order to
maximise the level of profit on behalf of its shareholders.
The ownership of the two business structures sits with the shareholders
(Hansmann, 1996). However, ownership in an IOF is based on individual private
property rights (Chaddad & Cook, 2002), which contrasts with the collective
ownership of the co-operative structure. Further, in a co-operative, the shareholder is
also a member while in an IOF the shareholder is simply an investor. The cooperative shareholder is referred to rightly as a ‘member’ in co-operative discourse
(Craig, 1993), although in Australian agricultural co-operatives, the term
‘shareholder’ is widely used (Madden, 2003b). IOF shareholders have an ‘arm’s
length’ association with the IOF (Hansmann, 1996). Members of a co-operative, as
its owners, have a much more intimate and direct relationship with the co-operative,
as they are also the users of the co-operative, by, for example, supplying raw
materials or purchasing services or products.
Membership of an agricultural co-operative is usually restricted to farmers
actively involved in the commercial production of a commodity. This is different
from an IOF, as usually there are no restrictions on who can buy a share or how
many shares they may purchase (Cobia, 1989). Further, as the company is listed on
the external stock exchange, shares can be easily bought and sold in the open market.
Shares in an IOF can increase or decrease in value according to the market (Cobia,
1989), while shares in an agricultural co-operative are generally of a fixed and
nominal value and can only be sold back to the co-operative at par value (the value at
which they were originally purchased). 32

32 Hybrid agricultural co-operative structures, such as the New Generation Co-operative model, may
have different mechanisms for share ownership and funding within a co-operative (Stefanson et al.,
1995).
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Voting privileges in an IOF are proportional to the number of shares owned
by an investor. Only investors with large share portfolios will have significant voting
power. In a co-operative, the democratic co-operative principle of one member, one
vote guarantees that all members have an equal share and vote in the election of the
Board of Directors (Craig, 1993). The democratic nature of the agricultural cooperative structure arising from the principle of one member, one vote ensures that
control of the co-operative remains with its farmer members.

Unlike the IOF

structure, in a co-operative, control of the business by one shareholder or group of
shareholders on the basis of their investment cannot occur, which is an appealing
feature of the co-operative structure for farmers with smaller enterprises.
Membership of the co-operative also conveys a responsibility for managing
and controlling the co-operative (Craig, 1993). Co-operatives and IOFs both have
elected Boards of Directors and employ staff. However, the differences between
IOFs and co-operatives are reflected in management styles of the Board of Directors
and executive staff. The implicit and explicit values of a co-operative require a
particular mindset in management, which Craig (1993) refers to as a ‘co-operative
logic’. However, access to a pool of management with this logic is limited in an IOF
dominated economy, which focuses on profit maximisation as the primary objective
of a business entity.
A further significant distinction between the IOF and the co-operative
concerns the distribution of profit (which is also referred to as ‘surplus’ in cooperative discourse). In an IOF, profits are usually allocated between reserves for the
growth of the IOF and a dividend, where investor shareholders receive a return on
their shareholdings (Hansmann, 1996). A co-operative’s profit (surplus) is also
allocated between retained equity to fund future co-operative activities and a
patronage rebate (Cobia, 1989; Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Fulton, 1995). However,
unlike an IOF, a co-operative does not allocate surplus on the basis of shareholdings,
but on the basis of member patronage. A rebate is a share of the co-operative surplus
and is calculated on a proportional basis determined by the amount of business
(patronage) a member conducts with the co-operative. Therefore, the greater the
business carried out with the co-operative, the greater the patronage rebate for the
member.
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IOFs and co-operatives can also differ in capital raising strategies. An IOF
raises its capital via listing on a stock exchange and selling shares to investors. It
may also borrow funds from the banking industry (Hansmann, 1996). In contrast, a
co-operative predominantly sources it funds from its membership, and may
supplement this member funded capital base with loans from the banking sector
(Hansmann, 1996). As a co-operative cannot list on the stock exchange, it cannot
access investor shareholder funds (Hansmann, 1996). While a co-operative relies
mostly on its members for capital, and cannot raise additional funds from investor
shareholders, an agricultural co-operative may be restricted in its capital raising
strategies (Cobia, 1989). This factor is a recurring theme in the literature.
In the United States, Schrader (1989) argued that agricultural co-operative
practices and State and Federal legislation affecting agricultural co-operatives result
in a persistent lack of capital. The USDA (2002) noted that as a business structure
funded predominantly by its membership, it can be difficult for members to provide
sufficient capital for the co-operative venture, particularly for a highly capital
intensive co-operative involved in the processing or marketing of commodities.
Further, an agricultural co-operative, in contrast to an IOF, may have difficulties in
accessing capital from alternative sources such as commercial banks or joint venture
investors (Cobia, 1989). Unlike the IOF structure, a co-operative is not designed as
an investment vehicle for external investors. Therefore, the structural inability found
within the co-operative form to raise sufficient funds may result in inadequate
investment in technology or equipment, leading to economic inefficiencies in the cooperative (United States Department of Agriculture, 2002).
In Australia, agricultural co-operatives that meet Sections 117 to 120 of the
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 may qualify for taxation benefits
(Hildebrand, 2002). This is a significant advantage over the corporate structure for
producers engaging in agribusiness related activities. 33
A comparison of the IOF and co-operative structure, in the absence of strong
co-operative theory knowledge, diminishes the intrinsic strength of the co-operative
business model and the factors influencing its behaviour. Given that the IOF is the
business structure compatible with orthodox economic theory, and that agribusiness
33 The Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 taxation advantages for agricultural co-operatives are
discussed in Chapter Eight.
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actors generally have a stronger understanding of the IOF model than the agricultural
co-operative model, the comparison tends to construct the agricultural co-operative
structure as a business entity with inherent flaws. Often, the proposed solution to
these perceived flaws is to encourage the agricultural co-operative to emulate
features of the IOF. However, this strategy unintentionally tends to weaken the
intrinsic strength of the co-operative model and may become the first step in a
process whereby the co-operative is converted into a corporation.
It is acknowledged that the agricultural co-operative structure may have some
elements that may contribute to organisational decline when left unaddressed (Cobia,
1989; Craig, 1993). These factors, however, need to be placed into perspective. The
IOF business structure also experiences a range of benefits and disadvantages, and
many businesses based on this model also fail as business entities. According to
Bickerdyke, Lattimore and Madge (2000), a third of Australian businesses are not
operating after five years. 34 This high failure rate is not countenanced as a flaw in the
basic premise of the IOF structure. In contrast, influential actors, particularly those
trained in economic theory, frequently contest the economic viability of the cooperative structure.
Review of Selected Agricultural Co-operative Literature 35
A review of agricultural co-operative literature reflects a strong and sustained
orientation towards economic theory. Economic analysis of the agricultural cooperative structure tends to fall into two streams. 36 Firstly, macro-economic theory
seeks to explain the existence of the agricultural co-operative as an organisational
form in the market. The focus of this approach is on the ability of the co-operative
model to contribute to the efficiency of the market and hence to rationalise some
form of public policy intervention in support of the co-operative model (Torgerson et
al., 1997).

Micro-economic approaches to internal agriculture co-operative

organisational behaviour has driven theoretical evolution for the past 40 years.
34 Many of these businesses may have closed due to non-economic reasons which are unrelated to the
financial position of the business, suggesting that the profit maximisation tenet of the theory of the
firm is not always a reason to enter business or indeed exit a business.
35 Some of the literature reviewed in this chapter and throughout the thesis may be viewed as ‘dated’.
However, the historical and evolutionary insight offered from this literature about agricultural cooperatives justifies their inclusion.
36 Cook (1995), Torgerson et al., (1997) and Krivokapic -Skoko (2002a; 2002b) summarise literature
on agricultural co-operative theory.
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Micro-level analysis tends to be dominated by neo-classical theory and new
institutional economic theory, including transaction costs theory. Property rights
theory and principal-agent theory are recent approaches to analyse problems
attributed to the agricultural co-operative structure.
The early macro-economic work is of interest to this thesis as it explores how
the agricultural co-operative can influence its external environment.

Sapiro’s

theoretical contribution in the 1920s positioned co-operatives as instruments of
orderly marketing (Sapiro, 1920, cited in Torgerson et al., 1997). He supported the
formation of regionally based monopoly marketing co-operatives as a market
mechanism to create economies of scale and secure the best market price for member
commodities, thus enhancing member returns. This form of post-farm co-operative
competed with, or bypassed, IOFs operating in the handling and marketing of
commodities (Cook, 1995). Sapiro’s interpretation of the role of the agricultural cooperative is an early indication that co-operatives enabled farmers to vertically
integrate into the post-farm gate segment of the supply chain. Sapiro’s work is
significant to this thesis, as this form of orderly marketing is reminiscent of
Australia’s adoption of Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs) around the same
period to undertake comparable functions on behalf of farmer members. 37
In a similar time frame, and as a counter to Sapiro’s interpretation of the role
of the agricultural co-operative, Nourse introduced the concept of the ‘competitive
yardstick’ (Nourse, 1922, cited in Cook, 1995, Torgerson et al., 1997). Nourse
rejected Sapiro’s monopoly role of the agricultural co-operative, arguing that an
agricultural co-operative’s function was to ensure a competitive market place.
Nourse contended that an agricultural co-operative formed to correct some form of
market failure. This may be removing the monopoly power of an IOF or providing a
missing, costly or inadequate good or service in the market (Mooney & Gray, 2002).
When a competitive market was created or restored by the presence of the cooperative, Nourse argued that it should not attempt to dominate the market, but
assume a maintenance role of keeping IOFs and the market competitive, that is, be a
‘competitive yardstick’. Nourse further argued that, in some situations, once IOFs
are competing efficiently amongst themselves in the market place, it may be more
appropriate for the co-operative to wind up (Mooney & Gray, 2002). The concept of
37 SMAs are discussed in Chapter Six.
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‘competitive yardstick’ is informative to this thesis in understanding the behaviour of
the United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC) case study.
A significant conceptual shift from analysing the macro-economic role of
agricultural co-operatives to examining their internal behaviour was Emelianoff’s
work in the 1940s (Emelianoff, 1948, cited in Torgerson et al., 1997). Emelianoff’s
contribution was the analysis of the agricultural co-operative as a mechanism for
vertical integration. He further argued that the role of a co-operative was to operate
at cost. Therefore, an agricultural co-operative did not seek to earn profits for itself,
but for the members' farm business, precipitately introducing the concept of principal
and agent within an agricultural co-operative. These are important concepts to guide
agricultural co-operative business strategy, and again they are useful in analysing the
strategic direction of UFCC.
A theory of the firm adapted for the agricultural co-operative business model
evolved during the 1960s, commencing with the work of Helmberger and Hoos,
(1962, cited in Torgerson et al., 1997). While the theory of the firm assumed that the
firm’s objective was to maximise profits, the co-operative was understood to have
multiple objectives related to maximising organisational outcomes. However, unlike
the IOF, these objectives were not to maximise profit, but to maximise benefits to
members, via for example, patronage refunds or minimising on-farm costs.
Helmberger contributed further to agricultural co-operative theory evolution
during the 1960s. Writing in a period when the United States agricultural industry
started to industrialise, Helmberger (1966) argued that the changing structure of
agriculture and technology would threaten the relevance of agricultural cooperatives. A contrary argument was presented by Abrahamsen who interpreted
agricultural industrialisation as an opportunity for agricultural co-operatives to
integrate farmers into the changing agricultural industry (Abrahamsen, 1966, cited in
Cook, 1995). Given that agricultural co-operatives continue to absorb the interest of
academics 40 years later, Helmberger’s views may have been premature. However,
Fulton (1995), employing a property rights approach, revisited the factors identified
by Helmberger as a starting point to analyse whether contemporary agricultural cooperatives, as collective structures, can survive in a wider society that favours
business structures which separate ownership and use, that is IOFs.

Fulton

concluded that changing societal values, such as rising individualism, combined with
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the increasing industrialisation of the agricultural industry, make co-operation more
difficult and by extension threaten the formation and resilience of agricultural cooperatives.
Fulton’s adoption of a property rights approach in the analysis of agriculture
co-operatives is part of a wider shift in the contemporary theoretical framework for
agricultural co-operatives. It is important to acknowledge that the increasingly
sophisticated theoretical treatment of agricultural co-operatives has coincided with
significant changes in the agricultural industry and the growing complexity of the
agricultural co-operative business model itself. Of significance to this thesis is the
application of concepts sitting within the broader field of new institutional
economics, such as transaction cost economics, the economics of property rights and
principal-agent theory, to explain the behaviour of agricultural co-operatives. 38
An important conceptual contribution for this thesis is the work of Shaffer
(1987).

Shaffer applied transaction costs analysis to explore the capacity of

agricultural co-operatives to coordinate macro-economic activity.

His work

indicated that vertical linkages established by agricultural co-operatives in an
economic system did not just depend on a co-operative’s ability to create economies
of scale and address monopoly power problems, but also on the costs associated with
transactions to perform this coordinating function. Additionally, Shaffer theorised
that the efficacy of performing these coordination functions also partly depended on
the internal organisational relationships between the co-operative’s principals and
agents. Shaffer’s work indicates a desire to take account of macro-economic factors
and the interplay of these with organisational factors to explain the complexity of
external and internal elements of agricultural co-operative behaviour.
The work of Cook (1995) and Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) also provides a
significant theoretical framework for this thesis. This work has drawn together a
body of literature detailing several difficulties attributed to the agricultural cooperative structure. From a new institutional economics perspective, these problems
38 The literature reveals the continuing economic focus of contemporary agricultural co-operative
analysis. Condon (1987) was an early advocate of the property rights approach to extend co-operative
theory for agricultural co-operatives. The property rights approach has been built upon by Fulton
(1995), Cook (1995), Cook and Iliopoulos (2000), van Bekkum (2000) and Chaddad and Cook (2002)
in their theoretical analysis of agricultural co-operatives. Principal-agent theory has been favoured by
European agricultural co-operative theorists, such as van Bekkum and Nilsson (2000), Rokholt and
Borgen (2000), and Borgen (2000). Australian academics and commentators, such as Mathews
(1999), Plunkett (1999) and Clarke (1999) have also adopted principal-agent theory in their work.
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are ascribed to vaguely defined property rights specific to the unique user-driven
nature of the co-operative model. The first three affect investment issues for a cooperative while the remainder impact on the management of co-operatives.
The first is the ‘free rider’ phenomenon, which may arise from factors within
or external to the co-operative (Cook, 1995). The internal problem is connected with
the common property of a co-operative and arises when new members of an
agricultural co-operative immediately gain the same benefits as existing members.
As new members join, co-operative rebates are diluted amongst the total membership
(Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). New members, in effect, are free riding on the past
efforts and contributions of long-standing members. This potentially creates intergenerational conflict and is a disincentive for long standing members to invest in the
co-operative (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000).
The external free rider problem arises when non-members benefit from the
collective action of co-operative members, without bearing any of the joint
organisational costs of the co-operative (Cook, 1995; Fulton, 2001). Non-members,
therefore, are enjoying private benefits from the co-operative without participating in
the process of creating them, consequently free riding on the collective effort of
others.
The second problem, the ‘horizon problem’, arises from a disparity in some
members’ anticipated membership period and the time frame required to benefit from
future investments undertaken by the co-operative. Members close to retirement
from farming may not have an incentive to support and direct co-operative funds into
projects that will not realise a financial benefit for them personally, even though the
proposed investment is in the long-term interest of the co-operative (Cook and
Iliopoulos, 2000). In this environment, some members may prefer that co-operative
surpluses be directed back to members as rebates, rather than set aside to invest in
the co-operative’s future, potentially depriving the co-operative of capital for future
proposals (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). This problem may render the co-operative
structure less efficient than an IOF, as it facilitates a situation where sub-optimal
investment decisions may occur (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000).
The ‘portfolio problem’ arises when some members’ personal risk profiles
may not be compatible with the strategies recommended by the Board of Directors.
Conflict may arise between members who have differing risk profiles, which may
36

cause the co-operative to make non-optimal decisions in order to pacify risk adverse
members (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000).
The last two problems relate to management issues that may affect
agricultural co-operatives (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). The fourth matter concerns
issues associated with the costs of control. This issue is linked to the principal-agent
theory, which examines the problem of motivating one party (the agent) to act on
behalf of another (the principal) to maximise the principal’s goals for the
organisation. While both IOFs and co-operatives separate ownership and
management, mechanisms to control management differ between the two structures.
The control problem is attributed to the inherent features of the co-operative structure
that cause inefficiencies in performance when compared to IOFs (Porter & Scully,
1987). As a democratic organisation, a co-operative requires the active participation
of its membership, each of whom have an equal voice in determining management
issues.

As the benefits of the co-operative are shared equally, there are fewer

incentives to become involved in the governance of a co-operative and monitor the
activities of management. In contrast, investors own an IOF and exert control over
management according to the number of shares they hold. As investors with large
share portfolios will potentially generate higher profits, it is in their own interests to
monitor the performance of management, thus allegedly rendering the IOF a more
efficient structure compared with the co-operative model. Linked to this cost of
control is a concern with a lack of measures to evaluate the success of the cooperative, compared with, for example, the indicator commonly used in an IOF of
the share price in the open market. The lack of measurable indicators within a cooperative is considered to inhibit management from developing higher-level
management skills.

Therefore, Cook (1995) concludes, the intrinsic factors

associated with the co-operative structure may lead to greater costs in controlling the
activities of the manager as agent.
Lastly, ‘influence costs problems’ may arise in a co-operative as it can have
multiple and possibly conflicting objectives. In contrast, an IOF has the singular
objective of profit maximisation. The broader the diversity of co-operative activities,
the greater the potential opportunity for influence costs to develop. Cook (1995)
argues that these problems may arise when members’ interests become
heterogeneous and factions develop to promote particular agendas. The separate
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groups may seek to exert influence over management and co-operative strategy for
their own interests, which can be distracting and damaging to the financial wellbeing of the co-operative (Cook, 1995).
Cook’s analysis of these property rights issues is significant to this thesis.
Professor Cook, at the invitation of the Western Australian Department of
Agriculture, presented some seminars in Western Australia in the late 1990s on these
factors in the context of NGCs. 39 Several interviewees for this thesis attended these
seminars, revealing that there is a residual knowledge within the agricultural industry
of these property rights ‘problems’ with the agricultural co-operative structure.
Non-Economic Theoretical Approaches to Agricultural Co-operatives
Craig (1993), from a sociological perspective, offers alternative theoretical
approaches to explain why people behave co-operatively and hence form cooperatives. He argues that these theories link co-operative activity to biological,
psychological and cultural origins. He briefly explores the theory of mutual aid,
socio-biological theory, behavioural theory and exchange theory as explanations for
co-operativeness. However, he argues that none of these theories adequately explains
co-operative behaviour and organisations. He goes on to develop his own theoretical
approach to account for co-operative organisational development, success and
failure, built around the concept of ‘co-operative logic’.
According to Craig (1993), co-operative logic is based on co-operative
values. Co-operative logic assumes that each member of a co-operative understands
these values. Complexity and diversity is intrinsic to this logic and is embraced as it
brings innovation.

Co-operative logic acknowledges the inherent tensions in

balancing economic and social objectives within co-operative organisations. Cooperative logic recognises that the needs of each group are unique and that members
will develop a co-operative organisational model responsive to their specific needs.
The logic accepts that decisions made by members via a democratic process and
based on co-operative logic may not be understood by outsiders, yet will be very
meaningful to members of the co-operative (Craig, 1993).

Craig (1993) also

acknowledges that co-operative logic can be difficult to communicate to those who
39 See Appendix Three for further information on these seminars and Appendix Five for a discussion
of New Generation Co-operatives.
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are not socialised in this logic.

He argues that individuals who frame their

understanding of business structures via the IOF prism can find it very difficult to
understand co-operative logic and the way that it applies to co-operative business
structures.
According to Craig (1993), as an organised group of farmers, agricultural cooperatives can be a vehicle for empowering farmers in political and economic
debates, enhancing the democratic nature of the organisation and the society in which
the co-operative functions. As democratic organisations, agricultural co-operatives
can therefore contribute to the formation of social capital. Putnam (1993, p 2) defines
social capital as ‘features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust,
that facilitate coordination and co-operation for mutual benefit’. Putnam considers
social capital as an essential ingredient in a civil society, and one of the prerequisites
for a democracy is a well-developed civil society. Therefore, in the process of
forming a co-operative, farmers join together to develop networks and trust among
members, building social capital within the rural community in which the cooperative is embedded. Agricultural co-operatives, as a result, are structures that
promote democracy, social capital and a blend of social and economic goals in
regional communities. 40
The social capital of an agricultural co-operative can be expressed in various
ways. The rooted nature of an agricultural co-operative in a geographic area ensures
that the income generated by the co-operative also remains within the community,
while an IOF may choose to leave (United States Department of Agriculture, 1990).
An agricultural co-operative, as a result, offers a mechanism for local control. Craig
(1993) suggests that external decision-makers are more likely to take notice of the
collective voice of the agricultural co-operative than the views of an independent
farmer, further enhancing local control. The participative structures of co-operatives
can promote and facilitate an entrepreneurial spirit among groups who may not have
an opportunity to develop organisational or management skills (Craig, 1993). Craig
(1993) argues that the internal funding via members makes co-operatives
independent of external investment. 41 This aspect means that co-operatives can be a

40 For further discussion on social capital see, for example, Cavaye (2000), Coleman (1988), Cox
(1995), Putnam (1993; 1995), Winter (2000), and Woolcock (1998).
41 Capital raising issues associated with agricultural co-operatives are discussed elsewhere in the
chapter.
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source of employment in mature or declining industries and sparsely populated
regions or with socially marginalised groups. Co-operatives, accordingly, enable the
local community to engage within a globalised capitalist economy.
Given that agricultural co-operatives may build social capital within a rural
community, Bourdieu provides a conceptual map to understand that in addition to
social capital, other forms of capital may also derive from agricultural co-operatives.
Bourdieu (1986) extended the concept of ‘capital’ beyond its economic basis to
include ‘immaterial’ and ‘non-economic’ forms of capital. He defined and explained
how the different types of capital can be attained, substituted, and converted into
other forms. In Bourdieu’s discussion on conversions between different types of
capital, he established that all types of capital could be derived from economic
capital through varying modes of conversion (Bourdieu, 1986). Social capital may
therefore be exchanged and transformed with another form of capital, such as
economic capital or possibly, even ‘co-operative capital’, thus contributing to the
economic well-being of a regional area.
Mooney and Gray (2002) present one of the few sociological examinations of
agricultural co-operatives. They identify the influences of historical and sociological
factors in contemporary agricultural co-operative behaviour. Their analysis of
agricultural co-operatives also acknowledges the inherent contradictions within the
co-operative values identified by Craig (1993).

However, unlike much of the

analysis of agricultural co-operatives by academics trained in economics, Mooney
and Gray argue that this tension is positive, as it leads to better quality decision
making by agricultural co-operative Boards.
Cobia (1989) also notes these social factors associated with being a member
of an agricultural co-operative. He recognises that these intrinsic and satisfying
benefits for members can accrue from being part of an association of peers, from
involvement in a member-based organisation with a common purpose and from
experiencing the democratic nature of electing co-operative Board members.
However, Cobia correctly cautions that, while the social benefits of an agricultural
co-operative are important, the co-operative must position its economic objectives as
its first priority to ensure that its remains in business.
Australian literature with a non-economic theoretical perspective on cooperatives and agricultural co-operatives is limited. Lewis (1992) explored the
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development of the Rochdale model in this country. Lyons (1996; 2001a; 2001b)
has written about Australian experiences of co-operatives, including agricultural cooperatives, mostly within the context of the broader environment of voluntary
associations. There are references to agricultural co-operatives by some Australian
academics working in the area of rural restructuring, such as Lawrence (1987) and
Pritchard (1996). Krivokapic-Skoko (2002a; 2002b) summarised international
literature and various classifications systems of agricultural co-operatives. The Cooperative Federation of Victoria, in conjunction with www.australia.coop (Griffiths,
2004) and the Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development
(ACCORD) have developed websites, undertaken some research and prepared
submissions to government agencies about co-operatives (Australian Centre for Cooperative Research and Development, n.d.-a). 42 Greenwood, for many years, edited a
co-operative newsletter, the National Co-op Update, and has written about dairy cooperatives (Greenwood, 1996a) Overall, as Cronan (2003) confirms, there is a deficit
in Australia of academic work on the co-operative structure.
Summary
This chapter has reviewed selected literature about agricultural co-operatives
and introduced some key concepts. These concepts are applied in parts of this thesis
to help explain elements of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector
story. The discussion of agricultural co-operative literature reveals that economically
focused theory has dominated theory development in this area. The review identifies
that the main trigger for establishing an agricultural co-operative is to address some
form of market failure. Agricultural co-operatives have the capacity to counteract
monopsony or monopoly situations; provide a missing or costly service and to reduce
risk for producers.

Much of the later theoretical work has been especially

preoccupied with correcting professed structural deficits or inefficiencies of the
agricultural co-operatives model, often using the IOF as a benchmark by which to
42 Founded in 1999, the Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development (ACCORD)
was a joint venture between the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) and Charles Sturt
University (CSU) and the New South Wales State Government. Each partner contributed financially
to its establishment (Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, n.d.-a).
ACCORD was formed to undertake research on and build awareness of the co-operative movement in
Australia, including mutuals and the broader social economy (Australian Centre for Co-operative
Research and Development, n.d.-a). In June 2005, ACCORD was unable to sustain itself financially,
and the research centre closed.
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evaluate the agricultural co-operative structure. Changes in the agricultural industry
resulting from increasing industrialisation, combined with identified problems with
the agricultural co-operative model, have led to recent literature that explores
modified agricultural co-operative structures that import features of the IOF model,
such as the NGC model.
The focus of earlier theoretical analysis by Sapiro and Nourse (cited in Cook,
1995; Torgerson et al., 1997), concerning the wider ability of agricultural cooperatives to generate public good by correcting market failure, and the capacity of
the co-operative structure to vertically connect farmers in the supply chain, have
become neglected areas of research for the co-operative structure. There is a scarcity
of recent research on the external macro-economic, political and institutional
environments that affect the agricultural co-operative structure.
This literature review suggests an over-reliance on agricultural economic
theory for analysis of agricultural co-operatives. A concentration on economic
analysis of agricultural co-operatives can lead to inappropriate and unhelpful
assumptions about the nature of the agricultural co-operative and co-operative
behaviour. Orthodox economic theory is unable to satisfactorily explain several
features of contemporary agricultural co-operatives, such as possible non-economic
motivations for being involved with an agricultural co-operative, the role of cooperative values within the organisation, or a long history of agricultural cooperatives as a type of farmer initiated social movement. 43 Further, the limitation of
an economic approach prevents the development of a highly descriptive analysis of
the relationship between agricultural co-operatives and their affiliated institutions,
such as government agencies and a peak body representing the co-operative sector.
Economic theory discounts these non-economic factors and as a result cannot
develop a subtler understanding of the agricultural co-operative model and its
behaviour in the social and economic arenas.

43 The concept of the agricultural co-operative sector as an expression of a social movement is
examined in the UFCC case study in Chapter Seven. The social movement concept can also partially
explain the minor revival in agricultural co-operatives in the latter part of the 1990s. As the influence
of the market informs the development of agricultural and regional policy in Australia, some sectors
of agriculture are bearing a greater economic and social burden resulting from agricultural
restructuring than are other Australians. This uneven disadvantage in turn is stimulating a renewed
interest among farmer groups in some sectors of the agricultural industry to evaluate the agricultural
co-operative model as a strategy to alleviate hardship. Their activities can be viewed as an expression
of a farmer initiated social movement.
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Scattered amongst the recent literature have been calls for an interdisciplinary
approach to enlarge theoretical and empirical understanding of agricultural cooperative behaviour. Torgerson et al. (1997) comment on the trend towards economic
approaches to evaluate agricultural co-operatives, observing the narrowness of
agricultural co-operative theory development resulting from this economic focus.
Baarda (2001) lamented the limited approach to research on agricultural cooperatives, supporting an interdisciplinary slant to develop a broader knowledge of
co-operatives and their role in a rapidly changing agricultural system. These requests
have not been restricted to academics. Hassebrook, a co-author of a USDA report on
the future of small farms (United States Department of Agriculture, 1998) and a cooperative member, disapproved of the business and economic focus of agricultural
co-operatives, challenging Boards to also remember their social obligations as cooperatives (Hassebrook, n.d.).
In conclusion, there is a deficit in Australian research on agricultural cooperatives, particularly from perspectives outside the dominant agricultural economic
orientation. Lastly, there is a need to undertake Australian research on agricultural
co-operatives that does not concentrate solely on issues within the organisation. This
thesis seeks to contribute to Australian research on agricultural co-operatives and the
wider agricultural co-operative sector to address this shortfall.
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CHAPTER THREE

Neoclassical Economic Doctrine, Australia’s Form of Capitalism and
Agricultural Co-operatives

Introduction
This chapter examines the implications of a quarter century of economic
reform in the Australian agricultural industry and the outcomes of this reform for
farmers and rural communities. The chapter commences by firstly exploring the key
concepts underpinning neoclassical economics and neoliberalism. The chapter then
sets out aspects of neoclassical economics and neoliberal concepts, policy and
strategies that have explicit or unintended consequences on the viability of
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia. The chapter examines points of
compatibility between neoliberal theory and co-operative theory to demonstrate that
agricultural co-operatives can be a means to support rural communities through
economic reform. The chapter concludes that persistent economic reform based on
neoclassical economic theories has mixed outcomes for the contemporary
agricultural co-operative model in Western Australia.
Neoclassical Economic Reform
Beeson (1999, p 1) maintains that the key elements of a developed or
advanced capitalist system consist of ‘market oriented commodity production,
private ownership of the means of production, the selling of labour power, and
individualistic, acquisitive behaviour’. According to Pusey (2003), several forms of
developed capitalism are in place throughout the contemporary world. Various styles
of capitalism, Pusey suggests, include the Dutch and German partnership form of
capitalism, the Japanese model, the Mediterranean model and the form of capitalism
implemented in various Asian countries. Variations in the implementation of these
key features of capitalism suggest that countries adapt elements of capitalism to
accommodate their domestic political, social and economic contexts and institutional
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environment. Australia, along with other mostly English speaking nations, has
chosen a ‘libertarian model of free market capitalism’ based on neoclassical
economic theory over the last few decades (Pusey, 2003, p 9).
In conjunction with domestic reform within nation States based on the
doctrines of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism, these theories have also
shaped the outlook of globally focused institutions. These include the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
(Lawrence, 1998; Pritchard, 2000). Domestic and international arenas therefore
mutually reinforce and strengthen neoclassical economic doctrines.
The Australian experience with economic reform was labelled as ‘economic
rationalism’ (Pusey, 1991). Pusey (2003, p 9) defines economic rationalism as the
‘…assumption that economies, markets, money and prices can always, at least in
principle, deliver better outcomes than states, governments, and the law’, and, as a
consequence, achieve human freedoms and social justice. Pusey (2003, p 9) further
adds that the concept of economic rationalism assumes that the ‘market provides the
only practical means for setting values on anything’. In recent years, the
internationally recognised terms ‘neoliberalism’, ‘the market economy’ or the ‘free
market’ (Pusey, 2003; Stilwell, 2000) have superseded the distinctly Australian
phrase of ‘economic rationalism’. Whatever language is utilised to describe the
ideology that initiated economic reform, the underpinning concepts persist in
reaffirming the supremacy of the market in organising the economy. The neoclassical
economic doctrine has garnered extensive backing in Australia by both economists
and the public service bureaucracy responsible for industry policy and it permeates
the nation’s economic policy (Pusey, 1991). Further, these concepts are the platform
for the dominant ideology in agricultural industry economic reform (Gray &
Lawrence, 2001b; Lawrence, 1996; Pritchard, 2000).
Shift in Paradigm
Prior to adopting the present day form of capitalism based on neoclassical
economic theory, Australia functioned under a Keynesian style of capitalism (Beeson
& Cloney, 1997; Pusey, 1991; Stilwell, 2000). Keynesian capitalism rose to
prominence in an era incorporating the Depression and the effects of two world wars,
followed by a long post war boom (Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). Keynesians
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favoured government initiated protectionist strategies, such as tariffs, subsidies and
direct intervention in the market place by government. Quiggan (2001) argues that
Keynesianism itself was a product of the failure of the initial form of the free market
economy of the 19th century, due to internal and inherent instabilities of free market
economics. As outlined in Chapter Four, the market failures of the 19th century
market economy identified by Quiggan also gave birth to the co-operative model,
including the agricultural co-operative, as a sophisticated adaptation to the free
market (Craig, 1993).
By the 1970s, the prevailing Keynesian economic theory became discredited.
Economic conditions in Australia and internationally were characterised by the rise
of very high inflation and unemployment, combined with rapid oil price rises, poor
exports and overvalued exchange rates, and gave rise to economic instability
(Beeson, 1999; Mauldon & Schapper, 1974; Pusey, 1991; Stilwell, 2000). These
economic factors also occurred at a time when increasing globalisation in trade and
capital demanded a less restrictive regulatory environment.

Collectively these

multiple factors presented a trigger for the counter theory of neoclassical economics
to emerge. A cyclical pattern can be detected in these economic shifts, from a 19th
century market economy to Keynesianism, to a period in which several western
countries, including Australia, again adopted a capitalist system informed by
classical economic theory.
According to Beeson (1999) and Pusey (2003), Australia has implemented
neoclassical economic reform with great zeal. 44 Commencing with the Whitlam
Labor Government in the early 1970s establishing the Industries Assistance
Commission in 1973, followed by the Industry Commission (1991), successive
Australian governments have continued with this process of domestic economic
reform across a range of industries, including agriculture. The introduction of the
National Competition Policy in the mid 1990s following the Hilmer Report (1993),
together with the Productivity Commission report (2000), confirmed this ongoing
ideological commitment to neoclassical economic doctrines. In the prevailing
political environment, there is every suggestion that future Australian governments
of both persuasions will undoubtedly continue to pursue economic policies in
harmony with this philosophy.
44 Pusey (2003) notes that New Zealand expressed even greater enthusiasm for the theories.
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Economic Reform in the Agricultural Industry
During the period in which Keynesianism guided Australian economic
policy, the agricultural industry gained an importance beyond its mere commercial
function (Botteril, 2003). This is partly attributed to the significant fall in agricultural
commodity prices after the Depression, followed by low commodity production
during and immediately after World War II (Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). Other
factors include the potential of the industry as a source of food for its own population
and internationally and the vulnerability of the industry to the vagaries of the climate.
The ability of the agricultural industry, as an export industry, to contribute strongly
to Australia’s gross domestic product, and the close cultural connection with farming
between rural and urban Australians, also stimulated a firm association between
those involved with the agricultural industry and governments (Lawrence, 1987;
Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). Consequently, this mutually agreed outlook generated
an agricultural industry policy position with a range of interventionist and
protectionist strategies to safeguard the industry’s ability to ensure farmers were able
to continue this economically, culturally and socially important function (Lawrence,
1987).
Due to the factors identified earlier, by the 1970s, Keynesianism agricultural
policy gave way to one based on neoclassical economic theory. The theory argues
that competitive market forces will shape the future of the agricultural industry into
an enhanced competitor in the international market, and this will result in increased
farmers’ incomes.

The role of government, according to the theory, is cast as

strategic and intervention is limited to what is permissible within market principles
(World Trade Organisation, 2002). At the farm level the theory assumes that a
typical farm household will follow a single path of development to intensive,
commercial farming based on the adoption of modern technology (Lawrence, 1987).
Further, the theory maintains that the consumer will also benefit from higher quality
and lower priced food and fibre products.
To apply the theory, contemporary Australian agricultural public policy
concentrates on a number of multi-tiered strategies designed to increase farm
productivity to enable Australian farmers to compete in a globalised market.
Approaches at the macro-economic level focus on working with other like-minded
countries to develop a market-oriented global agricultural trading system (World
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Trade Organisation, 2002). 45 At the industry-wide level, many of the SMAs in most
agricultural sectors have been dismantled under a policy of government withdrawal
from agricultural marketing and handling activities to facilitate a competitive market
in these areas (Productivity Commission, 2000). At this level, other strategies
encourage industry innovation; the development of industry leadership skills to assist
the industry determine its own future, and the promotion of the supply chain concept
between farmers, processors, and other actors (Botterill, 2003). At the farm level,
agricultural policy approaches focus on ‘capacity building’ among farmers (Botterill,
2003). Strategies include developing business and risk management skills to reduce
on-farm costs and capture economies of scale in production via adopting new
technologies. Concurrently, other strategies focus on farm exit programs for farming
families deemed less efficient in order to facilitate the redistribution of farm
enterprises to more competent farm operators (Botteril, 2003).
Agricultural industry policy also seeks to work in partnership with regional
and local communities to address natural resource management and wider rural
issues, overlapping to some extent, agricultural policy with regional policy. Other
macro-level policies impacting on rural and regional centres and the agricultural
industry include the withdrawal of government services from country towns (Gray &
Lawrence, 2001b), the privatisation of public assets and tariff reduction (Stilwell,
2000) and the retreat from proactive regional development strategies in nonmetropolitan Australia and the agricultural industry (Tonts, 1998).

45 The theoretical basis of Australia’s approach to agricultural policy contrasts with other
industrialised countries. While adopting the rhetoric of neoliberalism, the United States has retained
domestic agricultural subsidies and protectionism, as evidenced by the 2002 US Farm Act (Nuthall,
Osborn, Dobie, & Fine, 2002). Europe has the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) underpinned by
the concept of multifunctionality. CAP argues that agriculture has a cultural and social meaning which
outweighs its economic function. Agricultural policies based on this premise, from the viewpoint of
Australia’s agricultural policy makers, have highly distorting impacts on the global agricultural
market, with particularly unfavourable effects for exporting countries such as Australia. The
Department of Agriculture Strategic Plan 2003-2013 (Western Australian Department of Agriculture,
n.d.) states that the ‘concept of multifunctionality in agriculture will see countries supporting their
agricultural businesses for non-economic objectives. This will continue to distort markets, making it
increasingly difficult to gain entry to some major markets.’ The European and United States
approaches are examples of industrialised economies, on the one hand, supporting the general
direction of WTO agricultural policy, while concurrently developing domestic agricultural policies
that are inconsistent with neoclassical economic theory. In contrast, Australia has progressed with
implementing neoliberal policies in agriculture with considerable commitment. For an overview of the
different orientations of these arguments and their implications for agricultural industries in different
countries and globally, see, for example, Botteril (2003) , Coutsouradis (2000), Wynen (2002),
European Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (1999).
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Outcomes of Contemporary Agricultural Policy
Keogh’s (2004) overview of the present state of the Australian agricultural
industry confirms that the doctrine of neoclassical economics in agricultural policy
has resulted in a substantial change in the structure of the agricultural industry. These
changes include the introduction of new technology in machinery and agricultural
science and the requirement for higher levels of capital on-farm. Farm business
structures have altered and contract farming has entered some sectors of the industry.
Agricultural restructuring has resulted in a trend towards a two-tiered family farm
based production structure (Black, Duff, Saggers, & Baines, 2000; Keogh, 2004). 46
One trend is towards larger scale farm operators seeking production economies of
scale via farm consolidation, absorbing farmland as some farm families exit the
industry. A secondary trend is the subdivision of agricultural land into small scale
and possibly non-commercial farms in coastal and outer areas of metropolitan and
regional centres. Other adjustments are evident, such as increasing vertical
integration of the agri-food chain, and growing concentration in the processing and
retailing industries. More recently, environmental degradation has resulted in
modified farm production and management practices (Black et al., 2000). Lawrence
(1987) highlighted many of the anticipated implications of these changes in the mid
1980s and his subsequent writings confirm the depth and impact of agricultural
industry restructuring on farming families and communities. 47
There are approximately 110,000 commercial farms in Australia, with just
under 14,000 family farms in Western Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2001). 48 The number of farm enterprises declined by an average of 1.3 per cent per
annum in the ten years to 1994-95 (Black et al., 2000), citing Australian Bureau of
Statistics (1998), although other industry commentators suggest that the number of
farms in Australia has been falling by around 2 per cent per annum (Interviewee 688,
2001; Interviewee 689, 2002). Keogh (2004), also quoting ABS data over several
46 Chapter Two discussed the family farm based nature of Australian farming, comprising about 95
per cent of all farm enterprises.
47 Lawrence and Hungerford (1996; 2000) and Buttel (2000) summarise various theories of rural
restructuring, such as fordism and post-fordism, the third food regime, flexible specialisation,
subsumption, survival and synthetic schools and regulation theory, each of which seeks to account for
these changes in rural communities and agricultural industries.
48 Black et al. (2000) and Tonts (1998) outline changes that have occurred in gathering ABS data,
which contributes to the difficulty in quantifying an aggregate number of Australian farm enterprises.
ABARE data incorporates broad acre farms and excludes intensive farm enterprises such as dairy and
horticulture, which further complicates quantifying farm enterprises.
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years, estimates that the number of ‘commercial’ Australian farms has fallen by
approximately 15 per cent over the last decade or so.
While there is a decline in the number of farmers remaining in the industry,
ABARE (n.d.) confirms that farm production has been improving in volume and
value over the last decade. 49 Increasing production in crop yield was the major
contributor to the rise in value (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, n.d.). This indicates that Australian farmers have been achieving greater
on-farm efficiencies, as there is an increase in commodity output even though there
are fewer farmers in the industry.

Further, with approximately 80 per cent of

Australian commodities exported and contributing to more than one quarter of
Australia’s total exports (World Trade Organisation, 2002), Australian farmers are
successfully competing in the international market place.
The owners and managers of farm enterprises remaining in the agricultural
industry have negotiated their way through two decades of agricultural industry
restructuring. As a result, they have achieved on-farm efficiencies to lower the costs
of production, improve productivity, and be internationally competitive. These are
predicted outcomes of an agricultural policy underpinned by neoclassical economic
theory, and lend support the wisdom of the adoption of this policy approach.
Downside of Industry Restructuring
Yet, many farmers themselves are not benefiting from the predicted and
expected prosperity in spite of implementing the range of strategies outlined above.
Paradoxically, notwithstanding these improvements in international competitiveness,
and on-farm efficiencies and rising productivity, Australian farmers continue to
encounter low levels of farm profitability. Keogh states that:
As a generalisation, the 1990s are considered to have been a period of
low profitability for farmers in Australia, especially the early part of
the decade, and especially relative to previous decades. As a simple
indicator of this, over the 1980s and 1990s, average farm operating
costs increased sevenfold while average farm cash operating surpluses
increased only threefold. (Keogh, 2004, p 4)

49 The extended drought period in recent years weakened this trend in the short term.
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Despite the sustained growth in farm productivity, commodity prices received
by Australian farmers have not kept pace with the rising prices of farm inputs,
leading to low farm enterprise profitability. This ratio in the price of outputs to the
costs of inputs is referred to as ‘cost price squeeze’. Indeed, the Western Australian
Department of Agriculture does not anticipate any improvement in this area, as it
states in its Strategic Plan 2003-2013 that:
The cost-price squeeze will continue to affect farm profitability. Real
prices for farm commodities will continue to decline. Price inflation
will continue to affect the prices paid by farmers for their inputs.’
(Western Australian Department of Agriculture, n.d., p 4)
Keogh (2004) further acknowledges the increasing trend for Australian farms
to rely on off-farm income to remain financially viable. This points to a further irony
- Australian farmers who have remained in the industry have, willingly or
reluctantly, adopted the practices of industry policy, which have led to increased
productivity, efficiency, economies of scale and international competitiveness, yet
have not been able to increase their farm enterprise levels of profitability. Indeed,
profitability has fallen to the extent that many farm families are required to augment
their incomes off-farm to manage financially. Clearly, despite these policies and
strategies, farmers themselves have not been financially rewarded by industry policy
based on neoclassical economic doctrines. Those farmers remaining in the industry
have implemented the range of agricultural industry policies urged upon them by
successive governments but have not necessarily reaped the alleged financial benefits
of these new practices.
Undoubtedly, economic reform has had significant and mixed impact at the
individual farm enterprise level. Concurrently, other links in the supply chain
comprising the supply of various farm inputs and post-farm activities have also
experienced significant restructuring. In pursuing economies of scale, the
agribusiness, food processing and retail grocery industries have experienced
substantial industry consolidation to the extent that a declining number of major
companies now dominate these industry sectors. In the retail industry, a heavily
concentrated environment has arisen with two or three major supermarket chains
dominating the grocery industry (Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector,
1999).
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Several of the new companies formed following the dismantling of SMAs are
also undergoing a noticeable consolidation. The New South Wales based grain
handler and marketer, GrainCorp, merged with Queensland’s Grainco in late 2003
(Marshall, 2003), resulting in a consolidated company involved in grain storage and
export from Queensland to Victoria (Graincorp, 2003). Western Australia’s CBH’s
merger with the Grain Pool to achieve economies of scale in the storage, handling
and exporting of grain (Bolt, 2002) is another contemporary illustration of this
phenomenon. 50
In food processing, the dairy processing industry is especially prone to
consolidation, with the New Zealand dairy processing co-operative Fonterra
intricately involved with Australian dairy processors (Farmers Weekly, 2002). There
is growing interest by non-dairy food manufacturing companies to buy into the dairy
processing industry, further reducing the number of companies operating in this
sector of the supply chain (Sydney Morning Herald, 2004).
In the farm inputs sector, a similar pattern is emerging. This is illustrated by
the merger of the publicly listed company, Incitec, and the former agricultural
fertiliser supply co-operative, Pivot (Incitec Pivot Ltd, 2002). The resulting listed
company controls approximately 65 per cent of the eastern States of Australia’s
fertiliser business (Daily News, 2003).
The emerging pattern in the agricultural supply chain is that the agricultural
production sector, comprising in Western Australia of approximately 14,000 family
farms and approximately 110,000 nationally, sits in the middle of a supply chain in
which all other non-farm links shift towards consolidation controlled by a few large
national or multinational companies. As Drabenstott (1999) notes, the supply chain is
typically dominated and controlled by a dominant player in the chain. Clearly, the
on-farm production sector, depicted by the highly atomised and low profit family
structure, is the weakened link in the supply chain, despite its demonstrated
efficiencies, economies of scale and international competitiveness.
While increasing consolidation of the non-farm sectors of the agricultural
supply chain is leading to fewer corporations and therefore less competition, it is also
50 As discussed in Chapter Six, many of the dismantled SMAs have moved to a non-listed corporate
business structure comprised mostly of farmer shareholders. Some of these new companies are now
facing pressure to list on the Australian Stock Exchange, removing farmer control as non-farm
shareholders purchase shares.
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possible that they are less efficient than the on-farm production sector. As Keogh
(2004) states, the cost of farm inputs are estimated to have increased seven-fold over
the 1980s and 1990s while farm cash operating surpluses have increased only threefold. This suggests that the consolidated farm supply industries, comprising fewer
companies, are not under the same pressure as farmers to ensure that their prices are
actually competitive.
Additionally, the inability of farm cash operating surpluses to keep pace with
increasing farm input costs indicates that the consolidated food processing and retail
grocery sector are able to employ market power to continue to pay low prices to
farmers for their commodities. This again suggests that the consolidation of the postfarm gate links in the agricultural chain have resulted in these companies becoming
less competitive. At some point, unchecked economies of scale result in industry
consolidation to the point where there are too few large companies to enable a
competitive environment. Therefore, while on-farm efficiency has increased via
skills development, economies of scale and use of technologies, leading to improved
productivity and international competitiveness, it is not clear if the same can be
claimed for the other sectors of the agricultural supply chain. As James (2004, p 66)
states, ‘The top corporations are getting bigger, but they are not getting more
financially efficient’. In some cases, non-farm links of the agricultural supply chain
in Australia have become inefficient and, in the process, trapped Australian farmers
in a cost price squeeze (James, 2004).
Clearly, restructuring in agriculture has not produced the theoretical outcome
of a competitive market in all links in the agricultural supply chain. Further, one
sector of the supply chain, the on-farm agricultural production sector, has been
manoeuvred into a position in which it has to endure most of the burden of this
failure. It is evident that Australian farmers and rural communities are under stress
after a quarter century of economic reform.
Neoliberal public policy admits to some shortfalls, acknowledging that
certain individuals or sections of society may acquire the benefits of neoclassical
economic restructuring later than others (Productivity Commission, 1999).
However, the theory and its advocates maintain that the ‘trickle down’ effect will
ensure that in time the market will distribute social benefits all sections of society
(Productivity Commission, 1999). While the Productivity Commission report into the
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effects of the National Competition Policy on rural and regional Australia concedes
some downsides after decades of economic reform in rural and regional Australia
(Productivity Commission, 1999), it urges rural people to be patient about the
inevitable social and economic benefits that will arise in the future from the difficult
adjustment period. This sentiment is consistent with orthodox economic theory, in
that the disadvantage endured by many farmers is presented as a transitory problem,
as theoretically the free market process, in the long-term, benefits the economy and
society, including those in rural communities.
The impact of agricultural restructuring on rural communities, such as farm
consolidation into larger farm operations, coupled with a decline in the number of
remaining farm operators and the exodus of displaced farmers, has been commented
on by several academics, such as Tonts and Black (2001), Tonts (2000), Pritchard
(1996) and Lawrence (1992). It is well documented that these policies have resulted
in unprecedented economic and social changes in rural communities in the last few
decades with uneven outcomes (see, for example, Cheers, 1995; Gray, 1994; Gray &
Lawrence, 2001b; Lawrence, 1990; Lawrence, Gray, & Stehlik, 1998; Pritchard,
2000). Theorists researching the agricultural industry internationally and within the
Australasian region broadly agree on the considerable transformation in the
economic and social dimensions of agriculturally dependent rural communities,
family farms and agriculture (Lawrence, 1987; Lawrence & Hungerford, 1994).
These writers generally concur that neoclassical economic philosophy is a significant
factor contributing to the changes facing agriculture.
Market Failure and the Agricultural Co-operative Model
The effect of market driven agricultural policy at the on-farm business level
adds weight to Quiggan’s argument that neoliberalism is inherently an unstable
system (Quiggan, 2001). Farmers are in the midst of a pervasive form of market
failure arising from the market power of the non-farm production sectors in the
national and international agribusiness supply chain. Yet the underlying message
from the then deputy Prime Minister, John Anderson, (1999) to the 1999 Regional
Australia Summit, was for a recommitment to neoliberal influenced agricultural
industry policy.

Further, Anderson called for rural communities to fix these

problems by stating that ‘the individual solutions for individual communities can
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only come from within those communities’ (Anderson, 1999, p 6). Rural
communities are urged to mobilise their own resources and inventiveness as a selfhelp strategy to address the difficulties they are experiencing. Other strategies
include facilitating local investment and business activities and promoting links
between industry, government and communities to stimulate self-reliant communities
and unleash their potential for economic development (Regional Australia Summit,
2000). The subtext appears to be that the problem experienced by agriculturally
dependent rural communities is not the theoretical basis informing agricultural
policy; but that rural people have the wrong mindset and this poor attitude is the
impediment that blocks them from being receptive to new opportunities emanating
from economic reform (Gray & Lawrence, 2001b).
The current phase of economic public policy duplicates the philosophy of
classical 19th century economic theory. This ‘first’ phase also triggered similar
hardship for some sectors of society. The agricultural co-operative structure evolved
in the 19th century in response to the downside of a free market economy and small
government evolving from the industrial revolution. Agricultural co-operatives have
a particularly long history as a strategy to address the accumulation of market power
by other powerful entities in the agricultural supply chain by providing farmers with
a mechanism to achieve economies of scale in farm supplies or commodity
marketing (Cobia, 1989; Craig, 1993; Hansmann, 1996). The subsequent dominance
of the agricultural co-operative structure in Europe and North America indicates that
it fits the agricultural industry particularly well. Given that the agricultural cooperative evolved as a response to the initial period of classical economic theory,
similar conditions evolving from economic philosophies in the late 20th century
suggest a possible ‘rebirth’ of agricultural co-operatives.
The repetition of economic adversity in the present day agricultural industry
partly explains the recent mini-revival in co-operatives in Western Australia. The
successful examples of agricultural co-operatives, such as the UFCC described
briefly in Chapter One, illustrate this. 51 The UFCC, a relatively young organisation
formed in the contemporary economic environment, demonstrates the ability of the
agricultural co-operative model to continue with the traditional agricultural cooperative role of ameliorating some form of market failure. By amalgamating the
51 The UFCC is analysed in detail in Chapters Seven and Eight.
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collective resources of atomistic farmer members, the UFCC was able to harness
economies of scale to source chemicals and counter the escalating costs commanded
by agribusiness corporations for agricultural fertiliser and chemicals. The UFCC
experience suggests that the agricultural co-operative model, therefore, remains a
valid and legitimate mechanism at the beginning of the 21st century to address the
types of market failure problems arising from economic reform.
Despite the merits and potential of the agricultural co-operative model, the
Australian government’s approach to agricultural industry restructuring does not
readily present the co-operative business model as an option for farmers to address
economic adversity arising from market failure. In practice, however, contemporary
policy makers, while perhaps understanding the downside, do not take neoliberal
policy to its logical extreme at a program level. After two decades or so of
restructuring, there is evidence that Australian public policy makers are now seeking
an approach that can lessen the negative consequences of economic reform on
marginalised sections of society, including those living in rural and regional areas of
Australia. The disparity in economic and social well-being between rural and urban
communities after decades of restructuring has led to an increased awareness of rural
community well-being (Anderson & Chaffey, 2000; Black et al., 2000; Cheers, 1995;
Gray, 1994; Gray & Lawrence, 2001a; Kingma, Crellin, & Hoitink, 1999; Lawrence,
1995; Haslam McKenzie, 1999). The Productivity Commission (2003) report into
social capital, which suggests that there is capacity for Government to be more aware
of the role of social capital in effective policy development, demonstrates this
recently evolving ‘softer’ side of economic policy. 52 Further, the Productivity
Commission’s 2002-2003 Annual Report (2004), while continuing to recommend
on-going domestic economic reform, suggests subsequent reforms recognise the
human and environmental consequences of these policies. This is a significant
conceptual move from early policy approaches that focused on hard-edged economic
issues, which in the rural context, often resulted in harmful economic and social
consequences for farming families and rural and regional communities. This
52 The Productivity Commission report (2003) on social capital also recognises that some
Government activities actually undermine social capital within a community, diminishing a
community’s ability to implement the self-help qualities of its members, a key concept in neoliberal
theory. However, the Productivity Commission report, representing an essentially neoliberal analysis
of the concept of social capital, requires a cautious approach. To illustrate, the Productivity
Commission report explores the concept of social capital as it might be a useful mechanism for
reducing public expenditure.
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recognition of the disadvantages of economic reform on farming communities has
several implications for the agricultural co-operative business structure.
The Interface of Neoclassical Economic Theory and Co-operative Theory
Three key elements underline the divide between neoclassical economic
theory and co-operative theory. The first element of neoliberalism that has
implications for the agricultural co-operative structure is the concept of
individualism. Implicit in neoclassical economic theory is a particular understanding
of human behaviour as rational, self interested, and individualistic (Quiggan, 2001).
Neoliberalism assumes individuals are in competition with each other (Mooney &
Gray, 2002). Immediately it is apparent that there is a conflict between the
neoclassical economic concept of individualism and co-operative theory which is
built on a view of human behaviour that embraces a collaborative approach to solve
common problems (Craig, 1993). The notion of ‘co-operativeness’ is therefore
problematical in neoliberalism, as acting co-operatively is contrary to individualism.
When the wider public policy environment privileges individualism above cooperative values, a fundamental element of the agricultural co-operative business
structure is jeopardised.
Aligned to the value of individualism is the neoliberal concept of self-help,
the second element of interest to the agricultural co-operative model. In the context
of agricultural industry policy and regional policy, the concept of self-help places the
responsibility on rural people to personally overcome their own economic and social
obstacles. This policy implies a belief that it is ultimately the responsibility of rural
communities to advance their own economic futures. Government involvement in
these matters is construed as an inhibitor to individual expression of self-help.
Government therefore should withdraw from the provision of these services to
liberate individuals’ self-help ethos to overcome the barriers that formerly restricted
their options (Gray and Lawrence, 2001b). 53 Gray and Lawrence (2001b) cite
Landcare is an example of a government initiated approach to stimulate a collective

53 This neoliberal understanding of self-help removes the possibility of structural explanations
contributing to the difficulties facing the agricultural industry and rural people, placing responsibility
on human agency (Gray & Lawrence, 2001b).
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self-help response among rural people to address environmental problems. 54 Marsh
and Pannell (1998) note that State Departments of Agriculture now facilitate the
formation of farmer groups, rather than one-to-one interaction, as a strategy for
agricultural extension, particularly for human ‘capacity building’. The public policy
strategies of local communities working together in a self-help ethos to facilitate
revitalisation of small towns, rather than demand State support to resolve their
problems, also illustrate this approach.
Interestingly, the self-help concept of neoliberalism dovetails with the mutual
self-help concept embedded in co-operative values. The co-operative business
structure, built on the concept of mutual self-help, can also contribute to endogenous
rural community based development. The overlap of the neoliberal concept of selfhelp and mutual self-help in co-operative values is a potential argument for public
policy support to create the environment to stimulate the uptake of the agricultural
co-operative structure.

These two concepts enable individual farmers to work

collectively to help themselves cope with the market failure consequences of
agricultural restructuring. 55
The third feature of neoclassical economic theory of interest to the
agricultural co-operative business structure is the profit maximising IOF business
structure. As argued in the previous chapter, fundamental differences between the
IOF and the agricultural co-operative structure diminish the intrinsic value of the cooperative model. However, this chapter has argued that the co-operative model has a
number of features that make it particularly suited to a market economy environment.
The model is able to address market failure arising from the downside agricultural
industry policy and therefore make a positive social and economic contribution to
rural communities.
Agricultural Co-operatives as an Agricultural Industry Policy Tool
The implementation of free market public policies in agriculture and regional
Australia has created a paradoxical situation in which the co-operative business
model is a valuable mechanism to grasp opportunities created by economic reform

54 Landcare also reflects a relatively recent addition of environmental sustainability to the economic
competitiveness of agricultural policy (Western Australian Department of Agriculture, n.d.).
55 The public policy environment for agricultural co-operatives is discussed in Chapter Six.
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while also minimising the downside of restructuring. Gray and Lawrence (2001b)
argue that Australian public policy makers are seeking strategies to assist rural and
agricultural sectors to achieve the benefits of agricultural and rural restructuring by
adopting collective approaches to implement a neoclassical economic reform agenda
built around individualism. The agricultural co-operative is an ideal vehicle to
achieve this policy direction.
By reframing the agricultural co-operative structure in neoliberal discourse,
the formation of an agricultural co-operative can be interpreted as the rational action
of commercially minded independent farmers collaborating with similarly selfinterested farmers with the objective of maximising their individual benefit. In
circumstances where agricultural restructuring has resulted in some negative social
or economic outcome, the formation of a co-operative can be viewed as a self-help
strategy by individual farmers to address the downsides of economic reform.
Additionally, while the co-operative enhances the economic outcomes of the
individual farm entity as a business, it concurrently meets a neoliberal ideal of
assisting in social justice by facilitating the social and economic well-being of the
farming family. The co-operative structure can therefore rationalise minimal
government intervention in resolving economic or social inequities arising from
economic policies because rural people are able to use the co-operative structure as a
self-help mechanism to overcome these deficits.
Continuing this perspective, agricultural co-operatives can be presented as a
tool to participate in government’s ‘mutual obligation’ contract with rural
communities. Consistent with Gray and Lawrence’s (2001b) work, Yeatman (1999, p
258) examines the concept of ‘mutual obligation’, in which individuals ‘should make
a contribution to society in exchange for the support society gives them’. Mutual
obligation is a reciprocated arrangement, where government provides support while
the individual makes an effort to become self-reliant. Communities can use the cooperative model as a demonstration of their self-help orientation, in exchange for the
government providing the necessary seed funding to enable them to establish the
feasibility of the co-operative structure for their particular problem. An illustration of
this form of community self-help supported by small seed funding from government
is the collective effort of various individuals connected to the proposed Harvest
Highway co-operative. This initiative is a local response by a range of actors to the
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economic adversity experienced by small tourist and agricultural produce businesses
in a regional area in Western Australia’s southwest. Under the Commonwealth
Department of Transport and Regional Services program of ‘Stronger Regions, A
Stronger Australia’ (Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional
Services, n.d.), this initiative has gained funds to explore the feasibility of a cooperative structure for their venture.
Lastly, the concept of ‘freedom to choose’ suggests that the broader liberal
philosophy of an individual’s right to choose a business structure can support the
adoption of the agricultural co-operative structure. Consequently, it is acceptable if
individual farmers voluntarily choose a co-operative structure as the means by which
they wish to engage commercially with other sectors of the economy.
Conclusion
This chapter explored the impact of two decades of agricultural industry
restructuring on the industry and identified mixed outcomes for farmers and rural
communities. The chapter argued that the agricultural co-operative model can
provide a vehicle to capture opportunities as well as address some of the downside of
restructuring. Several key concepts underpinning neoclassical economics and
neoliberalism were examined to identify those that complement co-operative theory.
Identifying this theoretical interface enabled agricultural co-operatives to be
reframed as a strategy that is compatible with neoliberal assumptions of the market
and the economic behaviour of individuals, with the added benefit of ensuring the
social well-being of the farm family with minimal intervention of government. This
approach enabled new insights that validate the structure in a public policy context,
although there is some risk in perceiving the co-operative as potentially complicit in
the reform agenda of government withdrawal of services in rural and regional areas.
In conclusion, neoliberal theory and the accompanying reform based on these
notions provide some potential opportunities to facilitate the adoption of the
agricultural co-operative structure. However, the ideological challenge of neoliberal
theory to the fundamental values base of the co-operative structure, while subtle, is
potentially very damaging for the future of the co-operative structure in agriculture.
Fostering co-operativeness among producers in order to participate in the
marketplace can only be achieved if neoliberal policies acknowledge the importance
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of co-operative behaviour and the social foundations that facilitate this behaviour.
The contradiction between neoliberal notions of self-interest and market driven
behaviour on the one hand and developing a business structure based on collective
action is clearly apparent. While a public policy argument can be made to support
agricultural co-operative development as a tool to stimulate self-help, it does not
compensate for a strategy for sustainable co-operative development. Clearly, the
agricultural co-operative structure has proven its legitimacy as a structure that
historically and currently serves agriculture well. The task, expanded upon in
Chapter Six, is to identify how this intrinsic value can be recognised in a broader
theoretical context that can then facilitate a public policy position for the agricultural
co-operative structure.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Western Australia’s Agricultural Co-operative History

Introduction
This chapter reviews the history of the agricultural co-operative movement in
Western Australia. While the focus of this thesis is on the contemporary era,
particularly in the last decade or so, there is a strong, but arguably not wellunderstood, historical dimension to the Western Australian co-operative movement.
This chapter reveals that the severe economic and social conditions in rural and
regional Western Australia during the early decades of the 20th century gave rise to
the first agricultural co-operatives. These difficult circumstances nurtured the cooperative business model and subsequently agricultural co-operatives evolved into an
economically strong and politically influential Western Australian agricultural cooperative sector up until at least the late 1970s.
Historical Accounts of the Western Australian Co-operative Movement
There is relatively little secondary information available on the development
of the Western Australian co-operative movement and the agricultural co-operative
story. Sandford’s (1955) account of the co-operative movement in Western Australia
is the most detailed. He describes the early foundations of the co-operative
movement as it grew alongside an infant agricultural industry establishing itself
under primitive conditions. Of significance is his account of the genesis of the most
well known agricultural co-operative in Western Australia - Westralian Farmers Cooperative - that later converted to the corporation, Wesfarmers.
Smith (1984) also briefly recounted some of the early agricultural cooperative activity in the State.56 The focus of his work was much more on the growth
56 According to Munro (2003), this book was completed in the late 1970s although it was not
published until the mid 1980s.

62

and logistical development of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, which had
commissioned his book. Co-operative Bulk Handling has produced a history of its
background which sheds minimal light on the development of the Western Australian
co-operative sector apart from confirming that CBH was based on the principles of
the Rochdale model of ‘one man one vote, irrespective of the volume of business
conducted with no racial, political or religious bias’ (Ayris, 1999, p 12). The
Geraldton Fishermens’ Co-operative also published a history to celebrate its 50th
anniversary (H. Gray, 2000), again focusing predominantly on the logistical aspects
of establishing and sustaining the co-operative in regional Western Australia.
This chapter derives much of its information on two extensive personal
interviews with Mr Don Munro. Munro’s involvement with the Western Australian
co-operative sector commenced in the 1960s, when he began providing accountancy
services to Westralian Farmers Co-operative members (Munro, 2003). His first
exposure to agricultural co-operatives was in finalising the operations of many rural
co-operatives that were no longer operational. His association with the Western
Australian agricultural co-operative sector continued when he left Westralian
Farmers Co-operative with, according to Munro, their blessing and acknowledged
support, and established an accountancy firm specialising in the agricultural industry
and, in particular, agricultural co-operatives. The Co-operative Federation of
Western Australia (CFWA), the peak body for the Western Australian co-operative
movement, subsequently contracted his accountancy firm to provide secretariat
services until 1996, when the CFWA appointed a full-time Executive Officer.
Munro’s early connection with the co-operative movement overlapped the
last years of several Western Australia ‘co-operators’ 57 who were involved with the
first co-operative wave commencing around the time of World War 1. He spoke in
detail of his exposure to the idealism and enthusiasm that motivated these original
‘co-operative champions’ 58 to form the first co-operatives in Western Australia. He
commented that he felt privileged to share in ‘the wonder and values base of the cooperative movement’ as embodied by the founding agricultural co-operators in

57 Munro used the term ‘co-operators’, which is not commonly used in contemporary Western
Australian agricultural co-operative discourse. Craig (1993) also uses this term.
58 The term ‘co-operative champion’ is adopted from Craig (1993) and is well understood as a
concept by interviewees.
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Western Australia, such as Harper, Thomson, Ashton and others from that era. 59
Arguably, Munro is a bridge between the original Western Australian agricultural cooperative movement and the present day era of agricultural co-operatives.
The Early Development of the Western Australian Agricultural Co-operative
Sector
The early history of the Western Australian co-operative movement is a story
of the newly evolving agricultural industry and of the adaptation of a business
structure which itself was in its infancy. The emerging co-operative movement in
Western Australia is a distinctive example of co-operative development (Munro,
2003). The closeness between the agricultural industry and the co-operative model
resulted in the Western Australian co-operative movement being essentially one
based on the agricultural industry. While the first chapter differentiated and defined
the terms of the ‘co-operative movement’ and the ‘agricultural co-operative sector’,
the beginning of the Western Australian co-operative movement is also the history of
the agricultural co-operative sector. The formative and ongoing influence and
dominance of the agricultural co-operative sector on the overall Western Australian
co-operative movement is undeniable. The divergence of the Western Australian
agricultural co-operative sector and the wider co-operative movement only occurred
in the latter half of the 20th century when a number of metropolitan based cooperatives commenced in Western Australia. However, agricultural and regional cooperatives continue to dominate the contemporary Western Australian co-operative
movement as evidenced by the number of agricultural or regionally based cooperatives that are members of the CFWA.
The literature contains several references to early agricultural co-operative
activity in Western Australia. Kenyon (1983, p 49) states that rural co-operatives
were in operation in Western Australia by 1859. The Swan district was exploring the
formation of co-operatives as early as 1897 to ‘prevent a glut of grapes and to ensure

59 See Sandford (1955) for further information on the role of these key individuals in the early
Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector.

64

the making of wine of a high and uniform grade on a large scale…’ (Lindley-Cowen,
1897, p 158). 60 Smith (1984, p 115) refers to the existence of fruit co-operatives in
the early 1900s with a reasonable network of co-operative grower packing sheds and
export activities in place in the 1920s (K. Smith, 1984, p 116). Some dairy cooperatives were also operational, with the Bunbury Butter Co-operative registered in
1908 (Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection,
2005b).
These early Western Australian agricultural co-operatives focused on two
activities. Co-operatives either provided farm services or inputs at near cost; or
undertook the marketing, handling or value adding of commodities to achieve the
best possible price for members. These early co-operatives provided a service or
infrastructure which was lacking in the newly evolving agricultural industry, or were
established in situations where farmers were economically disadvantaged. This is
consistent with agricultural economic co-operative theory, in which agricultural cooperatives are created to either capture economies of scale or address some form of
market failure (Cobia, 1989).
Sandford (1955) argues that the first co-operative champions such as Harper
and Thomson recognised that in order to support farmers in their efforts to establish
and expand the agricultural industry, the industry had to embrace the co-operative
model. Undoubtedly, the influence of the first co-operative champions was an
essential component in the development of the agricultural co-operative sector in
Western Australia. Co-operative champions, both theorists and activists, were central
catalysts in spreading the co-operative ideal and motivating farmers to form cooperatives (Munro, 2003; Sandford, 1955; K. Smith, 1984). Sandford writes
…three men, Walter Harper, Tom Bath and WD Johnson, have been
the outstanding figures in the Western Australian co-operative
movement. Harper primarily a businessman with a sense of
trusteeship and the prestige of a name long famous in Western
60 At the time Lindley-Cowen was writing, in the last years of the 19th century, the co-operative
wineries had not been established. He cited Harper (the father of Walter Harper who in turn is the
father of the Western Australian co-operative movement), who warned that the industry was shortsighted in not forming co-operatives. Harper recounted the experiences of Californian, Victorian and
South Australian grape growers where ‘[the] growers, in fact, had to come to the position of working
for the benefit of those who were enabled to become monopolists, because those who had grapes to
sell were without the means of turning them into wine’ (Lindley-Cowen, 1897, p 158). The similarity
of this story at the end of the 19th century and that of grape growers in Australia at the beginning of
the 21st century is striking.
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Australia behind him, Bath an idealist in the practical sense of the
word and Johnson, the enthusiast, able speaker and politician….
(Sandford, 1955, p 84)
Munro (2003) adds that Harper 61 in particular had established links with
agriculture via his own family farm and therefore carried substantial credibility when
rallying farmers to the co-operative ideal. Sandford further writes ‘co-operation was
undoubtedly something of a crusade at the time and the example of the Rochdale
pioneers in England was bandied about by …. [co-operative] organisers in a way that
has not taken place since’ (Sandford, 1955, p 45). Munro (2003), based on personal
contact with some of these first co-operative champions, states ‘they had a dream and
wanted to share that dream with other farmers’ . The commitment and idealism of
these co-operative champions as an element in the development of a co-operative
movement is highly consistent with sociologically informed co-operative theory
(Craig, 1993).
The Rochdale consumer co-operative model, imported from the United
Kingdom, provided the guiding structure and philosophy for the champions striving
to develop the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector. The traditional
Rochdale model is based on many retail co-operatives owning a single wholesale cooperative supplier, with the distribution of ‘profits’ back to member customers
(Lewis, 1992). Akin to the Rochdale model, the early co-operative champions
envisioned a long-term strategy in which a network of agriculturally focused country
town retail co-operative stores would buy shares in a parent co-operative that would
assume a wholesale function.
This dream, however, did not eventuate. Circumstances unique to Western
Australia forced the adaptation of the Rochdale model and principles to suit the
environment in which it was seeking to establish itself. Several factors can account
for this. The infant Western government sought to create an agricultural industry in a
primitive pioneering environment and in virgin rural areas with an unknown ability
to support agriculture (Munro, 2003). Subsequently, the embryonic Western
Australian agricultural industry had to readjust to the difficult economic and social

61 The family name ‘Harper’ did not continue as a civic ‘father’ in Perth or Western Australia, unlike
several of the family’s business partner contemporaries.
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effects of the First World War and the Depression, quickly followed by another
world war (Sandford, 1955).
Sandford (1955, p 73) also argues that it proved impractical to have
independent retail co-operatives in country towns serviced by a separate wholesale
co-operative. The limited economic development of Western Australia at the time
demanded a strong overarching agricultural co-operative to undertake both retail and
wholesale functions to ensure that all country towns in agricultural Western Australia
had access to goods and services. Westralian Farmers Co-operative emerged from
the assortment of small agricultural co-operatives active at the time as the dominant
agricultural co-operative. Only a State-wide co-operative, such as Westralian
Farmers Co-operative, Sandford (1955) further argued, could provide the logistical
coordination between different agricultural regions given the transport and
communications channels of the period. Therefore, in response to the challenges
presented by the immaturity of the economic and infrastructure development of the
agricultural industry, the co-operative movement evolved as a top down initiative
under the influence of one dominant agricultural co-operative, Westralian Farmers
Co-operative. The unique development of the Western Australian co-operative
movement reflects Craig’s (1993) concept of co-operative logic. This logic accepts
that each group’s needs are unique and that the group’s members will develop a cooperative organisational model responsive to their specific needs.
While the Rochdale model had to be adapted for Western Australian
circumstances, as represented by Westralian Farmers Co-operative, the co-operative
based commercial activity embedded in the Rochdale model and promoted by the cooperative champions found fertile ground in rural communities. Steeped in a
collective self-help ethos, the beliefs of rural people and those underpinning cooperative philosophy were highly compatible (Sandford, 1955; K. Smith, 1984).
Munro (2003) maintained that farmers believed that they were part of a community
and the only way for them to survive during the difficult economic times preceding
the First World War, the years of the war itself, the following Depression era and the
Second World War, was to unite for their own common good. At a pragmatic level
Munro (2003) also considered that the first wave of the co-operative movement was
compatible with the ‘horse and cart’ level of technology in the early 1900s. These
factors suggest a strong focus on geographically bound social and economic
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networks among rural communities as a precursor to agricultural co-operative
development in this era. The ability of the co-operative message to overlay the values
of rural people and thus to enable the co-operative concept to take root and develop
is also a recurrent theme in Craig (1993).
Munro, (2003) in addition, argued that the concepts underpinning the benefits
of a co-operative, and how to form a co-operative, were simple for farmers to
understand and the co-operative champions were able to convey the key messages to
them without difficulty. These early farmers appeared to have an intuitive
understanding of co-operative logic. According to Munro, the message of the early
agricultural co-operators conveyed to farmers was to ‘look past your farm gate to see
how you can help yourself to get a better deal by owning and controlling your inputs
and outputs’. He asserts that this was an appealing and understandable message for
farmers. Munro (2003) believed that this was the first time farmers had been
encouraged to think more broadly about their industry by looking at issues outside
actual farm production. This reflects early understanding by farmers of the
agricultural co-operative structure as both a part of a supply chain and a means for
vertical integration.
Westralian Farmers Co-operative
The evolution of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector is
intimately entwined with Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Westralian Farmers Cooperative, established in 1914, was one of the many localised agricultural cooperatives formed around the turn of the 20th century to provide services or
infrastructure to the infant agricultural industry, or to assist economically
disadvantaged farmers. Unlike many of these early co-operatives, Westralian
Farmers Co-operative prospered and evolved over five or six decades into a powerful
economic and political force in Western Australia. Arguably, its economic influence
continues today as the publicly listed company, Wesfarmers.
Westralian Farmers Co-operative grew out of a politically oriented farmers’
interest group. In the immediate pre-World War I years, the Farmers’ and Settlers’
Association 62 was formed at a conference in Perth on March 28, 1912 (The
62 This farmer association is a predecessor to the current agri-political peak body, the Western
Australia Farmers’ Federation (WAFF) (K. Smith, 1984).
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Nationals, n.d.). Discussions focused on the political and economic well-being of
farmers and delegates elected to separate commercial activities from political
lobbying (K. Smith, 1984). The Country Party was formed in March, 1913, to
address the political concerns of farmers, 63 while the co-operative business model
was adopted as the strategy to achieve the economic goals of farmers (K.Smith,
1984).
The newly established Westralian Farmers Co-operative absorbed two
existing grains related agricultural co-operatives, the Producers Union Co-operative
and the Farmers Mercantile and Union Chaff Mills (K. Smith, 1984). The objective
of the new co-operative was to buy and sell grain and also to provide farm supplies
and merchandise, receiving commissions on the sale of goods and handling of grain
(Sandford, 1955). Over the next three decades until World War II, Westralian
Farmers Co-operative grew rapidly, and actively pursued agricultural supply,
marketing or processing opportunities in most agricultural sectors, such as grains,
dairy, horticulture, wool, cattle and sheep meat and honey.
Under the guidance of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, the agricultural cooperative sector in Western Australia evolved into two, highly inter-related, threads.
The first thread is that of Westralian Farmers Co-operative which directly owned cooperative branch retail stores in many country towns. 64 This thread also drove the
expansion of the agricultural co-operative movement in Western Australia for over a
half century, and provided the necessary level of coordination to ensure that growth.
Furthermore, this thread, again through necessity, adopted a ‘top down’ approach to
the development of the agricultural co-operative sector in Western Australia,
contrary to co-operative theory which suggests endogenous evolution (Craig, 1993;
Mathews, 1999).
The second thread was the formation in country towns of independent
merchandising co-operative stores owned by farmer members from the surrounding
area. These co-operatives were established in those small communities that had
sufficient zeal to form their own and therefore did not need to participate in the top

63 Following the success of the Western Australian Country Party, farm organisations supported the
establishment of Country Parties in Queensland in 1915, Victoria in 1917, South Australia 1918, New
South Wales 1919 and Tasmania in 1922. The Federal Country Party was formed in 1920 (The
Nationals, n.d.).
64 Westralian Farmers Co-operative head office was located in Perth, the capital of Western Australia.
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down Westralian Farmers Co-operative network of branch stores. These co-operative
stores were self-governing, and due to their atomistic evolution, tended to operate in
isolation from each other and to some extent without overall direction or
coordination from the wider agricultural co-operative sector (Sandford, 1955). Over
time, many of these stores were absorbed into the Westralian Farmers Co-operative
network as agents. Sandford (1955, p 45) indicates that by 1919, only four years after
it formed, Westralian Farmers Co-operative had a country town network of 65 local
co-operatives, either as directly owned branches or agents, demonstrating a high
level of goodwill between the endogenous and exogenous co-operative threads. In
this period, Westralian Farmers Co-operative also agitated to form a peak body, the
Co-operative Federation of Western Australia. As a result of this, the separate
threads of the agricultural co-operative sector were further integrated into a cohesive
movement under its own peak body.
This intense first wave of co-operative development over a relatively short
period, demonstrated a passionate and active social movement in rural Western
Australia in these early years. Munro (2003) reports, from first hand discussions
many years later with the co-operative champions involved, that they were extremely
active and busy over this period, travelling throughout Western Australia, often in
difficult conditions, promoting the co-operative option to agriculturally dependent
rural townships. The strategy of developing a network of local level multi-purpose
retail co-operatives was successful and facilitated imitation in other rural
communities, reinforcing the mutual self-help attitude already instilled in rural
regions. Munro (2003) argues that the ease of duplicating the Westralian Farmers
Co-operative successful formula for country town co-operatives contributed to the
spread of the co-operative business model in rural Western Australia. By the
outbreak of WWII, a coordinated system of co-operative farm and domestic supply,
and commodity transport and handling services operated in most country towns from
Esperance to Geraldton under the aegis of the Westralian Farmers Co-operative
network of directly owned or affiliated country town based co-operatives (K. Smith,
1984).
Westralian Farmers Co-operative also gained an early impetus in the
agricultural industry when it was appointed by the Western Australian government as
an agent to collect the grain harvest during the difficult years of World War I up to
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1922 when the compulsory scheme ended (K. Smith, 1984). The success of
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and its country town co-operative store network in
achieving the grain collection task developed strong farmer loyalty towards the cooperative concept and further entrenched the structure in the minds of country people
(K. Smith, 1984, p 67). It also demonstrated to the Western Australian government
the ability of farmer controlled co-operatives to benefit the economic well-being of
farmers in regional Western Australia, and therefore the State’s economy. The
contribution of agricultural co-operatives to the agricultural industry and the
economy subsequently stimulated a positive Western Australian government public
policy framework for agricultural co-operatives that endured for several decades (K.
Smith, 1984).
Nevertheless, Westralian Farmers Co-operative did face some difficulties.
The co-operative’s grain pool activities experienced growing competition from
private grain merchants during the 1920s. These grain merchants offered farmers
immediate cash payments compared to the part cash, part deferred payment system
of Westralian Farmers Co-operative (K. Smith, 1984). Concurrently, during this
period a new group of soldier settler farmers opened up virgin regions in the
wheatbelt. These soldier settlers were unfamiliar with Westralian Farmers Cooperative’s earlier contribution to the economic and social infrastructure of wheatbelt
farmers and were therefore unaware of and uncommitted to the co-operative ethos.
Their lack of knowledge about the co-operative philosophy further enabled the
private grain merchants to gain a foothold in grain handling and selling.
This new scenario for the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector
during the 1920s, following very quickly on its earlier success, demonstrates the
fragility of the co-operative movement. It confirms the need to consistently promote
the concept within the agricultural industry and to ensure that agricultural cooperatives continue to provide an economic and social benefit to member farm
businesses to retain relevance and hence loyalty.
Notwithstanding this challenge from private grain merchants, Westralian
Farmers Co-operative’s experience in the grains industry as the government agent
encouraged it to explore strategies to introduce a voluntary farmer pool for the bulk
handling of grain. It had attempted to introduce bulk handling directly after WWI but
circumstances frustrated this development (see K. Smith, 1984, chapter 6).
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Westralian Farmers Co-operative, in conjunction with the predecessor of the current
Western Australian Farmers’ Federation (WAFF), was instrumental in forming CBH
in 1933. Close connections between Westralian Farmers Co-operative and an
agricultural co-operative based in London, Overseas Farmers, jointly formed by
several Australian farmer co-operatives as a marketing agent, ensured that all profits
from the sale of grain went to farmers rather than ‘middle men’ (K. Smith, 1984).
Westralian Farmers Co-operative was also involved with the formation of some
Statutory Marketing Authorities, such as the Honey Pool, the Grain Pool and the
Australian Wheat Board (Sandford, 1955; K. Smith, 1984).
These activities demonstrated that the Westralian Farmers Co-operative was
purposefully undertaking a public good function, via its economic development role
on behalf of the wider agricultural industry, rather than simply focusing on providing
goods, services or infrastructure to its members within the grains industry. Although
most Westralian Farmers Co-operative activities contributed to the financial growth
of the co-operative, its commitment to the wider agricultural industry influenced it to
supply a farmer needed function in any agricultural commodity, even if it financially
stretched the co-operative or did not earn a surplus over the cost of undertaking the
activity (Munro, 2003). The involvement of Westralian Farmers Co-operative in the
economic viability of the dairy industry in the mid 1920s illustrates this approach
(see K. Smith, 1984, chapter 9).
As Westralian Farmers Co-operative expanded into other agricultural
industry sectors, it elected to incorporate the different industry sector co-operative
activities as divisions under the one organisational and administrative banner of
Westralian Farmers Co-operative, rather than develop separate co-operative entities
(Sandford, 1955). This was viewed as desirable as the small population base of
Western Australia could not absorb the additional administrative costs associated
with forming separate co-operatives (Sandford, 1955). The wisdom of this strategy at
that time was confirmed by the difficulties of some independent co-operatives that
struggled to survive while Westralian Farmers Co-operative continued to grow from
the benefits of organisational economies of scale. However, as a long-term strategy,
it has had negative impacts on the viability of the agricultural co-operative sector in
Western Australia as discussed below.

72

The success of Westralian Farmers Co-operative in the agricultural industry
is also partly attributed to its understanding of the biophysical and cyclical nature of
the agricultural industry, often characterised by ‘booms and busts’ (K. Smith, 1984).
Other for-profit providers of comparable services were not prepared over the long
term to accept the risks associated with the unpredictable elements inherent in the
agricultural industry. Unlike an IOF, Westralian Farmers Co-operative provided
services to farmers in the knowledge that in any one year, a farmer can experience
difficulty but rebound profitably in the following season (K. Smith, 1984).
Supporting farmers in down times in turn created a great deal of member loyalty
towards the co-operative, as members recognised that their financial well-being was
intimately enmeshed with that of the co-operative’s activities. During this period, the
symbiotic relationship between the co-operative and its members across different
commodities created a virtuous and mutually beneficial circle of collective self-help
in the agricultural industry.
As Westralian Farmers Co-operative matured as an organisation, a subtle
change in direction occurred. The co-operative started to provide a diverse range of
farm services that were not directly related to the actual production of a commodity,
such as the provision of finance, insurance, leasing and taxation advice. The cooperative continued to demonstrate its on-going commitment to the wider
agricultural co-operative sector by exploring international opportunities in
agricultural co-operative activity that could be applied in Western Australia (K.
Smith, 1984). Additionally, a number of technical commodity production or handling
innovations were introduced to Western Australia as a result of Westralian Farmers
Co-operative enthusiasm to look internationally for solutions to local issues (K.
Smith, 1984).
The Waning of the Western Australian Agricultural Co-operative Sector
By the 1960s, Westralian Farmers Co-operative had tentacles in virtually
every activity connected with assisting farmers in the production and marketing of
their commodities and conducting a farm business. A vast network of retail cooperatives in most country towns also underpinned it. Due to the vastness and
influence of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, those associated with agricultural cooperatives thought that there would always be a significant place for this business

73

structure in the Western Australian agricultural industry (Munro, 2003). The Western
Australian agricultural co-operative sector, under the auspices of Westralian Farmers
Co-operatives, was well established institutionally, well supported by its membership
and highly influential in a public policy sense. In spite of this confidence about the
longevity and embeddedness of the co-operative business model in the economic and
social viability of the agricultural industry, by the 1960s, the golden era of
agricultural co-operatives was gradually waning. The large number of country town
agricultural co-operatives still operating under the highly successful Westralian
Farmers Co-operative network masked this shift, although with hindsight, one
indicator of the change in the Western Australian co-operative movement was the
increasing pace in winding up defunct retail agricultural co-operatives in country
towns. 65 However, as Westralian Farmers Co-operative continued to grow in
organisational size and economic power, the awareness of the trend and its
implications for the agricultural industry and the Western Australian co-operative
movement did not become apparent to the agricultural co-operative sector until much
later (Munro, 2003). The agricultural co-operative sector had inadvertently instituted
its own subsequent decline.
The success of Westralian Farmers Co-operative created a self-contained and
self-sustaining agricultural co-operative sector functioning in a relatively closed
system without external input for several decades. Although Westralian Farmers Cooperative was internationally connected to the wider co-operative movement, there
was no need for any new impetus to the co-operative movement in Western Australia
for over forty years. Any additional service required by farmers was provided
directly by Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Alternatively, the co-operative
influenced the environment to ensure that another co-operative or company was
established under its auspices to deliver the service. As Westralian Farmers Cooperative was able to successfully meet the needs of farmers via its own unique
approach, the agricultural co-operative sector did not need to change its strategy to
maintain the viability and vivacity of the co-operative movement.

65 Sandford (1955) notes that prior to the Depression a number of agricultural co-operatives also
folded. He cites several reasons for this, such as inadequate capital, insufficient local support (which
Sandford argues leads to inadequate capital), poor or dishonest management, the early pioneering
efforts to establish an agricultural industry in certain regions proved to be misjudged and therefore the
co-operative also failed, or in some regions a natural conservatism did not facilitate a collective
approach.
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Paradoxically, the success of Westralian Farmers Co-operative unwittingly
created a dependency and vulnerability in the wider agricultural co-operative sector
on the goodwill of Westralian Farmers Co-operative. As the co-operative movement
grew throughout Western Australia, it became much more difficult for farmer
members to understand its complexity (Sandford, 1955). With the increasing
intricacy, fewer people were inclined to expend the effort to become involved, which
led to the burden falling on declining numbers of highly committed individuals. An
outcome of this was that management started to assume roles ordinarily undertaken
by the Board of Directors or members, creating the environment for co-operative
managers to exert greater influence over the strategic direction of the agricultural cooperative. 66 Sandford (1955) suggests, even as early as the 1950s, that the increasing
reliance of co-operative businesses on their management and executive for
administration and planning contributed to the diminishing role of agricultural cooperatives. This unwittingly further perpetuated the problem of an increasing
knowledge and power gulf between members and the individuals employed to
manage co-operative activities on their behalf.
Sandford (1955) lamented that farmer members had not become more
involved with and fully informed about the Western Australian co-operative
movement. Sandford was prepared to accept, due to the hardship of establishing their
farms, why the first generation of member shareholders did not become active
participants in the movement and understand how it contributed to the economic
viability of their farm enterprises. However, he commented that the second
generation of farmers in the post-war years were no more aware of the co-operative
movement then their fathers.
In their enthusiasm to establish the agricultural co-operative sector in
Western Australia, the founding co-operative champions appeared to have neglected
the co-operative principle of education. They did not, for example, set up adult
education centres as practised by the co-operatives established in British Columbia
(Mathews, 1999; Wilkinson & Quarter, 1996). The focus on education in British
Columbia, both generic and co-operative specific, developed an understanding by

66 The tension between agricultural co-operative Boards, chairs and senior executives is explored via
principal-agent theory in Chapter Five and Chapter Eight.
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these individuals of how the wider economic and social systems could disadvantage
them (Wilkinson & Quarter, 1996).
Smith (1984) notes the willingness of Westralian Farmers Co-operative
executives and Board members to travel to the UK to secure markets for agricultural
commodities, and to the US and Canada to observe new developments in agricultural
co-operative plant and equipment and understand the workings of Statutory
Marketing Authorities. These international trips reflect a technical orientation rather
than undertaking education according to the co-operative principle. There is little
evidence of key actors associated with the Western Australian co-operative
movement or agricultural co-operatives seeking to understand the nature of the
unique co-operative business structure or embed the spirit of co-operativeness within
the rural communities. This can partly explain Sandford’s lament that the agricultural
co-operative sector in Western Australia did not truly embrace the idealism of the cooperative movement, rather adopting the model in a pragmatic way as long as it
provided economic and social benefits.
Other developments emerging from the 1960s can also explain the gradual
decline in the agricultural co-operative sector. ‘Entrepreneurs’ 67 started to promote
co-operatives for reasons unrelated to the co-operative principles. These reasons
included the taxation benefits specifically for agricultural co-operatives under the
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, or to remove a proposed
agricultural business from the requirements of the extant Western Australian
Corporations Act, or to exploit some weakness in the Western Australian Companies
(Co-operative) Act 1943 (Munro, 2003). The philosophy motivating the early cooperative champions was not evident in these latter promoters of the co-operative
business structure.
Munro also identified the contribution, during the 1960s, of professional
advisors, such as accountants, financiers and solicitors, to the decline of the cooperative sector, as they recommended the corporate structure to farmers over the cooperative structure. This development illustrated the declining knowledge base of the
co-operative structure outside of the few key co-operative actors still active at the

67 This is the term used by Munro (2003), which was in vogue in Western Australia during the 1980s
to describe individuals such as Alan Bond. A more contemporary term to describe this type of activity
in agriculture may be ‘management consultant’ or ‘agribusiness management consultant’.
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time. Public servants also did not have an intrinsic interest in the co-operative
structure, also partly explaining the decline of the model (Munro, 2003). It is
insightful that these factors were starting to frustrate the viability of the agricultural
co-operative sector in the 1960s, as it indicates a waning in the agricultural cooperative sector that has been evident for several decades.68
Another possible explanation for the declining agricultural co-operative
sector from the 1960s can be based around the concept of co-operative development
as an expression of a farmer initiated social movement as discussed in Mooney &
Gray (2002). The first phase of Western Australia’s co-operative movement grew out
of the economic and social difficulties facing farmers at the time. These primitive
conditions and the economic adversity endured by farmers created the circumstances
where people seek to improve their situation via innovative strategies based on
mutual self-help. In this situation, it is possible to garner support from the
disadvantaged for new approaches to overcome their hardship. However, as the
Western Australian agricultural industry developed and prospered, the social and
economic conditions for farmers and rural communities also improved. As Sandford
(1955, p 299) stated ‘the pioneering atmosphere that surrounded the birth of cooperation has gone.’ Consequently, the difficult conditions that created the drive to
form agricultural co-operatives had been resolved and some co-operatives became
less important and closed down, leading to their diminishing numbers.
Munro supported this view, suggesting that the Westralian Farmers Cooperative was very successful in enhancing farmers’ economic well being. Therefore,
the original economic hardships that stimulated the formation of local co-operative
stores had been alleviated and they were no longer needed (Munro, 2003). He argued
that these co-operatives had achieved their function of correcting market failure and
that by the 1960s, the private sector was able to profitably provide the services and
products that previously could only be provided by co-operatives (Munro, 2003). To
illustrate, by this time, supermarkets and private sector farm machinery agents were
able to compete successfully with the co-operative merchandising stores (Munro,
2003).

68 The interviews conducted for this thesis demonstrate that in the first years of the 21st century, the
factors identified by Munro continue to thwart the standing of the agricultural co-operative model.
The significant difference today is that neo-classical economic theory confers a legitimacy on actors
when they dismiss the validity of the agricultural co-operative model.

77

Munro considered that improving technology also changed the external
environment for co-operatives. Better roads and cars enabled rural people to travel
more cheaply and efficiently to larger regional centres for goods and services, thus
bypassing their local retail co-operative. Clearly co-operative member loyalty to the
local co-operative was diminishing and this provided the space for for-profit actors to
enter. Munro’s rationale for the declining number and influence of agricultural cooperatives is consistent with Nourse’s competitive yardstick theory for agricultural
co-operatives (Nourse, 1922, cited in Cook, 1995, Torgerson et al., 1997). Nourse
considered that agricultural co-operatives should operate in a market as a competitive
yardstick to ensure that IOFs behave appropriately and that the market would operate
efficiently (Cobia, 1989). Once a market became competitive as a result of the cooperative participating in the market, then the role of the co-operative was fulfilled
and they could exit the market (Nourse, 1922, cited in Torgerson et al., 1997).
Munro, while unfamiliar with Nourse’s theory, found it related well to his own
observations of the evolution of Western Australia’s agricultural co-operative sector.
As small agricultural co-operatives were undergoing change, Munro (2003)
also identified that significant transformation was occurring within the dominant
Westralian Farmers Co-operative itself. He argued that by the 1950s, Westralian
Farmers Co-operative had operationally and psychologically evolved from a cooperative to a corporation. In 1984, when Westralian Farmers Co-operative
converted to the company Wesfarmers, Munro (2003) believed that its farmer
members recognised it was a reasonable step for the co-operative to take.
The Conversion of Westralian Farmers Co-operative to Wesfarmers
In 1984, the Westralian Farmers Co-operative Board proposed that the Board
restructure itself as a corporation, and this was subsequently endorsed by its
membership. 69 The Board was concerned about the possibility of a hostile takeover
of the co-operative. According to Madden (2003b), and confirmed by Munro (2003)
and Booth (2004), the co-operative’s $2.00 share (par value) was backed by net
assets which reflected approximately $12.00 value per share. The Board believed
that a significant number of members could be enticed to sell their $2.00 shares for a

69 See Plunkett (1999) for more information about the restructure of Westralian Farmers Cooperative.

78

higher price to a ‘corporate raider’, who would then control the co-operative (Munro,
2003). 70
In recognition of the effectiveness of the agricultural co-operative model to
ensure farmer control and ward off takeover bids, Wesfarmers preserved two features
of the co-operative business structure in its new corporate structure. The first was the
retention of the overarching co-operative structure via Westralian Farmers Cooperative, which held 60 per cent of Wesfarmers shares. The second strategy was
the holding of a single founders share (often referred to as the ‘golden share’) 71 in
Wesfarmers by the overarching co-operative. These mechanisms were subject to
five-year reviews by the Wesfarmers Board.
By 2001, the Wesfarmers Board elected to wind up the Westralian Farmers
Co-operative. 72 Booth (2004) argued that Wesfarmers made this decision as it no
longed needed the safeguard mechanism provided by the overarching co-operative
structure to protect Wesfarmers from a hostile takeover. Wesfarmers had, by this
time, also evolved into a highly successful Australia-wide company. The threat of a
hostile takeover bid had become highly unlikely, as it would require substantial funds
to achieve this outcome. 73 Thus, the Westralian Farmers Co-operative story ended
and its successor, Wesfarmers, was now totally in the corporate world.
Munro (2003) accounted for the transition of Westralian Farmers Cooperative to a corporation by the following sequence of events. When Westralian
Farmers Co-operative was the wholesaler to a large network of retail co-operatives in
country towns, the major source of cash flow was the commission it earned on
selling goods and services to members. Westralian Farmers Co-operative was
structured to devolve democratic power to its members, which is a key element of a
co-operative structure. The 30 or 40 managers of the country town retail co-

70 An agricultural co-operative, Pivot, was the target of an unsuccessful takeover bid by a private
‘corporate raider’, Mr Don Shears, in 1987 (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).
71 The Westralian Farmers Co-operative ‘golden share’ was a nominal share held by the co-operative
that gave it the right of a decisive vote in the new company of Wesfarmers. Thus the co-operative
retained the right to veto all other Wesfarmers shareholders, ensuring the control of the co-operative
over the corporation.
72 As part of its finalising its activities as a co-operative, Wesfarmers donated $5,000 to the CFWA
(Booth, 2004).
73 Wesfarmers also reorganised its structure at this time, which included dismantling of the Franked
Income Fund. This was another vehicle within the Wesfarmers group to protect it from hostile
takeover. The CFWA had some shares in this fund and recouped several hundred thousand dollars by
selling them back to Wesfarmers (Booth, 2004).
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operatives established by Westralian Farmers Co-operative were closely aligned to
their local farmer members. The managers gained their power and authority from this
familiar connection with the local co-operative members and used this strength to
control and direct the Perth-based head office management team.
Over time, however, the city based businesses or services Westralian Farmers
Co-operative accumulated after WWII, such as finance and insurance services,
started to earn more ‘profit’ for Westralian Farmers Co-operative than the simple
commission based income from the co-operatives in the regions. As a result, the
managers of these city based business units gained a stronger voice due to their
contribution to Westralian Farmers Co-operative’s profitability. Correspondingly, the
regional branch management power base gradually eroded. This trend was intensified
as falling farm enterprise numbers also contributed to a declining member base.
Munro argued that this shift in power from the country town retail cooperatives to the city based managers effectively meant that Westralian Farmers Cooperative had transformed during the 1950s from a co-operative to a corporation in
behaviour and thinking, although it remained incorporated under co-operative
legislation. He also argued that this occurred incrementally and without the farmer
members being aware of it or understanding the implications for the Westralian
Farmers Co-operative structure of the shift in the power base from the country town
co-operatives to the managers of the commercially oriented Perth based business
units (Munro, 2003).
Eventually Westralian Farmers Co-operative’s change in direction resulting
from its growth and transition to profit driven business units stimulated its
subsequent restructure to a publicly listed corporation in the mid 1980s. Munro
(2003) unsentimentally contended that co-operatives can get too big for the cooperative structure and, under these circumstances, that it was appropriate that they
become corporations. This, he argued, was to be viewed as a successful outcome for
the individual co-operative, and not as a failure of the co-operative structure itself.
Westralian Farmers Co-operative Contribution to the Agricultural Cooperative Sector
Although Westralian Farmers Co-operative eventually became a corporation,
it is clear that it had a highly demonstrated commitment to the co-operative ethos.
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Munro (2003) argued that Westralian Farmers Co-operative was jealously supportive
of the co-operative sector. In the pre-WWI era, the co-operative champions
persuaded farmers to adopt the co-operative structure due to its capacity to garner
economic benefits for member farmers and exert some control over the supply chain.
Further, Westralian Farmers Co-operative initiated and supported the formation and
growth of other agricultural sector co-operatives within its own organisation. He
stated that Westralian Farmers Co-operative continued to provide services and
infrastructure to the agricultural co-operative sector and contribute funds to the State
and National Co-operative Federations up until the 1980s, even though it itself had
outgrown the structure by the 1950s (Munro, 2003). 74
The Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector, largely as a result of
being under the aegis of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, was clearly dominating
the wider Western Australian co-operative movement. To illustrate the strength and
influence of agricultural co-operative sector, a survey conducted in 1945 estimated
that there were 32,000 members of agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia
(Sandford, 1955). Sandford (1955, p 297) adds that in 1954, there were 52 country
co-operatives under the banner of Westralian Farmers Co-operative and only eight
non-agricultural consumer co-operatives. Five of these non-agricultural co-operatives
were located in metropolitan Perth, two in the Goldfields and one in the South West
(Sandford, 1955), demonstrating the historical imbalance between metropolitan nonagricultural co-operatives and rurally based agricultural co-operatives. The city and
metropolitan retail merchandising co-operatives failed to gain much traction or
influence in Western Australia or to provide new directions or stimulus to the overall
co-operative movement.
Furthermore, the agricultural co-operative sector gained an inferred power
based on its ability, via the agricultural industry, to contribute to the Western
Australian economy. According to Munro (2003), the influence and strength of the
agricultural industry encouraged a positive response from external actors, such as
politicians, public servants and farm advisors, to the co-operative model as the
preferred business structures adopted by the industry. Additionally, many of Western
Australia’s politicians were also from regional areas. Tonts (1998) notes that a

74 Indeed, Wesfarmers donated some funds to the CFWA in 2003 (Western Australian Department of
Consumer and Employment Protection, 2005a).
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political feature of rural Western Australia was a longstanding electoral
malapportionment that facilitated a disproportionate representation of rural voters
over metropolitan voters. This resulted in country electorates achieving greater
political representation than their populations warranted.

The notion of rural

electoral malapportionment evolved from the 1870s in acknowledgement of the
hardships of rural life and that much of Western Australia’s wealth came from
agriculture (Tonts, 1998). 75
With the prevalence of co-operatives in rural areas it was not uncommon for a
number of co-operative Directors to be in a politician’s electorate. The Directors
therefore had considerable access to lobby politicians about co-operative issues
(Munro, 2003). The CFWA, as the peak body, was well supported by the agricultural
co-operative sector and, combined with the effect of electoral malapportionment, was
therefore able to favourably influence political stakeholders, reinforcing strong
member support (Munro, 2003). It is clear that during the period of Munro’s links
with the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector, it functioned within an
advantageous State and Commonwealth level public policy framework for
agricultural co-operatives.
The Westralian Farmers Co-operative story demonstrates that the Western
Australian agricultural co-operative sector was very viable and deeply embedded into
the social and economic activity of farming from the 1920s to the 1950s. While
deviating from the Rochdale model, the top down strategy fostered by Westralian
Farmers Co-operative undoubtedly succeeded in establishing a successful
agricultural co-operative sector in regional Western Australia. Over time, Westralian
Farmers Co-operative’s objectives expanded to develop the necessary infrastructure
to service the needs of its farmer members and address market failure by developing
more competitive markets (Sandford, 1955, p v). Westralian Farmers Co-operative
matured over fifty or so years into a multipurpose agricultural co-operative providing
a diverse range of services and goods to farmers across different sectors. It was a
highly vertically integrated co-operative and operated in an international market. The
Westralian Farmers Co-operative demonstrates that over successive generations,
Western Australian farmers have been successfully functioning within the concepts
75 Electoral malapportionment remained in place until May 2005, when the Gallop Government
(Australian Labor Party) secured the passage of legislation to remove malapportionment
(Findlaw.com.au).
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of ‘vertical integration’, ‘supply chain’ and ‘globalisation’ for decades.
Paradoxically, much of the contemporary farm business literature urges farmers to
develop these concepts (Botteril, 2003). In reality, farmers have been, in a very
sophisticated manner, using their co-operative structures to achieve these outcomes
for many decades.
The Agricultural Co-operative Sector in the 1980s
With the conversion of Westralian Farmers Co-operative to Wesfarmers,
however, the agricultural co-operative sector lost its primary benefactor and
leadership. Additionally, the switch to the company of Wesfarmers occurred at a
time where the founding co-operative champions had retired and a second generation
of co-operative champions with similar passion for the co-operative model in the
wider agricultural industry failed to eventuate. Lastly, the conversion of Westralian
Farmers Co-operative also resulted in a gradual loss of political influence for the
agricultural co-operative sector and the CFWA.
Despite the slipping power of the agricultural co-operative sector, new
agricultural co-operatives still formed during the 1980s (Munro, 2003). Co-operative
Purchasing Services, a wholesale grocery co-operative; Capricorn Society, which
sources products and services on behalf of member co-operative service stations and
smash repairs; and Rural Traders Co-operative, a wholesale and retail agricultural
co-operative, formed in the late 1970s and 1980s. Munro (2003) remarked that Rural
Traders Co-operative was a grass roots agricultural co-operative initiated under the
banner of the Farmers Union (now WAFF), and was formed in response to the
increasing neglect by Wesfarmers of its farmer base. This conforms with Madden’s
(2003b) view that there will always be co-operatives in agriculture because as one
co-operative grows and successfully moves onto another plane, the vacuum left
behind will be filled by another agricultural co-operative.
Another agricultural co-operative trend arose in the 1980s. Rather than
coming from the traditional agricultural industries as in the first period of agricultural
co-operative development, many of these new co-operatives were niche based in
sunrise industries such as deer, rabbits, emu and olives. According to Munro (2003),
they mostly failed as agricultural co-operative ventures. As Munro (2003) explains,
the potential members in these niche sectors understood the co-operative concept at
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an intuitive level and this enabled initial discussions with potential members to
commence. However, at another level, probably financial, they were not prepared to
commit to the initiative when the critical time came, leading to the collapse of the cooperative business enterprise (Munro, 2003). Further, ventures into niche industries
were often sidelines to the main commodity of farm businesses. Unlike the first era
of co-operative development, often this meant that there was not a great financial
dependence by the proponents on the outcome of the experiment (Munro, 2003),
which potentially weakened their commitment to the co-operative venture.
Another factor was that many of the individuals involved in niche industries
were more geographically dispersed than those with one commodity in a defined
region (Munro, 2003). The lack of deep social and economic connections between
the producers, apart from the shared interest in the niche activity itself, also
contributed to the failure of these co-operatives. The success of Westralian Farmers
Co-operative demonstrates the requirement for some pre-existing connection
between members of a proposed co-operative to build the necessary trust to move to
the subsequent stages of forming the co-operative business and building its economic
viability. These close associations, often arising from hardship and cemented in other
agricultural or community based activities, were in place prior to the first wave of
Western Australia’s agricultural co-operatives. However, with the niche agricultural
industries this pre-existing trust and these networks were not so well established.
Munro thought that another major factor was that the farmers involved in
niche production generally lacked the ability to see past the actual production of the
niche product into developing it as a commercially viable consumer product for the
retail market place. The newness of knowledge involved in a niche industry also
undermined confidence to develop the co-operative venture over a longer period. He
also commented that, ironically, if the product did have some potential in the market
place, invariably a ‘cashed up capitalist’ would come in and take it to the market
place after the producer members of the niche sector co-operative had undertaken all
the early feasibility research and development (Munro, 2003).
While many of the niche co-operative initiatives did not succeed for long, the
continued interest in forming co-operatives demonstrated an ongoing knowledge in
the 1980s of the commercial benefits of the structure despite the decline in overall
agricultural co-operative activity. Interestingly, notwithstanding the lack of success
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of these niche based agricultural co-operatives during the 1980s, many of the
contemporary agricultural co-operatives in the agricultural co-operative mini-revival
have also formed in these sunrise industries. Booth (2004) argues that the future of
agricultural co-operatives in present day Western Australia is linked to these sunrise
industries with the formation of small agricultural co-operatives comprising five to
twenty members. Munro (2003), with his historical knowledge and perspective of the
Western Australian agricultural sector, argues that there will always be a need for
small interest groups with a commercial focus, and that these could be formed into
agricultural co-operatives. However, as has been demonstrated with recent activities
in these niche industries, the role of the external consultant (the ‘entrepreneur’)
threatens the potential for grower control and ownership of returns via the
agricultural co-operative model (Booth, 2004). Farmer groups presently involved in
developing several niche sectors, such as olives, have potential for commercial
success, and have been encouraged by professional advisors and consultants to use
the corporate rather than co-operative model to develop their industries. The longerterm wisdom of adopting a corporate business structure is debatable. However, the
authority of agribusiness consultants, supported by an institutional framework based
on neoliberalism, overshadows the limited advisory resources affiliated with the
contemporary Western Australian co-operative movement.
Another development during the 1980s in Western Australia’s co-operative
movement was a drive, initiated by the Western Australian government, to integrate
commercial co-operatives and non-profit community based organisations based on
co-operative sentiments (Munro, 2003). The Co-operative Federation of Victoria
(CFV) also notes the role of the Victorian government to try and amalgamate
commercial and community based co-operatives around this time (Co-operative
Federation of Victoria, n.d.). According to the CFV (n.d.), the Victorian government
funded two projects, one about employment co-operatives and the other housing cooperatives. Both initiatives failed, attributed to the Victorian government driving the
agenda in their development, rather than the grass roots endogenous approach found
in co-operative theory (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, n.d.). 76 Concurrently,
Kenyon (1983) was exploring the potential of community and worker co-operatives
76 Booth (2004) argues that co-operatives in Victoria are more community based co-operatives unlike
the commercially oriented co-operatives which are dominant in Western Australia. The development
of the Victorian co-operative legislation partly explains this orientation.
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in Western Australia. Munro (2003) participated in several State Government
initiated meetings to explore the amalgamation of commercial co-operatives and
community based activities under the co-operative movement banner. 77

He

commented that representatives from Western Australia’s commercially focused cooperatives, which were essentially businesses, found it very difficult to comprehend
the nature of a community oriented non-profit co-operative. Munro (2003) argues
that the philosophical divide between the non-profits and the commercial cooperatives was too great to enable a joint focus and the Western Australian impetus
in the early 1980s to integrate the two approaches died away. Another effort to
stimulate the community based co-operative sector was mounted in the late 1990s
with the formation of a peak body for community based ‘co-operatives’, funded by
the Lotteries Commission (Booth, 2004). It appears to have produced a website then
rapidly disappeared. The proposed Western Australian legislation for co-operatives 78
will embrace ‘non-trading’ co-operatives, which are essentially community based
non-profit entities, thus potentially revisiting the philosophical divide between
commercial and community co-operatives identified by Munro.
Decline in the Use of the Co-operative Structure
Munro (2003) attributes the underlying cause of the decline in the cooperative option to the lack of need for the agricultural co-operative in the
contemporary agricultural industry. He contrasts the early period of rapid
development in co-operatives that, he argues, formed in response to a need usually
associated with market failure, with the contemporary situation where there are few
agricultural co-operatives. By inverting the maxim of ‘need leads to co-operatives’ to
‘no co-operatives, therefore no need’, he is able to dispassionately explain the
decline in active agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia. Based on this
interpretation, he therefore argues that it is not appropriate to artificially stimulate
interest in the agricultural co-operative model if the need for it is not there. He
maintains that the highly institutionalised support for co-operatives in other parts of
the world, such as in the United States and Europe, mistakenly props up agricultural
77 The Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 does not cover non-commercial
entities, such as community-based organisations, even if these organisations philosophically embrace
the co-operative principles. Further, the Act prohibits entities not incorporated under this Act from
using the term ‘co-operative’ in their registered name.
78 Appendix Two discusses the Western Australian development of new legislation for co-operatives.
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co-operatives and enables them to continue for the time being. This, he argues,
simply masks the fact that the real need for agricultural co-operatives has passed
(Munro, 2003). Later chapters in this thesis provide alternative explanations for the
present day circumstances confronting agricultural co-operatives and their role
within the changing environment of the Western Australian agricultural industry.
Conclusion
This chapter established that the severe economic and social conditions
experienced in the emerging agricultural industry of the early 20th century triggered
the early co-operative movement in Western Australia. Further, this period produced
arguably the most famous agricultural co-operative in Western Australia - Westralian
Farmers Co-operative. Westralian Farmers Co-operative underscored the role of an
agricultural co-operative in contributing to the economic viability and social wellbeing of the agricultural industry. The Western Australian agricultural co-operative
sector, symbolised by Westralian Farmers Co-operative, subsequently enjoyed
several decades of political and economic influence.
In the mid 1980s, Westralian Farmers Co-operative converted to the
corporation, Wesfarmers. Implicit in this conversion is a proposition that the most
appropriate pathway for a successful co-operative is towards a corporate structure. Its
conversion also impacted in other areas of the agricultural co-operative sector,
particularly the ability of the peak body to ensure that the co-operative movement
functioned in a favourable public policy environment. The role of the peak body is
explored in depth in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE

The CFWA: The Peak Body for the Western Australian Co-operative
Movement

Introduction
Inherent in co-operative philosophy is the belief that co-operatives foster a
broader movement by co-operating with other co-operatives. The sixth value of the
Statement on the Co-operative Identity is:
Co-operation among co-operatives - Co-operatives serve their
members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement
by working together through local, national, regional and international
structures. (International Co-operative Alliance, n.d.).
One way to develop a wider co-operative movement is to establish and
support a peak body. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of the peak
body for the Western Australian co-operative movement, the Co-operative
Federation of Western Australia (CFWA). The CFWA is a significant organisation in
this thesis, as it has a direct relationship with, and bearing on, the well-being of the
co-operative movement, the agricultural co-operative sector and hence agricultural
co-operatives in Western Australia.
This chapter reviews the current role of the CFWA, its organisational
structure and its evolution as the peak body. The chapter analyses an array of
challenges confronting the CFWA as it undertakes its complex peak body role of
representing its members and the co-operative movement to government and the
wider community while concurrently providing services and benefits to its
membership. The analysis is particularly interested in the way the CFWA adjusts to
the changing political and economic landscape of Australia emanating from
economic reform.
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As identified in Chapter One, several significant events occurred with this
organisation during the research for this thesis. In 2004, the Co-operative Federation
of Western Australia (Inc) changed its registered trading name to Co-operatives
WA. 79 The re-badging was part of a wider organisational restructure that included
the abolition of the full-time staff position of Executive Officer and the incumbent,
Mr John Booth, was made redundant. The Board of Directors subsequently
contracted the secretariat function of the peak body to an executive management
services consultant, Mr Peter Wells, of Peter Wells and Associates Pty. Ltd.
Additionally, at the time of the restructure; several new Directors to the Board were
elected. 80
These developments, to some extent, have complicated the narrative of this
chapter. A large amount of the research for this chapter occurred during the former
Executive Officer’s incumbency and shaped much of the analysis of peak body
behaviour. 81 With the change of name, structure and personnel, some of the
commentary is now historical. However, the insights of peak body behaviour
captured in the earlier research are pertinent to the overall argument of this thesis.
The CFWA as the Peak Body
The CFWA is the peak body for co-operatives incorporated in Western
Australia under the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 and the Co-operative and
Provident Societies Act 1903. The CFWA was formed in 1919 under its original
name, the Co-operative Federation of Western Australia. It is the oldest co-operative
movement peak body in Australia and has been continuously operational since its
incorporation. The CFWA, as an organisation, is itself incorporated as an association
under the Western Australian Associations Incorporation Act 1987. As required by
this Act, the CFWA is democratically structured. Its membership elects member co-

79 As the incorporated name of the peak body remains the Co-operative Federation of Western
Australia (Inc), and to simplify the narrative, the acronym CFWA is used throughout this thesis.
80 The CFWA refers to its Board of Directors as a Council.
81 While much of the research was conducted during the period in which the former Executive
Officer, Mr John Booth, was employed by the CFWA, the final draft of this chapter of the thesis
occurred after the restructure. For clarification, references to the individual employed as the Executive
Officer will continue to refer to him as such. The individual contracted to undertake the secretariat
function in early 2004 is referred to as the Secretary.
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operatives to form the CFWA Council. 82 In turn, the co-operatives elected to the
Council nominate representatives from their co-operative to sit on Council.
Currently, the Council comprises eight member co-operatives. A contracted
secretariat consultancy firm services the Council representatives and attends to the
day-to-day affairs of the CFWA.
Only business entities incorporated under the Western Australian
Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 or the Co-operative and Provident Societies
Act 1903 can become members of the CFWA. 83 The CFWA does not represent other
member based mutual organisations, such as housing co-operatives, building
societies, credit unions and friendly societies, which have their own peak bodies
(Griffiths, 2004). 84 A diverse range of industries and activities forms the basis of the
CFWA membership, such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Newspapers
Taxi cabs
Travel Agents (Wholesale)
Agriculture - supply, marketing, value adding in a range of traditional
and new niche industries such as inland aquaculture, carob and olives
Fishing
Irrigation
Storage containers, freight
Rural community development
Merchandising - retail and wholesale in grocery, farm machinery,
hardware
Services to Agriculture - grain handling, storage and marketing,
abattoirs

In May 2005, 71 co-operatives were incorporated under the Corporations
(Co-operative) Act 1943 or the 1903 Act, and listed on the Western Australian
Department of Consumer and Employment Protection database of co-operatives
(2005a). 85 All but one of these registered co-operatives was ‘active’; that is,
82 The Council is analogous to a Board and in subsequent parts of this chapter, reference is made to
the activities of a Board.
83 There are only a few CFWA member co-operatives registered under the Co-operative and
Provident Societies Act 1903.
84 The peak bodies for these mutual organisations are not part of this research. The fragmentation of
the mutual and co-operative sectors and the consequent lack of an overarching national peak body for
all mutual and co-operative organisations is one of the contributing factors to the marginalised
position of the co-operative movement in Australia.
85 The Department of Consumer and Employment Protection is responsible for administering this
legislation. During the course of this research, the Department of Consumer and Employment
Protection reviewed the status of co-operatives registered under its legislation. In late 2003, it was
estimated that there were approximately 80 Co-operatives were registered with the Department
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operational and trading on a commercial basis. Of these 70 active co-operatives, 48
were members of the CFWA (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2004b).
These figures demonstrate that the CFWA represented almost 70 per cent of
registered co-operatives, which is a respectable membership density. 86 Despite this
high density, the CFWA membership has declined from 52 in 1994 to the present 48
members (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2004b).
Membership fees are the main source of recurrent income for the CFWA. A
few larger co-operative members contribute funds in addition to their membership
fee as benefactors of the peak body. The CFWA also sources funds from fee based
consultancy services to both existing and newly forming co-operatives and generates
some profit from its annual conferences. A special levy was applied to members in
2002, which raised $24,000 to assist members with professional development related
to the proposed co-operatives legislation to replace the Companies (Co-operative)
Act 1943. 87 The Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment
Protection (DOCEP) also contributed $15,000 in 2003 for the CFWA to provide
advice to its membership about the proposed legislation (Interviewee 659, 2003). The
CFWA also has some cash investments. Despite the recurrent sources of income and
ad hoc special grants from government departments, the CFWA struggled to balance
its annual income and annual expenses, resulting in the need from time to time to
draw down on its investments (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 797, 2004). 88
A significant issue facing the CFWA is the drafting of new Western
Australian legislation for the co-operative movement to replace the Companies (Cooperative) Act 1943 and ensure greater consistency in legislation for co-operatives
across all Australian States. The issue of new co-operatives legislation has been
bubbling along for over a decade. Some recent impetus is evident, with an Industry
Reference Group established by the Minister for Consumer and Employment

(Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, 2005a). Of these 80
registered co-operatives, about 55 were operational (Booth, 2004; Western Australian Department of
Consumer and Employment Protection, 2005a). In the same time frame, the CFWA had a membership
of 48 co-operatives (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2005b; Interviewee 649, 2003).
86 Membership density is the percentage measurement of membership of all eligible co-operatives
belonging to the CFWA. It is determined by dividing the number of CFWA members (48) by the total
number of eligible co-operatives which are still operating (approximately 70).
87 Appendix Two examines the progress of updated legislation for co-operatives in Western
Australia.
88 The CFWA 2005 conference suggested that this situation was stabilising (Co-operative Federation
of Western Australia, 2005b).
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Protection in 2004 to advise on the new co-operatives legislation in Western
Australia (Newcombe, 2005). Another issue absorbing the Council’s energy is
implementing the new strategic plan following its restructure in 2004. Particular foci
of the strategic plan are governance and membership education issues, and ensuring
the peak body’s ongoing financial security (Co-operative Federation of Western
Australia, 2003b).
The Role of a Peak Body in the Co-operative Movement
Sandford (1955) and Kenyon (1983) provide insights into the historical role
of the CFWA. Writing in the mid 1950s, Sandford (1955, p 304) stated that the
CFWA was a ‘strictly non-political and non-sectarian body, with its main object the
promotion of co-operative activities’. The political neutrality of the CFWA is also
repeated by Kenyon (1983, p 156), who stated that the CFWA was structured as a
‘non-profit, non-political, non-sectarian, non-trading body’. 89
Kenyon (1983) 90 provided additional information on the functions and
services offered by the CFWA in the 1980s. He stated that the primary objective of
the CFWA was to ‘co-operate and promote Co-operatives actively within Western
Australia’ (Kenyon, 1983, p 157). Some excerpts from the extensive list of activities
of the CFWA quoted by Kenyon were to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Collaborate with interstate and overseas organisations
Encourage trade between Co-operatives
Extend its activities into the social and cultural field
Promote and protect the recognised co-operative principles
Advise and encourage Co-operatives in successful business
methods
Provide a channel through which Co-operatives can make
representations to governments
Overview legislative changes

89 The strong focus on political neutrality in the CFWA may be explained by the 1914 farmer
meeting discussed in Chapter Four, which resulted in the creation of the Country Party to address
political issues on behalf of farmers. Farmers at this meeting also voted to form the Westralian
Farmers Co-operative to pursue economic factors on behalf of its farmer members. The two new
entities strictly demarcated the political and economic pursuits. Perhaps this exacting separation also
carried across into the co-operative movement peak body, accounting for the non-political and nonsectarian nature of the CFWA.
90 Kenyon’s (1983) report to the Western Australian State Labor Government concerned the potential
of the co-operative model for both community based and self-employment business ventures as a
possible employment strategy.
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•

Provide a central organisation for the promotion, development,
protection and assistance for co-operative activity.

Kenyon recorded a number of specific member services provided by the
CFWA during the 1980s, such as advice on accounting and banking, preparation of
annual financial reports and organising training and development activities. He also
referred to a range of administrative services to the Board of Directors, such as the
organisation of district, regional and State-wide meetings. Lastly, Kenyon noted the
capacity of the CFWA, in assuming the function of Secretary of the Co-operative
Federation Trust Limited, to sign legal documents. The Co-operative Federation
Trust Ltd was a registered company which had legislative and fund administration
functions (Sandford, 1955; K. Smith, 1984) as specified in the Corporations (Cooperative) Act 1943. 91 This therefore directly involved the CFWA in the legislative
functions related to the formation, liquidating and changing of co-operative rules.
According to Munro (2003), this CFWA function was entrenched in the co-operative
legislation to ensure that business ventures that were not genuine co-operatives did
not attempt to form under the co-operative legislation to escape other legislative
requirements demanded by, for example, the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001
or its predecessors.
In August 2003, the CFWA Board of Directors ratified a new Strategic Plan
which states that the purpose of the peak body is to be ‘The representative body for
the promotion and development of the co-operative movement in WA’ (Co-operative
Federation of Western Australia, 2003b, p 1). Its vision is ‘To be recognised as a
leading authority on the Co-operative movement in Australia making a significant
contribution to Western Australian business and society achieved through the active
participation and commitment of its members’ (Co-operative Federation of Western
Australia, 2003b, p 1). The political neutrality emphasised in both Sandford and
Kenyon’s work is absent in this latest interpretation of the role of the CFWA.
The range of services provided by the CFWA in 2004 includes:

91 In mid 2004, as part of the restructure of the CFWA, the Co-operative Federation Trust was
incorporated into the CFWA for organisational efficiency, then subsequently wound up (Co-operative
Federation of Western Australia, 2005b).
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•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Development programs, seminars and workshops for cooperative Directors and managers on co-operative principles,
governance and good commercial practices.
Consultation with and presentations to State government on
the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 and matters affecting
the development of Co-operatives in general or an individual
co-operative
Assistance with formation of co-operative companies.
Advice and assistance to co-operatives on administrative
matters including statutory obligations.
Advice and assistance to co-operatives trading across State
borders on implication of other State co-operative legislation
and corporations law.
Promotion and facilitation of co-operative between cooperatives - intrastate, interstate and internationally.
Organisation of professional annual conference for members
and persons interested in co-operative activity.
As a member of the Co-operative Council of Australia Inc, the
CFWA provides an influential avenue through which
submissions can be made on matters of national importance.
Maintenance of a register of members and details of other
Western Australian registered co-operatives. (Co-operative
Federation of Western Australia, 2004a)

The evolution and range of the CFWA activities outlined above reflect its
particular approach as a peak body. A peak body can be defined as:
A representative organisation that provides information dissemination
services, membership support, coordination, advocacy and
representation, and research and policy development services for its
members and other interested parties, (though) it does not involve
direct service delivery. (Industry Commission, 1995, p 181; cited in
Melville, 2003, p 3)
Another definition of a peak body is:
An organisation, with other organisations as members, formed to
represent the collective views of its members to government, to the
community and to other bodies. (Hamilton & Barwick, 1993, p 17;
cited in Melville, 2003, p 3)
Melville (2003) argues that there is a gap in the literature and theory about
the role, function and behaviour of this type of organisation. Melville’s (2003)
research provides insight into the operation of community services sector peak
bodies and their relationship with government in influencing public policy while
these organisations concurrently adjust to different economic circumstances arising
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from a market economy. Notwithstanding the earlier definitions, Melville has settled
on the following statement of a peak body as:
A non-government organisation whose membership consists of
smaller organisations of allied interests. The peak body thus offers a
strong voice for the specific community sector in the areas of
lobbying government, community education and information sharing
between member groups and interested parties. (Melville, 2003, p 5)
Melville argues that this definition captures ‘the intermediary position of
peaks in relation to the development of government policy, their duty of
representing, informing the particular sectors that form their constituency, and the
communication of information to the wider community’ (Melville, 2003, p 5).
Melville’s definition suggests that a peak body consists of three sets of important
relationships. The first is between the peak body and the State or government. The
second concerns the link between the represented, the membership, and the
representative, that is the peak body. The final relationship involves the peak body
and the wider community.
The CFWA is much more industry based than the community services peak
bodies in Melville’s research. Further the CFWA represents a membership focused
on commercial rather than community issues. However, similarities occur in the role
of both sectors’ peak bodies and the external environment in which they operate. In
the same way as the community sector, the Western Australian co-operative
movement and its peak body is also adjusting to the impact of the market economy
on co-operatives and seeking to ensure that government policy does not discriminate
against the co-operative movement. Therefore, Melville’s research is a valuable
starting point to analyse the efficacy of co-operative movement peak bodies in
undertaking this role.
A comparison of the CFWA and the Canadian Co-operative Association, the
Federal level peak body for the Canadian co-operative movement, and the United
States National Co-operative Business Association, is instructive to identify
similarities and differences between these peak bodies in representing their
respective co-operative movements. Australia does not have directly comparable
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national level peak bodies to these two organisations. 92 However, the United States
and Canada are, to some extent, also confronting the impact of agricultural
restructuring and it is reasonable to suggest that the peak bodies representing the cooperative sectors in these countries would face similar issues to peak bodies in
Australia. Further, the literature review identifies that much of the literature and
research in relation to agricultural co-operatives emanates from these two countries.
Therefore, a review of their peak bodies is informative for Australian co-operative
movement peak bodies.
The Canadian Co-operative Association states that its purpose is to:
Support its members and the co-op sector through the provision of
services in three core areas - development, government affairs &
public policy, and common table. (Canadian Co-operative
Association, n.d.)
As a point of contrast, the national co-operative movement peak body in the
United States, the National Co-operative Business Association, states that it is the:
….. lead national membership association representing Co-operatives
of all types and in all industries. We are democratically organized and
operate according to internationally recognized co-operative
principles. Through our comprehensive education, co-op
development, communications, public policy, member services, and
international development programs, NCBA helps co-ops strengthen
their businesses so they can better serve their members. It also
provides a strong, unified voice on Capitol Hill. (National Cooperative Business Association, n.d.)
Using Melville’s (2003, p 5) peak body definition as a ‘bench mark’, the key
elements of a peak body, while expressed differently, can be discerned in the
statements of both the Canadian Co-operatives Association and the National Cooperative Business Association. Both peak bodies position themselves as the
intermediary link between government and their memberships, by representing their
membership to government and facilitating the development of constructive
government policy. They both seek to inform and educate their membership on
issues related to co-operatives, and communicate with the wider community about
the role of the co-operative business structure in economic and social development.
92 The background of Australia’s efforts to establish similar national level peak bodies representing
the Australian co-operative movement is discussed in the next section.
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Sandford (1955) and Kenyon’s (1983) explanation of the role of the CFWA,
as well as the recent CFWA statements (2003b; 2004a), indicate that the CFWA also
undertakes elements of the functions and activities of a peak body as outlined in
Melville’s definition. However, there are some exceptions. The non-political and
non-sectarian element is absent from Melville’s definition and the Canadian and
United States co-operative movement peak body statements. The legislative function
of the CFWA contained within the current Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 is
another departure. Lastly, contrary to the Industry Commission (1995, p 181; cited in
Melville, 2003, p 3) statement of a peak body, the CFWA undertakes activities which
could be deemed ‘service delivery’, such as fee based consultancy services to
proponents of embryonic co-operatives to establish their business ventures (Booth,
2004).
Additionally, neither Kenyon (1983), the 2003 strategic plan (Co-operative
Federation of Western Australia, 2003b) nor the statement of services (Co-operative
Federation of Western Australia, 2004a) purposefully separate the role and functions
of the CFWA into the discrete internal and external foci suggested in the peak body
definition. The United States and Canadian co-operative movement peak bodies also
do not arrange their purpose and function according to this division.
However, the sentiments of the CFWA statements, combined with many
interview discussions about the role of the CFWA, make it clear that it seeks to
represent its members and the Western Australian co-operative movement. It
aggregates member co-operatives into a single voice to ensure that their individual
needs are met via the collective structure of the peak body more efficiently than if
these co-operatives independently sought these outcomes. The CFWA undertakes a
number of external functions, such as advocacy and policy advice to government and
other external institutions on co-operative matters. This has become a greater focus
following the introduction of the 2003 Strategic Plan which contains a specific
objective related to government affairs (Co-operative Federation of Western
Australia, 2003b). It also performs a range of internally focused membership
activities, such as holding conferences and seminars to provide information and
advice about topical co-operative issues. Therefore, while the 2003 strategic plan
interweaves these activities, they are clearly identifiable as important foci for the
peak body. While the CFWA has statements concerning these activities and does
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attempt to implement these, the issue for the CFWA is the ability to achieve the tasks
it sets itself.
Historical Overview
The historical landscape of the CFWA provides insights into its longevity as
a feature of the Western Australian co-operative movement. As argued in Chapter
Four, the early Western Australian co-operative movement was essentially an
agriculturally based movement. The formation of a peak body for the Western
Australian co-operative movement grew out of the need to coordinate the activities
of Westralian Farmers Co-operative and a myriad of small rural and regionally based
co-operatives servicing the agricultural industry (Sandford, 1955). Chapter Four
revealed that the early Western Australian co-operative movement evolved into two
strands. One strand comprised the Westralian Farmers Co-operative with its network
of its own co-operative retail stores in many rural towns. The second strand
comprised independent co-operatives in the towns where Westralian Farmers Cooperative itself did not have a co-operative store. These independent co-operatives
also became retail agents for Westralian Farmers Co-operative wholesale activities.
According to Sandford, tension developed between these two strands when
some independent local co-operatives sourced products outside the Westralian
Farmers Co-operative wholesale range of supplies. Over time, as these small cooperatives purchased greater quantities of supplies from private traders, they were
unwittingly redirecting profits to the private traders and away from the wholesale
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and therefore farmer members. Co-operative
movement proponents recognised this unintended consequence as potentially
threatening to the future evolution of the embryonic Western Australian co-operative
movement.
The solution, promoted at a co-operative conference in 1919, was to form a
peak body to provide this overarching coordination and strengthen the co-operative
movement throughout Western Australia. The Co-operative Federation of Western
Australia (Inc) was formed within months of the conference (Kenyon, 1983;
Sandford, 1955), making it the first co-operative movement peak body in Australia.
Initially the CFWA struggled to provide the coordinating role it was established to
perform. Sandford (1955) attributes the problems of the CFWA to coordinate the
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fledgling co-operative movement to the primitive infrastructure of the period. He
argues that it was not possible, given the transport and communication systems of the
period, to organise the geographically diverse independent co-operatives into a
cohesive movement which worked with other co-operatives or with Westralian
Farmers Co-operative (Sandford, 1955). As an outcome, he contends, only those
individuals and co-operatives associated with Westralian Farmers Co-operative,
which had well-established transport and communication links, were able to develop
an overall understanding of the co-operative movement.
Sandford argues that up until the 1930s the CFWA was a ‘voluntary goodwill
organisation’ (Sandford, 1955, p 178), and consequently unable to undertake the role
and functions of a peak body as defined by Melville (2003). As the CFWA matured
as a peak body, it was able to exert more influence over the co-operative movement.
The first evidence of this increasing capacity arose after the Depression when the
peak body championed the introduction of contracts between the Westralian Farmers
Co-operative and the independent country town co-operatives (Sandford, 1955).
These contracts ensured greater coordination between the separate parts of the cooperative movement and removed damaging practices, such as sourcing products
outside the Westralian Farmers Co-operative’s wholesale network, which
inadvertently undermined the co-operative approach to business activity. These
contracts also established the CFWA as the overall co-operative movement arbitrator
on any contractual disputes that arose (Sandford, 1955). Sandford (1955) argues that
managing the new contract agreements enabled the CFWA to fill its peak body role
and subsequently develop an overall coherence within the Western Australian cooperative movement.
Sandford (1955, p 303) maps the structure of the CFWA in the mid 1950s,
via a diagram reproduced on the following page.

The diagram reveals that

representatives from the larger agricultural co-operatives dominated the CFWA
Board, complemented by delegates from seven district co-operative councils located
throughout rural Western Australia. Only one of the delegates to the CFWA Board
was to be a manager of a member co-operative, indicating the authority of farmer
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members and Directors on the CFWA Board of Directors (Sandford, 1955). 93 The
diagram literally and figuratively demonstrates the centrality of the CFWA in the
Western Australian co-operative movement in this period, reinforcing the point made
in Chapter Four that the Western Australian co-operative movement was essentially
an agriculturally based movement.

93 This can be contrasted with the makeup of the current the CFWA Board of Directors, in which
only one peak body Director is also a Director of a member co-operative, while the remaining peak
body Directors are employed as managers of co-operatives.
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The Contemporary Picture: 1955
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Source: Sandford (1955, p 303)
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Given the influence of Westralian Farmers Co-operative over the cooperative movement, there was a deeply entwined relationship between the CFWA
and the dominant co-operative. This ‘less than arm’s length’ relationship continued
until the Westralian Farmers Co-operative converted to a corporation in the mid
1980s (Booth, 2004; Munro, 2003). Several examples illustrate this close connection
between the two organisations. Mr Walter Harper, the key driver in the formation of
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the Western Australian co-operative
movement, was also the CFWA chairman from its inception in 1919 until 1953
(Munro, 2003; Sandford, 1955). He was succeeded by Mr Ernest Thorley Loton, who
also assumed the dual roles of chair of the CFWA and Westralian Farmers Cooperative (Munro, 2003; Sandford, 1955). Up until 1948, the Westralian Farmers Cooperative secretary also performed the CFWA secretariat function (Sandford, 1955),
and the CFWA office was co-located at the Westralian Farmers Co-operative head
office for many decades (Munro, 2003).
The close and sustained link between the CFWA and Westralian Farmers Cooperative perhaps set some limits on the independence of the CFWA to function as a
peak body in the manner described by Melville. However, the motives of Westralian
Farmers Co-operative in overseeing the CFWA at this period of the Western
Australian co-operative movement’s evolution justified the close relationship.
Without this connection, the CFWA would not have survived and the Western
Australian co-operative movement may not have evolved to achieve considerable
influence in the Western Australian economy in the post World War II period.
Sandford’s (1955) account of the association between the two organisations
demonstrates considerable benevolence and honourable intentions on behalf of the
Westralian Farmers Co-operative towards the CFWA. Munro (2003) concurs with
Sandford’s interpretation and maintains that Westralian Farmers Co-operative felt a
great responsibility for the Western Australian co-operative movement and was
jealously supportive of the peak body. While Munro believes that Westralian
Farmers Co-operative itself had outgrown the co-operative structure by the 1950s, he
maintains that Westralian Farmers Co-operative continued to provide funds to the
CFWA, as well as services and infrastructure to support the co-operative
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movement. 94 Booth (2004) also comments on the residual nature of this goodwill as
Wesfarmers donated a modest sum of money to the CFWA in 2003, although it was
under no obligation to do so and had converted to a corporation 15 years earlier. 95 A
Wesfarmers subsidiary, Wesfarmers Federation Insurance, continued to sponsor the
CFWA annual conferences for several years, demonstrating the longevity of this
relationship.
In addition to the CFWA gaining authority as a peak body from its close
association with the powerful Westralian Farmers Co-operative, Munro (2003) also
attributes the strength of the CFWA to its ability to influence government via
regionally based politicians, a peak body function highlighted in Melville’s
definition. As outlined in Chapter Four, Munro argues that the CFWA ability to
shape public policy was linked to the rural base of the Western Australian economy
and the influence exerted by agricultural co-operatives in the regions. Additionally,
many of Western Australia’s politicians were also from regional areas and Directors
had considerable formal and informal access to their politicians to discuss the
position of agricultural co-operatives within the broader agricultural industry.
Consequently, at that time, the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector
operated in a very favourable public policy environment.
Munro further reports that due to the privileged position of the agricultural
co-operative sector in Western Australia in that period, the CFWA did not have to
actively lobby politicians, but simply engage with them to ensure that the status quo
was retained. According to Munro, the CFWA continued to exert significant
influence in establishing and maintaining a positive co-operative public policy
environment by the Western Australian government up until the mid 1980s.
Munro himself was a significant CFWA actor from the early 1970s to the mid
1990s. After approximately a decade of employment at Westralian Farmers Co94 Despite Munro’s view that Westralian Farmers Co-operative was essentially behaving as a
corporate entity from the 1950s, it continued with the co-operative structure for another three decades
before it converted to a corporate structure in 1984.
95 As discussed in Chapter Four, this 2003 donation to the CFWA was linked to Wesfarmers
dismantling an overarching holding company which was still structured as a co-operative. The cooperative structure was retained when Westralian Farmers Co-operative converted to a corporation in
the mid 1980s to ensure farmer control of Wesfarmers and to protect the company from potential
hostile take-over bids (Booth, 2004). As Wesfarmers attained subsequent commercial success, its
large size served as a shield against threats of hostile take-overs and hence the safeguards embedded
in the co-operative structure became redundant. Wesfarmers donated some funds to the CFWA from
the winding up of the co-operative remnant.
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operative, providing accounting services to member co-operatives, Munro
established his own accounting firm. Westralian Farmers Co-operative supported
Munro’s transition to self-employment and assisted him by providing office space at
the co-operative’s head office. Known at the time as Munro and Wiley, 96 the firm
had a particular focus on the agricultural co-operative sector due, in part, to Munro’s
former connection with Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Munro, as a partner in the
firm, personally continued to provide accounting services to the agricultural cooperative sector, which included the winding up of non-active rural based cooperatives. Early in the 1970s, a CFWA registered co-operative auditor 97 from
another accounting firm retired with about 30 rural co-operative clients. As that firm
was not interested in retaining this function, Munro agreed that his firm would
assume auditing responsibility for these 30 co-operatives. As a result of this
connection with the Western Australian co-operative movement, Munro’s firm went
on to do other accounting or related activities on behalf of the CFWA. 98 This
relationship between Munro’s firm and the CFWA became more formalised in the
early 1980s when Munro’s firm was appointed by the CFWA as Secretary,
undertaking secretariat and member service function on behalf of the CFWA. Munro
personally provided many of these services until his retirement in the mid 1990s. 99
In 1996, the CFWA Board of Directors withdrew from the arrangement with
Munro and Wiley and directly employed Mr John Booth as Executive Officer on a
full-time basis. Booth occupied this position until January 2004, when the position of
Executive Officer was made redundant following the decision of the CFWA Board
of Directors to restructure the CFWA. The CFWA Board of Directors elected to

96 The firm is now known as Munro’s, Certified Practising Accountants.
97 The Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 requires that the auditors of co-operatives be registered
with the CFWA. This requirement is still current, although apparently not now widely known in the
co-operative movement, the auditing industry or DOCEP which receives copies of co-operative audits
(Booth, 2004). Consequently, auditors who are not registered with the CFWA inadvertently audit
some co-operatives.
98 According to Booth (2004), at that time the CFWA was the body responsible for auditing Western
Australian co-operatives, which at a surface level conferred authority to the CFWA. However many of
these co-operatives were agents of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, which implied less than an
‘arm’s length’ audit.
99 In addition to traditional Secretary functions of preparing materials for the Board of Directors and
acting as the point of contact for external stakeholders, as the CFWA Secretary, Munro was also very
involved in the auditing and accounting functions of individual member co-operative businesses as, at
the time, this was deemed one of the key functions of the CFWA. The Secretary was highly embedded
in the activities of member co-operatives. By contrast, the incumbent Secretary and the CFWA does
not view its role as being this involved at this level in its members’ businesses (Interviewee 797,
2004).
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contract the role of Secretary to an executive management services consultant, Mr
Peter Wells, of Peter Wells and Associates Pty. Ltd (Allomes, 2004).
CFWA Links with other Australian Co-operative Movement Peak Bodies
Co-operative Federations operate in New South Wales, Queensland, South
Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, and as peak bodies, perform similar
functions. However, different organisational models are applied. Some Co-operative
Federations employ full-time or part-time staff to undertake the function of
Executive Officer, while others have opted for the contracted secretariat model
currently adopted by the CFWA. Each peak body has developed in its own way in
response to its contextual social, economic and political realities. It is clear that in the
early co-operative movement of Western Australia, the co-operative model was
conceived as an economic structure rather than as a vehicle for not-for-profit
enterprises. This commercial co-operative focus was also inculcated into the values
base of the CFWA and this commercial focus has continued as a primary orientation
of the CFWA in the present day. The commercial trading nature of the CFWA is also
embedded in the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. As a result, the non profit cooperative sector has not gained traction in Western Australia.
The Co-operative Federation of Victoria (CFV), in contrast, has commercial
co-operative members, but also embraces non-profit co-operatives (Co-operative
Federation of Victoria, n.d.). This difference in orientation between the CFWA and
the CFV can be partly attributed to two factors. Firstly, the influence of the Catholic
Church in Victoria in developing a co-operative movement based on social justice
concepts charted the co-operative movement towards the community based not-forprofit sector. Secondly, the lack of co-operative legislation for many years in
Victoria suitable for commercially focused agricultural co-operatives drove
commercial co-operatives to register under the then State-based Companies Act, and
subsequently the Commonwealth Corporations Act, although co-operative legislation
was introduced in Victoria in the 1950s. The New South Wales Co-operative
Federation also has a strong non-trading co-operative membership reflecting that
State’s own co-operative movement evolution.
Although there were Co-operative Federations in most Australian States,
Kenyon (1983, p 49) comments that Western Australia had the ‘strongest co105

operative ethos’ with over 600 co-operatives. 100 Kenyon (1983) and Lyons (2001a)
also assert that the CFWA was an influential co-operative peak body not just in
Western Australia but also nationally up to the 1980s. Smith verifies the role of
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and its contribution to the CFWA and the national
peak body in his history of Wesfarmers (K. Smith, 1984). The Co-operative
Federation of Victoria (n.d.) confirms that the CFWA also assumed a key role in the
national co-operative movement.
The CFWA, along with its sister peak bodies in New South Wales and
Queensland, formed a national peak body, the Co-operative Federation of Australia,
in the mid 1940s (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, n.d.; K. Smith, 1984). 101 The
Co-operative Federation of Australia was based in Canberra and largely funded by
Westralian Farmers Co-operative via the CFWA (Lyons, 2001a). The power of the
Western Australian co-operative movement at that time to influence the national
peak body is demonstrated by the appointment of the CFWA Executive Officer to the
Executive Officer position for the Co-operative Federation of Australia in 1965. A
Westralian Farmers Co-operative employee was appointed as an Australian
representative to the International Co-operative Alliance, further integrating
Westralian Farmers Co-operative into the wider Australian and international cooperative movement (K. Smith, 1984). The influence of Westralian Farmers Cooperative over the Western Australian co-operative movement now extended
nationally via the CFWA to the Co-operative Federation of Australia with links into
the International Co-operative Alliance.
However, according to Lyons (2001a), the Co-operative Federation of
Australia collapsed in the 1980s. He attributes this to the significant change in the
agricultural co-operative sector in Western Australia brought about by the conversion

100 The reference to over 600 co-operatives in Western Australia in the 1980s is not supported by
available co-operative registration data at DOCEP or confirmed in anecdotal recollections from actors
involved during this period of co-operative activity. Booth suggests that the large number of cooperatives quoted by Kenyon could possibly be explained by each rural merchandising co-operative
under the overall banner of Wesfarmers deemed as a separate entity. However, Booth does not believe
that it is credible that Western Australia ever had that many co-operatives. Kenyon may have included
community-based organisations fashioned on the co-operative values but not incorporated under the
Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 to arrive at this estimate.
101 The Victorian Federation joined in 1970 and the South Australian Federation joined at a later
date. Tasmania, Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory do not have Co-operative
Federations and therefore were not been directly involved with the national body although their cooperative sector interests were part of the overall national body coverage (Co-operative Federation of
Victoria, n.d.).
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of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, the major funding source to the Co-operative
Federation of Australia, to the corporation, Wesfarmers, in 1984. The Co-operative
Federation of Victoria (n.d.) argues that, concurrently, the Co-operative Federation
of New South Wales (CFNSW) became disenchanted with the national peak body
and sought to introduce an alternative structure. The CFNSW withdrew from the
national peak body and independently formed the Australian Association of Cooperatives Ltd (AAC) in 1986. Other State Federations did not support this move and
they elected to retain the Co-operative Federation of Australia as the national peak
body for the co-operative sector (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, n.d.).
However, it appears that the removal of the NSW Co-operative Federation and the
loss of Wesfarmers funding and support was terminal for the Co-operative
Federation of Australia, as Lyons argues that the Australian Association of Cooperatives became the coordinating peak body from 1986 to 1993 (Lyons, 2001a).
Despite this national peak body status conferred by Lyons, it appears to have had a
New South Wales focus, rather than a national flavour. While Lyons credits the
Australian Association of Co-operatives with strong leadership and provision of
services to the co-operative sector, it too subsequently collapsed following some
financial difficulties resulting from bad debts (Lyons, 2001a). The State Co-operative
Federations then established, in 1993, the National Co-operative Council. This
organisation was renamed the Co-operative Council of Australia Inc (CCA) with the
Co-operative Federations of New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia,
Victoria and Western Australia as members (Griffiths, 2004). It continues as the
national peak body for the Australian co-operative movement.
According to the CFWA, the CCA provides it with an influential avenue
through which submissions can be made on matters of national importance (Cooperative Federation of Western Australia, 2004a). However, the CCA lacks a
dedicated secretariat and serviced office, and is only convened on an ad hoc basis. Its
achievements as a national peak body suggest that it does not have a unified and
cohesive State Co-operative Federation membership and further, that it has marginal
influence on issues of national importance to the Australian co-operative movement.
Griffiths (2004) reports that in the last five years, the CCA has only become involved
in two issues, firstly, the drive for updated co-operative legislation and secondly,
taxation matters. While acknowledging the amiable liaison between the State Co-
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operative Federations, Griffiths laments the reluctance of the State Co-operative
Federations to regularly and consistently engage in ongoing co-ordinated public
policy initiatives, citing two significant public policy matters which, in his view,
have been neglected at the national level. The first is the International Accounting
Standard 32, 102 an issue strongly debated by the New Zealand Co-operative
Association and the ICA, but with limited discussion within the Australian cooperative movement. The second concerns the 2002 review of the Commonwealth
Trade Practices Act 1974, 103 an important piece of legislation underpinning the
National Competition Policy. This legislation has implications for the co-operative
business model due to the perceived anti-competitive nature of the collective
approach to co-operative business that can be interpreted as engaging in collusive
behaviour. Co-operatives can therefore be deemed as operating contrary to the Trade
Practices Act 1974. This interpretation of the co-operative business structure presents
a potentially significant legal and structural impediment to the development of the
co-operative business model in Australia. Despite the significant implications of this
review, Griffiths notes that the national peak body did not take it up as an issue. 104
This lack of networking and a collective approach by various Australian
States’ peak bodies reinforces the fragmented nature of the contemporary Australian
co-operative movement. Furthermore, none of the State-based peak bodies nor the
national peak body, the CCA, are members of the ICA, counter to the Statement on
the Co-operative Identity of co-operatives helping other co-operatives and cooperatives contributing to the community (International Co-operative Alliance, n.d.).
While co-operatives are State-based entities operating under State legislation, the
lack of a serviced national peak body has left a vacuum for the development of

102 According to Griffiths (2004) the International Accounting Standard 32 would result in the ‘share
capital of most co-operatives being classified as liabilities rather than equities with three major
impacts - the preparation of misleading financial statements, negative impacts on the ability of cooperatives to raise finance and conduct business and the potential for consequential legal issues arising
in relation to solvency test requirements.’
103 Co-operative Federation of New South Wales (2002, p 4) argued in its submission to the Review
of the Trade Practices Act 1974, that the Act ‘does not currently recognise the fundamental
differences between co-operatives and other corporate entities. The Trade Practices Act 1974 is
targeted at preventing the anti-competitive practices of corporations and has an inherent bias against
businesses joining together. The Co-operative Federation submits that the Trade Practices Act 1974
does not recognise the pro-competitive nature of the co-operative structure, being small businesses cooperating through co-operatives to compete against other larger businesses.’
104 Two State peak bodies, the VCF and the NSWCF, prepared submissions independently for the
review.
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complementary and coordinated State or Commonwealth level public policy for the
co-operative movement.
CFWA Diminution in Peak Body Status
The contrast between the period in which the CFWA was an influential peak
body within Western Australia and nationally, and that of the early 21st century, is
striking. It is evident that the influence of the CFWA as peak body has diminished.
For much of its history, the standing of the CFWA was directly linked to the growth
and support of Westralian Farmers Co-operative. The conversion of Westralian
Farmers Co-operative to a corporation meant that the CFWA lost its major
benefactor. The trend identified by Munro (2003) towards the winding up of rural
town co-operatives also reduced the membership base of the CFWA and therefore its
financial base. Other concurrent events also contributed to the waning of the CFWA
influence from the mid 1980s. Munro (2003) argues that the relocation of the CFWA
from its co-located offices at Westralian Farmers Co-operative head office to that of
the Grain Pool contributed to the weakening of the CFWA as a peak body.
According to Munro, the CFWA did not receive the administrative and financial
support or the same level of goodwill in the new location that had characterised the
CFWA relationship with Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Further, in the 1980s, the
CFWA experienced a hiatus arising from inappropriate Board of Director decisions
that significantly undermined its authority as a peak body to external actors such as
Western Australian politicians and government bureaucrats. This incident also
severely eroded its financial base (Munro, 2003). While the CFWA membership
wrested back control of the CFWA from the Board of Directors and re-established it
as the peak body, the event occurred against a background in which the wider
implications of the Wesfarmers conversion had diminished the influence and
relevance of the CFWA and the importance of the co-operative movement in
Western Australia.
The CFWA has not been able to regain its former authority as the peak body
driving the direction and evolution of the Western Australian co-operative
movement. The conversion of the highly influential Westralian Farmers Co-operative
to a corporation symbolises the broader issues confronting the Western Australian
co-operative movement and its peak body in adjusting to a market economy. The
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recent restructure of the CFWA can be interpreted as an indication of a desire by
some member co-operatives to rejuvenate their peak body. It remains to be seen what
direction the peak body will go following the implementation of these substantial
changes.
Analysis of Contemporary Issues Confronting the CFWA
The next section of the chapter explores how the CFWA is managing its
external public role along with the internal issues associated with servicing its
membership. External issues concern the impact of neoliberalism on government
public policy, on the agricultural industry and on agricultural co-operatives and
therefore indirectly on the activities of the CFWA. Specifically, the relationship
between the CFWA and Western Australian State government departments, and the
ability of the CFWA to influence public policy, is explored. Secondly, the analysis
delves into internal issues at the CFWA, such as its relationship with its membership,
the role of the Board of Directors (the Council), the Board’s relationship with its
appointed agents (employees or consultants) and the value of membership.
Knowledge of the CFWA as a Peak Body for the Co-operative
Movement
The CFWA Council and Secretary view the CFWA as the peak body
representing the Western Australian co-operative movement (Interviewee 649, 2003;
Interviewee 797, 2004). This self identification of the CFWA as the peak body was
also evident in discussions with the former Executive Officer (Booth, 2004). Further,
interviews with individuals associated with co-operatives which are members of the
CFWA confirm that they also view it as their peak body on co-operative matters
(Interviewee 650, 2003; Interviewee 660, 2002; Madden, 2003b). Other interviews
revealed that a positive relationship is apparent, in that the greater the interaction
between an organisation or an individual with agricultural co-operative businesses,
the capacity for the CFWA to be perceived as the peak body representing the cooperative movement is higher. The converse is also apparent, in that the further an
actor is from the co-operative movement, awareness of the CFWA declines. This
diminishing awareness only becomes an issue for the CFWA when the actor has
some ability to influence matters of interest to the CFWA or the Western Australian
co-operative movement.
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Competition with Non-Co-operative Movement Peak Bodies for
Membership
A good understanding of the role and function of the CFWA as the peak body
is to be expected by members of registered co-operatives, particularly those cooperatives that are members of the CFWA. However, up to 30 per cent of registered
co-operatives have elected not to join the CFWA as their representative peak body.
The research has identified one agricultural co-operative that choose an alternative
peak body to represent its interests (Interviewee 654, 2003). The CEO claimed that
the agricultural co-operative did not see any value in belonging to the CFWA. He
believed that the CFWA focus on representing co-operative business was not a
sufficiently motivating factor to stimulate a decision to become a member. He
further argued that other peak bodies and organisations were able to meet the
representative and professional development needs of his co-operative. He
maintained that both he and the Board of Directors gained their professional
development and support from membership of organisations such as the Australian
Institute of Management (AIM) and the Australian Institute of Company Directors
(AICD). He further argued that, as co-operatives were a subset of small to medium
enterprises, there was no real need for a peak body specifically for businesses that
structured themselves as co-operatives. Consequently, this agricultural co-operative
was a member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia
(CCI(WA)).
The CCI(WA) presents itself as the peak body in Western Australia for the
private enterprise sector and undertakes the activities of member services and
influencing a favourable public policy environment (Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Western Australia, n.d.). The CCI(WA) webpage states that it provides
quality, cost effective support and services to enable members to build their
businesses. Secondly, it lobbies government to create an economic and legislative
environment which stimulates the role of private enterprise. It claims to represent
over 5,000 businesses, 105 ranging from self employed and small business through to
Western Australia’s largest enterprises in all industries throughout the entire State.
The CCI(WA) states that it is committed to the principles of free enterprise and
argues that Western Australia will benefit from the implementation of National

105 The webpage does not state the actual number of financial members of CCI(WA).
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Competition Policy (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia,
n.d.). 106
The views of the agricultural co-operative CEO raise significant issues for the
co-operative movement and its peak body. Firstly, a peak body is not overtly subject
to competitive processes, as being the ‘peak’ suggests that it is the only
representative body for an industry sector. However, in a neoliberal environment, the
CFWA is unable to assume that its natural constituency; that is co-operatives
registered under the Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943, will routinely seek
membership of the CFWA simply because they are registered co-operative
businesses. By recasting co-operatives simply as small to medium businesses, the
CCI(WA) is able to embrace co-operative businesses without the need to address the
specific values underpinning the co-operative business model. Categorising cooperatives as small to medium businesses essentially renders the co-operative
structure as meaningless. However, for the CFWA, the business structure is the sole
basis of membership. Of concern for the CFWA, the CCI(WA) represents many of
the neoliberal values which, as Chapter Three revealed, undermine co-operative
values. Hence, a preference of an agricultural co-operative for membership of the
CCI(WA) over the CFWA is a potentially threatening development to the cooperative movement and its peak body which needs to be closely monitored by the
CFWA.
Secondly, the views of the CEO reflect a lack of understanding of the
essential differences between the co-operative business model and the IOF model. As
a recently formed agricultural co-operative, and therefore closely observed by
industry and rural media commentators, this lack of commitment by the CEO to the
co-operative philosophy and the wider co-operative movement must be of further
concern to the CFWA. Thirdly, as the co-operative’s Board of Directors had, at that
point in time, not over-ridden the CEO’s views, it can be imputed that they also did
not perceive value in belonging to the co-operative movement peak body, suggesting
that it is not just one individual but a leading group of farmers who also share this
view. Lastly, the CEO’s position demonstrates that he cannot discern any value in
promoting the agricultural co-operative on the basis of the co-operative difference,

106 See Chapter Three for a discussion of National Competition Policy in the context of agricultural
co-operatives.
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and potential competitive advantage, to influential external stakeholders. This
attitude further undermines the purpose of the CFWA as a peak body. This example
demonstrates that the CFWA cannot afford to let registered co-operatives be unclear
about which peak body best represents their particular interests.
The Public Sector
Actors within government departments which interface with the agricultural
co-operative sector are generally aware of the CFWA as the organisation
representing the State’s co-operative movement (Interviewee 659, 2003; Interviewee
680, 2003; Interviewee 684, 2003; Interviewee 685, 2002). The existing knowledge
within relevant government departments about the CFWA and its role as a peak body
suggests that the CFWA is achieving one of its peak body functions, namely
presenting its collective views to government.
The Western Australian Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Consumer and Employment Protection, 107 the Department of Local Government and
Regional Development and the various Development Commissions and Business
Enterprise Centres, as well as local governments, are potential contact points for
actors seeking initial information and advice about co-operatives. With the exception
of the Department of Agriculture that has some internal capacity to deal with initial
queries about agricultural co-operatives, the research indicates that staff associated
with government agencies do not attempt to personally deal with queries from
proponents of embryonic agricultural co-operatives.

Staff prefer to redirect

individuals to the CFWA.
Some government departments have implemented ad hoc mechanisms to
support the agricultural co-operative model. The Western Australian Department of
Agriculture has provided advisory and financial incentives to the proponents of
embryonic co-operatives. To illustrate, the Challenge Dairy Co-operative obtained
considerable funds as part of the dairy industry restructuring package to purchase a
dairy processing plant (Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 2001a), and

107 The counterparts of this department in Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales have
detailed websites providing dedicated co-operative information on registration processes and cooperative legislation. The New South Wales department responsible for co-operative registrations and
legislation had a large staff and was involved with co-operative research. The research activity was
subsequently relocated to ACCORD.
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an informal farmers group received Department funds for a feasibility study for their
proposed co-operative venture (Interviewee 680, 2003). 108
The Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment
Protection provided the CFWA with a $15,000 grant in 2003/4 to deliver
professional development on behalf of the Department to co-operative businesses
about the proposed co-operative legislation. The grant was a recognition by a
government department that it did not have the institutional arrangements or
resources to undertake this function and that this ability already existed within the
CFWA. The development work associated with drafting new co-operative legislation
has also provided the CFWA with a vehicle to build awareness of the Western
Australian co-operative movement among the senior staff of various government
departments and their Ministers. Nevertheless, these examples of constructive
interaction between the CFWA and government agencies, when contrasted with its
former ability to influence public policy in the broader economic and political
environment, reveal that the influence of the CFWA and the co-operative movement
has lessened.
CFWA Connections with Other External Agencies
The research suggests that the further away an interviewee is from the
activities of agricultural co-operatives, knowledge of the CFWA as the peak body
declines (Interviewee 655, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002). This group of interviewees
represent organisations such as farmer industry associations, the rural media,
professional institutions in occupations such as accounting, finance and the law, the
tertiary education sector and agribusiness management consultants. The relatively
low awareness in this group of the CFWA is particularly significant for the peak
body as individuals from this group are very influential in the agricultural industry as
professional advisors. Actors in this group assist and advise farmers about their farm
business and in the process can exert influence over farmers about economic and
political issues in agriculture. If the knowledge of professional advisors about the
agricultural co-operative sector and the peak body representing this sector is low,
they are unable to provide appropriate advice or balanced opinions to farmers about
the economic benefits of forming co-operatives.
108 The farmers group comprised five local community members who were exploring agricultural
value adding opportunities in their region, possibly via a co-operative structure.
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Agribusiness Consultants 109
To illustrate this point, an agribusiness consultant (Interviewee 689, 2002)
has not had the need to liaise in a professional sense with the peak body, despite
having clients who are members of agricultural co-operatives. However, he became
aware of the CFWA in the late 1990s through the NGC study tours and subsequent
presentations coordinated by the Western Australian Department of Agriculture
about co-operatives. 110 Booth (2004) asserts that in his time at the CFWA, the peak
body rarely had agricultural co-operative inquiries emanating from agribusiness or
management consultants. He claims to have interacted with most of the consultants
working in the agribusiness area, particularly within the niche industries, and advised
them of the benefits to farmers of adopting the co-operative business structure. Booth
also argues that the greatest detriment to the formation of new agricultural cooperatives in the niche areas is the role of the private sector agribusiness and
management consultant. In his view, private consultants are ‘cherry picking’, by
targeting the most economically viable niche sectors and convincing farmer groups
to develop companies, tempting farmers with the prospect of higher profits from
listing these companies on the Australian Stock Exchange if successful. 111 Yet,
Booth argues, the niche sectors would benefit most from adopting the co-operative
structure. Booth contends that consultants are also motivated by self-interest to
promote the corporate structure over the co-operative structure, as there is greater
scope for consultant and management fees associated with establishing a company
than forming a co-operative business.
As Western Australian farmers readily seek the advice of agribusiness
consultants, agribusiness and management consultants are significant gate keepers to
farmers (Marsh & Pannell, 1999). If the CFWA wishes to influence an important
group that in turn influences farmers’ decisions about business strategy, developing
the knowledge of the agribusiness consultants and advisors linked to agricultural
niche industries about the co-operative option is a worthwhile strategy.

109 Agribusiness consultants and advisors undertake a function that was often formerly delivered by
Department of Agriculture extension officers.
110 Appendix Three examines the NGC study tours and seminars.
111 Munro, as discussed in Chapter Four, noticed a similar pattern in the 1980s with ‘entrepreneurs’
working in these niche industries.
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Agricultural Industry Peak Bodies
Western Australia has two main industry associations representing the
agricultural industry - the Western Australian Farmers’ Federation (WAFF) and the
Pastoralists and Graziers Association (PGA). Both have a number of affiliated
smaller industry associations under their umbrella. The two agricultural industry
associations embrace different political perspectives on agricultural industry policy;
however, neither has a policy position on the agricultural co-operative sector.
The PGA interviewee, actively favouring agricultural industry restructuring,
expressed a personal view that the co-operative structure was only useful for those
farmers who could not survive in the free market based agricultural industry on the
basis of their own business acumen (Interviewee 656, 2003). The WAFF interviewee
acknowledged the benefits of co-operative businesses in the agricultural industry,
particularly the potential of co-operatives to rein in the excesses of a market
economy (Interviewee 655, 2003). When the debate about the future of CBH as a cooperative was topical, representatives from both WAFF and PGA sought advice from
the CFWA on the merits or otherwise of retaining the CBH as a co-operative (Booth,
2004; Interviewee 655, 2003). WAFF was also instrumental in driving the agenda for
collective bargaining in the dairy industry and actively supported the formation of
the Challenge Dairy Co-operative (Economics and Industry Standing Committee,
2003).
Managing the Tension Arising From Internal and External Foci of a
Peak Body
Peak bodies such as the CFWA are complex organisational structures.
Melville’s (2003) definition of a peak body suggests that this type of organisation
performs dual and possibly competing roles. Firstly, a peak body advocates on behalf
of and represents its members in the external environment and, secondly, it services
its membership. Prioritising and balancing these roles can lead to tensions within the
peak body.
The CFWA, until its 2004 restructure, tended to focus more on the
membership side of its peak body functions (Booth, 2004) than on adopting an
external orientation on public policy issues and promoting the co-operative
alternative to the wider community. Several factors can explain the internal focus of
the CFWA on its membership activities. As suggested by Munro (2003), in the past
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the CFWA did not have to adopt a strong external public policy role to ensure that
the co-operative movement functioned in a favourable public policy environment,
due to its close linkage with Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Therefore, the
organisation did not need to develop the culture of engaging in debates about public
policy, although this advocacy role is a key feature of a peak body. Over time, the
changing external environment lessened the influence of the co-operative movement
in the overall economic performance of Western Australia. In this contracting
environment, with diminishing access to government and politicians, the natural
response of a peak body is to retreat and focus on its own membership. This
comprises activities for members, such as timely dissemination to members of
information on topical co-operative movement issues, arranging conferences and
guest speakers, providing specific advice to individual member co-operatives and
supporting potential members in new co-operative start-ups.
In the view of the former Executive Officer, the most appropriate focus of the
CFWA is on member services. Booth (2004) argues that the strength of the cooperative sector is from within its membership base. He maintains that the CFWA
members consider that the peak body is essentially a service delivery organisation, in
which members pay a membership fee in exchange for a service. He argues that the
primary objective of the CFWA is to service co-operative members to ensure that
they are viable businesses that comply with legislative demands. Booth (2004)
considers that in Western Australia, the commercial standards and auditing processes
of co-operatives are weak and the CFWA should be supporting members to
overcome this inadequacy. He also thinks that many Western Australian cooperatives are not really acting as co-operatives. Therefore, the role of the peak body
is to provide both education about the uniqueness and the intangible benefits of being
a co-operative in a competitive environment along with how to build a competitive
advantage for the co-operative business. Booth argues that the area of greatest need
in the Western Australian co-operative movement is in assisting commercially viable
co-operatives to establish themselves and survive the first years of business. He
believes that building the commercial strength of the members will create positive
role models for potential co-operative proponents to imitate. Given his focus on the
internal co-operative sector and member services, he does not really see the CFWA
as a lobby group. However, he acknowledges that it is important to keep in touch
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with politicians about co-operative issues that he claims to pursue in a subtle and
low-key manner.
The restructure of the CFWA in 2004 ushered in a new strategic direction for
the peak body. Collectively, the strategic plan’s purpose and vision statements and
key objectives reflect a greater external orientation. The differences in perspective
about the appropriate orientation of a peak body such as the CFWA are clearly
demonstrated in these two views. The Executive Officer presents a case for an
internally focused peak body with a strong emphasis on member services. Following
the restructure, the new Board of Directors (Council) sought to adopt a greater
external focus of influencing key stakeholders, while also attending to a range of
governance and member education issues within the peak body.
The CFWA case study demonstrates that managing this internal and external
focus leads to tension: for example, focusing on external lobbying deflects the
organisation away from the equally important task of servicing member needs.
Conversely, an emphasis on member issues can cause a peak body to neglect the
external advocacy role. Further, peak bodies can separate these activities to the
extent that they are almost parallel functions rather than integrating and informing
each other. It is difficult to determine if the individuals representing the different
orientations in this case study are actually aware of the two concurrent strands to the
functions of a peak body. Arising from this then is a potential inability to manage the
tensions that arise within the peak body in trying to simultaneously achieve these two
objectives or knowingly prioritising one over the other.
Value of the CFWA to its Membership - Self Interest versus Collective Interest
A membership density of about 70 per cent suggests that a significant number
of registered co-operatives join the CFWA as they perceive some form of tangible
and intangible benefit and value results from their membership. Member cooperatives can achieve value from CFWA membership through the peak body’s
ability to aggregate its membership into a single voice to external stakeholders that
individual co-operatives would not be able to attain independently. Secondly,
members realise benefits from the CFWA as it provides them with services such as
collating, analysing and distributing information, and providing education about the
co-operative movement and specific advice about the co-operative as a business
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structure. These benefits are greater than the costs of the membership fees and
sufficiently motivating for a co-operative to justify renewing the annual membership
subscription.
The forthcoming co-operatives legislation and the implications of this
legislation for existing co-operatives illustrate this collective benefit of belonging to
a peak body for individual co-operative members. The legislation possibly has been
the most significant issue confronting the Western Australian co-operative movement
over the last decade. This matter has provided members with a strong motivator to
renew their annual membership and support the CFWA as it negotiates the legislative
changes on their collective behalf. The cumulative outcome of these CFWA
activities conveys a value to individual co-operatives that is greater than the cost of
its actual annual membership fees.
The term ‘value’ often arose in interview discussions about being a member
of an agricultural co-operative or of the peak body (Interviewee 655, 2003;
Interviewee 656, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002); and came about in the context of
how an agricultural co-operative could or could not create ‘value’ for a farm
business, or how belonging to the peak body did or did not add value to the cooperative. The language in these interviews suggests that the empirical meaning of
‘value’ falls into two realms. The first is a neoliberal influenced rational choice
understanding of value based around some material or economic benefit that satisfies
a perceived self-interest. An alternative interpretation of value is to conceptualise it
in the context of ideals, principles or philosophy. Accordingly, members of the
CFWA determine if there is ‘value’ for their co-operative in joining the peak body on
the basis of self-interested value or a more idealised concept of value linked to the
co-operative principles.
Rational Choice and CFWA Membership
The empirical research suggests that the dominant interpretation of value for
a co-operative to join the peak body is tied to a rational choice concept of value.
Rational choice theory (see, for example, Hall & Taylor, 1996) implies that member
co-operatives join the CFWA to achieve some form of instrumental benefit from the
membership which is greater than the cost of annual membership. In evaluating this
decision about the value of the CFWA membership, there is a tension for a cooperative to determine if it should act independently or join with other co-operatives
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under the banner of the CFWA to achieve its goals (Booth, 2004). Members such as
Co-operative Bulk Handling (CBH), United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC)
and
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(WAMMCO)
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economically large and prominent co-operative business entities. Due to their size,
they have sufficient influence as single organisations to behave independently on a
number of fronts and do not need the collective power of a peak body to achieve
their political or economic lobbying.
This research has identified an example of this behaviour. According to an
interviewee who was at the time a government officer, the individual was approached
by a representative of a large and influential agricultural co-operative and asked to
effectively delay the implementation of the new co-operative legislation (Interviewee
658, 2003). The interviewee interpreted the approach as an attempt by this large cooperative to preserve some of the favourable conditions under the current legislation
while it sought to change its co-operative structure to a company structure. Another
interviewee disclosed that concurrently, as a member of the CFWA Board, that this
same co-operative also influenced the CFWA to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach to
the impending legislation. Yet the CFWA is at the same time pressured by some of
its member co-operatives and other interstate co-operative peak bodies to
demonstrate that it is moving ahead on this issue. In contrast, smaller co-operatives
lack this authority to influence external stakeholders in their own right and have little
option but to rely on the peak body to collectively and without bias represent their
interests in issues such as the new legislation.
Olson's theory of collective behaviour explores this type of relationship
between the represented and representative (Olson, 1965). Olson’s theory maintains
that ‘unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational,
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests’
(Olson, 1965, p 2; cited in Ostrom, 2000). Olson’s theory suggests that self-interest
motivates an individual’s involvement in collective behaviour. A conflict of interest
therefore exists between individual and collective behaviour. The reward in behaving
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collectively is consequently the ability to achieve an individual’s own self-interest.112
Self-interested behaviour by a large member co-operative could be demonstrated by,
for example, its ability to exert influence over the policies and strategies of the peak
body in the direction of its own self-interested position (Interviewee 678, 2003). A
large industry player can also use the peak body as a cover to conceal its own agenda
(Interviewee 678, 2003). Membership of the peak body masks the power broker role
of a large player as the peak body appears at arm’s length from the large independent
player in providing advice to government. The ‘wait and see’ response of the CFWA
discussed earlier to introducing the new co-operatives legislation is a possible
example of this phenomenon (Interviewee 678, 2003).
Olson argues that it is not rational for an individual to participate in collective
action if that good is available to everyone. Hence, that individual would seek to free
ride on the collective action of others (Olson 1965). Free-riding occurs when a
member is able to gain the benefit of collective action without contributing to its
availability (Cook, 1995; Kaul, Conceicao, Le Goulven, & Mendoza, 2003). Cooperative peak bodies in other Australian States have observed ‘free rider’ behaviour.
Some co-operatives have elected not to join their peak body yet paradoxically sought
to access peak body information from other co-operatives that are members (Booth,
2004). 113 Although a ‘free rider’ attitude indicates that the peak body offers some
value or benefit to non-member co-operatives, as demonstrated by non-members
seeking to access peak body information via a member co-operative, this value is
insufficient to entice the non-member co-operative to pay a membership fee. This
behaviour is consistent with Olson’s argument that individuals will not behave
collectively by joining a group, such as a peak body, out of a sense of a collective
ideal like a co-operative philosophy, but to achieve an identified and rationally
determined self interest. This suggests that a co-operative movement peak body

112 The application of Olson’s theory to a peak body is paradoxical as the member of the peak body
is also a collective organisation as a co-operative. Therefore, a peak body such as the CFWA is a
collection of collectively based organisations, while Olson is referring to an individual joining a
collective action. However, when a co-operative joins the peak body, Olson’s theory gives some
insight as it seems that the co-operative can adopt the attitudes that Olson attributes to the individual
when evaluating whether to join the peak body.
113 Additionally, the trend of ‘free rider’ identified in some other Australian State co-operative peak
bodies undermines the financial viability of the co-operative peak body due to diminished
membership fees. However, the more subtle issue is that as the membership density is diminished, it
potentially destabilises the peak body’s authority to assume this role in the eyes of Government, the
main actor which the peak body seeks to influence.
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therefore needs to identify other incentives or motivations beyond the ‘logic of cooperativeness’ to entice co-operatives to join the peak body. These incentives need to
be based around the ability of the peak body to satisfy the attainment of the potential
member co-operative’s self-interest.
While Olson’s theory of collective behaviour can provide some insight for
co-operative sector peak bodies, Ostrom (2000, p 2) states that, in relation to Olson’s
theory, a ‘substantial gap exists between the theoretical prediction that self-interested
individuals will have extreme difficulty in coordinating collective action and the
reality that such co-operative behaviour is widespread, although far from inevitable’.
Ostrom (2002) suggests that the world comprises many types of individuals, some of
whom are more disposed than others to initiate mutual activities to gain the benefits
of collective action. Therefore, despite Olson’s theory, a large co-operative can
belong to the peak body for reasons other than self-interest.
Co-operative Values and CFWA Membership
The work of Sandford (1955) and Smith (1984) suggest that, rather than self
interest, the relationship between Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the CFWA
was based on shared co-operative values and an altruistic commitment to the
Western Australian co-operative movement. Booth (2004) also comments on the
recent goodwill of Wesfarmers in donating a modest sum of money to the CFWA,
even though it was under no obligation to do so and had converted to a corporation
some 15 years earlier. Given that Westralian Farmers Co-operative was one of the
largest co-operatives in Western Australia, and there are several accounts of its
commitment to co-operative values, the size of the member co-operative is not an
indicator of its propensity to behave in a self-interested manner. Simply because a
co-operative is large does not mean that it will inevitably adopt values of self-interest
in determining peak body membership.
Co-operatives may elect to join their peak body because of their commitment
to the co-operative principles and the co-operative movement, regardless of
membership numbers, economic turnover, and ability to influence external actors in
their own right. Institutional sociological theory, drawing on the work of Selznick,
enables an organic analysis of an organisation (Perrow, 1986). An insight from this
approach is that an organisation can, over time, become steeped with values that go
beyond the specific operational tasks of the organisation. A sociological perspective
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enables the CFWA to be reconceptualised as an institution charged by the founding
co-operative fathers with the responsibility of ensuring the transmission over time of
practices and attitudes found in the ‘co-operative logic’ and co-operative values. The
ability of the CFWA to transmit the co-operative principles from one generation to
the next within the co-operative movement, individual co-operative members and the
wider society becomes a useful ‘benchmark’ of its viability as a peak body. Viewing
the CFWA in this context provides an alternative approach to analysing its activities
from that of rationale choice and self-interest or in the dual internal and external
focus contained in the definitions of a peak body.
Sociological theory also enables co-operatives to be understood as a
culturally constructed form of organisation shaped by 19th century economic and
social conditions following the Industrial Revolution. The successful transplanting of
the co-operative business structure to Australia and the agricultural industry at the
beginning of the 20th century demonstrates the compatibility of the co-operative
model with the economic and social conditions of that time. In the subsequent
Keynesian period, the co-operative business model was also found to be well suited
to the social and economic views of that period. The connection between the values
of the co-operative business model with the external political and economic systems
is demonstrated by the sustained economic viability of the co-operative business
structure and its peak body in Western Australia over the next five to seven decades.
The peak body, established to represent the co-operative sector, absorbed and
reflected back to the co-operative movement this time bound understanding of cooperative logic and assumed responsibility of ensuring the diffusion of this logic to
the next generation, political decision makers and the wider community. The peak
body, in perpetuating these values, can therefore be viewed by external and internal
stakeholders as a legitimate organisation representing the co-operative movement.
While this compatibility between the external political and socio-economic
environment and the values embedded in the co-operative philosophy continued, all
facets were harmonised and the CFWA as the peak body was able to replicate these
values through time.
When there is a positive relationship between the values of the co-operative
movement peak body and the wider society, members see the value in joining the
peak body and retaining membership. Consequently, the co-operative movement
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peak body is able to perpetuate itself over time. According to this theoretical line of
reasoning, the ability to sustain this values based approach to membership of the
CFWA is dependent on how much these values are also reflected in the broader
society (Perrow, 1986). 114 The mismatch identified in Chapter Three between the
values characterised by neoliberalism, and those of the co-operative principles and
represented by institutions such as the CFWA and the co-operative structure, partly
explains both the small number of co-operatives in Western Australia and the
challenges facing the present day CFWA as the peak body. While the concept of
value embodied in co-operative principles or other non-material benefit captures the
imagination of some present day co-operative member actors, on balance it does not
seem to be a strong motivator for a co-operative to join the peak body. The lack of
understanding of the co-operative values by external stakeholders of influence, as
well as some of its member co-operatives, was a significant source of frustration for
the former the CFWA Executive Officer (Booth, 2004). This suggests that the
CFWA has been curtailed in its role as the institution transmitting over time the cooperative values to the co-operative movement and the wider society.
The introduction of new co-operative legislation will test the capacity of the
peak body to transmit co-operative values to the wider community. The new
legislation enables the incorporation of a new category of co-operative entities, that
is, non-trading co-operatives. Historically, CFWA members were only commercially
focused co-operative businesses and this new category of co-operative membership
will bring a change to the deeply rooted focus on for-profit co-operatives. The
CFWA will need to develop a values base that incorporates the aspirations of nonprofit co-operatives. Additionally, it will need to build a skills base to advise on nonprofit co-operatives, establish the networks to interact with this sector and institute
democratic election processes to ensure appropriate non-profit co-operative
representation on the Board of Directors.
The impact of new legislation on other Australian co-operative movement
peak bodies is instructive for the CFWA. The introduction of the new legislation
suggests that, in addition to value based on self-interest or co-operatives principles,

114 Sociological theory also suggests that ongoing membership renewal of the CFWA may be
interpreted as a form of organisational inertia (Perrow, 1986), whereby members continue their
membership due to established organisational patterns rather than a strictly rational evaluation of
accrued benefits of the membership.
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membership value is also linked to major topical co-operative movement issues. The
CFWA has demonstrable value for its co-operative membership in a period of
significant change that has a direct impact on member co-operatives, such as the
introduction of new co-operative legislation. The CFWA, to some extent, recognises
this phenomenon, as it believes it has the attention of the membership at the moment
as a result of negotiations with the Western Australian government about the
proposed new co-operative legislation (Interviewee 797, 2004). However, the
experience of co-operative movement peak bodies in other Australian States suggests
that once the new legislation has been embedded and member co-operatives are
familiar with its implications, the member need for the peak body can diminish until
a new topical or contentious issue arises.
The preceding analysis suggests that, in the current climate, membership of
the CFWA can best be explained by rational choice theory. That is, the peak body is
able to efficiently deliver material value to its membership, thus satisfying some
form of self-interest within individual co-operative member organisations. However,
the research has demonstrated that a commitment to co-operative values among
individuals associated with member co-operatives remains a motivator for
membership of the CFWA. Lastly, recognition of the CFWA’s ability to address
topical issues on behalf of member co-operatives can also motivate membership, but
this is dependent on the nature of the issue.
Member Education
Several commentators have noted that the lack of member education, one of
the co-operative principles, is a reason for low member commitment to the cooperative values. Both the International Co-operative Alliance (1999) and the
International Labour Office (2001) emphasise the importance of member education.
Many actors deeply connected to the Australian co-operative movement view
member education as critical to ensure member loyalty, develop an understanding of
matters confronting the co-operative movement, mobilise members around public
policy issues, and importantly appreciate how co-operative values can contribute to
competitive advantage in a commercial sense.
The Victorian Co-operative Federation is particularly concerned about this
issue (Griffiths, 2004; Interviewee 996, 2004) and has sought to develop Australian
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specific education and professional development courses for co-operative Boards,
staff and members. The CFWA Board of Directors has recognised the importance of
member education and has focused on co-operative education in its strategic plan
(Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2003b) and the statement of services
provided by the peak body (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2004a).
As part of its restructuring in 2004, the CFWA established a Membership Committee
with a particular focus on member education (Co-operative Federation of Western
Australia, 2003b). The annual conference continues to be a main source of
membership education about topical co-operative movement issues.
Despite concerted efforts to stimulate greater interest in education issues by
forming dedicated subcommittees for co-operative member Chairs and CEOs, it
appears that these strategies have been difficult to implement. The CFWA is
changing its focus on co-operative education by seeking to introduce courses or
curriculum on co-operatives at tertiary and secondary education institutions
(Interviewee 797, 2004). The change in strategy away from education directed at
member co-operatives to a long-term strategy of seeking to introduce new curriculum
in schools and universities reflects the difficulties facing the CFWA as a peak body
in the area of co-operative education.
Explaining Lack of Co-operative Member Engagement with Peak Body Matters
A source of frustration for the former CFWA Executive Officer was a
difficulty in encouraging members to actively participate in the affairs of the peak
body. A Board Director (Interviewee 935, 2004) of a rural based retail co-operative
that is a member of the CFWA, provided a possible explanation for this seeming lack
of commitment. He commented that member co-operatives are often inwardly
focused on their own specific co-operative issues. He added that it is difficult to find
volunteer co-operative Board members within the local community and encourage
them to focus properly on their legislative responsibilities as Directors of their own
co-operative. As a result, member co-operatives may not have the energy or desire to
look at the broader Western Australian co-operative movement issues addressed by
the peak body (Interviewee 935, 2004). Therefore, understanding the wider
‘political’ issues associated with the peak body and the co-operative movement and
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encouraging volunteer Board members to take on Director duties at the peak body
can be very onerous for small member co-operatives.
This interviewee’s comments suggest that, as some of its members have to be
inwardly focused on their own business survival, the CFWA pursues issues that are
not overly relevant for some members, particularly smaller regionally located cooperatives. As a consequence, the CFWA can inadvertently become detached from
segments of its membership base. He also stated that the big agricultural co-operative
members of the CFWA, which he believed were now essentially corporate entities
except in legislation or name, did not care about smaller co-operatives or the viability
of the wider co-operative movement (Interviewee 935, 2004).
His views highlight a paradox. Smaller co-operatives are tightly stretched in
their own human and financial resources, while the larger co-operatives have the
organisational capacity to provide the human resources to undertake Board of
Director functions at the CFWA. Consequently, smaller regionally based cooperatives become further disenfranchised from the peak body, as the Board of
Directors, predominantly from larger co-operatives, do not have the ability to
empathise with issues confronting smaller member co-operatives. The difficulty with
this situation is that, without the support of all its members, the peak body risks
becoming ineffectual in its ability to represent the diversity of the entire co-operative
movement and promote an environment that encourages a positive public policy
environment for the co-operative movement, including small co-operatives. Further,
as highlighted earlier, large co-operatives have the capacity to influence external
actors independently of the peak body and do not need to rely on the collective voice
of the peak body. However, smaller co-operatives are very reliant on the aggregated
collective voice of the peak body to represent their interests to external stakeholders.
The prevalence of representatives from larger co-operatives on the CFWA Council
also raises other issues.
Board of Directors and the Agent
The principal-agent relationship can provide some insight to the relationship
between the Board of Directors and the individual appointed to carry out the Board’s
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directions. 115 Mathews (1999) explains that the principal-agent relationship is
established when one actor - the agent - agrees to comply with the wishes of and
represent the principal, who in turn agrees to provide the agent with a specified
reward, usually a salary. According to this theory, the CFWA Board of Directors
assume the role of principal and appoint the Executive Officer 116 as an agent to act
on their behalf, with both parties entering into a form of ‘contract’. Consistent with
economic theory, the principal-agent relationship assumes that individuals by nature
pursue their own self-interest and are opportunistic. As the agent pursues his or her
self-interest, the interests of the principal and the agent can diverge and cause friction
as each has imperfect knowledge and information about the motives and interests of
the other. According to the theory, agents can express their self interest and
opportunistic behaviour by shirking, under-performance, theft and collusion
(Mathews, 1999; Perrow, 1986). Principals can theoretically fail to perform their part
of the agreement of ensuring that the agent is fairly compensated (Perrow, 1986).
The theory argues that the way to resolve this conflict is for the principal to enhance
the quality of the contract and monitor the behaviour of the agent against the
contract.
A current Board Director expressed concern that, prior to his appointment to
the Board, the previous Board of Directors had loosely guided the CFWA. As a
consequence, much of the decision making and priority setting had been initiated by
the Executive Officer (Interviewee 649, 2003). The Director acknowledged that the
Executive Officer had assumed this role as a result of a governance vacuum created
by an inactive Board. However, he thought the situation between the existing Board
and Executive Officer had become ‘too cosy’ and that the CFWA needed some
reinvigorating. The views of the CFWA Director intuitively correspond with the
principal-agent theory. Implicit in his interpretation of the motives of the Executive
Officer is a belief that the Executive Officer had created a self-serving niche for
himself and that he had taken advantage of a compliant and passive Board of
Directors. The Director, as principal, sought to resolve this by implementing a range
of contracts such as an employment contract and a duty statement to monitor the

115 The principal-agent theory is also applied in Chapter Eight to understand the relationship between
the United Farmers Co-operative Company Board of Directors and the executive management.
116 This discussion refers to the position of the former Executive Officer as agent. The agent at the
time of writing is the Secretary of Peter Wells and Associates, Pty Ltd.
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activities and behaviour of the Executive Officer (Interviewee 649, 2003). While the
views of the CFWA Director reflect principal-agent theory, they are not consistent
with co-operative logic (Craig, 1993) or as a guardian of the peak body and
transmitter of co-operative values to subsequent generations of the co-operative
movement.
Sociological institutional theory provides an alternative lens through which to
view human behaviour. It contends that an individual’s world view will be shaped by
his or her interactions with institutions, particularly the values base of these
institutions, and that this will influence subsequent behaviour. This perspective
enables the Executive Officer’s behaviour in filling a vacuum created by a
disengaged Board of Directors to be interpreted as an effort to ensure that the cooperative movement continued to have a functioning peak body to convey the cooperative logic to members and potential members. Therefore, contrary to principalagent theory, this theoretical approach would suggest that the Executive Officer was
not behaving opportunistically. Rather, his interaction with co-operative businesses
and the wider co-operative movement had shaped his world view and values.
Therefore, the Executive Officer, as agent, was not acting from self-interest and guile
as predicted by principal-agent theory, but from a genuine concern to ensure that the
CFWA continued to function and deliver a service to its membership in the face of
Board apathy and possible lack of commitment to the co-operative principles.
Board of Directors - Balancing the Mix of Skills
The relationship between the CFWA Board of Directors and the agents it
contracts to act on its behalf raises another issue of interest. Of the eight cooperatives elected to the Council, six of the representatives from these elected cooperatives are senior management employees of their respective co-operatives. This
is in marked contrast to the make-up of the CFWA Board of Directors in the 1950s.
Chapter Four reveals that only one employee of a co-operative was permitted to sit
on the CFWA Board of Directors, with the other Director positions occupied by
individuals who were members of co-operatives (Sandford, 1955).
Booth (2004) argues that a mix of members and employees of co-operatives
on the CFWA Board of Directors is desirable as it provides a balance of skills in
guiding the peak body across the breadth of co-operative sector issues.
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Representatives of other co-operative movement peak bodies also view this
combination of member and employee Directors on a peak body Board as
appropriate (Interviewee 945, 2003; Interviewee 996, 2004). Managers of cooperatives, as peak body Directors, can bring strength to the peak body in their sound
administrative and management skills (Interviewee 945, 2003). Additionally, they
often have greater time to read documents and analyse policy issues (Interviewee
996, 2004). To complement these skills, Directors involved as members in their own
co-operative bring a broad perspective on the value of the co-operative structure in
their industry and a strong user and owner perspective (Interviewee 945, 2003). Peak
body Directors who are members of their own co-operatives can also act as a
practical and commonsense brake on peak body Directors with management
backgrounds and ensure that the peak body remains oriented towards co-operative
principles (Interviewee 996, 2004).
The issue is to ensure the appropriate mix of Board member skills and
attitudes on the CFWA Board of Directors. The principal-agent relationship can
provide insight into the different roles within the peak body. CEOs, in their
employing co-operative, assume the role of agents. However, as Board members of
the peak body, they are required to undertake the role of principal rather than retain
the attitudes and perspectives attributed by the theory to them as agents in their
employed position. Consequently, the question to be considered is whether the CEOs
can adopt the appropriate mindsets to switch between the different roles of principal
and agent.
Munro (2003), in accord with contemporary organisational and management
theory, argues that the CFWA Board are the policy setters for the co-operative
movement, while CEOs are the implementers of these policies. This implies, as per
principal-agent theory, that managers are essentially technical day-to-day actors
undertaking functional and managerial activities, while the Board performs the
broader visionary policy activities. Several of the members of the CFWA Board of
Directors are employed as managers of their respective co-operatives. Managers of
co-operatives, as employees on a salary, do not necessarily bring to the role of
CFWA Director the same perspectives as those individuals who are members of cooperatives (Interviewee 996, 2004). Directors who have been involved in the
formation or growth of their own co-operatives, and have an interest in its survival
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and the wider political economy in which it functions, can bring to the role of
Director a broader perspective than a co-operative employee (Interviewee 996,
2004). Directors who are members of a co-operative have a strong and vested interest
in ensuring that the peak body has a role representing co-operatives as a business
model and influencing a positive public policy environment for co-operatives
(Interviewee 996, 2004).
In contrast, there is potential for a Board, dominated by managers of cooperatives, to adopt a managerialist perspective and focus on issues that ordinarily
fall into the domain of the manager - the agent - of the peak body. If professional
managers of co-operatives fail to understand co-operative logic and assume that the
co-operative behaves according to the logic of a ‘for-profit’ business, conflict with
the inherent nature of the co-operative values will inevitably arise (Craig, 1993). This
will influence the direction of the CFWA due to the different perspectives that
Directors who are also managers of co-operatives bring to the understanding of a cooperative and a co-operative peak body. Therefore, a Board of Directors dominated
by the CEOs of member co-operatives may, over time, change the values orientation
of the peak body (Interviewee 996, 2004).
Lastly, the articulate professionalism of Directors who are career managers
can be overwhelming for co-operative member Directors (Interviewee 996, 2004),
who in their own careers may be self-employed farmers or taxicab owners. In other
words, career managers can overshadow a Board containing only a few Directors
who are also co-operative members. It is difficult for co-operative member Directors
to counter this power imbalance in the mix of Directors and ensure the peak body
remains true to its charter (Interviewee 996, 2004).
Conclusion
The CFWA journey from its registration as an association in 1919
representing the interests of the Western Australian co-operative movement to the
present has been a long and winding one. This organisation has functioned
continuously for nearly eight decades, a significant achievement in itself. Throughout
the majority of this time, the CFWA and the Western Australian co-operative
movement, particularly in the agricultural co-operative sector, operated in a
sympathetic and supportive political, social and economic environment. The
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longevity of the CFWA suggests that it evolved into an institution with its own
distinctive character and was valued for itself as much as for the technical functions
it performed on behalf of its membership. However, in recent years, the present day
CFWA has had limited success embodying co-operative values and transmitting
these values to subsequent generations, achieving these aims within the Western
Australian co-operative movement and the broader community. The chapter
concluded that the CFWA is highly vulnerable to internal and external issues
influencing the Western Australian co-operative movement overall.
The late 20th century has produced different cultural interpretations of the
role of the State and the market based around the concepts of neoclassical economic
theory. This analysis of the CFWA demonstrated the effect of the contemporary
Australian economic and political context on the peak body. The dominance of
neoliberal discourse has essentially displaced the agricultural co-operative structure
and its institutional support structures such as the CFWA from public debate. In this
political and economic context, it is difficult for the CFWA to engage in public
discussions about the co-operative movement or represent the interests of its
membership to external stakeholders. Despite a desire to promote the co-operative
structure positively to a range of stakeholders, the co-operative movement peak body
is manoeuvred into adopting a defensive approach to dispel misconceptions about the
co-operative structure held by many in government agencies, the business
community, the media, and influential positions of leadership. Time will tell if the
peak body can continue to perpetuate knowledge of the co-operative values to its
membership, the wider community and political decision makers during a period
when the external environment is not particularly receptive to these values.
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CHAPTER SIX

Public Policy, Statutory Marketing Authorities and Agricultural Cooperatives

Introduction
This chapter reviews the interface between State and Commonwealth
governments and the agricultural co-operative sector by analysing two related
matters. The chapter firstly examines the contemporary public policy framework for
agricultural co-operatives in a period of agricultural industry deregulation. The
second part of the chapter explores a specific public policy issue, the dismantling of
Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs), and the connection between SMAs and
agricultural co-operatives. The chapter revisits some of the neoliberal concepts
raised in Chapter Three, extending the analysis to the repercussions of these notions
on Departments of Agriculture, SMAs and the possible development of a revamped
public policy environment for agricultural co-operatives.
Public Policy
Public policy has many definitions, though Gerston (2002, p 3) states that, at
a minimum, it is the ‘combination of basic decisions, commitments, and actions
made by those who hold or affect government decisions’. The United States CapperVolstead Act 1922 (Volkin, 1995) is an archetype of agricultural co-operative public
policy enacted in the United States in the third decade of the 20th century. Via this
legislation, agricultural co-operatives were, and continue to be, exempt from antitrust laws in recognition of the co-operative structure’s particular ability to address
economic disadvantage for farmers. 117 While Australia did not emulate this anti-trust
strategy, two examples of legislation with specific links to the agricultural cooperative suggest that historically, Australia provided a positive public policy

117 Anti-trust laws are similar to Australian laws dealing with anti-competitive behaviour.
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environment to support agricultural co-operatives. Firstly, sections 117, 118, 119 and
120 of the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment 1936 were specifically
incorporated to provide taxation concessions for agricultural co-operatives,
illustrating an early example of public policy for the agricultural co-operative
structure. 118
The second example of evidence from the first half of the 20th century of a
constructive public policy environment for the co-operative structure is that most
Australian States promulgated co-operative legislation that recognised the cooperative business structure as a separate legal entity. 119 These examples of a
favourable public policy environment in the first half of the 20th century signal
recognition by Australian State and Commonwealth governments of the difficult
economic situation confronting farmers and threatening the viability of the fledgling
agricultural industry. The capacity of the agricultural co-operative structure to
resolve market failure, particularly its countervailing ability and the provision of
goods and services the market was unwilling or unable to provide, justified a public
policy framework for the agricultural co-operative structure. Policy makers
developed legislative mechanisms to facilitate the development and financial
viability of agricultural co-operatives. This form of public policy specifically for
agricultural co-operatives on behalf of State and Commonwealth governments
therefore contributed to the development of the emergent agricultural industry to the
benefit of Australia overall.
Public policy for agricultural co-operatives was reinvigorated in the early
1990s to update, via State Departments of Consumer Affairs and State Co-operative
Federations, co-operative legislation. 120 A significant feature of the new cooperatives legislation is the incorporation of the co-operative principles based on the
1995 ICA Statement on the Co-operative Identity. Reinforcing the centrality of the
co-operative principles in the updated legislation can be interpreted as a significant
118 An attempt in the Commonwealth Coalition Government’s 1996 Budget Proposal to remove
Section 120(1)(c) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 survived an Opposition-controlled Senate
with the support of Labor, the Democrats, the Greens and two Independents (Greenwood, 1996b). The
ability of other political parties to prevent the Government’s efforts in this area indicate a residual
positive public policy environment for agricultural co-operatives, as it demonstrates that agricultural
co-operative advocates can rally political support for their cause when the structure is under some
form of threat. The issue has not been revisited by the Howard Coalition government and the
concessions still remain in the Act.
119 Victoria introduced specific legislation for co-operatives in the 1950s, the Co-operation Act 1953.
120 Appendix Two reviews the development of State based co-operative legislation.
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public policy statement about co-operatives. Parliamentary debates during the late
1990s from various Australian States on the updated co-operative legislation were
invariably supportive of the co-operative sector and the value of dedicated cooperative legislation, regardless of which party was in government (see, for example,
New South Wales, 1992; Victoria, 1996). The ability of the co-operative sectors
within each Australian State to stimulate government support for updated cooperative legislation in the closing years of the 20th century is a noteworthy and
contemporary public policy statement about co-operatives. However, despite a
decade of negotiations on new co-operatives legislation, Western Australia continues
to operate under the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. No new legislation has
appeared to date, and the extended delay in introducing this legislation in Western
Australia can be interpreted as reflecting the low priority within the Western
Australian government of the co-operative movement in a public policy sense.
Notwithstanding the taxation concessions in the Commonwealth Income Tax
Assessment 1936 and the updating of legislation for co-operatives, a deeper analysis
of the co-operative movement public policy environment in present day Australia
reveals a comparatively unresponsive state of affairs for agricultural co-operatives.
Lyons (2001a) correctly argues that government interaction with the co-operative
movement is characterised by a high degree of ambivalence. Although remnants of
agricultural co-operative public policy linger into the 21st century in the form of cooperative legislation, they mask an ambiguity about the agricultural co-operative
structure among policy makers generally in Western Australia or Australia (Booth,
2004; Cronan, 2001; Interviewee 680, 2003; Interviewee 682, 2003; Munro, 2003).
Nevertheless, the continued existence of State and Commonwealth legislation
provides a solid platform from which to strengthen the argument for an overt and
active form of public policy for agricultural co-operatives. Further, the historical
rationale for a public policy position for agricultural co-operatives remains cogent
and legitimises the role of present day government agencies to develop and
implement public policy to stimulate and support co-operative development.
Weak Public Policy Position for the Agricultural Co-operative Structure
An inadequate contemporary public policy framework for Western Australian
agricultural co-operatives has several implications for the agricultural industry.
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Public policy silence on the agricultural co-operative diminishes the legitimacy and
relevance of the co-operative structure in the contemporary agricultural industry and
the wider agricultural supply chain. It is discriminatory as it covertly privileges the
corporate business model over alternative business structures and permits
stakeholders to overlook or devalue the potential benefits of the co-operative
structure. It undermines stakeholder knowledge of the role of the agricultural cooperative in the broader community, and limits the transfer of information and
awareness about the ability of the co-operative structure to subsequent generations of
farmers and rural communities.
The contemporary Australian public policy position for agricultural cooperatives can be contrasted with that in the United States (Torgerson et al., 1997;
United States Department of Agriculture, 2002) and to a lesser extent in Canada
(Fulton, 2001). The United States, rhetorically at least, also makes use of neoliberal
theory to organise its economy, yet its public policy position for agricultural cooperatives is explicit. In addition to legislative frameworks which confer taxation and
anti-trust benefits to agricultural co-operatives, the United States provides significant
institutional support for the agricultural co-operative structure (Fulton, 2001). United
States government agencies at the Federal and State level, in agriculture and rural
community economic development, along with other co-operative development
organisations, often funded by the Federal United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), implement a range of strategies to develop and support agricultural cooperatives. This support is diverse, such as a network of co-operative development
organisations that employ development officers to advise farmer groups about
forming co-operatives, and the provision of seed funding for feasibility studies and
business plans. Agricultural faculties within several universities provide extension to
and undertake academic research about agricultural co-operatives to complement the
activities of government agencies. This research is closely linked with the
agricultural industry to maximise reciprocal skills and knowledge transfer between
actors from both the agricultural industry and the tertiary sector. There is also a
strong linkage between regional and rural development policy and the role of
agricultural co-operatives in rural community economic development (Fulton, 2001).
The United States experience, mirrored to some extent by the Canadian
approach, has an integrated and complementary set of public policies and strategies
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to develop the co-operative structure. The synergy created by these intertwined
elements of a cohesive agricultural co-operative public policy facilitates a virtuous
cycle. To illustrate, other institutions orient themselves to supplement this public
policy. Banking institutions are prepared to lend capital to co-operatives and the
professional advisory services understand the co-operative structure and advise
farmer groups from a strong knowledge base. Fulton (2001) argues that the
institutional support offered via government agencies and other sectors is possibly
the most significant factor in the United States agricultural co-operative
development. 121
In contrast, Australia and Western Australia do not have a similarly broad and
integrated public policy framework supplemented by strong institutional supports
and strategies to champion the agricultural co-operative structure. Unlike the United
States, Canada and parts of Europe, Australia has invested very little in agricultural
co-operative research (Cronan, 2003). 122

Agricultural industry associations

(Interviewee 655, 2003; Interviewee 656, 2003), other industry and business
associations (Interviewee 688, 2001; Interviewee 689, 2002), the tertiary education
sector and the professional bodies and banking sector (Interviewee 692, 2002;
Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 695, 2003; Interviewee 696, 2002) lack a basic
knowledge of the co-operative structure or unintentionally perpetuate misconceptions
about the model. The provision of publicly funded curriculum for co-operatives at
secondary, technical or tertiary level is virtually non existent (Cronan, 2003), and
promotion of co-operatives as part of a comprehensive economic development
framework is marginal if not absent. Public funding for the co-operative peak body,
which essentially undertakes some functions on behalf of government, particularly in

121 Fulton’s (2001) paper explores the New Generation Co-operative (NGC) phenomenon in the
United States to explain why Canada has not experienced a similar explosion in NGC development.
However, the conclusions he draws concerning the United States institutional support for NGCs
applies to agricultural co-operatives generally and highlight the different public policy environment
between the United States and Australia.
122 According to Cronan (2003) Australia in 2003 had two PhDs specialising in the co-operative
movement, and two PhD students researching agricultural co-operatives, including the researcher of
this thesis. The Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development (ACCORD) affiliated
with Charles Sturt University and the University of Technology Sydney, conducted research into cooperatives. Cronan (2003) stated that government and the universities funded ACCORD, and that the
centre did not receive any financial contribution from the co-operative movement. Funding constraints
necessitated that ACCORD adopt a broader research focus into the ‘social economy’, which, it can be
argued, diverted its attention away from dedicated co-operative research. ACCORD ceased operation
in 2005.
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advice on governance and regulatory responsibilities of co-operatives, is also
marginal.
Despite this neglect of institutional support for the agricultural co-operative
sector emanating in part from a lack of public policy, there are fine examples of ad
hoc initiatives. The Western Australian Department of Agriculture has undertaken
several initiatives over a decade or so that demonstrate a strong and sustained
commitment to stimulating the agricultural co-operative sector. 123 Additionally, from
time to time, the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection has provided
small grants to the co-operative sector peak body to undertake specific tasks (Booth,
2004). 124 However, these informal approaches are highly dependent on the goodwill
of individual government Ministers or influential public servants within these
Departments. Hence, these initiatives are particularly vulnerable as the lack of an
overall public policy for agricultural co-operatives prohibits these initiatives
becoming more formally embedded within the organisation.
Consequently, the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector has an
under-developed and under-resourced institutional environment in both the public
and private sectors to support the co-operative movement. An overall government
policy statement on the value and contribution of co-operatives to the State’s social
and economic development does not exist and is one of the factors contributing to the
generally weak co-operative movement in present day Western Australia.
Decline in the Former Public Policy Position for Agricultural Co-operatives
Despite the theoretical and empirical benefits of the agricultural co-operative
structure identified in the earlier chapters, this knowledge and understanding is not
robust among present day actors. Consequently, the agricultural co-operative
structure has slipped into a very neutral and passive public policy twilight zone. A
number of interrelated and multi-levelled factors partly explain this decline in
agricultural co-operative public policy.

123 Some of these activities are discussed in a following section.
124 The Western Australian Department of Employment and Consumer Affairs has in the past given
the peak body $15,000 in some financial years to fund specific activities, such as consultation with cooperatives about the proposed legislation.
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Chapter Three explored neoliberalism as the dominant paradigm driving
Australian macro-level industry policy, including agricultural industry policy, over
the last two to three decades (Pusey, 1991; Stilwell, 2000). The objective of these
market-oriented reforms was to introduce greater competition into different industry
sectors, including agriculture, and dismantle unnecessary regulation (Hilmer, 1993).
The 1995 National Competition Policy Agreement involved a review of all
State and Commonwealth legislation to determine if any piece of legislation had an
anti-competitive impact on Australian industry. This review included legislation for
co-operatives and Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs), which share some
features in common with co-operatives. From the perspective of National
Competition Policy, co-operatives are interpreted under the Trade Practices Act
1974, the Commonwealth government’s anti-competitive legislation, as agreements
between competitors, that is between farmers, which may be potentially anticompetitive (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, 2002).
The International Labour Office (ILO) (2001) commented on the implications
for the co-operative business model of this international trend by nation States
towards market driven economies and the use of competition policy to facilitate free
markets. The significant issue identified by the ILO was the potential conflict
between competition legislation and the agricultural co-operative business structure.
The ILO argues that agricultural co-operatives are a collection of individual farmers
who assemble to achieve economies of scale or other business efficiencies in the
agricultural supply chain that they would not be able to achieve as independent farm
business entities. However, the ILO acknowledges that, from the perspective of
competition policy, this form of co-operation can be mistakenly interpreted as
collusion. The ILO recommends that government policy makers acquaint themselves
with the fundamental distinction between a co-operative business venture and the
anti-competitive practices of IOFs to understand that the co-operative model is not
engaging in collusive behaviour.
This misinterpretation of the role of the agricultural co-operative confirms the
difficulty facing advocates of the co-operative structure to develop a constructive
public policy space within a neoliberal framework. Clearly, this misunderstanding
about the role and function of the agricultural co-operative business structure is
persistent. Submissions from the peak bodies of the co-operative movement in New
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South Wales (Co-operative Federation of New South Wales, 2002) and Victoria (Cooperative Federation of Victoria, 2002) to the 2002 review of the Commonwealth
Trade Practices Act 1974, expressed concern that the Act does not comprehend the
intrinsic differences between the co-operative business structure and other forms of
commercial structures. Furthermore, the submissions argued that, contrary to
contemporary understanding, the co-operative business structure is a pro-competitive
market mechanism that corrects market failure and therefore stimulates a competitive
environment. Consequently, the submissions conclude that the Trade Practices Act
1974 has an intrinsic and entrenched prejudice against the co-operative business
structure that impedes the development of successful co-operative businesses. 125
However, recommendations emanating from the review offer some benefits
for the co-operative structure. The Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC), which already had the ability to adjudicate on anti-competitive
practices that would otherwise breach the Trade Practices Act 1974 through a
mechanism known as an authorisation process (Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission, 2001), may develop a simpler process to enable farmers, as
small business operators, to bargain collectively (Oczkowski, 2003). Despite this
tentatively constructive outcome, the essential problem of a lack of understanding
about the fundamental differences between the co-operative business structure and
other business models in Commonwealth anti-competitive legislation, and the
administrative and regulatory government bodies responsible for the carriage of this
legislation, continues to plague the development of a public policy framework for the
co-operative business structure.
This perpetual misconstruction by highly powerful and influential actors
within these Commonwealth regulatory and administrative agencies about the unique
function of the agricultural co-operative structure and its pro-competitive role in a
market economy, is deeply entrenched. Further, the competition policy interpretation
of the co-operative business structure filters through to other influential agencies. To
illustrate this lack of understanding about the role of the co-operative structure, the
Australian Stock Exchange, a public company, has sought to accommodate those
125 The Capper-Volstead Act 1922 recognises the dilemma that agricultural co-operatives can be
perceived as behaving collusively in anti-trust or anti-competitive legislation and overcomes this by
quarantining, with certain qualifications, the agricultural co-operative from this type of legislation.
The review of the Trade Practices Act 1974 rejected submissions recommending that Australia adopt
a similar piece of legislation for agricultural co-operatives.
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agricultural co-operatives seeking to raise external funds by listing them in a specific
category on the stock exchange. At one level, this appears to be a positive
development in normalising agricultural co-operatives as simply one option among a
suite of business structures. However, the Australian Stock Exchange interprets the
co-operative structure as an immature structure that will inevitably transform into the
IOF corporate structure (Australian Stock Exchange, 2001). Consequently, rather
than being presented as a valid model in its own right, the co-operative structure is
stereotyped by the Australian Stock Exchange as an oddity among business
structures that will eventually evolve into the standard IOF.
In addition to the macro-level industry policy and the agricultural industry
policy, another significant factor to explain the lack of an agricultural co-operative
public policy is the manner in which neoliberalism invariably redefines the role of
the State. The theory dictates that the private sector is able to provide services and
goods more efficiently than the public sector, leading to the ethos of minimal and
small government (Stilwell, 2000). Government delivered services, neoliberal theory
argues, will lessen the well-being of society, as government provision of services
tends to be bureaucratic, inefficient and stifles innovativeness (Stilwell, 2000).
Neoliberalism maintains that governments cannot remedy market failures.
Furthermore, the costs associated with leaving the market to resolve market failure
will be lower than the costs incurred from government initiatives to address market
failure. Under this model, the legitimate role of government agencies is pared back to
facilitating a stable, free and competitive market to enable the private sector to
assume the dominant role in an economy.
Marsh and Parnell (1998) catalogue the significant changes in the functions
of State Departments of Agriculture, particularly in the context of agricultural
extension programs, 126 as these organisations reposition themselves according to the
neoliberal paradigm. As well as out-sourcing former government delivered services
and employees to the private sector on the basis of private benefit, other strategies

126 Marsh and Pannell (1997; 1998) define agricultural extension very generally to encompass both
public and private sector activities including technology transfer, education, attitude change, human
resource development, and dissemination and collection of information. They also incorporate offfarm as well as on-farm players in agricultural industries in this definition. The breadth of this
definition could include a public policy position on agricultural co-operatives and the strategies to
endorse and stimulate the uptake of this alternative business structure as part of agricultural extension.
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include decentralising a trimmed department 127 to the regions; implementing the
‘Funder-Purchaser-Provider’ model; developing industry partnership groups; and
focusing on cost-recovery and cost-sharing. In addition to the influence of
neoliberalism in the development of agricultural policy and the redefined role of
State Departments of Agriculture, Marsh and Pannell (1998) also attribute the
changing function of agricultural government agencies to other more pragmatic
factors, such as increasing fiscal burdens on government and the waning significance
of the agricultural industry in the Australian economy.
These competitive market driven policies alter the historical relationship
between State and Commonwealth government Departments of Agriculture and
farmers and significantly modify the traditional range of strategies available to
Departments of Agriculture. Seeking to develop a public policy framework for
agricultural co-operatives in this new paradigm is challenging as it is essentially
contrary to open market policy strategies for government. Subsequent sections in this
chapter explore in some detail the conflict confronting a Department of Agriculture
in seeking to develop and implement an agricultural co-operative public policy in a
neoliberal environment.
This overarching account of the influence of orthodox economic theory on
the lack of an agricultural co-operative public policy framework is supplemented by
other related explanations. Chapter Three identified several elements of
neoliberalism that are incompatible with the philosophy underpinning the cooperative business structure. Briefly, the archetypal business structure consistent with
orthodox economics is the IOF or corporate structure, which focuses on the pursuit
of profit and the distribution of this profit to shareholders. In contrast, an agricultural
co-operative is formed to pursue benefits or services for its members rather than a
‘profit’ from a commercial activity. Another element of the neoliberal doctrine is the
concept of individualism, which suggests that individuals should pursue activities to
maximise their personal welfare (Lawrence, 1987). The co-operative model is a
collective, rather than individualistic, approach to economic activity (Fulton, 1995).
Economic theory therefore has a difficulty in accommodating a concept such as ‘co-

127 A trimmed or pared down Department refers to the reduced Full-time Equivalent (FTE) public
servants within the Department of Agriculture, as staff are made redundant or relocated to undertake
former Department functions that the Department has privatised.
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operation’ when one of the cornerstones of the theory is the pursuit of individual
self-interest.
Another factor leading to the diminished public policy role for agricultural
co-operatives is the perception of the co-operative structure as an outdated business
model. A range of influential stakeholders, such as some professional advisors and
agribusiness consultants, bankers and media representatives, often hold this view.
The features of the co-operative model, such as its collective membership base as
opposed to individualism, and its focus on services and benefits rather than profit,
further reinforce the perceived oddity of this structure for this stakeholder sector
trained in classical economic principles. This view is strengthened by the dominant
discourse by commentators and many academics about the shortcomings of the
agricultural co-operative structure. This commentary often focuses on the difficulties
agricultural co-operatives encounter with capital raising, which allegedly do not
occur with a company structure. The solution to capital raising challenges is
supposedly found in converting the co-operative to a corporate structure, which in
turn fortifies the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm. In summary, the lack of
positive and informed understanding of the co-operative structure in the business and
corporate world, reinforced by some elements of the media, combined with the
deficit in professional training for stakeholders about the co-operative business
model, along with the overriding ascendancy of the neoliberal paradigm, lead to a
blindness about the economic value of a collective business structure in agriculture.
Lastly, the capacity of the present day Western Australian co-operative
movement to develop a relationship with government to explain the benefits and
significance of the co-operative model appears to be limited (Interviewee 682, 2003).
According to Interviewee 682 (2003), very little information about the co-operative
sector crosses the desks of Ministers of a number of departments, particularly when
compared to other business sectors. Consequently, ministerial policy makers and
government department officers have minimal understanding of the co-operative
movement and the co-operative structure. As the co-operative movement does not or
cannot present a cohesive agenda to the government, the result is unclear or mixed
messages about what the sector is trying to achieve.
Despite a conducive public policy environment in the past to nurture the
agricultural co-operative structure, contemporary public policy based on a
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competitive market driven framework does not encourage the use of this business
structure. Clearly, the development of an agricultural co-operative public policy in
Western Australia will be very challenging. An agricultural co-operative public
policy promoting the co-operative structure presents a quandary for policy makers as
it potentially competes with central notions of orthodox economic theory and
National Competition Policy. Additionally, agencies that administer or regulate
Commonwealth legislation may be inclined to misinterpret the co-operative structure
as a form of collusion (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, 2002). State and
Commonwealth government public policy makers are unable to counter the efficacy
of this interpretation as they have limited direct experience with or awareness of the
benefits of the agricultural co-operative structure. Furthermore, their professional and
classical economic training channels them into interpreting the model via the IOF
prism. All these institutional elements contribute to the enervated state of the overall
co-operative movement in Western Australia and Australia, and challenge the
relevance of the co-operative business structure. Without an overt public policy
framework for agricultural co-operatives supporting the peak bodies and successful
agricultural co-operatives demonstrating the merits of the co-operative structure in a
market economy, there is very little opportunity for these misconceptions to be
corrected.
Public Policy Theory for Agricultural Co-operatives
The Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and the various State
co-operative Acts to incorporate the co-operative structure are reminders that
Australia had a public policy framework for agricultural co-operatives. The concept
of ‘public good’ provides a rationale for the further development of a public policy
framework for the agricultural co-operative model. Musgrave and Musgrave (2003, p
ii) quote Adam Smith as first defining the nature and purpose of a ‘public good’.128
According to Musgrave and Musgrave, Smith supported the free market but
understood that it had some deficits. Smith observed the existence of certain products
which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a
great society are, however, of such a nature that the profits could
never repay the expenses to any individual or small number of
128 This concept of ‘good’ in economic terminology refers to something that may be tradable and
have some economic value, rather than understanding the term ‘good’ in a moral sense.
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individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any
individual or small number of individuals should erect. (A. Smith,
1994 [1776], cited in Musgrave and Musgrave, 2003, p ii)
Smith’s concept of a public good can be defined as ‘a good that, even if
consumed by one person, is still available for consumption by others’ (Begg, Fischer,
& Dornbusch, 1997, p 48). The notion can be further understood by differentiating it
from a ‘private good’. A private good is can be defined as a ‘good, if consumed by
one person, cannot be consumed by another’ (Begg et al., 1997, p 262). The
consumption of private goods is restricted to those individuals who actually pay for
them (Begg et al., 1997). Those individuals, in purchasing and consuming the good,
also gain the benefit of consumption (Kaul et al., 2003).
The concept of public good contains two necessary features. Firstly, the idea
of ‘non-rivalry’ embodied within a public good, in which the consumption by one
individual of a good does not reduce the amount available for other people. Access to
sunlight or fresh air epitomises this criterion to some extent. Secondly, the concept of
‘non-excludability’ conveys the idea that when the good is provided, no individual is
excluded from the benefits, as the benefits are collective. Kaul, Conceicao, Le
Goulven, & Mendoza, (2003) argue that a public good which possess these two
qualities absolutely is ‘pure’. Of interest to agricultural co-operatives, Kaul et al.
(2003) adopt the term ‘collective good’ to differentiate ‘pure’ public goods from
those that are applicable to a particular sub-set of society. An agricultural cooperative is clearly a public good that is restricted to a sector of society, that is
farmers, and is therefore appropriately termed a ‘collective good’. However, for
reasons of clarity and simplicity, this analysis of agricultural co-operative public
policy will continue to apply the term ‘public good’ rather than ‘collective good’.
Clearly, the motivation for the provision of a public good is some form of
market failure in the private sector. According to Musgrave and Musgrave (2003),
Smith acknowledged that as the market fails to provide public goods, it is appropriate
that government to do this. In a contemporary context, the term ‘public’ does not
imply that its production is undertaken by a public sector, that is, by government, but
relates to the consumption of the public good by the public (Kaul et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, the peculiarities of a public good often result in a government
connection to it in some way (Pannell, 2004). Further, public goods often are not
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free. The sheer cost of providing them discourages the private sector from
undertaking this function, resulting in government provision at some cost to the
community. 129
Pannell (2004) further differentiates the understanding of ‘public good’,
which has a precise economic meaning, from concepts of ‘public benefit’ and
‘private benefit’. ‘Public benefit’ and ‘private benefit’ are terms that arose in
interviews with public servants when discussing issues around the present and
potential role of the Western Australian Department of Agriculture with the
agricultural co-operative sector (Interviewee 679, 2002; Interviewee 680, 2003).
Pannell (2004) also notes the popular use of these terms by government agencies and
actors, but points out that there is a deficit in theoretical information on ‘private
benefit’ and ‘public benefit’, although there is considerable literature on the theory of
‘public good’. Pannell (2004) defines the concept of ‘private benefit’ as benefits
which are generated for the private landholder, while ‘public benefit’ concerns
benefits generated for a collective group of landholders. According to Pannell, the
‘public/private benefit’ concept is applied by government agencies as a rationale for
funding activities that are considered to generate public benefits. However,
government will not fund activities which result in ‘private benefit’ for individual
farmers as there are assumed to be sufficient market based incentives for farmers to
adopt the practice without additional government encouragement (Pannell, 2004).
Pannell (2004) argues that the concept of public and private benefit is not derived
from public good theory and is not linked to the concept of market failure. However,
in the context of this thesis, both concepts clearly have an underlying neoliberal
sentiment that rationalises when government should or should not be involved with
the provision of a public good or a public benefit (Pannell, 2004).

129 However, a downside to the provision of a public good is the propensity for free-riding. As all
individuals in a community share a benefit, it becomes a ‘public good’. Free-riding occurs when an
individual is able to gain the benefit without contributing to its availability (Kaul et al., 2003). Chapter
Five discusses Olson’s concept of collective action to explain the motivations for free riding. As the
co-operative can be construed as a public good, consistent with any public good, there is an incentive
for individuals to minimise their involvement in producing the public good, as it is accessible for all
members, resulting in free riding (Cook, 1995; Fulton, 2001).
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Public and Private Goods and the Western Australian Department of
Agriculture
In the context of a neoliberal paradigm, the concept of public and private
goods and benefits determines whether government or the private sector provides the
good or benefit. In the process of deeming a good or benefit as public or private, the
role and structure of government is inevitably redefined (Marsh & Pannell, 1997, p
8). The overall effect is the reorientation of government departments from direct
delivery of many programs previously delivered by governments by shifting
responsibility for delivery to the private sector. This also includes extension
activities, such as agricultural co-operative initiatives. 130 Extension activities have
shifted from being a public good provided by the Department of Agriculture to a
private good delivered by the private sector. This is rationalised on the basis that the
consumption of agricultural extension, such as enhanced business management skills
or technical production skills, translates into a direct private benefit for the individual
farmers who consume this good, through greater on-farm business efficiency or
profitability. Therefore, it is appropriate for individual farmers to pay, on a user-pays
or fee-for-service basis, for extension. Secondly, neoliberalism assumes that the State
or government services tend to be inefficient and bureaucratic while the private
sector is deemed to provide these services and goods in an innovative, efficient and
profitable manner (Marsh & Pannell, 1998). Consequently, it is presupposed that
private agricultural consultants are better placed than State Departments of
Agriculture officers to deliver agricultural extension (Marsh & Pannell, 1998).
However, in the context of extension for agricultural co-operatives, it is clear
that the market, represented by the private sector, has failed to provide appropriate
advice to farmer groups wishing to explore the potential of an agricultural cooperative. The research has identified several examples of farmer groups being
actively dissuaded by private professional advisors and agribusiness consultants from
adopting the co-operative structure for their proposed venture (Booth, 2004;
Interviewee 664, 2002; Interviewee 665, 2003).

130 Marsh and Pannell’s definition of ‘extension’ is described elsewhere in the chapter.
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Department of Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operative Public Policy
A neoliberal interpretation of the role of the State also reinforces a narrow
and one-dimensional interpretation about the agricultural co-operative structure.
Rather than evaluating agricultural co-operatives from a neoliberal perspective, an
agricultural co-operative public policy position requires a nuanced response from
government that acknowledges the pro-competitive nature of the co-operative
structure. Public good theory suggests that in market failure situations, government
and government agencies have a legitimate function to provide public goods to
ameliorate the market failure.
Agricultural co-operatives are able to address two forms of market failure and
therefore justify the development of a public policy position for the agricultural cooperative. Firstly, a form of market failure in agricultural extension is arising, as the
market is unable or unwilling to build the institutional support to deliver informed
professional development and advice about the agricultural co-operative. Western
Australia does not have one private sector consultant providing dedicated training,
professional advice, or development services for individuals or groups of farmers
seeking guidance on agricultural co-operatives, 131 despite evidence of an existing
market demand for these services. Additionally, due to the weak institutional
environment surrounding the agricultural co-operative sector, including the cooperative movement peak body, other organisations such as industry or business
associations do not feel any pressure to meet this need for advice and support for
agricultural co-operative development. The outcome for farmer groups of this
entrenched lack of institutional support for the agricultural co-operative model is the
exclusion of the co-operative structure as an option in the suite of business structures
for proposed farmer group initiatives. Given the documented theoretical and
empirical public good features of the agricultural co-operative structure, the market
failure in agricultural co-operative extension has potential economic disadvantages
for the agricultural industry.
A second level of market failure is apparent, as the neoliberal interpretation
of the agricultural co-operative structure devalues its capacity to perform a public
good function within the wider agricultural supply chain. As stated above, neoliberal
131 The former Executive Officer of the CFWA indicated that he would undertake consultancy work
in co-operative development and advice.
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public policy interprets the co-operative structure as a form of collusion that is
deemed as anti-competitive. However, an informed understanding of the co-operative
structure reveals that it facilitates a competitive market by correcting market failures.
Paradoxically, the lack of an agricultural co-operative public policy leads to a
propensity for market failure in the agricultural industry. The difficult position of
farmers in the agricultural supply chain identified in Chapter Three illustrates the
depth of market failure in the agri-food industry. The development of agricultural cooperatives by farmers can, to some extent, address this market failure. The multitiered market failures arising from a lack of support for the agricultural co-operative
structure at the agricultural industry level and in the institutional and extension
spheres demand a public policy intervention by the Western Australian Department
of Agriculture.
Arguments to Justify a Public Policy Framework for Agricultural Co-operatives
A key theme in the agricultural co-operative literature review in Chapter Two
was the pro-competitive ability of the agricultural co-operative structure to correct
various forms of market failure. Orthodox economic theory confirms that the
agricultural co-operative structure is able to use economies of scale to countervail the
power of monopolies or monopsonies in other links of the supply chain (Cobia,
1989). Agricultural co-operatives are also able to provide a good or service that the
market was unable or unwilling to provide (Cobia, 1989). These elements of the
agricultural co-operative structure were a significant factor in the early adoption of
the model in the agricultural industry. Chapter Two argued that, in its contemporary
role, the agricultural co-operative structure is able to rebalance market power
disparities between different actors in the agricultural supply chain. This procompetitive ability of the agricultural co-operative structure to even out the
behavioural extremes of a free market economy demonstrates that the agricultural cooperative performs a public good for society in excess of its specific business
activity.
From a sociological perspective, Chapter Two also demonstrated that
agricultural co-operatives provide economic and social benefits to the industry and
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rural communities, thereby performing another form of ‘public good’. 132 Agricultural
co-operatives facilitate the development of social capital, enable members to
experience democracy within the co-operative, and strengthen active participation of
members within their local community (Craig, 1993). Further, agricultural cooperatives are mutual self-help organisations (Craig, 1993), which is compatible with
the neoliberal tenet that individuals help themselves solve their own problems. As a
result of these public good characteristics of the agricultural co-operative structure,
government itself does not have to intervene to achieve these outcomes.
The Department of Agriculture goal to develop the economic viability of the
agricultural industry provides further justification for a public policy position for the
agricultural co-operative model (Western Australian Department of Agriculture,
n.d.). Interviewee 680 (2003) argued that the objective of the Department of
Agriculture was to provide a benefit to multiple farm entities and the broader
industry, rather than to a single farm unit. He maintained that agricultural cooperatives also provide benefits to multiple farm entities and by default to the
broader industry, and as such represented a form of public benefit. While Interviewee
680 (2003) acknowledged that a corporate entity could also benefit multiple farm
entities, the corporate structure does not have the intrinsic qualities of distributing
surplus among members and providing service at cost, which contributes to the
public benefit function of the agricultural co-operative structure.
Consequently, he argued, there is a high level of compatibility between the
wider public benefits delivered by the Department and agricultural co-operatives.
Due to this consistency in outcomes, he argued, it was appropriate for the
Department to provide public policy support for the agricultural co-operative
structure. Therefore, in supporting the co-operative structure to benefit the broader
industry, the Department was also achieving its own objective of benefiting the
broader industry (Interviewee 680, 2003). Additionally and importantly, Interviewee
680 (2003) considered that, as agricultural co-operatives have a net public benefit for
the community and the industry, it was reasonable for the government to share the
risk of fledging agricultural co-operative start-ups by providing access to seed
funding for activities such as feasibility studies or business plans.
132 While social outcomes are not part of the economic theory of public goods, the wider social
benefits of agricultural co-operatives in rural communities exceeds the actual co-operative activities
(Mooney & Gray, 2002).
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Concurrently, Interviewee 680 (2003) argued that in developing the viability
of the co-operative sector, the Department of Agriculture is also building a private
benefit for individual farmers as agricultural co-operatives have well documented
economic advantages in improving the efficiency and profitability of the farmer’s
individual farm enterprise. Therefore, he reasoned, a stronger agricultural cooperative sector leads to a stronger farm enterprise, which then becomes selfperpetuating. Interviewee 680 (2003) concluded that this end point of economically
viable individual family farms, complemented by a viable co-operative sector,
legitimised a public policy position for agricultural co-operatives by the Department
of Agriculture. Paradoxically, Interviewee 680 (2003) added, an agricultural cooperative public policy framework can facilitate government objectives of
economically profitable and efficient individual farm businesses and over time, the
withdrawal of overt government involvement in this area, further rationalising a
public policy framework to develop the agricultural co-operative sector.
In the opinion of Interviewee 680 (2003), several constructive side effects
also result from a public policy position for agricultural co-operatives. Drafting a
public policy framework and exploring the range of strategies within the Department
to implement the policy results in a deeper awareness of the structure among policy
makers. Further, a public policy framework for agricultural co-operatives stimulates
professional advisors, the media, and industry and business associations to develop a
more informed understanding of the model. A public policy framework for
agricultural co-operatives ensures knowledge transfer about the benefits of the cooperative structure among present day and future farmers. A public policy
framework legitimises the agricultural co-operative structure as a valid business
structure, expanding the range of business model options for farmers as they seek to
explore potential opportunities or shield themselves from the downsides of
globalisation and industry restructuring. Lastly, an agricultural co-operative public
policy positively influences gatekeepers and stimulates institutions to undertake a
catalyst role in co-operative development and support.
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Department of
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Initiatives
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A neoliberal paradigm diminishes the role of a government agency while
privileging the private market. While a strong theoretical element drives the rhetoric
of government policy, in the context of agricultural co-operative activity within the
Department of Agriculture, the actual behaviour of some staff within the Department
indicates that they are more engaged with the agricultural co-operative structure than
neoliberal theory would suggest. To some extent, these activities reflect the views of
individual Department officers that there is a justifiable role for government in the
agricultural co-operative sector. These individuals tend to be informed by New
Institutional Economics (NIE), which arose in the 1920s as a separate theoretical
response to the market failures emanating from the interpretations of liberalism and
classical economics (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This branch of economic theory
legitimises a position for institutions, including governments, in industry policy.
However, the dominant economic discourse in government agencies requires
that arguments for a possible policy position for agricultural co-operatives be framed
in neoliberal discourse to ensure its passage through the channels of government. It is
a difficult and conflicting task to analyse an issue on the basis of one theory due to its
explanatory capacity yet use the language of a competing theory to rationalise it in a
public policy sense. However, agricultural co-operatives have always been pragmatic
business structures. To ensure that the agricultural co-operative structure can perform
its broader public good role of stimulating competition and correcting market failure
in the agricultural supply chain, and contributing to the well-being of rural
communities, this pragmatism must also enter into the debate on agricultural cooperative public policy.
The examples of ad hoc agricultural co-operative support and initiatives
occurred under both the Western Australian Coalition and Labor Governments. The
Department of Agriculture, in the last decade, has directed considerable public funds
into developing industry knowledge of agricultural co-operatives. In the late 1990s,
the Western Australian Department of Agriculture initiated several international
study tours comprising agricultural industry actors, dedicated to exploring the
agricultural co-operative structure, particularly the new phenomenon of the NGC
structure (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 652, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002; Interviewee
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695, 2003). 133 The Department also sponsored lectures and seminars delivered in
Western Australia by internationally renowned agricultural co-operative academics
and proponents (Interviewee 689, 2002; Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 695,
2003). Additionally, the Department provided seed funding for feasibility studies for
potential co-operatives to evaluate business concepts (Interviewee 665, 2003;
Interviewee 680, 2003). It directed significant public funds and officer support to the
establishment of the Challenge Dairy Co-operative as part of an industry
restructuring package negotiated for deregulating the Western Australian dairy
industry (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 652, 2003; Interviewee 679, 2002; Interviewee
680, 2003). Further, the Western Australian Department of Agriculture has played a
significant role in promoting the co-operative alternative to agricultural and allied
industry sectors undergoing deregulation. Particularly in relation to the actual or
potential dismantling of SMAs for the dairy, egg, potato and meat industries, the
Department has been active in presenting the co-operative model as an alternative
business model post deregulation. Department officers have also been involved in
water deregulation, leading to the formation of farmer owned co-operatives
managing the distribution of water rights.
The Department has also supported and funded research into agricultural cooperatives, such as assisting a staff member to undertake PhD research in the United
States and contributing funds to Western Australian PhD research on agricultural cooperatives (Interviewee 680, 2003; Interviewee 681, 2001). 134 Departmental officers
driving agricultural co-operative initiatives have also sought to integrate the
agricultural co-operative structure into other programs and strategies within the
Department (Interviewee 680, 2003; Plunkett & Kingwell, 2001; Western Australian
Department of Agriculture, 2002b).
Perhaps the most significant example of Department of Agriculture activity
has been the introduction in late 2004, after several years of persistent activity, of a
new piece of specific Western Australian legislation for agricultural co-operatives,
entitled Co-operative Loans Act 2004. This legislation enables Western Australian
agricultural co-operatives to gain the benefits of S120 (1)(c) of the Income Tax

133 Appendix Three provides an overview of these study tours and seminars about the NGC model.
134 This thesis is the Western Australian research partially funded by the Department of Agriculture.
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Assessment Act 1936. 135 Following Department information seminars about the new
legislation, Interviewee 680 (2003) believed that there was a high level of latent
interest from farmers about the co-operative business model.
The introduction of the new loans facility coincided with the evolution of
some niche industry sectors, such as the olive industry, which were investigating the
processing stage for the commodity. Interviewee 680 (2003) argued that the loans
facility provided the agricultural industry with a concrete feature that positively
differentiated the co-operative business structure from the corporate structure and
therefore cemented the co-operative structure as a viable option for these niche
industries (Interviewee 680, 2003). Lastly, Interviewee 680 (2003) suggested that the
loans facility was also a benefit for agricultural co-operatives as co-operatives were
renowned for poor governance systems, particularly management and financial
control. The loans facility requires co-operatives to be ‘profitable’ to benefit from it
and therefore imposes financial discipline on co-operatives, overcoming the
reputation of poor financial control in co-operatives. 136
These ad hoc initiatives have arisen when individual public servants
recognised the potential of the agricultural co-operative model to meet Departmental
objectives of a viable agricultural industry, and therefore sought to stimulate the
uptake of the structure. Apart from the Co-operative Loans Act 2004, which is
institutionalised into Western Australian government policy, these agricultural cooperative initiatives are dependent on the goodwill of three or four individual actors
spread throughout the Department of Agriculture. While this is highly admirable at
one level, this ad hoc approach is too dependent on these few individuals. If these
individuals left the Department, then the momentum they created within the
Department to support the agricultural co-operative would no doubt dissipate.
According to Interviewee 680 (2003), State Departments of Agriculture throughout
Australia have a similar informal approach in which individual public servants drive
the co-operative agenda, as agricultural co-operative strategies are not entrenched in
135 Previously, the Western Australian government, unlike most other Australian State governments,
had not introduced a mechanism to loan government funds with its associated taxation benefits to
agricultural co-operatives under S120(1)(c) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.
136 Interviewee 680 (2003) indicated that in promoting the new legislation to the industry that farmer
groups interested in pursuing the co-operative model had little understanding of the steps required to
establish a co-operative, suggesting that a gap in provision of co-operative development services to
the agricultural co-operative sector. The issue is which organisation should fill this gap in co-operative
development - the peak body, the Department of Agriculture, or the private sector.
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a policy position within the departments. He also thought that the Commonwealth
Department of Agriculture had even less involvement in or connection with the cooperative model, with minimal evidence of efforts to facilitate its development
(Interviewee 680, 2003).
Further, these individuals believe that the Department is best placed to
undertake these developmental activities within the industry, given the fragile
institutional support for agricultural co-operatives. This, they argue, is particularly so
when other organisations that could or should undertake this public policy leadership
role, such as the CFWA, are in a weak position (Interviewee 680, 2003).
Consequently, these Department of Agriculture officers are mounting agricultural cooperative development strategies in a broader institutional and public policy vacuum
that may drive the agricultural co-operative movement in inappropriate directions. A
public policy position on agricultural co-operatives within the wider government and
appropriate government departments, and importantly developed in conjunction with
the peak body, is necessary to separate initiatives supporting agricultural cooperatives from the goodwill of individual public servants. This is necessary to
institutionalise agricultural co-operative policy into the long-term fabric of
government policy and service delivery.
Developing a Public Policy for Agricultural Co-operatives
The United Nations (1998) produced guidelines for member countries to
assist in creating a supportive environment for the development of co-operatives. The
guidelines are a valuable contribution to drafting a public policy framework for
agricultural co-operatives, which can be contextualised to Western Australia’s
specific institutional environment.
The guidelines address issues related to the public recognition of the cooperative structure; the legal, judicial and administrative provisions for cooperatives; research, data collection and statistics on co-operatives; information and
education about co-operatives; the provision of public funds for co-operatives and
institutional arrangements for collaboration and partnership between the co-operative
movement and government. Paraphrasing some key points of the guidelines:
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•

Government recognises and understands the uniqueness of the co-operative
business structure, based on co-operative principles and values which are
desirable and beneficial to society.

•

Government is charged with creating a supporting and enabling environment
for co-operatives and working in partnership with the co-operative
movement.

•

Government publicly acknowledges and promotes the role of co-operatives in
the economy and society.

•

Co-operative legislation incorporates and reinforces the co-operative
principles. All other laws, judicial and administrative practices are consistent
with co-operative legislation and principles. The co-operative movement via
the peak body needs to monitor this and bring anomalies to attention of
relevant government agencies.

•

Government acknowledges the co-operative structure’s self-regulatory nature
and the autonomy of the co-operative movement. Government therefore
should not be involved in the internal affairs of individual co-operatives or
the co-operative movement. Government works in partnership with the cooperative movement, via the peak body, in the development of co-operative
movement public policy, with formal procedures set up for consultation and
collaboration between government and co-operative movement.

•

A single government department should undertake the registration and
regulatory functions. At the industry level, government agencies, such as the
Department of Agriculture, should undertake development activities in
consultation with the co-operative movement peak body. Government
departments must avoid ‘taking over’ the development of the co-operative
movement.

•

Government funding to the co-operative movement or co-operative business
should be the same as other funding arrangements between government and
business sector.
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•

Government can have active role in undertaking and funding co-operative
research, the results of which need to be disseminated to the co-operative
movement.

•

The co-operative business structure is mainstreamed and normalised by
receiving the same level of public government support as any other form of
business enterprise.

•

Government has a role in facilitating knowledge and understanding of the cooperative movement and the co-operative business structure, especially in
dismantling prejudices and misconceptions. (United Nations, 1998)
In Western Australia and Australia generally, agricultural co-operative public

policy is strong in relation to legislative matters, evidenced by dedicated co-operative
legislation in each Australian State that incorporates the co-operative principles and
the taxation concessions within the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. However, in
other areas, public policy for agricultural co-operatives is clearly deficient. It is
apparent that governments do not provide a supportive framework equal to that
provided for other forms of business structures (International Co-operative Alliance,
1999). Western Australian support mechanisms for small business and companies far
outweigh those available for the co-operative business structure, such as the Small
Business Development Centre and the Business Enterprise Centres located in
regional centres. Additionally the business sector is well supported by a range of
industry associations, such as the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which is
able to exert considerable political influence over State and Commonwealth
governments. However, the most debilitating factor for an agricultural co-operative
public policy is the apparent ambivalence of government towards the co-operative
sector, which in turn permits other actors of influence to dismiss its contribution and
relevance to contemporary Australian agriculture.
Several interviewees commented positively on the agricultural co-operative
public policy model illustrated by the Rural Business-Co-operative Service in the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), which in turn was supported by a
strong institutional framework (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 680, 2003; Madden,
2003b). Madden (2003b) commented enthusiastically about the USDA support for
agricultural co-operatives and considered that it was a legitimate role for Australian
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State and Commonwealth governments to fund a similar resource for the agricultural
industry. However, based on his personal views of not relying on government, 137 he
believed that rather than a government agency delivering such services, that it
contributes to the activities of organisations such as the Co-operative Federations in
each State to provide the level of co-operative sector support. Madden believed that
such a strategy would stimulate the agricultural co-operative sector in Western
Australia.
The Respective Roles of the Department of Agriculture and the CFWA
The United Nations guidelines (1998) and interviews confirm that a
supportive government public policy is a key element in shaping the development
and viability of co-operatives as a valid business structure in agriculture. The
guidelines, however, indicate that the challenge for government is not to develop the
co-operative sector itself, but to facilitate an environment to stimulate the autonomy
of the co-operative sector with its own aims and philosophy. This position is
consistent with the neoliberal role of government as the manager rather than
deliverer of goods and services. Therefore, while the role of government is to provide
a positive public policy environment for co-operatives, the driving force in
implementing a public policy for co-operatives rests with the co-operative
movement.
These guidelines indicate that the future role of government involves
collaboration between the three levels of Australian government and with various
significant actors in the private sector and the peak bodies representing the
agricultural industry, the business sector, the co-operative movement and rural
communities, which collectively influence the validity of the agricultural cooperative structure. This facilitator role entails political and managerial issues related
to the sensitive design and implementation of politically acceptable strategies to
enhance the viability of the agricultural co-operative sector, and the appropriate
monitoring and evaluation of agricultural co-operative initiatives delivered under the
concept of public good. The UN guidelines also emphasise the need for government
to involve participatory decision making processes with the co-operative peak body

137 Chapter Seven expands on Madden’s views of government involvement in agriculture.
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and co-operative actors, which will enhance political support for public policy for
agricultural co-operative sector strategies.
While the United Nations guidelines provide direction on the role of
government in co-operative sector development, the long established co-operative
movement peak bodies are also a resource to facilitate the development of
agricultural co-operative public policy. To illustrate, the Canadian Co-operative
Association takes a proactive role in the development of public policy for the cooperative sector. Its webpage, in relation to public policy, states:
If government policies, legislation, and regulation are to enable cooperatives to thrive, a national voice for co-operatives must be heard
within the corridors of power. Our Government Affairs & Public
Policy (GAPP) unit analyzes and influences federal government
strategies, policies, legislation, and regulations to ensure that the
needs of co-operatives are met. Communicating this information to
CCA members is an important part of the unit’s work. Each month
GAP Update highlights key public policy developments and
government relations that are of interest to the co-operative sector.
The GAPP unit also works with members to develop positions and
representations to shape government policy and programs, and
facilitates opportunities for CCA and its members to partner with the
federal government. (Canadian Co-operative Association, n.d.)
As outlined in Chapter Five, the co-operative movement peak body, CFWA,
is under-resourced to perform a similar role of monitoring various government
activities to determine possible impacts on the Western Australian co-operative
sector. Additionally Chapter Five suggests that the peak body also lacks the
necessary influence to encourage government to pursue a co-operative movement
public policy framework. However, given the underlying compatibility of the
objectives of the Department of Agriculture with those of the CFWA, the
Department can help ameliorate this situation by initiating, in conjunction with the
CFWA, a strategy to incorporate the agricultural co-operative business structure into
Department activities in rural and regional Western Australia.
A challenge for the co-operative movement and its peak body is to recognise
the influence of neoliberalism on political and economic contemporary macro-level
public policy and how over time, these influences pervade the wider society. These
notions diminish the basic values of the co-operative movement and consequently,
the ability of the peak body to exert political and economic influence. The peak
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body, in seeking to lobby for a public policy position favourable toward the Western
Australian co-operative movement, needs to acknowledge and accept that
neoliberalism is deeply entrenched internationally and nationally, and therefore
develop strategies to facilitate the co-operative identity in this environment. This
partly involves understanding these wider political and economic drivers, and the
way that they are implemented in an institutional sense. This also incorporates an
understanding that there are influential opinion leaders who view the co-operative
structure as an inappropriate business structure in a market economy.
Despite this, the CFWA is perhaps at a fortunate time in history. After
several decades of allowing the market to organise the economy, a recognition by
government of the role of civil society structures, such as the Western Australian cooperative movement peak body, is emerging (Lyons, 1996). According to Lyons,
civil society sits between the State and the market economy and is a ‘sphere of
freedom where people can co-operate and organise to pursue their interests as
citizens free of the state or the market’ (Lyons, 1996, p 8). Civil society organisations
can focus on non-market aspects of society and undertake activities to ameliorate the
excesses of a free market. Civil society organisations can also advise and influence
governments (Lyons, 1996). These types of organisations can develop national and
international networks, and form partnerships with government that can lead to fresh
perspectives in developing and implement public policy (Lyons, 1996). The CFWA
can sit in this civil society space and in partnership with government, to facilitate
public policy development on behalf of the co-operative movement.
Lastly, the peak body must take the lead role in this area as an attitude change
agent and knowledge builder for the co-operative structure. The co-operative
movement peak body, in addition to a constructive relationship with government,
needs to ensure that it nurtures positive relationships with a range of agencies or
groups that can influence the success of a public policy framework for agricultural
co-operatives. These include liaising with industry associations such as the
Pastoralists and Graziers Association (PGA), Western Australian Farmers Federation
(WAFF) and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI), a range of professional
associations in the professions of law, accounting, banking and finance, management
and marketing, among others. Further, other government agencies involved with
business development, such as Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC)
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and the Business Enterprise Centres are important partners in developing a
constructive public policy environment for agricultural co-operatives.
Apart from these relationship strategies, it is essential that the peak body for
the co-operative movement have a thorough understanding of the implications of
macro-level public policy at the State and Commonwealth government sphere on the
co-operative business structure and the development of co-operative public policy.
Focusing on the micro-level, in isolation from these wider issues, will not lead to
sustainable policy position for the co-operative movement and struggle to be
effective.
Agricultural Co-operatives and Statutory Marketing Authorities
The previous section argued that the concept of public good legitimised the
development of a public policy framework for agricultural co-operatives.

This

section explores a related example of public policy for collective farmer activity, the
Statutory Marketing Authority. An analysis of SMAs and their association with cooperatives is included in this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, interviewee perceptions
revealed some confusion about the differences between SMAs and agricultural cooperatives, to the extent that sometimes it was unclear if interviewees were referring
to SMAs or co-operatives. Secondly, in a public policy environment of agricultural
industry restructuring, the dismantling of SMAs creates opportunities for cooperatives to form as an alternative structure. Examples of co-operatives forming in
the wake of dismantling of SMAs are examined to identify if this will stimulate
interest in the model.
Chapter Four revealed that Australian farmer approaches to collective
organisational structures has passed through a number of phases. The first phase
indicated that early 20th century Australian farmers followed the strategies of other
agriculturally focused Western countries by forming co-operatives in response to
some form of market failure. Following two world wars and the Depression, but
particularly after the Second World War, the second phase emerged with the
introduction of Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs).

Primary producers

connected with co-operatives such as Westralian Farmers Co-operative, lobbied
government to establish these SMAs and the two collective structures continued to
function side by side. In response to changes in government economic and political
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positions over the last two decades, a third phase has arisen, resulting in the
dismantling of most SMAs. This last phase reveals that the agricultural industry is
entering a new period in the agricultural co-operative story.
The Productivity Commission defines SMAs as:
monopoly producer boards, protected by legislation and various
import controls [to provide a] vehicle for an array of home price and
stabilisation schemes for many commodities. (Productivity
Commission, 2000, p ix)
SMAs are grower controlled organisations underpinned by State or
Commonwealth government legislation, with final responsibility for their operation
sitting with the government that drafted the legislation. The legislation often conveys
monopoly power to compulsorily buy and sell farmers’ commodities for both the
Australian and overseas markets. This pooling and marketing aspect of SMAs is
often referred to as ‘single desk’ (Productivity Commission, 2000) and the two terms
are used interchangeably. 138
Two theoretical concepts support the formation of SMAs arrangements.
Firstly, the concept of economies of scale enables growers to pool their
homogeneous commodity to achieve reduced costs and highest possible prices in
domestic and overseas markets. Secondly, SMAs provide a countervailing power to
other actors in the supply chain by bringing small atomised producers together under
the banner of the SMA to offset monopoly power of IOFs in the post-farm links of
the supply chain (Productivity Commission, 2000). Chapter Two reveals that these
arguments are consistent with those put forward in the literature concerning the
formation of agricultural co-operatives.
This similarity in theoretical justification and function has clearly resulted in
confusion in the literature and by interviewees about the differences between the two
structures. Given the imperfect knowledge of the co-operative structure identified in
interviews with a range of actors, it is understandable that many interviewees, even
those closely connected to the agricultural industry, struggle to differentiate between
the co-operative structure and the organisational structure represented by the SMA.
While many aspects of SMAs and co-operatives are similar, the compulsory
acquisition of commodities via a piece of legislation is the key difference between

138 In addition to the term ‘single desk’ SMAs are also referred to as Statutory Marketing Boards.
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marketing co-operatives and SMAs. The Productivity Commission refers to SMAs as
‘compulsory co-operatives’ (Productivity Commission, 2000) while agricultural cooperatives are voluntary organisations. Mauldon and Schapper (1974) argue that
SMAs are essentially government instrumentalities with farmer representation. Like
co-operatives, SMAs are effectively the link between producers and the wider supply
chain and have enabled farmers to gain some control over the processing and
marketing their commodities (Moran, Blunden, & Bradly, 1996). The interviews
suggest that those who hold negative opinions associated with SMAs transfer these
views across to the co-operative structure, to the detriment of the wider public
perception of the agricultural co-operative structure.
Legislative Basis of SMAs
As Chapter Two illustrated, Cobia (1989) and Torgerson et al. (1997) give
some insight to the formation of monopoly co-operative structures underpinned by a
legal framework. They argue that Sapiro, an influential agricultural co-operative
theorist in the first two decades of the 20th century, advocated that agricultural
producers establish centralised monopolies on a commodity basis, supported by
legislation. Sapiro argued that orderly marketing would balance grower market
power with large external corporations as wall as increase returns to farmers.
Torgerson et al. (1997) contend that Sapiro’s influence on this type of cooperative structure lead to the drafting of the Capper-Volstead Act 1922, the Cooperative Marketing Act 1926, and the creation of national commodity co-operatives
under the Federal Farm Board in 1929. They also credit him with the formation of
orderly marketing structures established under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreements Act 1937.
Sapiro’s influence diminished as other co-operative theorists gained favour,
particularly Nourse, who advocated the concept of the co-operative competitive
yardstick (Torgerson et al., 1997). Nourse viewed co-operatives as a mechanism to
address market failure via regionally based co-operatives rather than large centrally
controlled structures supported by specific legislation. While the United States
drifted away from Sapiro’s approach, the timeframe of his influence in the United
States corresponds with the period when Australian producers were investigating
marketing options (Sandford, 1955).
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Linkages between SMAs and Agricultural Co-operatives
The early history of Australian SMAs further reveals the interrelatedness of
the SMA and co-operative concepts. Governments, in response to WW1 and food
shortages, introduced specific legislation to establish SMAs to ensure an orderly
marketing approach for staple food commodities. Many of these early SMAs grew
out of already established voluntary farmer co-operatives which had been formed at
the beginning of the 20th century to gain higher prices for farmer commodities
(Industry Commission, 1991; Sandford, 1955). When various governments sought to
withdraw from these arrangements in the years following WWI, farmers lobbied for
the retention of these formalised arrangements of SMAs underpinned by government
legislation (Sandford, 1955).
Government attention in the SMA mechanism was further reinforced in the
1920s. Increased agricultural production, resulting from soldier settler farms and
improving technology, caused a fall in commodity prices and threatened the
economic viability of solder settler farmers. Additionally, it was in the government’s
interest to continue to support the agricultural industry as it had invested substantial
funds in infrastructure, such as roads, rail and irrigation to support these settler farms
(Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). The combined impact of these two factors encouraged
governments to establish SMAs in a number of commodities to ensure that domestic
prices were maintained and farmers able to stay on their properties.
In anticipation of a boom in agricultural production and a corresponding fall
in prices following the Second World War, farmers called for the preservation of
existing statutory price stabilisation and marketing arrangements. Moreover, the
concept was extended as some form of orderly domestic and export marketing
system was introduced in this period for most commodities. This practice continued
through the 1950s and 1960s (Productivity Commission, 2000).
SMAs were a policy outcome of an era in which Australian farmers and
governments were comfortable with active government involvement in orderly
marketing. Chapter Three argues that Keynesian policy influence on government can
partly explain this affiliation with orderly marketing arrangements. Additionally, a
long period of conservative government provided the agricultural lobby group with a
mechanism to ensure government intervention in the development of favourable
agricultural policy. There was also a long standing belief in government and the

164

community that the agricultural industry was fundamental to the well-being of the
Australian economy (Mauldon & Schapper, 1974).
Chapter Three demonstrates that public policy attitudes towards SMAs
changed in the 1970s under the influence of neoliberal inspired economic theory. The
shifting public policy position on SMAs can be attributed to the differences in
government understanding of their role within the economy. Various reviews of
SMAs have been undertaken since the formation of the Industry Assistance
Commission by the Australian Labor Government in 1973 (Mauldon & Schapper,
1974), and later the Industry Commission (1991). In recent years, following Hilmer
(1993) and the subsequent introduction of the National Competition Policy, all
remaining SMAs were scheduled for review (Productivity Commission, 2000).
National Competition Policy
In the National Competition Policy agreement of 1995 with the
Commonwealth government, all State governments were required to review all their
legislation to ascertain if similar outcomes can be achieved for the community
without using legislation (National Competition Council, 1998; Productivity
Commission, 2000). Under National Competition Policy, the direction of Australian
public policy is undoubtedly towards abandoning these single desk arrangements.
The peak farmers association, the National Farmers Federation (NFF), also supports
this policy position (Halpin, 1999), although it is more contentious in some
agricultural industry sectors than others. The long standing debate within the grains
industry over the restructure of the Australian Wheat Board was and remains a very
heated issue (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999; Martin, 2006; Skuthorp, 2006).
The argument against SMAs revolves around the economic inefficiencies
built into these single desk mechanisms (Productivity Commission, 1999). SMAs are
recast as structures that stifle competition; remove farmer incentives to improve
productivity and quality and average grower returns despite individual farmer efforts
to increase productivity. SMAs are now deemed as constituting an inappropriate
form of assistance to the agricultural industry (Productivity Commission, 1999). The
Productivity Commission (2000) emphasises that the compulsory element of SMAs
and the economic inefficiencies that arise from this, rather than the collective action
aspect, is the driver for change. As discussed in Chapter Five, the collective
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behaviour of farmers via co-operatives is a separate issue covered by the
Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974.
Under the National Competition Policy (NCP) framework, the burden of
proof is on the individual SMAs to argue that their monopoly marketing
arrangements are in the public interest (Productivity Commission, 2000). This is
clearly a difficult hurdel as many SMAs have been dismantled altogether and
elements of other SMA functions have been progressively removed in preparation for
industry deregulation. The use of reviews has undoubtedly been a successful strategy
for government to bring change to the long established statutory marketing system in
agriculture.
In addition to the requirements of the NCP, many of the Western Australian
SMAs had regular reviews built into their underpinning legislation. Further, the
Western Australian Labor Government, when newly elected in 2001, directed that all
statutory authorities be reviewed (The Machinery of Government Taskforce,
2001). 139 The Western Australian Meat Marketing Corporation was dismantled
following a review in the late 1990s (Clarke, 1999). The Western Australian dairy
industry was deregulated in 2001 and its SMA dismantled (Economics and Industry
Standing Committee, 2003). The Potato Marketing Board, trading as Western Potato,
and the Egg Marketing Board, trading as Golden Eggs, were reviewed and
subsequently dismantled in 2005 (Agricultural Produce Commission, 2005). Each
Australian State conducted similar reviews of SMAs.
Several years after the mid-1990s introduction of the NCP, Western Australia
continued to have the largest number of remaining SMAs in Australia (Interviewee
680, 2003). Interviewee 680 (2003) attributed this to several factors. He argued that
the power of sections of the agri-political lobby in Western Australia to influence
government to retain SMAs combined with the reality that many farmers in Western
Australia ardently believe that these structures are serving their needs are partial
explanations.

Interviewee 680 (2003) advised that a widespread response from

Western Australian farmers concerning the implications of the NCP and proposed
reviews of SMA was to seek stronger Western Australian government legislation to
insulate existing SMAs. He considered that generally, Western Australian farmers’
response to international developments in agriculture and the related food and fibre
139 The Taskforce review encompassed all statutory authorities, not just those in the agricultural
industry (The Machinery of Government Taskforce, 2001).
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industries was to ‘build a bigger fire wall’ via government intervention to enhance
the power and structures of SMAs.
Additionally, he argued that successive Western Australian governments did
not have the appetite to deal with the political fallout from the agricultural industry
about this matter. Furthermore, some government actors continue to support the
retention of these structures. Several interviewees commented that the incumbent
Minister for Agriculture, the Hon. Mr Kim Chance is a supporter of the retention of
SMAs.

Indeed, some interviewees characterised the Minister as an ‘agrarian

socialist’ (Interviewee 672, 2002; Interviewee 680, 2003; Interviewee 686, 2003;
Interviewee 695, 2003).
Apart from ideological arguments supporting SMAs, other pragmatic reasons
partly explain why the Western Australian government is moving slowly in
reviewing SMAs.

In the views of some interviewees (Interviewee 660, 2002;

Interviewee 665, 2003) SMAs are institutions integral to maintaining an important
industry, and hence economic activity, in Western Australia. The recent fresh
produce campaigns reflect that urban voters want fresh local produce sold in Western
Australia (Agricultural Produce Commission, 2005). Perhaps the government
considers that it is electorally unpalatable to dismantle institutional arrangements that
contribute to ensuring safe local produce is sold in Western Australia. Despite these
possible sentiments, the implications of not complying with the requirements of the
NCP conveys a significant financial burden on Western Australia which will no
doubt influence the final decision in relation to the remaining SMAs in Western
Australia.
Interviewee Perspectives and Insights
The interviewees frequently referred to Co-operative Bulk Handling (CBH)
as an example of an agricultural co-operative with which they were familiar.
Additionally many were also aware of CBH’s ability to compulsorily acquire
producer grain, thereby paradoxically referring to it as an SMA. These interrelated
functions within CBH have led to lack of clarity among some interviewees about
what a co-operative is and how it differs from a SMA. This misunderstanding about
CBH is also demonstrated at government level. Under National Competition Policy,
the Productivity Commission identified CBH as an SMA for review (Competition
Policy Unit Western Australian Treasury, 2001).
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Mauldon and Schapper (1974) clarify to an extent why this misunderstanding
about the distinction between an SMA and an agricultural co-operative arises.
Mauldon and Schapper (1974, p 166) argue that some ‘successful farmer cooperatives … act as agents for statutory marketing boards, such as Co-operative Bulk
Handling in Western Australia…’. Sandford (1955) explained that the founding
members of CBH believed that the co-operative would only be viable if it was able to
collect all Western Australian grain. This, they argued, could not be guaranteed in a
free market situation so the co-operative proponents successfully made a case to the
Western Australian government to draft legislation granting CBH the sole right to
compulsorily acquire all grain from Western Australian producers (Co-operative
Bulk Handling, n.d.; Sandford, 1955). While CBH is registered under the Western
Australian Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 as a farmer owned and controlled
co-operative, it also functions under a specific piece of Western Australian
legislation, the Bulk Handling Act 1967, which effectively removes farmer choice
about which organisation can handle their grain.
According to the Western Australian government, CBH is not an SMA but
rather a privately owned co-operative and therefore it does not fall under the
requirements of the National Competition Policy (Competition Policy Unit Western
Australian Treasury, 2001). 140 However, while the Western Australian government
rejected the NCP requirement to review CBH on the basis of it being an SMA, the
government planned to review the underpinning legislation, the Bulk Handling Act
1967 as it was conducting reviews of all Western Australian legislation (Competition
Policy Unit Western Australian Treasury, 2001; The Machinery of Government
Taskforce, 2001). CBH reveals some uncertainty in the industry and government
policy makers about the differences between agricultural co-operatives and SMAs, as
it occupies a strange space as a quasi SMA quasi co-operative. This lack of clarity
about CBH carries over to other SMAs and agricultural co-operatives and accounts
for the confusion among interviewees and other actors about the differences between
the two structures. Further, many interviewees colloquially referred to SMAs as cooperatives, further confusing the differences between the models.
Two divergent groups arose in interviewee perspectives of SMAs and by
implication, agricultural co-operatives. The interviews suggested that those who
140 The CFWA also argues strongly that the CBH is a co-operative and not an SMA (Interviewee
797, 2004).
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support SMAs tend to be older farmers or industry actors, possibly reflecting
Keynesian or agrarian socialist influences towards agricultural industry public
policy. They retained, through inter-generational memory, knowledge that
agricultural co-operatives and SMAs were formed to ensure farmers were able to
survive economically difficult times by instituting collective business structures. For
this group, it did not really matter what business structure, an SMA or a co-operative,
was used. The main objective was that the co-operative principles of farmer control
and farmer benefit via profit distribution to members were central pillars in the
business structure. The similarity in the objectives of the SMA and agricultural cooperative structure was the key to understanding this group’s views. Further, they
did not express concern about their inability to correctly distinguish between a cooperative business and an SMA.
Conversely, interviewees who favoured a drier economic analysis highlighted
the negative features of the SMA as argued by the Productivity Commission (2000).
Interviewees holding this view tended to be from either the wider agribusiness sector
or younger farmers who were tertiary educated in agri-business, economics and
management theory. Both groups focused on the compulsory element of SMAs
leading to inefficiencies, and their externally imposed politicised nature. Negative
perceptions in these groups about SMAs were often then transferred to the cooperative model, as they were both perceived as similar types of organisations.
While some younger farmers hold a negative view of agricultural cooperatives due to similarities in function and structure with SMAs (Interviewee 689,
2002), Madden (2003b) presents an alternative perspective.

He argues that its

younger members are the ‘better quality’ members because they understand business
and can evaluate the benefits of the co-operative model using these business tools.
Younger farmers, he contends, have not grown up in the SMA ‘era’ and arguably are
not tainted by the negative views about them. This segment, while trained in the
theory of the free market economy, can evaluate the economic benefits of the cooperative model without the ‘baggage’ of the former SMA era. While co-operatives
may not fit the traditional IOF business model of an open market, this segment,
Madden (2003b) argues, can apply their economic training to identify the financial
benefits of the collective business model. Lastly, he believes, young farmers perceive
the new co-operatives, such as the UFCC and Challenge, as their own enterprises,
while SMAs were externally imposed models with overtones of political
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interference. Appendix Four outlines a proposed typology of farmer attitudes, based
on Madden (2003b) and other interviewee perceptions, of the agricultural cooperative model.
Dismantled SMAs Adopting Co-operative Structures
The dismantling of SMAs in Western Australia has had an interesting
outcome.

A co-operative structure has evolved from deregulation of Western

Australian SMAs in the agricultural water industry, the dairy industry and the meat
processing and marketing industry. The Western Australian Meat Marketing Cooperative (WAMMCO) was formed as a farmer owned co-operative to undertake the
abattoir and marketing functions of the former SMA. Following the dismantling of
its SMA, a small group of producers established a dairy processing co-operative,
Challenge Dairy Co-operative, although the functions of the co-operative are
different from those of the former dairy industry SMA.
The co-operative model was raised as option in a government discussion
paper for the egg industry in the event that the industry SMA was dismantled
(Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 2002a). The SMA was dismantled in
2005 and its assets transferred to a producer owned company, West Coast Eggs
Limited, which trades as Golden Egg Farms (Agricultural Produce Commission,
2005). The potato industry SMA was the last remaining SMA for that industry in
Australia and the Board and industry strongly but unsuccessfully lobbied for its
retention (Interviewee 686, 2003; Potato Marketing Corporation of Western
Australia, 2003). Potato industry restructuring commenced in 2005 with a producer
owned entity assuming responsibility for marketing and promotion functions
(Agricultural Produce Commission, 2005).
Role of Government in Forming Co-operatives in Place of Dismantled SMAs
The creation of a co-operative structure following industry deregulation
provides an insight into the role of the Western Australian government and Minister
for Agriculture. According to Booth (2004), the Western Australian government
initiated the formation of regional farmer owned and controlled co-operatives
following deregulation of the water industry. Interviewee 680 (2003) indicated that
the decision for the meat marketing SMA to adopt a co-operative structure was
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essentially a politically driven one. The fledgling Challenge Dairy Co-operative
received a significant grant from the Western Australian government in the wake of
dairy industry deregulation (Bowen, 2003). The hand of government is clearly
connected with these examples of a co-operative business structure arising from
dismantled SMAs.
Clarke (1999) explains the behaviour of the then Western Australian
Coalition Government’s role in the late 1990s in dismantling the financially
vulnerable meat industry SMA and the subsequent installation of the WAMMCO cooperative structure as a form of the ‘third way’. Hamilton (2001, p 89) defines the
‘Third Way’ as searching ‘for a means of grafting traditional social democratic
concern for equality and social justice onto an economic system based on free
markets’. Interviewee 680 (2003) argued that while a minor partner in the former
Western Australian Coalition Government, the National Party was a controlling force
in the agricultural industry and the Minister for Agriculture was from the National
Party. According to Interviewee 680 (2003), the Liberal Party ideology was
essentially neoclassical economic theory, while the National Party approach was still
linked with concepts found in agrarian socialism. As a result, the Western Australian
government was reluctant to upset the National Party members of the Coalition,
which were concerned about letting the free market resolve the destiny of the meat
industry and the possible implications for rural industries and communities. Yet it
was also reluctant to become involved in the meat industry as an equity partner in a
business venture.

The Western Australian government had previously been

connected with a number of abattoirs with negative political outcomes (Clarke,
1999). The ‘third way’ provided the Western Australian government with a
politically acceptable pathway between these ideological differences.
The traditional co-operative model provided the government with a strategy
to achieve this ‘third way’. Similar to an SMA, the co-operative structure retains
control and ownership by the industry, with profits going back to the farmers, but,
distinct from the SMA, government no longer has a role. Clarke (1999) argued that
this strategy provided the government with a ‘win-win’ situation as the meat industry
SMA was dismantled, fulfilling its NCP requirements. Secondly, producers were
sheltered from the vagaries of the market by the co-operative structure.
Clarke’s ‘third way’ arguments help explain the present Western Australian
Labor Government’s involvement in dismantling SMAs in other agricultural sectors
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and facilitating the development of farmer controlled businesses in their wake.141
However, the role of the Western Australian government in initiating new
agricultural co-operatives needs to be carefully considered. This chapter has argued
that it is an appropriate role for government to support agricultural co-operatives due
to their public good function in correcting market failure. Therefore, it is reasonable
for government to develop a public policy framework for the agricultural cooperative sector. The United Nations Guidelines identify that the role of government
should be arm’s length rather than proactive and top down and that it is not
appropriate for government to initiate agricultural co-operative development (United
Nations, 1998). The WAMMCO scenario suggests that the Western Australian
government was the driving force behind the development of the co-operative. The
hand of government can also be seen in the dairy processing co-operative and the
various regional water industry co-operatives. However, given the weak institutional
environment surrounding the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector,
these initiatives would not have eventuated without the driving role of government,
to the disadvantage of producers in these industry sectors.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the implications for two matters concerning
government public policy that partly explains the contemporary environment for
agricultural co-operatives. The chapter firstly explored the public policy position for
agricultural co-operatives, with a particular focus on the appropriate role of
government agencies in shaping this. Secondly, the chapter analysed the relationship
between agricultural co-operatives and SMAs and the public policy role of
government in this relationship.
The chapter identified that there are constructive elements in Western
Australia on which to build a positive public policy framework for agricultural cooperatives. The Western Australian Department of Agriculture has demonstrated its
141 Farmer controlled and owned business structures may be registered under the Commonwealth
Corporations Act 2001 rather than the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. Only
entities registered under the latter legislation can be labelled ‘co-operatives’, resulting in new entities
adopting the term ‘farmer owned company’. According to Interviewee 822 (2002), the Corporations
Act 2001 enables farmers to achieve all that they wish for a co-operative business by embedding cooperative principles into the constitution, with the exception of the name ‘co-operative’. This
approach also provides the added advantage of the benefits and flexibility of the Commonwealth
legislation, overcoming shortcomings in the State legislation.
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interest in the public good potential of the co-operative model and initiated several
projects, which along with the favourable legislative framework, can form the basis
of a revamped public policy for agricultural co-operatives.
The chapter also explored the appropriate role of government for agricultural
co-operatives following the dismantling of SMAs. The chapter identified that there
are similarities between the agricultural co-operative structure and the SMA structure
that often caused confusion about the critical distinctions between them. Neoliberal
informed economic policies leading to the dismantling of SMAs has paradoxically
provided opportunities for developing agricultural co-operatives in their wake. In
conclusion, this chapter argued that there is a legitimate role for government to
stimulate a public policy environment favourable towards agricultural co-operative
development.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

United Farmers Co-operative Company Case Study

The UFCC will not deviate from the co-operative principles.
(Madden, 2003b)
The UFCC objective is to maximise return to shareholder farmers’
enterprise. (Madden, 2003b)

Introduction
Two chapters are devoted to the case study of United Farmers Co-operative
Company (UFCC). This first chapter identifies the conditions that led to the genesis
of the co-operative and reviews the early years of its evolution. The chapter analyses
both the economic and less acknowledged sociologically influenced factors
contributing to the co-operative’s birth. Chapter Eight examines the UFCC as a
maturing co-operative, with a particular focus on its internal dynamics.
The case study is based primarily on long interviews in late 2002 and early
2003 with two actors associated with the co-operative, one of whom was the
founding Chairman, Mr Rod Madden (2003b). At the time of the interviews, the
Chair had held this position for about a decade. Additional information about the
UFCC was gathered via the rural media, in the wider national co-operative
movement newsletters and updates on the UFCC website. Comments from other
interviewees who were not directly connected with the UFCC also added to the wider
understanding of this agricultural co-operative.
Background
The United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC) is predominantly a
supply co-operative of fertiliser and agricultural chemicals, focusing mostly on the
broad acre grains industry of Western Australia. In the last few years, it has also
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supplied other Western Australian agricultural industries, such as the horticulture and
dairy industries, with chemicals and fertilisers (United Farmers Co-operative
Company Webpage, n.d.). Recent developments at the UFCC have been the addition
of value added services such as a grains pooling and marketing division and crop risk
management services (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).
The UFCC was incorporated as a co-operative in 1992 under the Companies
(Co-operative) Act 1943. By 2002, it had grown to around 3000 farmer members 142 ,
representing approximately 50 per cent of broad acre farmers in Western Australia
(Interviewee 650, 2003; Madden, 2003b). Within a decade, the co-operative had an
annual turnover of around $100 million, assets of $20 million, and rebated over $34
million to shareholders (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). The
UFCC, in 2002, had approximately 60 employees in full-time and part-time positions
(Interviewee 650, 2003; Madden, 2003b). Its head office is located at the Fremantle
Port in Rous Head, Western Australia, with storage facilities in Perth, Kwinana,
Geraldton, Esperance and Albany.

Membership of the UFCC is restricted to

individuals who are involved in some form of commodity production in any sector of
the agricultural industry (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).
Member shares are $1.00 each, and the UFCC requests that members hold 1000
shares, representing a $1,000 investment in the UFCC (United Farmers Co-operative
Company Webpage, n.d.). 143 The Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 requires that
the UFCC conduct 90 per cent of its business with its membership (United Farmers
Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).
The Creation of an Agricultural Co-operative
Madden (2003b) maintained that the UFCC was formed to duplicate one of
the core functions of the former agricultural co-operative, Westralian Farmers Cooperative (now Wesfarmers), which had historically provided its farmer members
with agricultural chemicals and fertiliser via the subsidiary CSBP Limited. Despite
its past as an agricultural co-operative, Madden argued that, as a company,
Wesfarmers was essentially a corporate monopoly supplier of fertiliser, extracting
142 The UFCC refers to its members as shareholders. Throughout this case study, the terms are used
interchangeably.
143 Members are able to purchase fewer shares initially and build up their 1000 shares over time,
funded via patronage rebates (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).
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high profits from farmers. To illustrate his point, he stated that in 1991, the
Wesfarmers annual report indicated that of its $55 million profit for the financial
year, $50 million had been drawn from fertiliser sales to farmers. This was
particularly bitter for Madden, as previously when Wesfarmers was an agricultural
co-operative, its objective was the provision of services to farmers at cost. However,
he contended that, as a corporation, Wesfarmers was maximising profit for
shareholders at the expense of farmers.
The Chair’s interpretation of Westralian Farmers Co-operative conversion
into a corporation is arguably the most significant of the multiple triggers leading to
the genesis of the UFCC. In Madden’s words, Wesfarmers represented the ‘power of
corporations to leach profit away from rural areas’ (Madden, 2003b). Further,
Wesfarmers confirmed that individual family farms powerlessly butt up against large
corporations in the agricultural supply chain, unless they collectively and
influentially link into the chain under the aegis of their own agricultural co-operative.
The Wesfarmers experience, the Chair believed, highlighted the dangers associated
with farmers losing control of their own co-operatives and therefore control of their
own destiny.
In addition to the increasing price of fertiliser and agricultural chemicals
charged by Wesfarmers, Madden argued that the prices of other farm inputs were
also increasing via the influence of several other corporates or multinationals
entering the agricultural industry. The Chair argued that farmers had an ‘almost
pathological hatred of multinational corporations’ based on their collective historical
experience of exploitation by corporations (Madden, 2003b). An agribusiness
consultant in the grains industry (Interviewee 688, 2001) also supports this
perspective about farmers’ significant dislike of corporations and it is a reoccurring
theme in Sandford’s (1955) work. Corporations, the Chair argued, had only one
motive to get involved in the agricultural industry and that was to ‘take what little
profit was left in the industry away from producers and rural regions’ (Madden,
2003b).
Apart from the issue of Wesfarmers and the subsequent increase in the cost of
farm inputs, Madden identified several other economic factors that were instrumental
to the formation of UFCC. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Australian
agriculture was in a well-established and continuing period of restructuring based
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around the concepts of neoclassical economic theory (Lawrence, 1987). The
Commonwealth government corporatised the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and
dismantled the ‘guaranteed minimum price’ (GMP) scheme (Pritchard, 1998),
changing a long established method of paying farmers for grain collected by the
AWB. The price of wheat also collapsed in this period as the Australian dollar rose
in value (Madden, 2003b). Madden cited the damaging impact of record interest rates
during the early 1990s on farm businesses and that banks foreclosed on farmers ‘with
no compunction’. He added that the lack of farmer payments for wheat shipped to
Iraq as a result of the 1991 Gulf War also contributed to the difficult economic
circumstances facing Western Australian farmers (Madden, 2003b). 144 Madden
commented that farmers who had borrowed money to expand their operations
following the successful Western Australian seasons and strong commodity prices of
the early 1980s, which at the time appeared to be a reasonable strategy, were
particularly financially vulnerable in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to these
multiple factors (Madden, 2003a). Madden (2003a) stated that ‘Not since the great
Depression of the 1930s had there been a greater need for a co-operative to be
formed.’
The combined impact of these events motivated the Chair and a farmer
colleague from the same grain growing region to form a political lobbying group, the
Rural Action Movement, to highlight and address the difficulties facing farmers. The
Chair believed that State and Commonwealth governments were not adequately
assisting farmers caught in this multifaceted vise. 145
However, Madden became uncomfortable in this new role of a politicised
farmer lobbyist. Madden is reported as stating ‘We started the Rural Action
Movement out of frustration - because farmers were getting a raw deal and nobody
was listening’ (Lee, 2003, p 1). He asserted in interviews for this thesis that he did
not enjoy being involved with the media or meeting with what he termed ‘dopey

144 When Iraq invaded Kuwait, United Nations sanctions prevented Australian wheat farmers from
receiving a $480 million payment for wheat delivered over the previous three years. Most of the debt
was recouped in following years via insurance compensation payments, but the Australian
Government forgave the remaining $98 million debt in 2004, leaving some farmers with a deficit of
up to $20,000 (Parliament of Australia Senate, 2005).
145 Western Australian farmers were not alone during this period in confronting these problems and
forming activist lobby groups. Halpin (1999) refers to unfavourable economic conditions producing
activist lobby groups and that a Rural Action Movement (RAM) also formed in NSW in a similar
timeframe.
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politicians’ whom he believed were not genuinely interested in doing anything
constructive about the dire situation of farmers (Madden, 2003b). Madden became
disenchanted with RAM’s inability to influence agricultural policy politically.
According to Lee (2003, p 1), Madden stated ‘…it seemed we were working hard for
so little and I decided I was wasting my time with politics’. He elected to withdraw
from this activist role and focus on achieving an economic outcome to offset the
escalating costs of farming. Lee (2003, p 1) quotes Madden stating ‘When someone
suggested that we could import fertiliser cheaply, I decided it was a good way to help
make the family farm more viable, which had always been my goal’. This, Madden
considered, was a practical activity that could be achieved by farmers themselves to
address one of the economic dilemmas they were confronting, that is, the cost of
farm inputs. 146 The short period of political activism by the individuals who became
the Directors of the UFCC had ended.
Forming the UFCC
The UFFC commenced its commercial life in July 1992 with five farmer
shareholders contributing $1,000 each (Madden, 2003a). 147 The objective of the new
co-operative was to, on behalf of its members, lower the price of farm inputs and
therefore increase the financial viability of the farm business.148 The Directors
identified four major farm business cost points as fertiliser, chemicals, finance and
fuel. Fertiliser was selected as the initial focus of the UFCC, and subsequently it
determined that it would investigate opportunities in reducing the costs to farmers
associated with chemicals, and later finance and fuel (Madden, 2003a). As an
146 Interviewee 689 (2002), an agribusiness consultant, argues that the UFCC had been able to find a
space in the fertiliser market because of earlier activity by AgDirect, a small for-profit business which
had imported fertiliser into Western Australia. According to Interviewee 689 (2002), AgDirect broke
the Wesfarmers connected CSBP Limited’s stranglehold on the fertiliser market and was able to
capture a significant percentage of that market. As a result of this breakdown in the CSBP monopoly,
he argued that other fertiliser importers were able to enter the market, including UFCC (Interviewee
689, 2002). Actors connected with the UFCC did not raise this background information.
147 The Western Australian Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 requires a minimum of five
members to incorporate a co-operative.
148 This is similar to a concept in Torgerson, Reynolds, & Gray (1997) who refer to work conducted
in the 1940s by Emelianoff. He argued that an agricultural co-operative is an ‘aggregate of economic
units’ represented by its members and is not itself an ‘acquisitive economic unit’. Torgerson et al.
(1997) summarised Emelianoff’s understanding of the co-operative as an agent of its members who
collectively are the principals. Cook reinforces Madden’s concept by stating that ‘The co-operative's
goal is to enhance the financial well-being of its owners as producers, not as investors. Thus, a cooperative is appropriately viewed as an extension of a producer-owner's farming operation’ (Cook,
Ratchford, & Griffith, 1995, p 1).
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interview in 2003 confirms (Lee, 2003), Madden, in late 2002, considered that the
UFCC had not lost sight of its original purpose to provide members with the best
priced fertiliser to enable the farmer members’ businesses to be more profitable.
The UFCC developed a ‘statement in lieu of prospectus’ and commenced a
promotional campaign to encourage other farmers in rural communities throughout
Western Australia to become members of the new co-operative (Madden, 2003a).
This involved Madden personally undertaking a series of meetings from Esperance to
Northampton and all country towns in between. In a few months, $66,000 was raised
and the Directors employed a manager and set about the task of importing fertiliser
(Madden, 2003a). The lack of a strong capital base meant that the Board of Directors
was unable to employ additional staff.

The Board decided to directly contract

Conbata Pty Ltd as the procurement agent, and Bakke Shipping Pty Ltd to arrange
the shipping and logistics on a commission basis. This strategy enabled the Board to
calculate fixed costs in advance, enabling the co-operative to provide fertiliser to
members at an extremely low cost.
The fledging co-operative’s low capital base and lack of organisational
history inhibited the Board’s ability to access credit from any banks. Therefore,
members were required to pay well in advance for their fertiliser. When funds had
been raised and a letter of credit organised, the procurement and shipping agents
attended to their respective tasks. This strategy leveraged the modest co-operative
capital and skill base and enabled the Directors to focus their efforts on the
promotional aspects associated with building the co-operative’s membership base.
Ironically, Madden (2003b) reflected, if the Board had had the funds to employ more
people at that early point, rather than contract in the required expertise, the cooperative’s development may have been retarded due to the probable lack of breadth
in in-house skills to import and distribute fertiliser.
In the first year, the co-operative achieved a turnover of $14.7 million, with a
profit (surplus) of $1 million. As it had been difficult to raise the start-up capital in
the first year, the Board decided to rebate the co-operative surplus to its members as
80 per cent bonus shares and 20 per cent cash, thereby retaining $1 million in cash as
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share capital in the first year. 149 The co-operative determined that it would not pay
any dividends, as it firmly believed the dividend to members was in the form of the
lower cost of fertiliser. Implementing this strategy in the first year meant that the cooperative did not have to deal with many of the issues associated with sourcing funds
for a fledgling co-operative. Capital raising, according to several Australian
agricultural co-operative sector commentators, is a major impediment to co-operative
formation and development, and the most significant issue facing Australian
agricultural co-operatives (see Greenwood, 1999; Langdon, 1991; O'Connor &
Thompson, 2001).
In the first two years, the UFCC was able to competitively import fertiliser on
behalf of its membership with very simple logistical techniques and infrastructure
requirements. Fertiliser was discharged from the ships directly into members’ trucks
on the wharf. Additional storage was hired if required (Madden, 2003a). This
uncomplicated approach enabled the UFCC to build a judicious capital base from its
modest beginnings.
However, the presence of the UFCC in the market place did not go unnoticed
by its competitors. Providing a service at cost based on co-operative philosophy
impacted on the IOF price of fertiliser in Western Australia. CSPB Limited was
substantially threatened by the presence of the UFCC in the market place, and had
retrenched several hundred employees in this short period of competition from the
UFCC (Madden, 2003a). However, by the third year of UFCC operation in 1995,
CSBP Limited recognised that the UFCC had a limited capital base and that the cooperative could not offer an up-front price for fertiliser (Madden, 2003b). 150 CSBP
Limited implemented a loss leading strategy to exploit these weaknesses (Madden,
2003b). It undercut the UFCC by selling fertiliser at a lower price than it or its
competitors could source it, even though it was financially unprofitable for CSBP
Limited to adopt this strategy (Madden, 2003b). A ‘fertiliser price war’ erupted
between CSBP Limited and the UFCC (Madden, 2003b). Madden is adamant that the
objective of Wesfarmers, (the parent company of CSBP Limited), was to drive the
149 The 80 per cent/20 per cent split in the UFCC rebate strategy is explained in Chapter Eight. The
UFCC therefore has two categories of shares – member shares valued at $1.00 each, and bonus shares
created from the patronage rebate mechanism adopted by the UFCC.
150 The UFCC pricing for fertiliser comprises two parts, the original purchase price and the effect of
the rebates on this initial price. The original purchase price is comparable to the market price set by
competitors. This price is then offset by the rebates members receive annually. Rebates are discussed
elsewhere in this chapter.
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potentially financially vulnerable UFCC out of business (Madden, 2003a, 2003b).
The UFCC Board of Directors, recognising that it could not compete with this
artificially low price, rapidly developed a response based on its co-operative
objective of supplying its members with the lowest priced fertiliser (Madden, 2003b).
The Board swiftly recommended to its members by fax, telephone and letter that the
prices offered by CSBP Limited were lower than what the UFCC could purchase it
and recommended that members purchase their fertiliser from Wesfarmers (Madden,
2003b). UFCC members followed this advice and Wesfarmers suddenly had
overwhelming numbers of orders for fertiliser that was significantly underpriced,
immediately affecting its own profitability. Within two weeks, the price returned to
its original level. While the UFCC did not make a profit in that third year, it had
achieved its foundation goal of lowering the price of fertiliser for its members
(Madden, 2003b).
A third player, Summit, was also caught up in this price war. Summit’s
response to the lowering of the Wesfarmers price was to match it although it was at a
price that impacted on Summit’s own profitability (Madden, 2003b). Madden
(2003b) argued that Summit adopted this strategy as they could not afford to have
their customers seduced by the low Wesfarmers price for fertiliser because they may
switch altogether, threatening Summit’s future business (Madden, 2003b). He
believed that Summit lost significantly from the price war (Madden, 2003b).
The UFCC had survived its first commercial challenge to its position in the
market by relying on the co-operative principles to guide its strategy. This episode
demonstrates the ethics underpinning the UFCC philosophy as a low cost supplier of
fertiliser. While the UFCC did not itself supply the fertiliser, it achieved the objective
of lowering the cost of fertiliser to its membership. However, Madden (2003b)
volunteered that if a similar situation in which a competitor sought to destabilise the
UFCC via price war arose as the co-operative matured, the UFCC would not be able
to take such a principled stand. To illustrate, the Chair said that as a result of a
change in Australian Quarantine Inspection Services (AQIS) requirement, members
could no longer collect their fertiliser directly into their trucks from the wharf
(Madden, 2003b). In response to this, the UFCC instigated a program of building
storage facilities at various ports at considerable expense. Consequently, each storage
facility had fixed overheads and needed to operate at optimum capacity to ensure that
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members were assured of the lowest price for fertiliser. The co-operative, therefore,
was no longer financially unencumbered as in 1995 when it could make the
principled decision not to import fertiliser and recommend its members purchase
elsewhere (Madden, 2003b). This account suggests that the life cycle of the maturing
agricultural co-operative has inexorably led to different internal business strategies
and therefore different responses to external threats. 151 The case study reveals that
the co-operative principles did not provide the over-riding guidance for a maturing
agricultural co-operative as it did in its formative years. As the case study unfolds
further in Chapter Eight, other incidences in the evolution of the UFCC highlight the
conflicts an agricultural co-operative tussles with in trying to apply the co-operative
principles throughout its life cycle.
UFCC and Agricultural Economic Co-operative Theory
The factors cited by Madden leading to the birth of the UFCC illustrate that
traditional economic theory for the formation and continuation of co-operatives is
still a powerful explanation for the establishment of Australian agricultural cooperatives. Chapter Two demonstrated that the ability of agricultural co-operatives
to achieve economies of scale or break the power of monopolies are key triggers
motivating farmers to establish co-operatives.
The episode with CSBP Limited illustrates that market failure arising from
monopoly (or monopsony) situations prevent farmers from participating fairly in a
market (Cobia, 1989; Cook, 1995). This can be demonstrated historically in the
literature, as farmers formed an agricultural co-operative as a strategy to counter the
power and influence of powerful corporations (Cobia, 1989; Cook, 1995; Craig,
1993; Hansmann, 1996). The high prices Western Australian farmers were forced to
pay in the early 1990s for fertiliser supplied by companies such as CSBP Limited
exposes this type of market failure. An agricultural co-operative, with its capacity for
economies of scale, can provide a countervailing balance to an exploitative market

151 The concept of life cycle is described in Chapter Eight. It is a useful adaptation of a biological
concept to understand the evolution of an organisation through stages of establishment, growth,
maturation and potential decline. Cook’s (1995) five stage theory of the evolution of co-operatives
also indirectly suggests that agricultural co-operatives travel through a number of relatively
predictable life cycle stages.
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situation and introduce a fair market price [a ‘floor price’] 152 for a commodity
(Cobia, 1989). The entry of the UFCC to the market illustrates this countervailing
ability because as a co-operative it was quickly able to lower the market price
charged by corporates for chemicals and fertiliser in Western Australia (Madden,
2003b). The UFCC demonstrates the relevance of agricultural co-operative economic
theory in explaining contemporary Australian agricultural co-operatives, and
importantly, that an agricultural co-operative is a proven strategy to address present
day market failure.
The threat posed by CSBP Limited in the 1995 ‘fertiliser war’ also led the
UFCC Board of Directors to acknowledge that, as with any organisation, the cooperative needed to address its strategic planning processes and future direction.
With the support of external management consultants, the UFCC Board of Directors
and management developed a clearer understanding of the fertiliser industry and the
import and logistics business. The UFCC Board of Directors were able to overcome
an issue found in the literature (see, for example, Patrie, 1998) in which farmer
Directors, whose expertise lies in commodity production, are guiding a commercial
entity in another sector of the agricultural supply chain in which they have very little
knowledge, experience or sophisticated management expertise. However, the Board
succeeded in this backwards vertical integration, as the UFCC achieved significant
financial returns over the next two years. This in turn enabled the UFCC to develop
strong relationships with their bankers which resulted in favourable and flexible
trading terms (Madden, 2003a), addressing another problem commonly attributed to
the agricultural co-operative model of difficulties in capital raising. Over the next
decade, the UFCC established itself as a major player in the agricultural supply
sector of the agribusiness industry, with an annual turnover in 2002/2003 of $100
million and more than 3000 farmer members in Western Australia (United Farmers
Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).
Madden’s explanation for the formation of the UFCC reflects a strong
economic focus. Indeed, many of the interviews conducted for this thesis suggest that
agricultural industry actors adopt the concepts of economic theory and use the

152 Western Australian actors often use the phrase ‘floor price’ to describe the effect of an
agricultural co-operative in a market on price.
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language associated with the IOF business structure to explain the presence of
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia.
The UFCC and Sociologically Informed Enquiry
While agricultural economic co-operative theory helps explain the formation
of the UFCC, sociologically informed enquiry provides different perspectives on the
establishment of the UFCC to complement economically informed explanations.
Madden stated that the five founding UFCC Directors knew about the co-operative
model as a result of their exposure as grain growers to agricultural co-operatives in
Western Australia, particularly Co-operative Bulk Handling and Westralian Farmers
Co-operative. As Chapter Four demonstrates, the Western Australian grains industry
and the wider agricultural industry was historically steeped in the agricultural cooperative business approach to integrate with and control other links of the
agricultural supply chain. The early development of the Western Australian
agricultural industry and the evolution of agricultural co-operatives were highly
entwined, leading to a prosperous industry following WWII (Sandford, 1955). As the
founding UFCC Directors were from long established grain farming families well
embedded in their communities, they were very aware of the role that co-operatives
had played over the generations in the viability their own family farms. Therefore,
the co-operative model was fully institutionalised into the broad acre grains industry
of Western Australia and an accepted and understood strategy.
The five founding Directors sought the advice of an accountant, Mr Don
Munro, who at the time was closely associated with the CFWA, in forming the cooperative. The accountant had a library of agricultural co-operative books and lent
some of these to the Chair. The ability of the group to identify and consult an
accountant with a strong knowledge of the co-operative business structure
demonstrates the historical depth of agricultural co-operative institutionalisation,
although the UFCC was fortunate that this level of support was still available at this
time from Munro, who was close to retirement. Chapter Five and Six argue that this
institutionalisation has diminished over the last 20 years or so and the ability to
access this level of professional expertise in the first decade of the 21st century is
highly debatable.
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The Chair commented that emotion rather than agricultural co-operative
economic theory or business knowledge originally drove the formation and early
development of the UFCC. He recognised that they ‘got the UFCC right without
really realising it and that there was a lot of luck involved’ (Madden, 2003b).
However, he also added wryly that ‘you make your own luck’ (Madden, 2003b).
These comments reflect the informal and unconscious knowledge that the founding
members had developed over their lives about the agricultural co-operative business
model. Simply as a result of being immersed within the agricultural industry and
watching the significant agricultural co-operative institutions which had a
considerable and influential role within the industry, they were highly but perhaps
unconsciously socialised into the co-operative business approach. The formal
research they commenced once they had decided to create the UFCC merely built on
this implicit understanding they already had. The experience of the UFCC illustrates
that individuals motivated to form an agricultural co-operative tap into a deeply
embedded folk memory that forms a connection between people from which to
further develop the co-operative concept.
After the UFCC was established, the Chair sought to expand his knowledge
of the agricultural co-operative business structure and travelled to Britain and the
USA to observe other co-operatives. He also read widely on co-operative theory,
attended co-operative and corporate business courses, conferences and workshops,
such as the Monash Agribusiness Co-operatives Conference, the Co-operative
Federation of Western Australian conferences and the Australian Institute of
Company Directors seminars. Interviews with the UFCC Chair for this thesis
revealed that he had developed a deep knowledge of co-operative history and values
and was comfortable in discussing co-operative theory. Increasing knowledge of cooperative theory reinforced his commitment to the co-operative business model and
confirmed to him that ‘they had got it right with the UFCC’ (Madden, 2003b). His
belief in and commitment to the co-operative structure had not wavered as the UFCC
matured into a successful and influential agricultural organisation.
The Chair’s view that a deep-seated distrust in the farming sector of
corporations also suggests non-economic triggers are a factor in co-operative
development. This intense suspicion of corporations by farmers also demonstrates a
complementary need by farmers to ‘control their own destiny’ (Madden, 2003b). The
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Chair believed that farmers understood that ownership of their co-operative business
enabled them to achieve this level of control in their industry. He considered that the
co-operative concepts of ‘member owned’ and ‘member controlled’ were not only
easily understood concepts, but were very meaningful for farmers as they satisfied
this deep need for control. The co-operative business structure, with its high intrinsic
trustworthiness, combined with farmers’ ability to exert control over their own
situation and thus avoid economic dependence on corporations they did not trust, was
a powerfully motivating combination of features for farmers.
The UFCC as an Expression of Agrarian Socialism
The Chair’s focus on farmer distrust of corporates reflected a philosophical
and ideological battle about neoliberal influenced capitalism and the way that it is
rolling out in Australia. However, several interviewees suggested alternative
motivations for this strong aversion of corporations and embracing the co-operative
model. An interviewee from the accounting industry specialising in the agricultural
industry (Interviewee 695, 2003) believed that farmers’ inherent ‘socialist’ outlook
was a key feature which attracted farmers to the co-operative structure. Therefore, he
argued, the founding members of the UFCC may have had this philosophical
commitment to this type of business structure, as it was consistent with agrarian
socialism. An agribusiness consultant in the grains industry (Interviewee 688, 2001)
considered that the co-operative model used by the UFCC represented a version of
‘feel good economics’ which he believed was appealing to its members. He
suggested that farmers who join agricultural co-operatives were drawn to the dual
benefits of an economic return for their farm business combined with a social benefit
for their communities and the industry (Interviewee 688, 2001). The interviewee also
added that he thought that farmers have supported the UFCC because the UFCC is
the underdog and helping them out by becoming members appealed to farmers’ sense
of fairness. He also thought that UFCC members want something different from what
Wesfarmers or other corporates could offer them, illustrating this with the view that
farmers felt that corporates took them for granted, unlike a member based
agricultural co-operative (Interviewee 688, 2001).
These comments about ‘feel good economics’ and agrarian socialism reveal a
perception by some agribusiness advisors that there is a segment of the agricultural
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industry who are wedded to remnants of Keynesian style economics in Australian
agriculture and this is the segment which is also attracted to the co-operative
structure. This view implies that the UFCC membership represents an element in
agriculture that is perhaps disillusioned by the perceived social and environmental
costs of the form of capitalism practised in Australia today. However, the Chair
dismissed these possible explanations of ‘feel good economics’, agrarian socialism or
the Australian ethos of ‘supporting the underdog’ as reasons for farmers supporting
the agricultural co-operative model. The Chair maintained that he was very
committed to the pragmatic economic outcomes of the co-operative structure that he
believed was the overriding motivating factor for farmer attachment to the structure.
He wryly added, to support his position, that one of the Board members was
definitely not a ‘socialist’ type; on the contrary, he was very committed to dry
economic theory.
The UFCC as an Expression of Social Capital
The Chair was from a settler family with a reputation developed over several
generations of being involved in district agri-political issues, the local church, and
the community (Interviewee 824, 2003). Ergstrom (1994) and Patrie (1998), in the
context of NGCs, contend that Northern European immigrants to the prairie states of
the United States created an environment for farming families to work together in a
range of activities associated with their church and local social activities within their
communities. They argue that this collaborative approach within the communities
translated to economic behaviour based on collective business structures. Wilkinson
& Quarter (1996) note this phenomenon in the co-operative activity in the
experiences of the Evangeline community in Prince Edward Island, Canada
(Wilkinson & Quarter, 1996). Interviewee 691 (2002), a United States academic, in
personal communication, also acknowledged a possible link between the prevalence
of co-operatives in certain American States and the northern European ethnic
background of the settlers.
Booth (2004) believed that the religious and social activities of these early
Scandinavian settlers on the co-operative nature of the North American prairie States
was a significant antecedent to the success of the co-operative business structure in
that region. Booth based this view on his personal observations and discussions with
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United States co-operators while on a Western Australian Department of Agriculture
study tour. He commented on the way in which local communities, over generations,
were used to meeting on Sundays for church services. This coming together in one
context, he believed, spilt over into other areas leading to an intertwining of
religious, civic, social and economic aspects of members in the community. This, he
argued, created a fertile ground in which to continue with the co-operative economic
business approach that they brought with them as immigrants at the end of the 19th
century. He believed that the passing of generations or the influence of the corporate
business structure had not undermined this connection in these communities to the
co-operative model. However, Fulton (2001) argues that the explanatory power of
Northern European immigrant and religious aspects, while a factor, may have been
over played in the literature as a causal element in the formation of agricultural cooperatives in North America.
Despite Fulton’s position, Booth (2004) considered that this strong
community and religious aspect he observed in co-operators the United States was a
factor in Madden’s connection with the agricultural co-operative sector. Booth
argued that the UFCC Chair ’s Christian background instilled a strong community
ethos in him. Further, the commonality of Christian values and co-operatives values
reinforced a connection to the co-operative business structure. This, Booth attributed,
was a direct precursor to the UFCC Chair’s commitment to the co-operative model
and a key element in its subsequent success. Booth believed that the attitude
displayed by the Chair was not a common outlook shared by others involved in cooperatives in Australia or by Australians generally. In Booth’s view, the connection
between a strong community ethos and agricultural co-operatives in the United States
was not as observable in Western Australian rural communities and was a factor
inhibiting the uptake of the co-operative structure in contemporary Western
Australia.
When these were raised with him, the Chair was not familiar with the views
put forward by agricultural co-operative observers such as Ergstrom (1994) and
Patrie (1998) about a strong co-operative culture emanating from communities with
similarly robust religious and social ties. The Chair (Madden, 2003b) acknowledged
his personal Christian values but did not consider that these were a major factor in
the formation of the UFCC as he was the only practising Christian on the Board of
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Directors. However, he believed that co-operative behaviour does seem to be linked
with undertaking community deeds. The Chair noted that the similar quality of all
Board members was their commitment to and involvement in their local community.
He stated that they all shared a ‘community mindedness’ and were actively involved
in local community initiatives and events. The co-operative Board knew each other
via these community activities before working as a group to explore options for their
farming businesses. This commitment to improving their community, Madden
(2003b) stated, motivated and sustained them to form and nurture the co-operative.
The community behaviour displayed by the original five members can
understood as a form of social capital. This enabled them to trust each prior to
commencing discussions about adverse economic issues and the formation of an
agricultural co-operative as a strategy to address this problem. This behaviour
illustrates Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of social capital and how it can be utilised and
converted to another form of capital. A clear pathway from the previously existing
social capital within the local community to the creation of economic capital can be
demonstrated via the UFCC, leading to a form of ‘co-operative capital’. The UFCC
case study indicates that the presence of social capital within an agricultural
community is a precursor to the creation of an agricultural co-operative. The depth
of social capital in Western Australian rural communities is a factor influencing a
community’s capacity to explore the potential of the agricultural co-operative model
for economic opportunities.
The non-economic factors explored in the formation of the UFCC and farmer
connection to the model are insightful to identifying if an agricultural co-operative
can arise as a potential solution in rural communities facing economic difficulties.
However, Madden’s interpretation of why the model is embraced by farmers is
grounded in the economic adversity facing the agricultural industry and particularly
the behaviour of corporates in agriculture leading to some form of market failure.
These factors, well established in economic agricultural co-operative theory, appear
to carry more authority with Madden as the main stimulants for the formation for the
UFCC and member connection to the structure. Madden’s greater comfort with
economic rather than sociological explanations for the formation of the UFCC
reflects the dominance of economic theory in contemporary agricultural industry
discourse. When recommending the co-operative model as a potential solution to

189

agricultural communities, the case study reveals that economic language carries
greater authority to encourage communities to adopt the co-operative structure.
However, an understanding of the sociological factors underpinning the development
of an agricultural co-operative cannot be overlooked.
The UFCC as an Expression of a Farmer Initiated Social Movement
Madden’s 1990s involvement in a political interest group such as the Rural
Action Movement and an agricultural co-operative reflects an historical repetition of
the political and economic environment in the period leading up to WWI.

As

Chapter Four identified, this period also resulted in the concurrent formation of a
political interest group and an agricultural co-operative. At a 1914 farmer meeting
convened to discuss strategies to address the severe economic conditions confronting
farmers, it was agreed that a political interest group, which evolved into the Country
Party, would be formed to lobby government on these matters (K. Smith, 1984). At
the same meeting, it was also agreed that a separate strategy would be implemented
to focus on farmers helping themselves economically and the Westralian Farmers
Co-operative was formed (K. Smith, 1984). The political activism and agricultural
co-operative activities were to be undertaken as two separate pursuits, which
removed the co-operative from agricultural industry political activism, consistent
with the co-operative philosophy of political neutrality.
This shared linkage of political and economic action by Western Australian
farmers can be viewed as a form of farmer initiated social movement (Craig, 1993;
Mooney & Gray, 2002). Analysing the birth of the UFCC as a social movement
provides an alternative insight to the motivations for this type of collective action.
Craig (1993, p 19) defines a social movement as ‘a collective attempt to bring about
or resist change in social institutions or to create an entirely new order by noninstitutionalised means’. Craig argues that three factors need to be present in a social
movement. Firstly, a shared frustration with the existing orders is evident. The
farmer meetings of 1914 and the early 1990s, convened to address the economic
disadvantage of farmers, illustrate a powerful dissatisfaction with the existing
conditions. However, Craig argues that this frustration is insufficient to explain the
evolution of a social movement. This leads to the second necessary factor, which is
the ‘development of a vision or a belief in the possibility of a different state of
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affairs, which leads to the articulation of a goal or ideology’ (Craig, 1993, p 19). The
period leading to the formation of both Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the
UFCC co-operative clearly demonstrate Craig’s second essential element. Madden
and his colleagues mirrored the early agricultural co-operative champions who
advocated and promoted an alternative strategy for farmers to help themselves via
the co-operative business structure. The passionate language displayed by the UFCC
Chair to explain the circumstances facing farmers in the early 1990s illustrates that it
was possible to develop strategies to alleviate their situation. Lastly, Craig (1993, p
19) states that the ‘emergence of organisations that are devoted to realising the vision
or the mission of the social movement’ becomes the catalyst in the ongoing
expression of the idea and garnering the support of others. The formation of
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the UFCC illustrate this third necessary
element, as both new entities were the pivot on which further farmer support for the
co-operative business structure was gathered. The decade following both the
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the UFCC reflect rapid and substantial
organisational development that reinforced the vision of farmer control and
economic power via this alternative approach to business behaviour. The triggers
contributing to the formation of the UFCC in the early 1990s replicate many of the
factors leading to the establishment of Westralian Farmers Co-operative eighty years
earlier and suggest that both co-operatives can be viewed as the vehicle for a farmer
initiated social movement.
The UFCC and the Agricultural Co-operative Life Cycle
Craig (1993) alludes to the cyclical nature of an individual agricultural cooperative business, whereby a successful co-operative expands and matures, and in
the process may lose its co-operative focus and subsequently convert to a corporate
structure. Interestingly, an outcome of this evolutionary life cycle of an agricultural
co-operative is that it recreates the negative economic conditions that stimulated the
formation of a co-operative business in the first place. This in turn sets up the
opportunity for the birth of a new co-operative. This co-operative life cycle can be
illustrated by the formation of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, and its sustained
growth over several decades, followed by its conversion to Wesfarmers. This
conversion then created the necessary conditions for the formation of the UFCC as a
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response to some of the negative economic factors for farmers, such as higher costs
for farm inputs, emanating from the new corporate Wesfarmers.
The parallels between Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the UFCC reveal
patterns of an organisational life cycle for an agricultural co-operative, as well as a
broader agricultural co-operative sector life cycle. One version of the life cycle
concept would predict that, like the Westralian Farmers Co-operative, the UFCC
itself will eventually convert into a corporation. Madden’s response to this possible
scenario was ‘that co-operatives will never die’. While Madden was adamant that
the UFCC itself would remain a co-operative business, he indicated that if the UFCC
did evolve into a corporation, it would simply create the conditions for the birth of a
new agricultural co-operative, hence continuing the rotation of the agricultural cooperative sector life cycle.
Sandford (1955, p 43), writing 30 years before the Wesfarmers conversion,
also indirectly acknowledges the concept of a co-operative life cycle when referring
to the need for the agricultural industry to learn the lesson of a co-operative business
response to economic and social adversity ‘over and over again’. However, his
comment that ‘it is not in times of prosperity but during adversity that forward
movements are made; the former is the time for consolidation, and the latter the time
to command and exploit new support’ (Sandford, 1955, p 43). This suggests that
when the agricultural industry is performing well, commitment to and knowledge of
the co-operative business model diminishes. Sandford’s insight about the need to
relearn the co-operative business solution to economic and social adversity is
reinforced by the relatively low levels of awareness of the co-operative business
model by many actors interviewed for this thesis.
The ‘Co-operative Champion’
This account of the UFCC story strongly features the role of the founding
Chair as a significant actor in the genesis of the UFCC. The literature, particularly
the empirical work, highlights the importance of an individual who assumes the role
of ‘co-operative champion’ to facilitate the evolution of an agricultural co-operative
from a good idea into reality. Patrie (1998) identifies a number of critical factors in
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the individual who successfully fills this role. 153 The co-operative champion must
come to the fore in the early period of the co-operative’s development to move the
concept along to an outcome. The individual must be credible and have the ability to
command the respect of colleagues. He has to have a willingness to accept a ‘servant
leadership’ role, be able to accept criticism and be uncompensated for his work. A
co-operative champion will rarely recuperate the personal costs associated in
undertaking this role, nor be rewarded for these efforts. If a champion seeks to
capture personal benefits, he will risk being seen as ‘corrupt’, possibly leading to a
decline in member motivation. The champion needs to be a developer rather than a
promoter, with sound business sense and judgement. A champion as well needs to
build strong communication channels with potential members and a range of external
actors. A co-operative champion also has to demonstrate financial stability in his
own farm business. Lastly, a co-operative champion requires a sound knowledge of
the wider agricultural industry. Bielik (n.d.) comments that the co-operative
champion must evolve from within the farmer group. It is not, she argues, a function
that can be undertaken by external actors such as agribusiness management
consultants or government officers.
Several interviewees commented on the importance of the catalyst role of a
key individual - the co-operative champion - in the evolution of Western Australian
co-operatives (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 680, 2003; Interviewee 688, 2001;
Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 695, 2003). These interviewees recognised a
strong and respected leader as a central ingredient to the success of co-operatives
such as the UFCC. Conversely, the absence of a co-operative champion as a catalyst
has resulted in many co-operative failures in the embryonic phase of development
(Booth, 2004).
The inaugural UFCC Chair is an archetype of the co-operative champion. He
is one of the few co-operative actors in Western Australia who is known as an
advocate of the agricultural co-operative structure outside of his own co-operative.
This deep seated passion which motivated Madden to form the RAM and secure a
‘better deal for Western Australian farmers’ (Madden, 2003b) is also an element in
the makeup of a co-operative champion. The UFCC Chair is acknowledged by many

153 Every ‘co-operative champion’ discussed in the literature or interviewed for this research has
been a male.
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external actors as one of the critical success factor in the achievements of the UFCC.
The intrinsic qualities in the founding Board members, particularly the inaugural
Chair, provide some insights into the role of a ‘co-operative champion’ to translate a
vision into reality. The Board nurtured an emergent co-operative into a substantial
business in a few years. The Chair strongly supports the philosophical position of cooperative values, particularly in relation to ‘one member, one vote’ and proportional
rebates based on patronage. As a result of this demonstrated commitment to the
UFCC, the Chair brings a great deal of credibility to the function of co-operative
champion.
Despite Madden’s personal role with the UFCC, there was a consensus
among these interviewees that the overall Western Australian agricultural cooperative sector lacked ‘co-operative champions’ to advocate on behalf of the wider
co-operative sector. Key co-operative leaders at the beginning of the 20th century
with a focus on using the co-operative model as a vehicle to develop the agricultural
industry and well-being of farmers, such as Harper and Thompson, appear to be
missing from the contemporary Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector.
Interviewee 689 (2002), principal of an agribusiness consultancy, argued that a key
factor in the lack of co-operative champions in Western Australia is the pressures of
modern farming businesses which absorb considerable time and energy of an
individual farmer. He reasoned that adopting the role of co-operative champion on
behalf of the industry would inevitably diminish a farmer’s focus on his or her
primary business and therefore threaten its economic viability. This rationale for the
lack of co-operative champions points to the dominance of the economic ethos
driving modern agriculture. The language and sentiment from State and
Commonwealth government agencies reinforces the position that farmers are now
business managers and their farms are businesses; Farming cannot be seen primarily
as a ‘lifestyle’. Agricultural industry associations (Halpin, 1999) and agribusiness
advisors (Interviewee 689, 2002) tend to support and reinforce this economic
orientation of the agricultural industry. Therefore, farmers who do not direct their
full effort to the financial success of their farm business are characterised as ‘poor
businessmen’ (Interviewee 689, 2002) who risk farm failure through their lack of
commitment to farm management issues. The dominant ethos of individualism
demonstrated by focusing on one’s own financial well-being is incompatible with the
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notion of working on behalf of industry to undertake the role of co-operative
champion.
This contemporary environment in agriculture is a key difference between
modern agriculture and the agricultural industry that enabled the first co-operatives
to form in Western Australia around the time of the First World War. Clearly, the
changed circumstances of modern agriculture limit the capacity of individual farmers
who could potentially undertake the role of co-operative champion (Interviewee 689,
2002). This in turn restricts the ability of many agricultural co-operatives to form,
grow and succeed in Western Australia. The inability of the agricultural co-operative
sector to cultivate a critical mass of co-operative champions is clearly one of the
barriers to the wider adoption of the agricultural co-operative model in Western
Australia. Despite the drawbacks facing potential co-operative champions, the
inaugural UFCC Chair, supported by the founding Board members and their families,
was able to undertake this vital function on behalf of other farmers.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has canvassed a range of economic and non-economic factors
leading to the establishment of the UFCC. Economic adversity in the external
agricultural industry environment is clearly a key trigger in the formation of the cooperative. A significant element was a form of market failure in which corporations
were extracting high prices from farmers for farm inputs. This is consistent with
agricultural economic co-operative theory. Another trigger was economic adversity
arising from the implementation of agricultural industry public policy informed by
neoclassical economic theory during the 1980s and 1990s. Additionally, farmers
were disadvantaged by factors outside of their control, such as the Gulf War and
fluctuating exchange rates.
The economic adversity leading to the formation of the UFCC replicates the
dominant issue that prompted the formation of Westralian Farmers Co-operative,
demonstrating a cyclical pattern in the establishment of agricultural co-operatives.
Another historical link between the UFCC and Westralian Farmers Co-operative is
the political connection arising from farmer discontent. Both the creation of political
interest groups and agricultural co-operatives can be understood in the context of
farmer initiated social movements.
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The commitment of the founding Board of Directors and their success in
recruiting their members is attributed to the deeply embedded folk memory of
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia’s broad acre rural communities. This
folk memory of the purpose of a co-operative model legitimised the structure as a
strategy for the supply of farm inputs. A further feature is the community focus of
the founding Directors and their connectedness to their communities. A pre-existing
level of trust developed within their social and community interactions enabled them
to move onto deep discussions about business and economic issues. The Chair’s
developing knowledge of co-operative theory reinforced the appropriateness of the
co-operative structure for their purpose. The embryonic co-operative was fortunate
that additional professional advice about the agricultural co-operative structure was
accessible and available. This was partly due to happenstance as the co-operative
movement peak body had contracted an accountant with a long history of
involvement with agricultural co-operatives and was well connected to an extended
‘co-operative familiar’ network of professional advisors. This thesis overall has
identified that access to and the knowledge base of agribusiness professional advisors
about co-operative issues is not as available in contemporary times.
Lastly, the pivotal role of the Chair as a co-operative champion in the
development of the UFCC was a critical factor. As identified in Chapter Four in the
first wave of agricultural co-operative development in Western Australia, the role of
charismatic farmers who can arise from the ‘grass roots’ and advocate the cooperative business alternative to fellow farmers remains a critical factor in the
formation of agricultural co-operatives. Without these co-operative champions acting
as instigators, co-operative businesses are unable to establish themselves as
alternative sources of co-operative advisory support and knowledge is scarce or nonexistent. In the absence of wider institutional support, the subsequent loss of a cooperative champion from an established agricultural co-operative is a contributing
factor in it becoming unsustainable as a co-operative in the longer term. The overdependence on co-operative champions to stimulate agricultural co-operatives in
Western Australia highlights the lack of wider institutional frameworks to support
agricultural co-operatives.
The birth of the UFCC indicates that the rationale for commencing a cooperative business is multifaceted. These factors are both economic and non-
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economic. However, the economic justification is more obvious and carries greater
weight in the eyes of most UFCC commentators. While non-economic factors are
subtle, acknowledging the role of these intangible elements to the formation of a cooperative is essential in any strategies to present the agricultural co-operative as a
potential solution to help confront rural difficulties. A hidden outcome of the success
of the UFCC is a re-evaluation of the value of agricultural co-operatives as a
business structure. The UFCC clearly demonstrated that an agricultural co-operative
is an appropriate response to an industry undergoing restructuring.
This chapter has revealed the astonishing achievements of this twelve year
old agricultural co-operative. Chapter Eight analyses the internal dynamics of an
agricultural co-operative functioning within a broader economic and political
framework that privileges the corporate business structure over the co-operative
structure. The chapter explores an evolving undertone in which the future of the
UFCC as a co-operative is potentially uncertain.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

UFCC as a Mature Co-operative

Introduction
The previous chapter outlined the external circumstances that triggered the
formation of the United Farmers Co-operative Company and its significant
achievements as an agricultural co-operative over the following decade. This chapter
reviews the maturing UFCC, with a particular focus on its internal dynamics. This
chapter outlines some recent developments in the UFCC, indicating that the
organisation is now behaving differently from its start-up and early evolution phases.
The chapter concludes that the co-operative logic within the UFCC, which
influenced its initial organisational development, is in danger of being eroded
predominantly by internal factors. This may lead to an eventual conversion of the
UFCC to a corporation.
The information in the chapter is heavily dependent on the accounts of events
relayed in several interviews, particularly those with Madden, as well as information
available in the public domain. 154 While the UFCC is the basis of the chapter, the
chapter also draws on information from other interviewees to illustrate wider
agricultural co-operative organisational behaviour in contemporary Australia.
Co-operative Management Issues
The UFCC case study provides insight into matters relating to employing
suitably skilled senior staff in an agricultural co-operative. The following section
discusses the implications of importing senior level staff from corporations,
determining salary packages for senior staff, and the challenges for agricultural co-

154 In order to avoid repeatedly attributing information to Madden and other interviewees, I have
resolved not to cite them in every instance.
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operative Boards in inculcating co-operative values in senior staff to develop
appropriate business strategies based on these values.
Selecting a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
The UFCC Board of Directors appointed the incumbent CEO in early
2002. 155 The Board had clearly experienced a problematical time recruiting and
developing the correct mix of CEO skills for the rapidly growing co-operative. In its
first ten years, five individuals had occupied the position of Chief Executive
Officer. 156

The Board of Directors asked all of them to leave their position,

reflecting that as an agricultural co-operative grows in size and is more exposed to
the wider business environment and economy, it needs to employ higher calibre
management.

The high turnover of CEOs suggests that while the UFCC had

experienced significant success as an agricultural co-operative in the market place, it
also had some challenging internal staff issues.
The first interviews for this thesis focused on the recruitment process for the
incumbent CEO.

The intensity of discussions with interviewees about the

recruitment of a CEO highlights the key role this senior management position plays
in an agricultural co-operative and the need to find the right person for the position.
The UFCC placed the CEO position with a recruitment agency. Members of the
Board of Directors interviewed five short-listed applicants and a subset was asked to
attend a second interview. The interview panel identified their preferred applicant
(not the person finally appointed to the position) and invited the individual to an
evening meal with the full Board. The Board quickly became aware that their
selected candidate was not going to fit with the organisational culture of the
agricultural co-operative. The Chair contacted the second preferred applicant (the
person subsequently appointed to the position) early the next morning to come to a
breakfast meeting with the Board. After the meeting, the Chair advised the applicant
that he would be contacted within the week. He was offered the job that afternoon.

155 Throughout this discussion, the Chair and CEO are referred to as the Chair and CEO. However, it
needs to be recognised that this is a story that evolves over a decade or so and parts of the account
refer to periods prior to, or after these individuals held their respective roles. To avoid confusion, the
two individuals are referred to by the titles of Chair or CEO even though they may not have been in
these positions at a particular time in the narrative.
156 The UFCC Board of Directors did not use the title ‘Chief Executive Officer’ for all the
incumbents managing the co-operative. This discussion employs the term CEO to refer to all
individuals who filled this role, despite variations in their official job title.
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The newly recruited CEO achieved some very impressive outcomes in the
first year of his appointment.

These substantially contributed to the UFCC

profitability and returns to members. In 2002 the UFCC had returned to members
$6.72 million in rebates in one of the worst years for the agricultural industry as a
consequence of severe drought.

The CEO had also negotiated $2.2 million

reimbursement from the $3 million written off previously as a result of a
contaminated shipload of chemical. 157

Within the first eight months of his

employment, the CEO had also resolved most of the outstanding litigations facing
the UFCC. 158

The Chair confirmed the CEO’s achievements on behalf of the

members. He added that the Board of Directors recognised the CEO’s contribution to
the financial basis of the co-operative with a substantial enhancement of the CEO
compensation package on the first anniversary of his appointment. 159
Importing Corporate Staff
The CEO recruited two former colleagues from the corporate sector in his
first twelve months at the UFCC, resulting in three new senior level corporate sector
managers working in the co-operative in a relatively short period. The Chair had
commented on how well these new recruits had adapted to the co-operative business
structure and believed that they now understood the values underpinning the
organisation. This was attributed to dedicated professional development of UFCC
staff about the co-operative values and business model.
The Chair explained this co-operative journey for the new senior
management recruits by recounting a story concerning the ability of one of them to
adapt to the co-operative business ethos. 160 The new employee had a long and ‘hard
nosed’ corporate background, and from the Chair’s comments appeared to be
perplexed by the co-operative model approach to business when first appointed. The
new manager demonstrated this confusion about co-operative business objectives by
commenting to the Chair ‘that if the UFCC continues to grow at this rate we will be
157 The UFCC had written off approximately $3 million when a container of fertiliser was rejected in
by Australian quarantine in the late 1990s on the basis of contamination. The source of contamination
was the supplier from Israel. Despite hiring lawyers in several countries the UFCC could not get
reimbursement and had resigned itself to the loss, advising the membership that it had been written
off. The new CEO successfully negotiated a $2.2 million reimbursement comprising cash and
replacement fertiliser to be delivered over the following two years.
158 At the time of the selection for the CEO, the co-operative was involved in seven litigations, one of
which involved an industrial relations unfair dismissal case with the immediate past CEO.
159 Compensation packages for agricultural co-operative senior management are discussed below.
160 This episode does not refer to the CEO.
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able to list on the Australian Stock Exchange in a year’. The comment reflected the
manager’s eagerness to impress the Chair as well as his uninformed belief that this
would be a highly desirable outcome for the UFCC. The Chair stated that he made it
very clear to the manager that the future UFCC business strategy was as a cooperative based on co-operative principles and listing on the stock exchange would
be the last option for the UFCC. The Chair maintained that he had reinforced to the
manager that it was precisely because of the co-operative business strategy that the
UFCC had achieved such long-term financial success. The Chair believed that the
new manager had evolved well into the co-operative ethos and understood the
purpose of the UFCC as a mechanism to benefit farmers’ own businesses, rather than
as an entity in its own right.
The Chair also stated that he was very impressed with the way in which the
CEO adapted from the corporate world to the co-operative environment and the
specialist management qualities he brought to the UFCC.

At the time of the

interviews in late 2002 and early 2003, the relationship between the CEO and the
Chair appeared to be very positive. The CEO gave the impression of developing a
good understanding of co-operative philosophy and business strategy by participating
in professional development on co-operative values and encouraging his staff to also
build their understanding. The Chair and the CEO seemed to share optimism for the
future of the UFCC as an agricultural co-operative that adhered to the co-operative
principles.
These vignettes demonstrate that the UFCC, like most other agricultural cooperatives in Australia, is forced to recruit senior staff from outside the co-operative
movement. This situation reflects a lack of co-operative business and management
training at the undergraduate or graduate level in Australian universities. This in turn
deprives the agricultural co-operative sector of appropriately trained management.
The experience of the UFCC suggests that corporate staff can be imported from the
corporate sector into commercial co-operatives on the proviso that they are intensely
professionally developed in the co-operative values. If this can successfully occur,
the lack of specific training for co-operative managers at tertiary level is not
necessarily a barrier to the agricultural co-operative sector in Western Australia as
the co-operative philosophy can be grafted onto managers via professional
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development after technical managerial competence is gained in standard commerce
and business degrees.
While the UFCC Chair acknowledged that this was not optimal, in the
absence of a co-operative management training facility in Australia to provide a pool
of potential co-operative management staff, he was comfortable with the recruitment
of corporate sector staff into the UFCC. He rationalised this on the basis that he
viewed a co-operative as essentially a business and, in the same way that a corporate
needs to adopt business tools, a co-operative can also utilise these technical and
managerial strategies. He argued that in common with a corporate, a co-operative
needed to implement strategic planning, financial and accounting management,
human resource management, marketing, operational management strategies and
governance policies and procedures.

The Chair considered that the corporate

background of the executive management team brought a range of skills and
strategies that the UFCC could utilise to its benefit (Madden, 2003b). The Chair
stated that a staff member with an ability to read a balance sheet was of more use to
the co-operative than an employee with an understanding of co-operative principles
but with limited technical business skills. This strategy, he acknowledged, can only
work in an environment in which the Board of Directors was strongly committed to
the co-operative principles and understood their role as Directors of a co-operative
business. At the time of the interviews, the Chair believed these values were solidly
embedded within the Board.
The UFCC experience in early 2003 with the importation of corporate staff is
contrary to the picture painted by Craig (1993) of corporate managers in co-operative
positions and their influence over the future strategies of the co-operative. Craig
(1993) highlights co-operative leadership within both the Board of Directors and
management as one of the factors contributing to the failure of co-operatives
remaining as co-operative businesses. He attributes this potential for co-operative
failure to a conflict between co-operative logic and the logic of bureaucratic
organisations such as IOFs. Craig argues that a CEO needs to understand and
balance the twin co-operative objectives of the economic and the democratic in
managing the organisation.

Craig maintains that management trained in the

dominant capitalist corporate paradigm struggle to understand the co-operative
philosophy. He contends that the CEO often becomes the instrument by which a co-
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operative starts the process towards becoming a corporation by focusing on the
economic and losing its ‘democratic’ qualities.

As a result, the CEO applies

management principles compatible with corporations and experiences frustration
with the co-operative’s inability to conform to the rules and norms of an IOF. Due to
the imported CEO’s lack of knowledge and understanding of the unique philosophy
underpinning co-operative structures, the CEO can feel discouraged when the Board
chides him or her for being too corporate (Craig, 1993). In response, the CEO then
tries even harder to please the Board by applying other corporate logic strategies,
inadvertently setting up a cycle of co-operative decline (Craig, 1993).
Craig (1993) also notes that the CEO, in a position of influence and authority,
may also subtly encourage the Board to move towards corporate strategies. In an
environment where the Board may not be fully conversant with and committed to cooperative principles, a CEO can exude considerable authority (Craig, 1993). The
CEO can therefore eventually become an instrument of a co-operative converting to
a corporation, arguing that this is the only way to achieve organisational growth and
increased profits.

Additionally, Craig comments, the CEO is supported in this

strategy by external professionals, such as solicitors, accountants, financiers and
management advisors who also lack understanding of co-operative culture and
operate within the rules of corporate business structures. Collectively, these external
advisors tend to present the co-operative business structure as substandard compared
with the corporate structure.
The scenario outlined by Craig, whereby a corporate manager sits
uncomfortably in a co-operative management role and becomes an instrument of
corporatisation, did not appear to apply, at the time of the 2003 interviews, to the
UFCC. The UFCC recruitment and professional development of imported corporate
staff suggested that both the Board and the new staff operated under Craig’s cooperative logic paradigm. However, Craig’s insight into the influence of corporate
trained management in a co-operative’s evolution may prove to be correct for the
UFCC. The ensuing events in early 2004, outlined later in the chapter, suggest that
the Chair was not as persuasive as he thought in influencing senior management
about the merits of co-operative values in guiding long-term business strategies for
the UFCC. The unfolding UFCC case study supports Craig’s position that an
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agricultural co-operative is vulnerable to the internalisation of corporate ideology
and practices from management that destabilises co-operative logic.
Compensation Strategies for Agricultural Co-operative CEOs
The CEO accepted the UFCC position although it was a significant salary
drop from his former corporate sector remuneration. 161 The Australian agricultural
industry has a reputation for paying low wages for on-farm employees and its
industry associations (Rural Training Council of Australia, 2000).

Based on

comments from some interviewees, this appears to also be a feature with agricultural
co-operative manager salary levels (Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 695, 2003).
This phenomenon in which agricultural co-operatives lag behind in compensation
levels for managers compared with managers of comparable sized IOFs is also noted
in the United States (United States Department of Agriculture, 2002). Interviewee
654 (2003) thought that farmers in Australia did not really understand the need for
appropriate compensation for the managers of agribusinesses, including the CEOs of
agricultural co-operatives, despite these organisations being comparable to those in
the corporate sector and deserving similar salary packages.

He attributed this

tendency towards lower compensation levels to the unpredictable nature of farmers’
income, resulting from international price fluctuations for commodities and variable
climatic conditions. This situation, he maintained, set up some resentment among
farmers when the CEO continued to receive a consistent income paid from the cooperative’s activities, regardless of the fluctuations in the farmers’ income and the
financial viability of the agricultural co-operative (Interviewee 654, 2003).
Therefore, offering lower salaries to staff employed in agricultural industry
associations, peak bodies and co-operatives helped off-set this resentment by farmers
towards employees who received stable incomes regardless of the economic wellbeing of the agricultural industry.
Interviewees identified strategies to supplement agricultural co-operative
salary packages to overcome the compensation differential between the CEOs of
corporations and agricultural co-operatives. One strategy was conferring bonuses for
achievement of certain benchmarks.

According to Interviewee 650 (2003), the

UFCC Board of Directors offered bonuses to executive management for
161 After many years working overseas, the UFCC CEO was prepared to accept a lower
compensation package in exchange for the family and lifestyle benefits of residing permanently in
Perth.
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‘achievement of performance in excess of expectations’. In 2002, the UFCC Board
conferred both a bonus and a significant salary package increase on its CEO at the
first anniversary of his employment in recognition of his input to the co-operative’s
profitability (Madden, 2003b).
The use of bonuses to reward the CEO suggests that the UFCC Board had a
mechanism to objectively measure the CEO’s performance. The Board of a publicly
listed corporation, with its primary focus on maximising shareholder profitability,
can use its Australian Stock Exchange share price as an objective ‘measure’ by
which to reward CEO competence via bonuses. However, an agricultural cooperative is a complex organisation, often with a multiplicity of goals, some of which
can be contradictory (Craig, 1993; Mooney & Gray, 2002).

To illustrate, this

conflict arises in relation to the twin UFCC objectives of low cost fertiliser supply
and high member rebates. To achieve high rebates, the UFCC has to charge as high
a price as possible for the product it imports in order to maximise the profit it makes
on behalf of its members and can distribute back to them as rebates. However, the
UFCC also has an objective of supplying the product at the lowest price possible to
its members in order to reduce their input costs and as a result contribute to the
financial profitability of their individual farm businesses.

These objectives are

contradictory and appear as of equal value or importance. A good understanding of
co-operative principles helps prioritise these objectives and minimise the conflict.
The UFCC Chair frequently and clearly stated that the first objective of the UFCC
was low cost supply to facilitate the profitability of member farm businesses.
Rebates were therefore a lesser objective. However, Johnson (2005, p 1) recognised
that in the UFCC ‘Traditionally, the key performance indicator - often the only
performance indicator - considered by members has been the annual rebate’.
These contradictory co-operative objectives can make it difficult to apply
performance measures to determine CEO compensation bonuses. The annual rebate
is the more observable indicator by which to measure the performance of an
agricultural co-operative and hence evaluate the performance of the CEO. The
concern with applying an ‘objective’ criterion of UFCC ‘profitability’ as measured
by rebates as a trigger for a CEO bonus is that it focuses the Board, the members and
the CEO on the lesser of the UFCC’s co-operative objectives of rebates, rather than
low cost supply. It reinforces a corporate mindset about ‘profitability’ on the co-
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operative that potentially erodes the co-operative logic. Further, it inadvertently
trains co-operative members to assess the performance of the co-operative on the
basis of how much rebate is received each year, diverting their focus from the true
purpose of the co-operative on low cost supply as a strategy to maximise returns to
the family farm. Bonuses, particularly those based on annual rebates, therefore, can
be a distracting and damaging mechanism by which to reward agricultural cooperative CEO performance.
The CEO of another co-operative identified an alternative to the bonus
strategy to supplement agricultural co-operative CEO salary levels. He reasoned that
reward for effort should be in the form of issuing shares in the co-operative business
to management (Interviewee 654, 2003). This, he argued, was an incentive to cooperative management to ensure that ‘we [the Board of Directors and senior
management staff] are all rowing in the same direction’ (Interviewee 654, 2003).
However, this strategy is contrary to co-operative principles in which the benefits of
the co-operative should only accrue to the members (Craig, 1993). By issuing shares
to management, a portion of co-operative ‘profit’ is diverted away from the
membership to management. This potentially sets up a conflict situation within the
Board by forcing it to direct a percentage of co-operative surplus to management
shareholders, who are essentially investors, and the balance to co-operative members.
Interviewee 669 (2003) presented a third option for agricultural co-operative
CEO salary packages which forgoes performance incentives such as bonuses and
share allocations. He was not self-conscious about acknowledging that the CEO of a
co-operative needed to be appropriately compensated for their contribution to the
financial viability of the co-operative, at a similar level to a comparable sized
corporation. He claimed to be personally satisfied with his salary package, despite
the lack of performance incentives to enhance his base salary.

This ‘fair and

reasonable’ compensation strategy enabled the CEO to concentrate on core business,
as it removed the potential for a CEO’s self-focused distraction to develop
supplementary strategies such as bonuses or share allocations to boost an inadequate
base level compensation package.
Interviewee comments on agricultural co-operative compensation packages
demonstrate a need for Board of Directors to be sensitive to the messages they
covertly convey to the wider agribusiness industry when establishing salary packages

206

for management staff. Further, interviewee insights and the literature suggest that
performance incentives can be counter-productive for agricultural co-operative CEOs
as they can potentially distract CEOs from core co-operative objectives.
The Relationship Between the Board and the CEO
A former UFCC Director, speaking generally rather than specifically about
the UFCC, considered that the most significant issue for a co-operative was the
dynamics between the management and the Board (Interviewee 660, 2002). In his
view, he thought that management tended to dominate an agricultural co-operative
unless there was a strong and knowledgeable Board of Directors to provide checks
and balances on the management team. In his opinion, management had a vested
interest in shifting the power balance in their favour. An alternative position is that
the CEO accepts the authority of the Board and does not exploit a situation to assume
greater power or authority (Interviewee 650, 2003).

Interviewee 669 (2003),

speaking as a former co-operative business CEO, argued that a co-operative needs a
strong relationship between the Board and the CEO, suggesting a joint or collective
power balance between the two functions. Three views on the power balance in the
relationship between the CEO and the Board of Directors are evident - that the CEO
seeks to dominate the Board (Interviewee 660, 2002); that the Board controls and
directs the CEO (Interviewee 650, 2003);or there is a strong and balanced
relationship between the two (Interviewee 669, 2003).
The comments by Interviewee 660 (2002) that the management of cooperative organisations will seek to manoeuvre themselves into a powerful and
influential position are consistent with empirical and theoretical literature on cooperative business structures. Craig (1993) argues that agricultural co-operative
CEOs tend to exert an influence over the Board of Directors. Further, due to the
corporate background of CEOs, this influence appears to encourage co-operatives to
evolve in the direction of converting to a corporation (Craig, 1993). Interviewee 660
(2002), illustrated this trend by the activities of the CBH to restructure as a
corporation, a topical agri-political issue at the time. He believed that the campaign
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by the CBH Board of Directors to convert to a corporation was in reality the result of
management pressure and influence on the Board. 162
Interviewee 660 (2002), as an agricultural co-operative Board Director,
argued that it was unacceptable for management to influence the Board in the
direction of a structural change to a corporation.

He unequivocally put the

responsibility on co-operative CEOs and management to understand that the cooperative model is the best structure for producers to collectively gain the greatest
financial return for their commodity and that management must work to achieve this
outcome (Interviewee 660, 2002). Following on from this logic, he maintained that a
conversion of a co-operative to a corporation is actually a demonstration of the
failure of the co-operative CEO and Board to do the best by its members. Therefore,
he reasoned, a co-operative that started to entertain ideas of becoming a corporate
showed a flaw in management and Board understanding of the co-operative model
(Interviewee 660, 2002).
The unfolding UFCC case study suggests that in the agricultural co-operative
business, problems with the CEO or Board can be eventually connected back to their
lack of understanding of the co-operative paradigm or logic. At the time of the
interviews with actors associated with the UFCC, there was scant indication of a lack
of commitment to the co-operative principles by management or within the UFCC
Board of Directors. However, the events leading up to the 2004 AGM suggest that
this commitment was not as deeply embedded as required in an agricultural cooperative to quarantine it from potential debates about its future structure.
Farmer Board Concept of a Working Week
The interviews with actors associated with agricultural co-operatives
highlighted the rapid turnover in the CEOs of agricultural co-operatives. This was
attributed to the phenomenon of ‘burn out’, often resulting from the demanding
nature of working with farmer Boards (Interviewee 654, 2003; Interviewee 668,
2001; Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 949, 2003). According to Interviewee 694
162 The 2002 drive to convert CBH to a company business structure and possibly list on the stock
exchange was not successful. However the retiring CBH Chair, Watson, publicly raised the issue
again in early 2004, arguing that the CBH needed to change its co-operative structure to increase
CBH’s market value and face future challenges in a rapidly consolidating national storage and
handling industry (Slater, 2004). In late 2005, the CBH Board accepted member dissatisfaction with
this proposed direction and publicly acknowledged that it would not pursue corporatisation and public
listing, unless overwhelmingly initiated by members at some point in the future (Bolt, 2005b).
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(2003), several Western Australian agricultural co-operatives had lost CEOs as a
result of a real or perceived expectation that they were available 24 hours a day to
Board members. The culture of agricultural co-operatives appears to manoeuvre
CEOs into a position in which it is difficult for them to put a boundary around their
personal accessibility to their Chair and individual Directors on the Board.
The interview process described earlier to recruit the UFCC CEO hints at
this. When the Board of Directors realised at a Saturday night dinner that the
preferred applicant for the CEO position was not suitable, Madden (2003b) contacted
the second preferred applicant very early the following morning requesting that he
come to a breakfast meeting. This incident reveals a Board of Directors that finds it
difficult to differentiate between an individual’s private and work time. Interviewee
694 (2003) also illustrated this expectation of high level CEO accessibility by
describing an episode in which a Chair contacted his CEO at 3.00am to discuss an
issue concerning the co-operative.

Interviewee 694 (2003), based on personal

experience, portrayed working with farmers and farmer Boards as a very intense
activity.

Helou (2002), an agricultural co-operative CEO recruited from the

corporate sector, commented on an ‘intimacy’ in the relationship between the Chair,
the Board, the CEO and co-operative members that he had not experienced when he
was in the corporate sector. He sought to illustrate this intimacy by drawing a
parallel with a shareholder of a large company listed on the Australian Stock
Exchange who would never know if there was an administrative problem at its head
office. However, if there was a problem in an agricultural co-operative head office, a
member would be sure to know about it and get onto the CEO immediately,
regardless of the time of the day or night.
Interviewee 669 (2003) presented a different perspective on this issue of
accessibility. He argued that the agricultural co-operative CEO has to accept greater
interaction with members and recognise that it is the members’ right to be involved
with their co-operative.

It appears that accessibility to a farmer Board outside

standard working hours depends on the personal views and disposition of the CEO.
However, Interviewee 694 (2003) believed that these situations would not be
tolerated in a corporation. He also commented that it illustrates the way that those in
the agricultural industry conduct business, which, in his opinion, is not very
professionally. He added that agricultural co-operative Boards need to learn about
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the norms of modern management, including the appropriateness of contact with
management outside working hours.
The tendency for a mismatch between the approach of an agricultural cooperative Board of Directors to ‘standard working hours’ and that of a co-operative
employee can be explained by the traditional working patterns found in farming.
Farming businesses and family residences are frequently co-located creating an
opportunity to work on the farm business outside traditional work hours.
Agricultural work often requires intense spurts of activity that does not respect the
clock. Additionally, an agricultural co-operative is a creature of passion, which
requires from its proponents the level of commitment, and attention that is similar to
the demands of a young child. This enthusiasm and dedication to the co-operative in
the Board of Directors is a key ingredient to the development of the co-operative
business. However, a paid employee, no matter how committed they are to the
values underpinning the co-operative organisation, cannot be expected to share this
interest to the same depth, particularly if they have to balance personal commitments
as well.
This level of interaction by members with their agricultural co-operative can
also be viewed as a positive strength of the co-operative. Agricultural co-operative
members are demonstrating that they identify strongly with their co-operative. The
issue is how to manage this level of commitment and perhaps channelling it
constructively.

It becomes counterproductive if this connectedness to the local

community overwhelms co-operative management and staff, leading to burn out and
high staff turnover. The literature does not expose the negative aspects of being
employed in an agricultural co-operative in such a personal manner as identified in
these interviews.
Perceptions of Agricultural Co-operatives by External Actors
The previous section discussed issues related to the management of the
UFCC, particularly the central role that the Chair, the Board of Directors and the
CEO play in the organisation. This section explores the attitudes of external actors
from the corporate and agribusiness sector about the agricultural co-operative model.
Key themes are perceptions by individuals from the corporate sector of the
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agricultural co-operative as a business structure and work environment, and the lack
of professionalism of agricultural co-operative management and Board of Directors.
Stereotyping of the Agricultural Co-operative Business Model
As discussed above, the UFCC imported new management staff from the
corporate sector. Interviewee 650 (2003) commented that the new recruits expressed
a concern that they would not have enough work to do in a co-operative and
therefore be insufficiently stimulated. The comment reflects the lack of knowledge
by corporate actors about the co-operative structure as a commercial entity.
Interviewee 650 (2003) acknowledged that working in a co-operative was not a
‘normal’ business, as management in agricultural co-operative has to balance a
broader range of interests than just the financial success of the organisation,
however, he reassured the potential recruits that the UFCC was a highly
commercially oriented work environment well suited to their skills.

Further,

Interviewee 650 (2003) argued that while an agricultural co-operative deviates from
the corporate norm, it remains a ‘hard edged’ commercially focused organisation
operating according to the realities of the market economy.

According to

Interviewee 650 (2003), the new recruits had subsequently found the co-operative
work environment very challenging and stimulating and as a result of their
experiences at the UFCC, had re-evaluated their initial perceptions of a co-operative
as a ‘soft’ business.
A representative from a bank with an agribusiness focus (Interviewee 694,
2003) observed that agricultural co-operatives tend to attract two types of CEOs.
Firstly, he maintained, young CEOs work in an agricultural co-operative for a few
years with the objective of developing their management expertise and when an
opportunity arises, move into senior positions in the corporate world. For this group,
he believed that the agricultural co-operative CEO role is perceived as a stepping
stone in their corporate career, rather than a goal in itself. The other group, in his
opinion, consisted of older CEOs who view the agricultural co-operative position as
an ‘end of career’ role prior to retirement, as it is perceived as a less demanding role
than its comparable counterpart in the corporate sector.
This view suggests that the position of CEO of an agricultural co-operative is
not a highly sought after career move. By implication, mid-career agricultural cooperative CEOs have not been able to secure more prestigious and career enhancing
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positions in the corporate sector. There is also an implication in his comment that
indicates that agricultural co-operatives can only attract ‘second best’ applicants to
the role of CEO.

A former CEO (Interviewee 654, 2003) of another Western

Australian agricultural co-operative confirmed this sentiment when he remarked that
corporate sector colleagues and social contacts sympathised with him for being the
CEO of an agricultural co-operative and working with farmers. He believed that his
colleagues viewed the position of CEO of a co-operative as a ‘come down’ and that it
lacked the prestige of a similar position in a company.
The Agricultural Co-operative as an Outdated Business Model
The views and experiences of Interviewee 694 (2003) and Interviewee 654
(2003) suggest that many in the corporate sector perceive agricultural co-operatives
as staid and out-of-date business structures which are protected from the harsh
demands of business and cannot function in the market economy. By implication,
agricultural co-operative CEOs therefore have limited management skills and would
not succeed in the corporate environment. Indeed, one interviewee stated that some
agricultural co-operatives were run like ‘sheltered workshops’ (Interviewee 694,
2003). Discussions with Booth (2004) indicate that some co-operatives do indeed
function in this way and therefore the reputation was not undeserved. According to
Booth, it is anticipated that these co-operatives will close or be sold as for-profit
businesses when the current management retires (Booth, 2004).
The UFCC experience, however, demonstrates that agricultural co-operatives
in Western Australia can only remain economically viable if they adopt the
techniques of modern management and understand that they are functioning within a
market economy.

Therefore, highly commercial agricultural co-operatives are

required to recruit senior management staff of very high calibre. These staff are
clearly not ‘second best’ employees.

However, as indicated previously, the

recruitment of senior level staff from the corporate sector requires a complementary
professional development strategy to establish the appropriate philosophical
orientation of the organisation and its strategic direction.
Interviewee 654 (2003) indicated that another commonly held perception of
agricultural co-operatives by corporate and agribusiness actors is that co-operatives
do not appeal to ‘successful’ farmers. According to this view, ‘successful’ farmers
are those who operate commercially profitable farm businesses and have linked into
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the wider agricultural supply chain as independent agents. As successful farmers,
they do not need the collective approach of agricultural co-operatives. Consequently,
agricultural co-operatives appeal to the less successful or ‘problem’ farmers in the
industry and are effectively only a ‘safety net’. Associated with this view is the
perception of some corporate actors that agricultural co-operatives are an oldfashioned ‘welfare’ strategy that does not sit well in a modern market economy
(Interviewee 689, 2002).
However, the UFCC experience does not fit these stereotypes of a cooperative as a safety net or welfare mechanism for unsuccessful farmers. The UFCC
has over 3,000 grains industry members, representing approximately 50 per cent of
Western Australia’s grain growers. Collectively Western Australian farmers produce
about one third of Australia’s grain crop (Western Australian Department of
Agriculture, 2001b). It would be difficult to sustain an argument that these 3,000
grain farmers constitute the agricultural industry’s ‘welfare’ farmers.

On the

contrary, Madden (2003b) argues that these farmers are in fact deliberately choosing
the UFCC to manage a segment of their farm business as part of an overall farm
management strategy, reflecting an opposing view that these members are very
business oriented and successful farmers. According to Madden (2003b), the farmers
with business management and economics training are the ones who make informed
decisions about the economic benefits of the agricultural co-operative model for the
financial development of their farm businesses and are deliberately choosing to
become members of the UFCC as a strategy to achieve this.
An interviewee raised a contradiction in perceptions about the agricultural cooperative model often held by external actors (Interviewee 654, 2003). On the one
hand, he argued that the agricultural co-operative model received a lot of criticism
from those not closely associated with them, because ‘everyone knows about
agricultural co-operatives, particularly the problems of co-operatives’ (Interviewee
654, 2003). However, in exploring his comments further, it became clear that this
‘knowing’ was actually a myth about agricultural co-operatives based on
misinformation rather than the reality of what the co-operative model actually
provides for its members. Ironically, in other situations, this interviewee found that
being associated with an agricultural co-operative in commercial situations was an
advantage as external actors regarded co-operatives as reputable and trustworthy
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organisations.

This reveals an interesting paradox about the perceptions of the

agricultural co-operative model. On the other hand, these sentiments by third parties
reveal the perception of co-operatives having a range of problems, yet concurrently
co-operatives are also perceived by third parties as reliable and honourable
organisations with which to do business.
Agricultural Co-operative Business Strategy
This section discusses a range of issues related to the UFCC business
strategy, such as capital raising, share allocations and marketing. It was apparent at
the time of the research interviews that the UFCC was firmly committed to cooperative principles and that its focus was to ensure the best return for its members
rather than to be the biggest player in the market. However, some indications have
appeared that suggest that there is a difference in interpretation among actors
associated with the UFCC about the meaning of the co-operative principles and the
most appropriate strategies for the co-operative to adopt. Unlike a company which
focuses on profit maximisation, the UFCC business strategy is based around cooperative principles. Tensions between business strategy for a co-operative and
corporate business strategy have become evident as the co-operative matures.
Co-operative Principles at UFCC
The 2003 version of the United Farmers Co-operative website conveyed a
strong sense that farmers needed to collaborate via co-operative businesses to ensure
that corporate organisations did not ‘take what little profit there is left in the
industry’ (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). 163 The ‘strict
adherence to the co-operative principles’, particularly farmer ownership and control
via the co-operative structure, was an important message communicated by the
webpage (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).

The website

emphasised the benefit of the agricultural co-operative model for rural Western
Australia communities as a strategy to retard rural decline, emphasising that the
significant shareholder rebates represented funds that have been retained within rural
communities due to the presence of an agricultural co-operative (United Farmers Co-

163 The UFCC webpage was upgraded in 2003 and some of the earlier pages referred to in this
chapter were subsequently removed from the website.
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operative Company Webpage, n.d.).

The UFCC has publicly retained these

sentiments in subsequent upgrades of its webpage.
The messages on the UFCC website strongly indicated that the organisation
understood the co-operative principles and the point of difference resulting from
adopting a co-operative rather than company structure within an agricultural industry
context. The webpage also hinted that it was important that current and potential
members understood the benefits of the co-operative model for the agricultural
industry and their local communities. These sentiments are consistent with the
literature on the benefits of co-operatives in rural communities and their ability to
reduce exposure to the profit driven behaviours of companies (see, for example,
Mooney & Gray, 2002; Torgerson et al., 1997).
The Chair attributed the success of the UFCC during its first decade to the
relevance and strength of the co-operative structure in the Western Australian
agricultural industry. The Chair conveyed in the interviews that he was adamant that
the rationale of the UFCC was to increase the financial profitability of its
shareholders as farmers, not as investors. He continued to maintain this view in late
2003 when he stated that ‘the [UFCC] philosophy is still to maximise returns to the
family farm - not [for the UFCC itself] to …. make a profit’ (Lee, 2003). The Chair
quite rightly argued that the UFCC was not an investment vehicle for its shareholders
and therefore it should not view shareholder members as investors (Madden cited in
Lee, 2003).

However, as discussed above, the management and the Board of

Director can be conflicted by their perception of the twin objectives of low cost
supply and high rebates. 164 A shift to privileging rebates over low cost supply
inappropriately represents the UFCC shareholders as investors, akin to the purpose of
a company. Consequently, the objective of being a low cost supplier aligned to the
co-operative principles becomes jeopardised.
A second conflict in objectives for the Board and management team is in
balancing the twin objectives of the economic and the democratic (Craig, 1993),
particularly with respect to co-operative equity principles.

This conflict was

illustrated by an episode in which some members who bought substantially large

164 This conflict in objectives is reflected in the following statement ‘the focus on rebate levels
creates a “Catch 22” situation for our management team …. This directly conflicts with the traditional
goal of our Co-operative - to achieve the lowest possible prices for our members’ (Johnson, 2005).
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amounts of product from the UFCC requested a bulk discount (Interviewee 650
2003). These members argued that if they bought in bulk from a corporation they
would be able to receive a discount, and could not appreciate why the UFCC did not
offer the same benefit (Interviewee 650 2003). Management trained in the corporate
sector can understand the rationale behind this argument of discounts for bulk
purchases. A corporate organisation is able to develop different incentive packages
to engender loyalty from customers, leading to greater organisational profitability.
Management becomes the vehicle for promoting these types of corporate strategies
and encouraging the Board to implement them (Craig, 1993). However, the cooperative principles dictate that the UFCC cannot discriminate amongst its
membership in its pricing strategy. Further, all product is sold at cost, regardless of
how much is purchased by an individual member. By adhering to its co-operative
principles and not offering bulk discounts, the UFCC received some dissension from
a few members (Interviewee 650 2003). 165
Agricultural economists, such as Staatz (1987), have used these conflicts in
co-operative goals to illustrate the shortcomings of the co-operative model when
compared to an IOF. Craig (1993) and Mooney and Gray (2002) also acknowledge
the conflicting nature of co-operative objectives, but address it from a different
perspective. Mooney and Gray (2002) argue that the conflicting objectives in a cooperative business in fact stimulate innovation in the co-operative. They contend
that the co-operative objectives force the Board and management to think laterally.
This they argue actually inspires rigour and vitality in the co-operative, leading to
innovative solutions and approaches.
UFCC Business Strategy and Philosophy
The UFCC webpage stated that the UFCC philosophy was:
To promote and advance the family farm as a viable long-term
business unit by engaging in commercial activities which balances the
financial objectives of the organisation with the needs and
expectations of its shareholders. (United Farmers Co-operative
Company Webpage, n.d.)
165 In addition to this story reflecting a lack of awareness of co-operative principles by some
elements of the management team, it also demonstrates that some UFCC members also did not
understand the basic difference between an agricultural co-operative and an IOF. This reinforces a
perception that agricultural co-operative members tend to adopt an agricultural co-operative structure
for pragmatic rather than values based reasons.
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Following from this the UFCC webpage maintained that its objectives were:
•
•
•

To increase farm operating margins of farmer
shareholders.
To maintain financial strength and independence.
To remain farmer owned and controlled. 166

Lastly, the UFCC webpage identified that its core business was supplying
fertiliser to its membership (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).
Interviewee 650 (2003) considered that the UFCC co-operative business strategy
comprised three components.

Firstly, he maintained that the UFCC’s core

philosophy was based on the co-operative principles. The UFCC webpage contained
significant information on the co-operative principles but does not actually state this.
Secondly, the core mission, he stated, was to reduce costs of farm inputs to increase
profitability of farm outputs. This is consistent with the sentiment of the UFCC
philosophy as outlined on the webpage. Lastly, he argued that the UFCC core
business, as a supply co-operative, was the logistics business. This interpretation
differed from that stated on the UFCC webpage of low cost supply of agricultural
chemicals and fertiliser.
As Interviewee 650 (2003) considered that the UFCC was in the logistics
business, he argued that it was a natural extension for the co-operative to enter the
grain marketing business, in which the UFCC would identify the best priced markets
for members’ grain. In his view, it was still a logistics activity and therefore
consistent with the UFCC core business strategy (Interviewee 650, 2003).

He

believed that the addition of grain marketing to the UFCC’s supply business was
essentially just a reversal of the input process. He argued that it called upon many of
the same logistics, networks and relationships and skills that the UFCC had already
developed.
Consistent with this view that the UFCC was in the logistics business, the
UFCC Board of Directors subsequently developed a proposal for a marketing arm to
compete with the former single desk marketer, AWB Ltd, which had been privatised
in 1999. In 2003, the UFCC presented a ‘road show’ in rural areas to its members to
166 These statements are from the 2003 version of the UFCC webpage. The UFCC statements on its
philosophy and objectives did not include the terms ‘co-operative’ or ‘co-operative principles’. The
webpage, in other sections, contained detailed information on the co-operative business structure,
principles and history (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).
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ascertain the level of interest in the concept. According to Interviewee 650 (2003),
the country tour demonstrated considerable farmer disenchantment with AWB Ltd
and that farmers were interested in the proposed UFCC strategy because it offered an
alternative marketing option for them. The UFCC website confirmed that it pursued
this strategy with the introduction of a grains division. This division presents ‘a
range of grain, pulse and oilseed marketing options to its shareholders’ by offering a
mix of Wheat Pooling and Cash trading options (United Farmers Co-operative
Company Webpage, n.d.).
This backwards and forwards logistics strategy represents a significant
diversion from the original UFCC objective to lower the price of farm inputs to its
members by sourcing agricultural supplies and providing them to members at near
cost (Madden, 2003a). However, Interviewee 650, (2003) argued that the grains
marketing function of the UFCC could meet the second part of the UFCC objective
of increasing the members’ return for farm-gate produce prices by selling members’
commodities at higher prices than achieved by the current market processes.
Madden (2003b) argued that these functions are two different business activities that
could cause the successful supply co-operative to loose its momentum in its area of
expertise. Co-operative theory suggests that an agricultural co-operative is formed to
address a specific need such as economic adversity (Cobia, 1989). The UFCC
corrected a form of market failure via the ‘competitive yardstick’ mechanism by
importing and selling fertiliser at a lower price than the main supplier. Deviating
from this objective into another activity, which does not necessarily require a cooperative structure to perform the function, may threaten the organisation’s primary
function of low cost supply and hence its future as a co-operative (Craig, 1993).
After entering the grain marketing area, the UFCC continued to expand its
range of goods and services to members by offering crop nutrition and protection
(insurance), as well as wool marketing services (United Farmers Co-operative
Company Webpage, n.d). The evolving direction of the UFCC business strategy is
discussed further in the context of the 2004 AGM.
Capital Raising Strategies
The International Labour Office (2001) notes that one of the commonly
identified disadvantages with the co-operative structure is the problem of raising
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sufficient capital or funds. Capital raising is a perennial issue in agricultural cooperative literature and is often quoted by commentators as one of the most
significant shortcomings for the model (see, for example, Greenwood, 1999;
Langdon, 1991). They argue that the lack of available equity, combined with the
relatively small ‘return on investment’ compared with for-profit agribusiness firms,
limits the agricultural co-operative’s ability to be competitive.

This identified

weakness in the co-operative structure is attributed to the co-operative principle of
‘one member, one vote’ in which a member’s financial contribution to the cooperative is not rewarded via proportionally weighted voting power. In contrast, the
larger a shareholder’s financial input to a corporation, the greater voting rights the
shareholder enjoys. Further, a co-operative member’s individual contribution will
not result in meaningful dividends on this capital, as the purpose of the co-operative
is not an investment vehicle for individual members, but rather to provide a
collective benefit or service to its membership. The considered outcome by many
commentators of these intrinsic co-operative features is that a co-operative member
has little incentive to contribute more than the minimum funds to the co-operative.
This in turn, they maintain, restricts the ability of the co-operative to raise sufficient
capital for its commercial activities. The argument concludes that, compared to other
commercial business structures, the co-operative structure has an inherent
disadvantage in raising capital.
Hansmann (1996) does not share this view. He comments that equity capital
required by agricultural co-operatives must generally be raised from the members
and that it is not apparent that difficulty in raising capital has substantially inhibited
the formation and growth of co-operatives. He further suggests that agricultural cooperative managers have not reflected any general sense that their organisations
suffered from serious capital constraints, or that it was harder to raise capital as a cooperative than an IOF (Hansmann, 1996).
Madden (2003b) indicated that the UFCC was well capitalised and the issues
outlined above did not arise in the UFCC, although he acknowledged that the ability
of an agricultural co-operative to raise capital is an essential element to its viability.
The Chair divided UFCC capital raising strategies into two categories; infrastructure
funds for building long-lived capital assets and working capital for ongoing co-
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operative business activities.

Both classes of funds mutually reinforced and

leveraged each other.
Rebate Strategies, Retained Earnings and Infrastructure Capital
Consistent with co-operative theory of rebates based on member patronage
(Craig, 1993), all UFCC trading profit is distributed back to members as rebates in
proportion to the amount of business they have conducted with the co-operative
(United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). The UFCC rebate policy
was developed to maximise member benefits under sections of the Commonwealth
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, in conjunction with strategies that were
permissible under the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. The
Chair acknowledged that the legislated taxation concessions, in conjunction with the
Western Australian legislation, were very important for the capital raising and
financial management of the UFCC and that it would be difficult for an agricultural
co-operative to build capital reserves without these concessions (Madden, 2003b).
Under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, profits retained by a cooperative are taxed at the standard company rate. However, Sections 117, 118 and
119 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 allow agricultural co-operatives to
deduct patronage rebates to members out of pre-tax income.

Therefore, an

agricultural co-operative does not pay tax on profits that it distributes to members as
rebates, transferring the taxation burden to the individual member level (Greenwood,
1999; Hildebrand, 2002; Madden, 2003b). The UFCC is able to comply with the
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 concessions as all trading profits
are rebated to members as unfranked assessable income.
Greenwood (1999), in analysing capital raising strategies for dairy cooperatives located in Australia’s eastern States, argues that these sections of the
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 are counter-productive, since they
encourage agricultural co-operatives to return all surplus to members as rebates and
therefore restrict the ability of agricultural co-operatives to build up cash reserves.
Consequently, agricultural co-operatives are not able to preserve capital for
infrastructure (Greenwood, 1999).
However, the UFCC is able to avoid the problem identified by Greenwood of
diminishing cash reserves within the co-operative. Of significance to the UFCC
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rebate strategy, the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 allows
members’ rebates to be distributed as a mix of bonus shares and cash. UFCC trading
profits (surplus) are rebated back to members, not as cash, but by allocating 20 per
cent as cash and 80 per cent as bonus shares in the UFCC. The members’ rebate
associated with the 80 per cent bonus shares is retained within the co-operative as
cash for infrastructure capital. In effect, the UFCC has retained the actual cash
component equivalent to the 80 per cent of member rebates in return for bonus
shares, thereby building a significant interest free cash reserve within the cooperative. The Chair believed that UFCC farmer members understood that the cooperative could not be starved of funds in order to maximise member cash returns
and supported the strategy of converting 80 per cent of member rebates into bonus
shares (Madden, 2003b).
As the UFCC has rebated all trading profits to members as unfranked
assessable income, the members pay the appropriate tax on the combined 80 per cent
bonus share rebate and the 20 per cent cash rebate according to their own businesses
tax regime, as it is all assessable income for the member. The member generally
uses the 20 per cent cash component to pay the overall tax bill (Madden, 2003b).
According to the Chair, the UFCC members understand the taxation arrangements
and how they have been designed to enable the UFCC to build up its capital reserves
(Madden, 2003b).
The outcome of this strategy is that the same tax concession under the
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 is achieved, but 80 per cent is
retained as capital in the co-operative. This ensures that the UFCC has sufficient
capital to continue expansion of the co-operative business as only 20 per cent of
UFCC profits are rebated as cash. In addition, they do not have to pay interest on the
retained rebates because it is not borrowed funds. Madden (2003b) credited this
strategy as one of the main reasons that the UFCC had been able to minimise the
potential dilemma of capital raising within an agricultural co-operative structure.
For the UFCC rebate policy to work effectively it has to meet several
requirements. Firstly, the 80 per cent of bonus share rebates has to be capped at an
achievable ceiling, in this case, $22,000, so that it was a genuine incentive for
members to support the strategy (Booth, 2004). When a member has accumulated
$22,000 of bonus shares, the total value of the rebate is paid out to the member in
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cash (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). The incentive element
of the bonus shares worked well as the Chair said that members looked forward to
receiving their $22,000 cash (Madden, 2003b). Madden (2003b) believed that the
$22,000 rebate also encouraged members to purchase more product from the UFCC,
for example, by buying two years supply of fertiliser in one year and storing it on
their farm, in order to achieve the rebate as soon as possible. This suited UFCC as
well because they were selling more fertiliser.
After a member has received their $22,000, subsequent rebates are paid fully
in cash, rather than in the combination of cash and bonus shares. Members are then
effectively getting their fertiliser at cost from UFCC, which also means that the
member is getting the best possible deal. Madden (2003b) argued that this ‘at cost’
benefit for members could only occur with a co-operative business model and a
corporate could not compete with this strategy.
Secondly, the rebate strategy of 20 per cent cash, 80 per cent bonus shares,
combined with the $22,000 ceiling, avoids the problem faced by co-operatives with
high levels of retained member rebates (Booth, 2004; Craig, 1993; Madden, 2003b).
When an agricultural co-operative holds high levels of retained member rebates, it
may face a significant cash flow problem if many members seek to realise the value
of their bonus shares in the same time period (Cook, 1995). With a $22,000 ceiling,
the UFCC is able to monitor how much it needs in reserves to meet projected
member rebate payments each year and budget for it, thus managing its cash flow.
By limiting the value of bonus share allocations to $22,000 per member and then
paying members out in cash once they achieve this level, the UFCC is ensuring that
it will never have a huge ‘payout’ bill at some future date. Further, the rebate
strategy alleviates the ‘horizon problem’ (Cook, 1995) as members are collectively
prepared to leave their rebates in the co-operative to ensure it can pursue future
investment strategies, despite their own projected membership timeframe.
Lastly, the ‘retained earnings’ converted into bonus shares are clearly
allocated to members rather than becoming the joint property of all members. This
strategy minimises the conflict identified by Cook (1995) about residual claims on
the unallocated assets of co-operatives. The UFCC rebate strategy has created a
virtuous cycle as it has alleviated many of the identified shortcomings in capital
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raising for agricultural co-operatives and generated sufficient funds for infrastructure
capital.
Madden (2003b) stated that the five founding UFCC Board of Directors were
able to design the rebate policy and associated capital raising solutions due to their
prior exposure to capital issues confronting other agricultural co-operatives such as
CBH and Westralian Farmers Co-operative. According to Madden (2003b), one of
the motives for Westralian Farmers Co-operative to restructure as Wesfarmers was
the substantial unallocated equity within the co-operative.

In the Wesfarmers

situation, Madden (2003b) believed that this resulted in the co-operative shares being
undervalued on paper as they were not reflected in co-operative assets. As indicated
by Madden (2003b), the Wesfarmers management and Board believed the true value
of the co-operative would only be best realised via a corporate structure listed on the
Australian Stock Exchange. 167

The UFCC, he argued, avoided this problem of

unallocated equity and the value of the co-operative increasing asset wise out of
proportion to the paper value of the shares by introducing the cash and bonus share
rebate allocation strategy. At all times the amount of member rebates within the
UFCC are clearly identified back to the individual members (Madden, 2003b).
Consequently, there is no collective ownership of retained earnings within the UFCC
(Madden, 2003b).
The Chair (2003b) explained how the UFCC used infrastructure capital. He
stated firmly that the UFCC was very clear that its core function is importing and
distribution rather than storage and handling. This clarity of vision meant that the
UFCC leased storage facilities where possible and capital for infrastructure was
minimised. The UFCC only built or purchased infrastructure if no other alternative
was available. Additionally the UFCC did not make an investment strategy in
infrastructure unless it could ensure a 22.5 per cent return on investment (Madden,
2003b).

This strategy also reduces member equity tied to collectively owned

infrastructure.
Madden (2003b) illustrated this leasing strategy with the negotiations in 2002
with the Fremantle Port Authority. He remarked that due to the volume of business
it conducts, the UFCC found that commercial stakeholders who profit from this
167 Chapter Four notes that a trigger for the conversion to Wesfarmers was a concern about
‘corporate raiders’ mounting a take-over bid for Westralian Farmers Co-operative.
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volume were keen to work with the UFCC to facilitate business strategies for their
mutual benefit. The Port Authority negotiated with UFCC to build dedicated storage
facilities that the UFCC leased for 21 years, as both parties benefit from the ongoing
success of the co-operative. The UFCC was not using its own capital but rather that
of investor agencies (in this case the port authorities) to obtain the infrastructure they
required. However, Madden (2003b) acknowledged that, as a facility leased for a
significant period of time, the agricultural co-operative now confronted issues
associated with depreciation and needed to ensure that the facility was utilised at
optimum capacity to maximise returns for its members.
The competing objectives of retaining members’ equity within the cooperative for business goals and the desire to return cash refunds to members is a
complex issue for agricultural co-operative Board of Directors to manage. The
UFCC has dealt with this issue in a manner that supports both objectives. The UFCC
Chair is aware that the rebate policy they have instigated is a unique response to
rebates and attributes this to the flexibility within the Western Australian cooperative legislation. He said that agricultural co-operative representatives from
other Australian States visited the UFCC to gain a better understanding its solution to
the tension between capital raising and member rebates.
Working Capital
Madden (2003b) explained that UFCC working capital was gained via a
combination of farmer funds and bank borrowings. Initially the UFCC was required
to use ‘letters of credit’, in which it was necessary for the UFCC to have a specified
amount of working capital in the bank to pay for the goods before delivery. The
early success of the UFCC as a supply co-operative enabled it to build an adequate
capital base. Consequently, rather than borrowing money from its own bankers, it
was able to leverage the collective capital raising capacity of all its members. The
Chair explained the process via a hypothetical example. Each member, he stated,
was able to raise, through their own farm business banking arrangements, say
$100,000, with which to buy fertiliser. With about 3000 members placing orders and
using their own money to pay for it, the UFCC then had the capacity to import
fertiliser very competitively without using its own funds. As a result of this strategy,
the UFCC, by 2003 had an annual turnover of $100 million. Madden (2003b) stated
that this system had evolved further whereby the UFCC now operates on the basis of
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‘cash against documents’ where the individual farmer pays directly for their order via
a direct debit system at a time when the supplier needs to be paid. The UFCC was
therefore effectively left out of the capital transfer loop as the farmer was paying the
supplier directly. The outcome was that the UFCC adopted a brokerage role and did
not itself have to use its own funds to arrange for purchase of product.
Madden (2003b) argued that both categories of fundraising, infrastructure
capital and working capital, are mutually beneficial. Further, these internal capital
raising strategies enabled the UFCC to raise additional funds in its own right
(Madden, 2003b). The Chair stated that their banker had authorised the UFCC to
borrow up to 350 per cent of its asset base. He illustrated the significance of this by
contrasting the borrowing capacity of an individual farmer, tied to a standard loan to
valuation ratio of 50 per cent to 90 per cent of their asset base. Madden (2003b)
further stated that the UFCC was the largest Western Australian customer for that
bank and the tenth largest customer nationally. Consequently, he pointed out, the
UFCC was also able to obtain a better interest rate on the funds it did borrow.
Capital raising is the one consistent point in the literature about the weakness
of the co-operative model over the corporate structure. To an extent, the UFCC is
not as exposed to the issue of capital raising because as a supply co-operative it has a
relatively small need for capital to build infrastructure.

However, the UFCC

strategies for capital raising are innovative and have proven to be successful.
Further, the co-operative business structure has not restricted its ability to raise
capital.

On the contrary, the UFCC has been able to exploit unique features

associated with the co-operative structure to pursue innovative and successful capital
raising strategies.
The UFCC approach to capital raising demonstrates that co-operatives have a
remarkable ability to accumulate capital when members have a strong collective
interest. Madden (2003b) strongly believed that agricultural co-operatives should not
have a capital raising problem.

Paraphrasing Parnell (1999b), Madden (2003b)

argued that if members supported the proposed activities they will make the
necessary effort to raise the funds for the well-being of the co-operative, in the
knowledge that the co-operative was in effect an extension of their own farm
businesses. If the funds could not be raised via the membership, Madden (2003b)
argued that the purpose of the funds needed to be questioned. His attitude towards
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the issue of capital raising for an agricultural co-operative reiterated his intrinsic
connection to the co-operative logic.
Dry Shareholders
In Australia, members of an agricultural co-operative who no longer trade
with the co-operative are referred to as ‘dry shareholders’ or ‘non-trading
shareholders’. 168 The theoretical problem with dry shareholders in a co-operative is
that they separate the ownership of a co-operative from its users (United States
Department of Agriculture, 2002). Dry shareholders can therefore adopt the outlook
of an investor rather than a member and consequently may behave in a manner that
ensures they will gain the most for their shares rather than focusing on getting the
best price or service from the co-operative (Cook, 1995). An increasing proportion
of dry shareholders in a co-operative’s membership may result in sub-optimal
influence decision making in the co-operative, and this may not be in the best longterm interests of the co-operative (Cook, 1995). 169 Furthermore, an agricultural cooperative may become particularly vulnerable to corporate take-over when raiders
offer dry shareholders a greater amount for their shares than the face or par value of
their co-operative shares (Greenwood, 1999). 170 171
The UFCC Board of Directors developed a strategy of buying back
membership shares from non-trading members at par value, that is, the UFCC pays
back the same face value of the share that the member paid for them in the first
place.

The Board introduced this strategy to avoid a situation relating to dry

shareholders which arose with the former agricultural co-operative, Westralian
Farmers Co-operative.

According to Madden (2003b), non-active Westralian

Farmers Co-operative members were approached to sell their membership shares at a
premium to a ‘corporate raider’ who wished to control the co-operative. While the

168 An agricultural co-operative member may become non-trading if, for example, they retire or leave
the industry, but still retain their share in the co-operative.
169 This phenomenon is known as the horizon problem (Cook, 1995).
170 Agricultural co-operatives can develop substantial assets but the par value of a member’s share
does not reflect this as it remains fixed. In addition to the issue of dry shareholders and corporate
takeovers, the growing asset backing of a co-operative can stimulate debate in a co-operative to
consider a corporate structure to unlock this value held in assets. This argument was employed in the
CBH debate about corporatising (Bolt, 2005b).
171 An agricultural co-operative, Pivot, was the target of a takeover bid by Shears in 1987
(Greenwood, 1999).
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strategy was unsuccessful, it highlighted the potential problem for a co-operative of a
large pool of non-trading members within a co-operative.
The present Western Australian legislation is silent on the issue of dry
shareholders. The problems associated with dry shareholders within a co-operative
have been recognised in the drafting of the proposed Western Australian co-operative
legislation, which expressly excludes dry shareholders from co-operative
membership.
Open or Closed Membership
Madden (2003b) commented that in late 2002 the UFCC Board of Directors
had recognised that it must contend with being too successful in the business of
importing fertiliser and chemicals as it was attracting more members than it had the
capacity to service, particularly during periods of peak demand. The UFCC had
implemented a strategy to smooth out demand over the year, by offering a discount
to encourage farmers to collect their fertiliser in non-peak periods, representing a
saving to the UFCC in storage and benefiting both parties. Additionally, UFCC
Board considered whether to close off membership in certain geographic regions, as
they did not have the capacity to expand storage facilities in those areas. The UFCC
Board also contemplated the option of closed membership, by putting a ceiling on
the number of members in the co-operative.172
This last strategy is contrary to co-operative principles of open membership.
The Chair was able to rationalise the incompatibility of this strategy with the cooperative principle of open membership.

He stated that the UFCC’s primary

objective was to the economic well-being of its farmer members. In his view, the
UFCC did not have a responsibility to the entire agricultural industry (Madden,
2003b). Therefore, if the Directors determined that closed membership was the most
appropriate strategy to address that issue, he was able to support it in good
172 The concept of ‘open’ or ‘closed’ membership in co-operative theory is different from the way
that the terms are applied to legal discourse. In co-operative theory, ‘open’ membership means that
any farmer can become a member, while ‘closed’ membership restricts membership of the cooperative to farmers who also meet some other requirement. ‘Open’ shareholdings in law apply to
publicly listed companies which do not put a qualifier on who may purchase shares. ‘Closed’
shareholdings refer to a situation in which a shareholder must comply with some requirement in order
to purchase shares. Farmer controlled businesses registered under the Corporations Act 2001 are
deemed ‘closed’ as only practising farmers can purchase shares in the company, even though every
farmer in the industry may choose to join and this is, in a sense, a form of open membership.
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conscience (Madden, 2003b). Subsequently, Madden advised that the problem did
not evolve to the point where the UFCC had to close membership.
In contrast to the Chair’s concern about the possible need to close
membership as a result of too great a demand, Interviewee 650 (2003) was concerned
that the UFCC was about to reach a natural ceiling on membership and could only
capture another 15 per cent of potential Western Australian members. He considered
that this ceiling on members would restrict future growth opportunities for the cooperative. He thought that there may be potential for the UFCC to expand into other
Australian States via NETCO (Interviewee 650, 2003). 173 The UFCC subsequently
expanded its membership into Queensland and New South Wales by signing up
distributors in these States as members, who then sold UFCC product to non-member
farmers (Ladyman, 2004a).
The UFCC Chair’s comments in relation to member size reinforce the UFCC
objective of being a low cost supply co-operative and demonstrate that the cooperative did not seek to be the largest player in the marketplace (Madden, 2003b).
The comments of Interviewee 650 (2003) reflect a need for the UFCC to identify
strategies for future business growth. The differing orientations in business strategy
revealed by these two perspectives are explored later in the chapter.
External Advisors on Co-operative Board of Directors
UFCC members democratically elect the Board of Directors from within the
membership. 174 The Chair strongly believed that it was appropriate for the UFCC to
only allow farmer members to sit on the UFCC Board.

However, he also

acknowledged that a drawback was that it also curtailed the pool of potential Board
members and therefore the skills mix of the Board.

The Western Australian

Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 allows co-operatives to appoint non-members as
Board directors. The UFCC Board is able to balance the skills mix of its farmer
Board Directors by inviting external advisors onto the Board of Directors. In 2003,
the UFCC had one external Board member who was from an accounting firm.
173 NETCO was an Australian wide grains industry second tier alliance of agricultural co-operatives
(Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, 2003). The UFCC was a foundation
member of NETCO. NETCO collapsed in late 2003, a month after being awarded a Rabobank
Agribusiness of the Year award (Booth, 2004).
174 The UFCC Board in 2005 consisted of seven farmer members (United Farmers Co-operative
Company Webpage, n.d.).
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Madden (2003b) maintained that external Directors with expertise in the
corporate sector were a beneficial addition to the UFCC Board, as many issues
facing corporates and co-operatives were similar, such as governance and finance
matters. Madden (2003b) argued that the external Director appointed to the UFCC
Board of Directors made excellent contributions in the accounting and business
strategy areas. He also considered that the individual was personally committed to
the future well-being of the UFCC as a co-operative and made an effort not miss a
Board meeting despite personal or work commitments (Madden, 2003b). While
Madden (2003b) acknowledged that external Directors may not understand the cooperative philosophy, he believed the potential corporate influence of external
Directors was countered by the Board as it was steeped in the co-operative
principles. Therefore the Board was able to filter the technical advice of external
Directors to ensure that what the Board adopted was consistent with co-operative
philosophy (Madden, 2003b). The UFCC case study suggests that external Directors
on an agricultural co-operative Board are appropriate and valuable, as long as the
Board can interpret and implement such advice via co-operative principles.
Co-operative Principles and Member Education
The demand by some UFCC members for bulk purchase discounts discussed
earlier actually reflects a lack of understanding by them about the differences
between an agricultural co-operative and a corporation. The underlying problem of
member confusion about these differences can be tackled via member education on
the distinct purpose and operational functions of a co-operative enterprise.
However, interviews conducted for this research indicated that implementing
member education within an agricultural co-operative remains a persistent difficulty
for the Western Australian co-operative movement. Madden (2003b) acknowledged
that it was a challenge for the UFCC Board of Directors and management to provide
conceptual understanding of agricultural co-operative theory to more than 3000
members scattered throughout a large geographical region of the State. The Chair
had written articles in the UFCC newsletter about the history of the co-operative
movement to build knowledge of the uniqueness of the co-operative model and
principles. However, he was certain that the articles ‘went over members’ heads’
and was sure that it was not meaningful for them. Members, he argued, were already
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overloaded with information as farm business managers functioning in a rapidly
changing agricultural industry.

He attributed this information overload to

contemporary farmers’ need to be competent in a range of areas which was not
required of farmers a generation earlier.

Non-essential information about the

benefits of the co-operative business model in this environment failed to attract
farmers’ attention.
The Chair thought that the UFCC did not need to be overly concerned about
ensuring that members understood the unique purpose and structure of the cooperative model. He considered that as long as members were getting their fertiliser
from the UFCC at a cost plus price, the UFCC was achieving its role as a cooperative. He believed that the members’ litmus test for the UFCC was the price of
chemicals and fertiliser and if the UFCC delivered on this front, the UFCC was
servicing its membership. Consequently, Madden’s (2003b) preferred strategy in
relation to member eduction was to ensure that the Directors and staff were schooled
in the co-operative principles, and as a result, they could make informed decisions on
behalf of the wider membership about the strategic and operational direction of the
co-operative.
Notwithstanding the Chair’s views on member education, the UFCC,
however, operates in an environment in which the agricultural industry is confronting
significant restructuring based on notions found in neoclassical economic theory.
This theory exhibits a partiality towards the corporate structure and diminishes the
validity of the co-operative business model. The UFCC membership, without the
opportunity to access and participate in co-operative education and develop a strong
understanding of the point of difference about the co-operative as a business model
from the company structure, is not going to be in a position to make informed
judgements on behalf of the UFCC at critical times.

As later events suggest,

particularly at the 2004 AGM in which members were asked to vote on issues
concerning the strategic direction for the UFCC as a co-operative, the scant attention
by the UFCC Board of Directors to the education of the broader membership about
co-operative principles and strategies proved to be a high risk omission. Further, the
Chair’s later efforts to communicate the uniqueness and value of the co-operative
business model to the UFCC membership was too late to influence them about the
future direction of the UFCC. The UFCC experience suggests that, unless members
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have an appreciation of co-operative logic, they will not be able to make informed
decisions on the future directions of their co-operative.
Generational Change and Succession Planning
In response to the disruptions that occurred when some Board members or
staff left their positions, the UFCC Board of Directors subsequently implemented
succession planning to ensure the smooth transition from one incumbent in a position
to the next (Madden, 2003b). Part of the succession planning strategy involved a
training development program for potential Board members, combining professional
development in the technical and legal duties of Board members with an
understanding of co-operative principles. The UFCC Board invited members to
nominate for the program and successful applicants were required to sign a
confidentiality clause when they participated in the program. At the completion of
the program, those who were interested in pursuing a Board position put themselves
forward as potential nominees for future elections. Board members also participated
in on-going professional development programs, such as those offered by the
Australian Institute of Management (AIM) and the Australian Institute of Company
Directors (AICD).
The UFCC also introduced a succession plan for senior management. The
sudden removal of one of the previous CEOs demonstrated that the organisation had
not mentored other staff to fill this role, leaving the UFCC in a difficult situation
(Interviewee 650, 2003). The succession plan for senior staff involved developing a
skills matrix for each staff member and then aligning these to the positions within the
organisation. The matrix identified strengths and gaps in staff skills sets. Senior
staff coached individuals with potential for senior positions about the broader UFCC
business management functions.
Clearly the UFCC efforts in succession planning and professional
development are seen as an investment, rather then as a cost, in the future of the
organisation as an agricultural co-operative. The UFCC case study reveals that the
organisation is proactively minimising difficulties with staff and Board changes,
which will also contribute to addressing issues associated with generational change.
While the ‘co-operative champions’ who initially formed an agricultural co-operative
remain actively involved, the original purpose of the co-operative remains
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paramount. However, as the ‘co-operative champions’ retire from the industry, a
new generation of farmers will become involved in the organisation and without the
inculcation of co-operative values, the co-operative may be at some risk (Craig,
1993).
Cote (2000) observes that the generational shift in a maturing agricultural cooperative can become a pressure point for a co-operative.

Subsequent farmer

generations may not appreciate or understand the nature of the co-operative business
structure and therefore not be able to make informed decisions about future business
strategies (Cote, 2000). They may be impatient to convert the co-operative to an IOF
to enable it to be free of perceived constraints of the co-operative structure (Cote,
2000). The UFCC case study indicates that dedicated training for prospective Board
members in co-operative theory and practice is a potential strategy to avoid this
pressure from successive generations to convert an agricultural co-operative to a
corporate structure.
The 2004 AGM
The previous discussion has described and analysed several features of the
UFCC to understand how an agricultural co-operative, as an organisation, is
adjusting to a deregulated agricultural industry. This section is primarily based on an
analysis of events in the UFCC in late 2003 and early 2004, culminating with the
AGM in January 2004, to gain insight to an agricultural co-operative undergoing a
‘changing of the guard’.
The UFCC was created expressly as a co-operative to maximise returns to the
family farm in the form of low cost farm inputs, specifically fertiliser and chemicals
(Madden, 2003b). The UFCC has evolved into an organisation of substance and
influence within the grains industry and wider agribusiness sector. This growth,
however, has exposed an evolving divergence in philosophical beliefs within the
Board and senior management about the most appropriate business strategies for the
co-operative to implement.
The growing difference of views resulted in Madden resigning as Chair of the
UFCC Board in September 2003, although he retained his position as a Director
(Ladyman, 2004a). The timing of Madden’s resignation is an indication of the depth
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of the crisis, as it occurred outside the usual AGM cycle. Johnson, the deputy Chair
and a co-founding Director of the UFCC, was appointed as the interim Chair until the
next AGM election scheduled for January 2004 (Farmers Weekly, 2003). Johnson
was subsequently elected as the UFCC Chairman and Madden resigned as a Director,
ending his role as a driving force in the UFCC. These events were well documented
in the rural media (see, for example, Australian Broadcasting Commission Rural
News, 2004; Bowen, 2004; Crane, 2004a, 2004b; Farmers Weekly, 2003; Ladyman,
2004a).
Broadly, two groups represented the conflict in philosophical and ideological
understanding about the objective of this agricultural co-operative and the most
appropriate strategic decision making to achieve that objective.

One group is

symbolised by Madden, the former and inaugural Chair. This group espouses the cooperative objective of low cost farm input supply to shareholders to maximise the
profitability of family farms, supplemented by annual rebates. The other Director
group, represented by Johnson, and seemingly aligned with senior management, also
claims to adhere to these co-operative goals (Ladyman, 2004b). In behaviour and
strategy, however, this faction appears to support profit and growth strategies that are
more consistent with the goals of a corporation. 175
Exploring the events leading up to this conflict illustrates the philosophical
base underpinning agricultural co-operative strategy and decision making processes
as the co-operative matures organisationally. According to rural media reports,
Madden’s resignation as Chair resulted from his concern over the 2003-04 budget
and his perception that the budget indicated a change to the co-operative’s strategic
direction (Ladyman, 2004a).

Taylor, a retired founding Director who, unlike

Madden, was freed from confidentiality constraints imposed on Directors, made
several strong comments in a letter to the editor of a rural newspaper that give
additional insight into the reasons surrounding Madden’s sudden and unexpected
resignation. According to Taylor (2004), Madden’s departure was triggered by a
‘lack of opportunity to fully research the annual budget prior to its adoption on the
slender margin of 4 to 3 and the potential liability of adopting that budget without

175 To support this growth strategy, the Board argued that the UFCC was losing its competitive
advantage as a low cost supplier, as rivals had cut their prices for fertiliser. This had forced the UFCC
to diversify into other areas, such as grain buying and insurance to ensure ongoing profitability (Bolt,
2005a).
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full appreciation’ of its implications for the UFCC. Taylor adds that Madden’s
concern over the budget subsequently ‘degenerated into a legal stand off [by some
UFCC Directors and senior management against Madden personally] which has
precluded the relevant issues being aired before shareholders’ (Taylor, 2004).
The situation deteriorated as three UFCC Board members, including the
founding Chair, subsequently resigned from their Director positions in late December
2003 (Ladyman, 2004a). This action suggests a deeply felt disquiet among the three
Directors about the strategic direction of the UFCC (Ladyman, 2004a), the
accompanying budget to implement this new focus and the ensuing legal ‘stand off’.
The solicitor representing the three resigning Directors was quoted as stating that
they were concerned that the UFCC Board was no longer pursuing the primary
purpose for which it was established, and that it was not acting in the best interests of
members (Ladyman, 2004a). Further, the solicitor is reported as stating that the three
Directors were concerned that this strategy would potentially lead the UFCC in the
direction of corporatisation, counter to their belief about members’ long-term
expectations that the UFCC remain as a co-operative (Ladyman, 2004a).
Prior to the AGM scheduled in late January 2004, the three Directors,
represented by Madden, communicated their concerns via a letter to shareholders.
They believed that in advising the shareholders of their concerns, shareholders could
make an informed decision when voting at the AGM (Ladyman, 2004a). A specific
objective outlined in the letter was to encourage shareholders to vote against the reelection of the Chair, Johnson, who, they believed, represented a growth based
strategic direction. The letter stated that the UFCC objective of a ‘low cost operating
structure to maximise returns to grower members is now being eroded’ (Ladyman,
2004a, directly quoting from the letter). The letter continued by asserting that ‘We
have, in a remarkably short period of time, become similar to the organisations that
we were originally formed to compete against’ (Ladyman, 2004a, directly quoting
from the letter). They argued that this was evidenced by the decision of the Board
‘by the slender majority, to accept a major change to the strategic direction of the cooperative’ (Ladyman, 2004a, directly quoting from the letter). The letter further
alleged that the cost of UFCC administration, storage and overheads had increased
from 10 per cent of gross turnover of $88.5 million in 2001 to more than 15 per cent
of $94.6 million in the 2003 trading year.

The letter’s authors also expressed
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concern that non-member farmers in Queensland and NSW had purchased UFCC
product at lower prices than Western Australian members, contrary to co-operative
principles (Ladyman, 2004a).

Taylor (2004) provides further information that

supports the resigning Directors’ claim of increasing costs. He stated that in the
previous 12 month period, ‘staff remuneration has increased … by $879,000 or
approximately 45 per cent’ while ‘productivity increased by 4 per cent’. Taylor
(2004) added that he believed that a similar increase in staff costs was proposed for
the following year.
It appears, however, that the three left their communication attempt with
shareholders too late. At the closed AGM, Johnson was re-elected. Media reports
quoted Johnson as asserting that only two other shareholders supported the position
taken by the three resigning Directors (Ladyman, 2004b). Johnson interpreted this as
an ‘outstanding success and an endorsement of the current Board strategic direction
and the current management team’ (Ladyman, 2004b). He rejected the claims of the
resigning Directors, arguing that if the UFCC was no longer a low cost supplier,
members would be switching to the competition to source their chemicals (Ladyman,
2004a).
The UFCC CEO did not deny the allegation that the UFCC was behaving in a
similar way to corporates (Ladyman, 2004b). Rather, he rationalised this mirroring
of corporate conduct on the basis of the extra regulatory or legislative frameworks,
such as occupational health and safety legislation, now imposed on all businesses,
including agricultural co-operatives, which were not deemed as important in the
early 1990s when the UFCC first formed (Ladyman, 2004b).

The CEO also

acknowledged that the UFCC costs had increased, but that this occurred within the
context of increased profits. While he conceded that the UFCC cost structure was
similar to that of a corporate cost structure, he argued that this did not mean that the
UFCC was therefore going to become a corporation (Ladyman, 2004b).
The three resigning Directors did not speak at the AGM. Johnson claimed
that anyone who wished to speak at the AGM could do so and that if the three did not
choose to speak it was their own choice (Ladyman, 2004b). Taylor (2004) gave a
different insight into the conduct of the UFCC 2004 AGM process. He claimed that
the resigning Directors and their supporters were constrained from speaking freely at
the AGM due to the presence of UFCC solicitors at the AGM (Taylor, 2004).
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According to Taylor (2004) the three Directors were also refused permission to have
their own legal advisors at the meeting. Taylor’s interpretation of the AGM casts a
different light on Johnson’s statement that any shareholder was free to speak.
Despite Taylor’s implied suggestion of Johnson’s autocratic behaviour at the
closed AGM, Madden was reported as saying that he was satisfied with the AGM
outcome and that it was a demonstration of democracy at its best (Ladyman, 2004b).
Another resigning Board member also echoed this sentiment. This acceptance by the
resigning Directors of the outcome of the shareholders’ vote illustrates a
philosophical position in which the process of democratic decision making contained
in the co-operative principles is more important than the actual decision itself (Craig,
1993).
Approximately 130 members attended the AGM out of a membership in
excess of 3000, representing less than 5 per cent of the membership. The number of
proxy votes held by the Chair was not indicated in media reports. Johnson claimed
the attendance of 130 members doubled the usual attendance rate (Ladyman, 2004b).
He attributed the high attendance to the media reports of the UFCC Board dispute
and member interest in gaining a first hand understanding of the reasons behind the
resignation of the Board Directors. Implied in Johnson’s statement is that members
were able to gain impartial information and make informed decisions about the
future direction of the UFCC. However, the above discussion suggests that the AGM
was a highly orchestrated process in which the ‘demonstration of democracy’ was
debatable, particularly given the presence of solicitors representing the Johnson
faction effectively silencing the Madden faction.
Understanding the UFCC as a Mature Co-operative
The 2004 AGM exposed a divergence in views among Board members about
the most appropriate strategies to implement.

These debates reflect a deeper

discussion about the on-going relevance of co-operative values and business
structure for the UFCC as it matures. Interviews with actors connected with the
UFCC provide insights into the decision making processes employed to rationalise
this evolving shift in philosophical orientation and therefore business strategy. Craig
(1993), from a sociological perspective, discusses the motivations of decision
making processes in co-operatives. Craig identifies the three criteria for decision
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making in a co-operative as profit, service and meaning. The profit rationale for
decision making is consistent with the neoliberal philosophy underpinning capitalism
and IOFs. This form of organisational decision making tends to be based on the
objectives of growth and profit maximisation and is comparable with the style of
decision making found in companies.
This can be contrasted with the decision making processes that are
compatible with co-operative logic, particularly the service rationale of a cooperative. According to Craig, the service rationale establishes that the purpose of
the organisation is:
to provide services to meet individual needs.
Democratic
participatory structures are present to enable individuals to define
their needs and to translate those needs into tangible services provided
by the organisations that they control. (Craig, 1993, p 66)
In this framework, good co-operative decisions are ‘those that meet the
service needs of the largest number of individual members over the longest time’
(Craig, 1993, p 67). Further, profit arising from the provision of this service belongs
to the members and is subsequently returned to members. Growth associated with
the profit rationale is therefore a secondary value for a co-operative.

Craig

summarises by stating:
…the central tenet for decision making is the provision of the services
to the people who use the organisation. Co-operative organisations
are not ends in themselves, but a means to an end. They exist to serve
the members. (Craig, 1993, p 67)
Craig explains that the ‘meaning’ rationale in decision making can be
understood as the sense of purpose individuals’ gain from participating in the cooperative. Ensuring that members are actively involved in decision making processes
leads to the best decision making outcomes for the co-operative. Craig states that the
‘actual decisions are less important than the manner by which they are reached’
(Craig, 1993, p 67).
The profit rationale emanating from orthodox economic theory can explain
the philosophical basis and the accompanying organisational goals embraced by the
Johnson camp. However, this rationale can hardly sustain the co-operative logic of
the UFCC and will lay the foundations for increasing imitation of corporate
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behaviour. In contrast, the service rationale displayed by the inaugural Chair is
clearly demonstrated by his view that the strategic direction of the UFCC needs to be
based on the provision of a low cost supply to reduce input costs to members and
contribute to the profitability of members’ farm businesses. This is consistent with
the view that the UFCC is a means to an end for shareholders, rather than an end in
itself. This understanding appears to have been lost by the Johnson camp, which
seem to focus on the UFCC as a stand-alone entity in its own right.
Lastly, Madden’s comment that the UFCC AGM was ‘a demonstration of
democracy at its best’ (Ladyman, 2004b) and a comment by another resigning
Director that the decision of the shareholders was ‘fine by him’ and he wished the
UFCC Board well (Ladyman, 2004b) reflect Craig’s concept of the ‘meaning’
rationale. Madden’s statement embodies the concept that the mechanism of the
democratic decision making process was more important than the decision itself,
even though his personal view was the casualty of the shareholders’ vote.
Craig’s analysis helps explain the difference in interpretation of the term
‘growth’, a term frequently and readily used during the interviews to describe UFCC
strategies. From one perspective, UFCC growth is evidenced by the substantial
increase in membership numbers and the consequent expansion in scale in the
importation of chemicals and fertiliser and the associated logistical matters. In this
context, growth is consistent with the UFCC objective as a co-operative of low cost
supply. This form of growth has a positive impact on the co-operative as it facilitates
economies of scale that in turn enhances low cost supply. The ‘profit’ or surplus that
accumulates as a result of this type of growth, after servicing business expenses, is
returned to members in the form of rebates proportionally linked to volume of
business conducted with the UFCC. After a decade of adopting this form of growth,
Madden still remained committed to maximising returns to the family farm (Lee,
2003). Clearly, the rapid expansion of the UFCC had not altered Madden’s belief in
the co-operative principles or the relevance of the co-operative business structure for
farmers and the agricultural industry.
However, the term ‘growth’ reveals how commonly used and understood
corporate terminology can lead to confusion about precisely what is meant to be
conveyed by this language terms in the context of a co-operative business. In
business and strategic management theory, growth can also be understood as a
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business strategy in which the pursuit of profitability becomes an end in itself. There
is clearly a clash of ideologies with these different understandings of growth (Craig,
1993, p 66). Hind notes this discord by stating that:
The [literatures] relating to conventional businesses exhibit a
tendency of accepting growth as an inevitable consequence of
corporate existence, i.e., to grow or die. Certainly many economic and
management theories of firms lean toward profit, growth, or sales
maximization/optimization as the firm’s obvious goals. For
conventional, non-co-operative structures, this may well be
appropriate. Co-operative definitions and theory, however, would
suggest that these traditional corporate goals are either superfluous or
act as constraints within which other member benefit goals may be
aimed, i.e., in theory at least, they are a means rather than an end.
(Hind, 1997, p 1079)
This corporate interpretation of the term ‘growth’ is illustrated by a statement
from the Chair which demonstrates that he believes that the UFCC was adopting a
pro-business growth strategy counter to co-operative values. Madden publicly stated
that:
I don't mind growth, providing that growth is sustainable and in the
best interests of the shareholders; but the growth that the Co-operative
has endeavoured to achieve over the last couple of years, and I believe
in the future, has come at a cost to shareholders; and the cost has been
reflected back in higher prices and a lower rebate. (Australian
Broadcasting Commission Rural News, 2004)
Madden’s assertions about inappropriate forms of growth in an agricultural
co-operative reflect a tension about what is the most suitable strategy for a maturing
agricultural co-operative.

The life cycle concept, paradoxically derived from

business management and economics disciplines rather than co-operative theory, is a
useful diagnostic device to gain an insight into the UFCC’s evolution, its present
circumstances and possible directions for future strategies to work through this clash
in ideologies. Hanks, Watson, Jansen, and Chandler (1993, p 7), cited in McMahon
(1998), define the life cycle as ‘a unique configuration of variables related to
organisation context or structure’. Based on a biological metaphor, the life cycle
concept reasons that all organisations will pass through several identifiable stages of
evolution (McMahon, 1998).

Consistent with most economic and management

theories of the firm, the concept is underpinned by a pro-growth orientation. This
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assumption of growth drives organisational decision making, although empirical
research acknowledges that some business behaviour is not solely motivated by
growth (McMahon, 1998). The life cycle concept further assumes that businesses
generally progress sequentially from one stage to the next in a deterministic manner.
A cluster of features is usually associated with each life cycle phase. Various models
of organisational life cycle suggest that there are three to ten phases of development
(McMahon, 1998). McMahon (1998) favours the Hanks et al. (1993) model which
consists of four development stages and two ‘disengagement’ stages. Summarising
Hanks et al. (1993), these stages are:
•

The start up phase in which the organisation is a young and small enterprise
with a simple organisational structure.

•

The expansion phase in which the organisation is a slightly older and larger
entity with a more complex organisational structure. As the organisation is
more formalised, functional specialisation is implemented and the goal of the
organisation is product commercialisation.

•

The maturity phase in which the organisation is double the size of the
expansion phase although it may not be older. The internal structure is more
complex with increasingly specialised functions.

•

The diversification phase in which the organisation is medium sized with
divisional structures. Organisational formality is at the highest level of any
stage of the life cycle. (Hanks et al., 1993, cited in McMahon, 1998).
Of interest to a maturing agricultural co-operative, Hanks et al. (1993)

include two ‘disengagement’ life cycle stages in which the business is sustainable but
not oriented around the concept of growth. Paraphrasing, these stages are:
•

The life style phase in which the organisation is a little larger than the start up
phase but usually older. Organisationally it is similar to the start-up phase
but it has attained viability as a small scale organisation and then disengaged
from the growth process.

•

The ‘capped growth’ phase 176 in which the organisation is slightly bigger
than the expansion stage, although usually much older.

It is often less

176 This is McMahon’s term for this phase.
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complex organisationally than other businesses in the expansion phase. The
organisation is economically viable and profitable, as it has achieved an
appropriate size and depth of market penetration. The organisation can linger
at this stage indefinitely, as long as the external environment does not erode
its market niche or management undermine its competitive advantage. (Hanks
et al., 1993, cited in McMahon, 1998) 177
Based on the phases of the life cycle model, the UFCC appears to be
straddling the maturity phase and the diversification phase. The UFCC has evolved
into a highly departmentalised and hierarchical structure, with senior executives
managing their respective departments and reporting to an overarching CEO.
Policies and procedures are documented and formalised, with a strong focus on
corporate governance. Further, reported media comments from Johnson, the UFCC
Chairman who succeeded Madden, suggests that the UFCC has linked its future
strategy to the business growth focus of the diversification phase.
In contrast, Madden’s reported statements suggest that he believes that the
future strategy for the UFCC, as a co-operative, would be more compatible with the
‘capped growth’ phase (Ladyman, 2004a, 2004b; Madden, 2003a, 2003b). The
capped growth strategy honours the foundation co-operative objective of maximising
returns to farm business via the supply of low cost fertilisers. This suggests focusing
on the maintenance and servicing of present members. This strategy is a form of
‘satisficing’ in which the UFCC Board are content to adopt a long term strategy in
which the UFCC sustains itself by continuing with its original purpose of being a low
cost farm input co-operative. The life cycle concept theorises that this strategy is
sustainable in the long term and can only be undermined by a changing external
environment diminishing its market niche or by inappropriate management styles.
For an organisation wedded to a co-operative logic, this strategy explains the
UFCC’s co-operative objective on behalf of its shareholders. However, for a cooperative employing senior management imported from the corporate sector and
experiencing a period of rapid development as it matures organisationally, this

177 In addition to the phases outlined above, McMahon (1998) notes that some life cycle models also
include an organisational development phase, (which occurs prior to the start-up phase), a decline
phase and a renewal phase.
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strategy is at odds with corporate trained management’s understanding of
organisational behaviour.
The concept of organisational life cycle reveals that in the early phases of
start-up and expansion, the organisation attracts individuals whose management style
is entrepreneurial and energetic to ensure that the organisation survives and grows in
a dynamic and possibly threatening external environment (Hanks et al., 1993, cited in
McMahon, 1998).

The UFCC case study confirms this very engaged style of

Directors of co-operatives, as the founding UFCC Directors were highly visionary,
committed and motivated.

These characteristics are also consistent with the

phenomenon of the ‘co-operative champion’, as discussed in Chapter Seven.
However, when an organisation evolves and matures, the life cycle concept
demonstrates that a more conservative management approach is required (Hanks et
al., 1993, cited in McMahon, 1998).

A ‘capped growth’ strategy, essentially

implying a failure to grow, is contrary to strategies adopted by managers socialised
in the corporate logic (Craig, 1993). Encouraged by management mostly trained
within a corporate environment who are keen to demonstrate their capabilities in
continuing with the UFCC success story, it is almost inevitable that some Board
Directors would scan for alternative business strategies based around the economic
concept of growth, as understood in an IOF sense (Craig, 1993). The fact that the
business is a co-operative with clear principles for strategic behaviour is lost in this
excitement. Hence, corporate trained managers resist strategies for a maturing cooperative that are consistent with co-operative principles (Craig. 1993).
Madden’s comments indicate that strategies based around pursuing growth as
a goal in its own right were being considered by the UFCC Board of Directors.
Without clear guidance of business strategy founded on co-operative logic, combined
with a lack of insight by Directors and management about what is occurring (Craig,
1993), a co-operative organisation can drift under its own powerful momentum
(Perrow, 1986) into the default IOF position of pursuing growth in volume,
customers and turnover. Strategies such as supplying interstate ‘members’ with
fertiliser at a lower cost than Western Australian members and offering grain
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marketing and crop improvement services certainly increases turnover. 178 In the
process, increasing turnover and ‘profitability’ become the indicators by which
management and the Board of Directors start to gauge the organisation’s success
rather than the co-operative objectives of member benefit and services.
Consequently, the goal of low cost supply becomes a secondary concern to the
pursuit of growth strategies.
The twin tensions in the goals of low cost supply and increasing turnover and
profitability are difficult to juggle. The organisational maturing of the UFCC, the
importation of senior management socialised in classical economic theory and IOF
business structures, and the centralisation of power and decision making away from
the regionally based members to a head office, have all combined and contributed to
eroding the co-operative logic of the UFCC. The original purpose of maximising
farmer business returns for the benefit of shareholder members becomes lost in this
evolution. Madden’s untidy exit from the UFCC Board symbolises just how far the
UFCC has strayed from its co-operative roots.
Notwithstanding the above analysis, an alternative explanation can be
mounted. Madden’s views can be interpreted as a form of ‘arrested development’, in
which he is resisting the natural life cycle evolution of the UFCC into its most
appropriate long-term business structure. Maug (2001, p 167) presents an argument
that the ‘optimal ownership structure of a company changes over the life cycle of the
firm’. He argues that as an organisation progresses through the life cycle stages, the
most appropriate company structure may also change. Therefore, Maug argues, in
some phases of the organisation’s evolution, it is advantageous to retain the original
structure; however, this comparative advantage can change over time and another
structure may better serve the organisation’s needs.
The extension of the evolution of an organisation’s life cycle to also include a
change in business structure is pertinent to the UFCC. This argument provides an
178 The UFCC Board response to a perceived conflict in co-operative principles of low cost supply
and high rebates illustrates this drift towards corporate strategies. The Board, under the guidance of
its Chair, Johnson, argued that members judge the success of the co-operative via high rebates rather
than low cost supply and as a result it was important for the Board to focus on strategies to ensure
high member rebates (Johnson, 2005). The Board elected to ‘progressively pav[e] the way to create
revenue streams from investment in value-adding processes to deliver increased returns in the future’
(Johnson, 2005, p 1). This strategy is similar to a corporation as it is an investment designed to create
a profit for distribution back to shareholders. It is not related to the co-operative purpose of provision
of goods and services to members.
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insight into the conversion of Westralian Farmers Co-operative from a farmer owned
and controlled co-operative to a publicly listed company structure of Wesfarmers
with non-farmer shareholders. Munro (2003) argued that Westralian Farmers Cooperative had simply outgrown its co-operative business structure and had to become
a publicly listed company. The conversion of the co-operative to Wesfarmers and its
subsequent growth illustrates Maug’s (2001) point that the most appropriate business
structure evolves over the life cycle of an organisation. The Wesfarmers conversion
also provides some insight into UFCC’s possible future direction as a co-operative.
The Subtle Influence of Wesfarmers
In March 2004, national and local media reports about a 94 year old retired
farmer from the small wheatbelt town of Narrogin captured the imagination of
Western Australians (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2004; Australian
Broadcasting Commission PM Radio National, 2004; Bolt, 2004; Sydney Morning
Herald, 2004; The Age, 2004). Bachelor Alf Jenkins, who had passed away in 2003,
willed his neighbours a parcel of 400,000 Wesfarmers shares worth about $11
million.

Most of the media stories focused on the quiet unassuming habits of

Jenkins, his love of country sport, the kindly nature of his long standing and aging
neighbours who cared for him as a family member, and the way that country people
look after each other.
Aside from the warm-hearted human interest element of this story, another
narrative is evident.

This relates to the potential capital gain agricultural co-

operative shareholders can hope to achieve if the co-operative changes its structure to
a company.

According to Bolt (2004), thousands of older Western Australian

farmers have accumulated share funds worth several hundred thousand dollars each
as a result of owning shares in the former Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Bolt,
however, also covertly delivers another message, that is, it is the duty of agricultural
co-operative Directors to explore the benefits of the corporate model on behalf of
their member shareholders. Bolt’s analysis of Wesfarmers ‘spectacular growth’ and
that it was once a ‘sleepy West Australian farmer co-op’, implicitly reinforces a view
that agricultural co-operatives are old fashioned structures and successful cooperatives must convert to a corporate structure to capture higher shareholder
profitability.

The media presentation of the Wesfarmers story is that the most
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appropriate and even ‘ethical’ goal for a co-operative Board of Directors is to steer a
successful co-operative onto the path of corporatisation. Bolt’s newspaper report
connects Wesfarmers growth in share values as a corporate to that of the Australian
Wheat Board (AWB), another former farmer owned entity that is now publicly listed,
as Bolt reports, to the advantage of Western Australian wheat farmers. 179

Bolt

(2004) also suggests that each Western Australian grain grower could also benefit by
$100,000 if Co-operative Bulk Handling (CBH) restructured from
to a listed company.

a co-operative

Media reports reinforcing the subsequent profitability of

agricultural co-operatives that convert to corporations further emphasise the
perception of the inappropriateness of the co-operative structure in contemporary
Western Australian agriculture. For UFCC Directors, and no doubt some members,
the Wesfarmers story presents as an alluring model for the UFCC to emulate.
This thinking can be theoretically reinforced within contemporary economic
public policy, as a market economy endorses profit driven and growth oriented
corporate business structures as the most appropriate organisational structure. In this
context, the agricultural co-operative model is seen as an anachronism of a time long
past. Some agribusiness interviewees have explained the paradoxical success of the
UFCC in a contemporary agricultural industry by suggesting that the co-operative
model is acceptable in a start-up situation when the market does not enable a
company structure to evolve (Interviewee 688, 2001; Interviewee 689, 2002;
Interviewee 695, 2003). However, once the co-operative has reached a critical mass,
the message is that modern business actors do not sentimentally attach themselves to
the co-operative structure; rather, they move in the direction that market forces take
them. 180 If this means restructuring a co-operative to a corporate structure, so be it.
Would this strategy represent a betrayal of the co-operative members and the
co-operative ethos? Or would it indicate that the UFCC Board of Directors have
behaved truly responsibly by steering the UFCC toward a corporate structure and
giving members the opportunity to potentially benefit from rising share values in the
179 Bolt is incorrect to suggest that Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the AWB are similar
organisational structures. The AWB was not a co-operative, but rather a SMA underpinned by
legislation, which gave it monopoly powers in the marketing of wheat. Therefore, the linking of
Wesfarmers as a former co-operative that corporatised to AWB which is now ‘privatised’ is
inappropriate. Further, it is debatable if CBH is a co-operative as it also has a legislative base which
historically gave it monopoly status. The confusion between SMAs, quasi SMAs and voluntary
agricultural co-operatives was frequently encountered in the course of this research.
180 This view is consistent with Nourse’s theory of competitive yardstick.

245

way that Wesfarmers shareholders have?

This research has revealed very few

criticisms from interviewees of the Wesfarmers decision to convert to a corporate
structure. Madden (2003b) is one of a few individuals who is prepared to state that
Wesfarmers actually betrayed not only its present shareholders, but its founding
members, past and future generations of farmers and the agricultural industry, when
it corporatised.
The paradox for those who wish to see the UFCC continue into the long term
as an agricultural co-operative is that farmer members of the former Westralian
Farmers Co-operative who retained their Wesfarmers shares have now become
wealthy. This further reinforces the perception held by some UFCC shareholders
and other actors connected with the agricultural and agribusiness industries (possibly
a majority) that the true benefits of a co-operative come to its shareholder members
when it converts to a corporation and is subsequently able to compete profitably in
the market place.
UFCC Postscript
Recent developments within the UFCC provide further insight into the
evolving position of agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia. At the 2006
UFCC Annual General Meeting, Mr Max Johnson, the Chair elected after Madden’s
resignation in 2004, unexpectedly lost in a vote for re-election as Chair (Bolt,
2006a). Prior to the election, a dissident group of about 20 members sought to
negotiate with the Chair to remove the Chief Executive Officer.

The group

expressed disquiet about the incremental shift in the UFCC from its original focus on
the low cost supply of fertiliser and chemicals by diversifying into wool broking,
grain buying, insurance and finance. The group was also concerned that the UFCC
did not pay a rebate in 2005, for only the second time in its history (Bolt, 2005a,
2006a). 181 The group’s concerns suggest that some members believed that the CEO
was the instigator of the changing direction within the UFCC. Johnson refused to
abide by the group’s demands, and as it held the numbers to defeat him, he lost the
181 The first time the UFCC did not pay rebates is discussed in Chapter Seven. According to the
UFCC, several factors accounted for low profitability and the subsequent decision not to pay a rebate
in 2005. Although the cost of fertiliser rose substantially, revenue was sacrificed to enable the UFCC
to maintain its pre-rise price. The UFCC was left with carry-over stock as many farmers did not
collect pre-ordered fertiliser due to liquidity problems or the wet start to the season. Delays also
occurred with commissioning a compaction plant (Bolt, 2005a).
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election. Just over a month later, in March 2006, the UFCC CEO suddenly resigned,
refusing to comment on the reasons for his decision (Henderson, 2006a).
Madden continues to be a significant actor within the Western Australian
agricultural co-operative sector. In late 2004, he was appointed as a Director on the
Board of WAMMCO, the meat processing and marketing co-operative established
following the dismantling of the meat industry SMA (Western Australian Meat
Marketing Co-operative, 2004).

In 2006, Madden successfully campaigned for

election as a Director on the CBH Board, on the platform of regaining grower
ownership and control of CBH. He won the position formerly held by long-standing
and pro-corporate director, Mr John Carstairs. 182 Madden’s election was interpreted
as a win for the pro-co-operative lobby (Henderson, 2006b).

The continuing

influence of Madden in the agricultural co-operative sector, while the UFCC has had
yet another change in Chair and CEO, indicates a growing power balance in favour
of those advocating the co-operative business model over those who are advocating
other business structures.

Concluding Comments
This chapter analysed internal factors at the UFCC in order to understand
how, as a maturing agricultural co-operative, it has negotiated its position within a
changing macro-economic environment. The UFCC case study indicated that part of
this maturation process for an agricultural co-operative is evaluating the relevance of
the co-operative principles and structure.

The chapter argued that there are

strengthening signals suggesting that the UFCC Board is considering alternative
business structures, possibly corporatisation. The diverging views concerning the
UFCC’s strategic direction, exposed by the 2004 AGM, demonstrated that the
commitment to the ethos and values of the agricultural co-operative philosophy for
larger and maturing agricultural co-operatives is challenged by the weight of
neoliberal ideology.
The 2006 developments at the UFCC, however, indicated that some farmer
members are not prepared to accept this shift within the UFCC to corporate business
182 Mr Carstairs is also the Chair of the CFWA, the peak body for the Western Australian cooperative sector.
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strategies and a potential conversion to a company.

This mirrors the long but

eventually unsuccessful debate within CHB to corporatise and possibly list on the
Australian Stock Exchange. A shared theme connected these developments. They
suggested that farmers’ minds have become focused on the importance of actively
defending farmer owned and controlled structures, such as agricultural co-operatives,
as a strategy to protect their position in a changing agricultural supply chain. The
exit of Johnson and the CEO from the UFCC is an indicator that farmers are not
prepared to lose control of collective business structures that assist them in
competing fairly in an evolving domestic and market environment. This hinted that
contemporary farmers are developing a sophisticated understanding of the role of
agricultural co-operatives in helping them adjust to neoliberal influenced reform.
However, the case study also demonstrated that members need to be vigilant
against pressures to corporatise agricultural co-operatives. The possible conversion
of the UFCC to a corporate needs to be placed against a background in which many
external commentators schooled within a liberalised market economy perceive
agricultural co-operatives as immature business structures.

Moreover, this

perception is reinforced by the subtext of the Wesfarmers story as an idealised
archetype for a large successful co-operative to imitate.

Therefore, despite the

coalescing of some farmers into a faction to defend the co-operative structure for the
UFCC, other members perceive a conversion to a corporate business structure as an
appropriate and reasonable long-term strategy for the co-operative.
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CHAPTER NINE

Concluding Remarks: The Contemporary Position of Agricultural Cooperatives in Western Australia

Introduction
This thesis has provided an exploratory study of the Western Australian
agricultural co-operative sector during a period of significant industry restructuring.
It has approached the analysis at two levels. Firstly, the thesis has examined the
broader political economy shaping the agricultural co-operative sector. Secondly, via
a detailed case study of one agricultural co-operative, the thesis has considered how
this external world influenced the internal behaviour of the agricultural co-operative.
This chapter revisits these two themes in the context of the information outlined in
the preceding chapters. The chapter concludes with recommendations for public
policy for the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector and possible areas
for future research into agricultural co-operatives.
Thesis Findings
The thesis has broached a myriad of challenging issues for the Western
Australian agricultural co-operative sector. Chapter One noted that Western Australia
experienced an upsurge in co-operative formation in the recent past. Several issues
contributed to this renewed interest in the co-operative model. These included the
rapid growth of a relatively new agricultural co-operative, the UFCC (Lee, 2003), the
on-going debate within CBH about the most appropriate business structure it should
adopt (Bolt, 2005c) and industry deregulation in which several co-operatives formed
in the wake of dismantled SMAs (Interviewee 689). Additionally, the Western
Australian Department of Agriculture was emerging as an actor in the agricultural
co-operative sector (Interviewee 680), and the CFWA, in converting the Executive
Officer role to a full-time position, was beginning to exert some influence in the

249

wider co-operative movement in Western Australia (Booth, 2004). However, the
chapter also hinted at possible barriers to the uptake of the co-operative model
associated with neo-liberal influenced industry reform that potentially limited the
momentum of the mini-revival. This paradox was essentially the research problem.
The research question arising from this tension was:
How do contemporary agricultural co-operatives contend with a neoliberal
influenced political and economic environment?
Chapter Two reviewed selected literature to analyse the major approaches to
co-operative theory and agricultural co-operative theory.

The chapter discussed

definitional variations of an agricultural co-operative and stated the definition
adopted within this thesis. The chapter highlighted the influence of economic
analysis to explain the formation and behaviour of agricultural co-operatives. This
analysis has tended to fall into two areas. Firstly, at a macro-economic level, theory
evolution has sought to explain the existence of the agricultural co-operative as an
organisational structure by its capacity to contribute to the public good by correcting
market failure (Torgerson et al., 1997). This area of theoretical development predated the second theme of agricultural co-operative theoretical evolution. Starting
around the late 1940s, the focus of theoretical evolution shifted to micro-economic
analysis of the internal organisational behaviour of agricultural co-operatives
(Torgerson et al., 1997).

This later theoretical development often focused on

perceived structural deficits in the agricultural co-operative model, particularly in
comparison with the IOF structure, and frequently prescribed the incorporation of
elements of the IOF model as a solution. A contemporary and evolving area in the
theoretical and empirical literature was an exploration of agricultural co-operatives
that have incorporated features of the IOF, with the NGC model presented as an
example of a hybrid agricultural co-operative structure.
Chapter Two also reviewed literature for alternative theoretical insights into
agricultural co-operative behaviour. Craig’s (1993) concept of ‘co-operative logic’
was used throughout this thesis to examine the behaviour of actors associated with
agricultural co-operatives. The concept of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Putman,
1993) provided an alternative lens to examine farmer member motivation and the
potential impact of the agricultural co-operative on rural communities. Mooney and
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Gray (2002) examined the organisational tension that may arise within agricultural
co-operatives from embedding the co-operative values in business strategy.
The chapter concluded that a dominance of orthodox economic theory about
the behaviour of agricultural co-operatives was unable to explain some features of
contemporary agricultural co-operatives. Neglected areas in the economic analysis
of agricultural co-operatives included, for example, non-economic motivations for
member involvement with an agricultural co-operative and the role of co-operative
values within the organisation. Research into the capacity of the agricultural cooperative to contribute to the public good by correcting market failure is currently
lacking in the contemporary analysis of agricultural co-operatives. Additionally,
further research into the ability of the agricultural co-operative to integrate farmer
members’ businesses with the supply chain is required. An emerging theme in the
recent literature has been a call for an interdisciplinary approach to broaden
theoretical and empirical understanding of agricultural co-operative behaviour. This
thesis has adopted an interdisciplinary approach to examine the agricultural cooperative model in the Western Australian context.
Chapter Three explored key concepts embedded in neoclassical economic
theory and neoliberalism (Pusey, 2003). The chapter discussed changes in
agricultural industry policy over the last two to three decades in Australia, brought
about by the international and domestic economic and political policies influenced by
neoliberalism (Keogh, 2004). The chapter argued that agricultural industry policies,
based on neoliberal notions, have had an uneven impact on the industry and rural
communities.

Given the theoretical capacity of agricultural co-operatives to

contribute to the efficiency of the market, as identified in Chapter Two, this chapter
argued that the model contributes to the economic well-being of farmers as they
confront significant structural changes arising from market-based policies.
Chapter Three concluded that, paradoxically, neoliberalism has a double
effect on agricultural co-operatives. While agricultural industry deregulation,
including the dismantling of SMAs, can stimulate renewed interest in the cooperative business model by present day farmers, the chapter noted that
neoliberalism also sets limits on the evolution of commercially successful
agricultural co-operatives. The foundations of neoclassical economic theory, based
on notions of individualism and the singular pursuit of profit maximisation by IOFs
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(Pusey, 2003), downplays the collective and democratic nature of co-operative
principles that are fundamental to the co-operative business structure (Craig, 1993).
Furthermore, the chapter established that the co-operative business model is
frequently misconstrued or misunderstood by powerful gate keepers who, influenced
by orthodox economic theory, privilege the corporate IOF model over the cooperative model and incorrectly deem the co-operative business model as a
substandard or outdated structure. Additionally, under the influence of the open
market, agricultural co-operatives in present day Western Australia also function in a
wider political, business and economic environment. This environment, the chapter
argued, reinforced this misinformed perception of the co-operative business model
and therefore marginalised it as a legitimate alternative business structure.
To place the contemporary period in perspective, Chapter Four explored the
development of the early Western Australian agricultural co-operatives in the first
decades of the 20th century. The harsh economic and social conditions in rural and
regional Western Australia during this period were particularly associated with the
development of these co-operatives (K. Smith, 1984). Westralian Farmers Cooperative was a co-operative of significance that emerged from this period.
Consistent with agricultural co-operative theory, Westralian Farmers Co-operative
evolved to correct some form of market power, specifically to provide a missing or
costly service or good in the market (Cobia, 1989). The chapter demonstrated that
Westralian Farmers Co-operative symbolised the capacity of the co-operative model
to adapt to and create an economically strong and politically influential Western
Australian agricultural co-operative sector over the following half century.
Parallels can be drawn between the harsh economic conditions described in
Chapter Four and the conditions confronting farmers during the contemporary period
of agricultural industry restructuring, as discussed in Chapter Three. Chapter Four
argued that these conditions in the first decades of the 20th century triggered the early
period of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector evolution by
correcting some form of market failure. These difficult contemporary conditions
partly explain why, as discussed in Chapter One, Western Australia has witnessed a
minor resurgence in agricultural co-operative activity in the last few years.
Chapter Five examined the CFWA, the peak body for the co-operative
movement in Western Australia. By exploring the functions of a peak body, the
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chapter argued that the CFWA has a particularly difficult task undertaking the role of
a peak body. Firstly, the CFWA has to position the co-operative business model as a
valid alternative to the IOF business model that is favoured by the dominant
neoliberal framework discussed in Chapter Three. In this setting, considerable skill is
required by the CFWA to access influential gate keepers and public policy makers
and present strong arguments in favour of the co-operative model. Additionally, the
peak body is required to support and develop its membership base and become the
custodian and inter-generational transmitter of co-operative values. The chapter
argued that the CFWA currently does not have sufficient capacity or authority to
achieve either of these functions and is limited in its ability to facilitate the long term
sustainability of the co-operative movement.
Chapter Six examined the State level public policy and institutional
frameworks for the agricultural co-operative sector. Chapter Six argued that as
agricultural co-operatives have the capacity to correct market failure, they are in turn
performing a ‘public good’ (Fulton, 2001).

By addressing market failure,

agricultural co-operatives are facilitating greater competition in the market.
Therefore, agricultural co-operatives have the capacity to enhance the productivity of
the agricultural industry, providing a rationale for government investment in the
agricultural co-operative sector (Fulton, 2001).
The chapter argued that the State has a valid role in ensuring that the cooperative model is presented to actors involved in agricultural business and rural
economic development as a beneficial business model for the agricultural industry.
Furthermore, the chapter maintained that the State has an implied obligation to help
sustain a viable institutional framework to support the wider Australian co-operative
movement. Notwithstanding some legislative frameworks supporting agricultural cooperatives, the State, under the influence of orthodox economic policies that dictate
minimal and small government, has generally not taken on this broader public policy
and institutional responsibility. The chapter concluded that the lack of a public policy
position for agricultural co-operatives by the State disadvantages Australian farmers
and rural communities as there are consequently fewer options available for farmers
to adjust to the negative outcomes of an open market in rural Australia. This public
policy deficit has in part contributed to the highly vulnerable situation of the current
Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector.
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Chapter Seven was the first of two chapters devoted to the UFCC.

In

examining the UFCC, the chapter ascertained that the role of charismatic farmers
who arose from the ‘grass roots’ and promoted the co-operative business alternative
to fellow farmers was a critical factor in the formation of agricultural co-operatives.
This was significant, as Chapter Six has demonstrated a deficit in public policy and
institutional support for the agricultural co-operative sector at the State level, while
Chapter Five concluded that the CFWA was limited in its capacity to undertake its
peak body role. Consequently, existing and embryonic agricultural co-operatives
were highly dependent on other mechanisms, such as the role of charismatic farmers,
for their development. Patrie (1998) and Ergstrom (1994) also identified the central
role of the co-operative champion in the formation and growth of agricultural cooperatives and contended that without these co-operative champions acting as
instigators, co-operative businesses struggled to become established.
Chapter Seven argued that the dependence on co-operative champions to
stimulate agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia further highlighted the lack
of wider institutional frameworks to support agricultural co-operatives.

This

situation also revealed an ad hoc approach to agricultural co-operative development
and the potential vulnerability of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative
sector. Additionally, the chapter noted that alternative sources of well-informed cooperative advisory support and knowledge in Western Australia were scarce. In the
absence of wider institutional support, the subsequent loss of a co-operative
champion from an established agricultural co-operative may result in it becoming
unsustainable as a co-operative in the longer term (Craig, 1993).
Consistent with agricultural co-operative economic theory, Chapter Seven
also established that the UFCC was formed to address a market failure. Farmers
were unable to buy agricultural chemical and fertiliser at fair prices due to the
dominance of an IOF in the market place (Cobia, 1989).

Madden (2003b)

highlighted the paradox of this situation, as the IOF itself was a former agricultural
co-operative.
Chapter Eight continued with the UFCC case study by investigating the
influence of the neo-classical influenced market place on the internal behaviour of
the co-operative. Chapter Eight argued that as the UFCC matured as a business, it
has become highly susceptible to the influence of management imported from the
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corporate sector. These managers, trained in IOF business and financial management
theory, were unfamiliar with or indifferent to the business ethos of organisations
based on co-operative values. The case study also highlighted that the UFCC Board
of Directors was similarly drawn in conflicting directions by co-operative principles
and corporate business practices. This scenario is consistent with that outlined by
Craig (1993) who argued that within the present neoliberal paradigm, co-operative
principles are challenged by management trained in IOF business strategies, leading
to the pressure to corporatise. Building on this concept, a maturing agricultural cooperative can be subject to a life cycle that moves from a co-operative structure, via
incremental pragmatic adjustments to perceived deficits in the co-operative business
model, to an eventual corporate business structure. Craig (1993) argued that when
co-operative Boards of Directors and management base business strategy on cooperative logic, they are able to resolve tension between IOF and co-operative
philosophy. The UFCC case study, supported by the outcome of the unsuccessful
attempt by some actors seeking to corporatise CBH, suggested that members can
exert a restraining influence on Boards of agricultural co-operatives that are tempted
to corporatise. It remains to be seen how the UFCC will resolve its internal tensions
between co-operative principles and IOF business strategies and if it will remain a
co-operative in the longer term.
The thesis concluded that, despite some incongruity in the theoretical basis of
agricultural co-operatives and neoliberal influenced reform, the agricultural cooperative model has a role in the contemporary market driven economic environment
of Australian agriculture.

The UFCC case study illustrated the theoretical and

applied strengths of the model within an industry responding to agricultural
restructuring. Rather than positing a diminishing role for agricultural co-operatives in
present day Western Australian agriculture, the thesis concluded that the agricultural
co-operative structure has a valid contribution to make to contemporary agriculture.
Thesis Recommendations
The thesis recommends a sustained response by key agencies to develop a
public policy and institutional framework for the agricultural co-operative sector. A
significant strategy is to build a solid CFWA to undertake its core functions as a peak
body. This approach requires a supportive Department of Agriculture, Department of
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Local Government and Regional Development and Department of Consumer and
Employment Protection to assist the CFWA develop and implement strategies that
present the co-operative structure to farmers and rural communities as a legitimate
and economically viable means of engaging with a changing global agricultural
market. Additionally, professional advisors and their associations, business
associations, industry associations, the media and tertiary institutions require ongoing
professional development initiated by the peak body, supported by government
agencies and delivered by appropriately trained facilitators, to dispel misinformation
and develop informed knowledge about the co-operative model. By building the
institutional strength of the peak body, combined with the public policy support of
government agencies and informing the professional ‘gate keepers’ about the
strengths of the co-operative model, the agricultural co-operative sector can be
legitimised and rejuvenated.

This can lead to a virtuous circle of social and

economic advantages for rural and regional communities in Western Australia.
Without such a public policy framework for agricultural co-operatives, Western
Australian farmers will be denied choice in the range of business structures available
to suit their particular needs.
Limitations of the Thesis
This thesis was an exploratory study of various issues affecting the
contemporary Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector.

The research

adopted a qualitative research methodology that enabled the researcher to explore,
examine, and describe an agricultural co-operative and the wider agricultural cooperative sector in depth. The case study methodology provided the thesis with rich
and meaningful data that would not have been obtained by other research
methodologies (Patton, 1990). Nevertheless, the thesis revealed that the qualitative
case study methodology had several disadvantages.
While the case study methodology enabled a holistic approach to reflect the
complex reality of the agricultural co-operative sector, the breadth of the
investigation and diversity of information at times became overwhelming. From
time to time, the vast quantity of material made it difficult to focus on the main
purpose of the thesis.

As the case study methodology acknowledged multiple

realities of different interviewees (Patton, 1990), at times it became difficult to
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reconcile the diverse perspectives of interviewees and determine how representative
they were of views held by actors in the wider agricultural co-operative sector.
While the in-depth interviews extracted confidential and sensitive information, the
interpretation of this information by the researcher was to some extent subjective,
another accepted limitation of the case study methodology (Patton, 1990). Further, it
is acknowledged by the researcher that the research may have been influenced and
possibly manipulated by interviewees (Patton, 1990), particularly as the thesis was
highly dependent on only a few interviewees for significant parts. This dependence
often did not allow independent verification of data, another potential disadvantage
of the case study methodology. Additionally, interviewee confidentiality demanded
by academic research, when undertaking a case study with relatively few cooperatives and actors, required careful attention and management by the researcher.
The four years dedicated to this research exposed another limitation of the
case study method. Many changes occurred within organisations that were central to
the research, particularly with some key interviewees leaving their positions. The
researcher was required to work with the organisational and actor changes as they
presented themselves. Further, these changes had to be accommodated during the
writing phases as they often had significant implications for the conclusions of the
thesis.
Lastly, while the case study methodology allowed the researcher to learn a
great deal about a particular case (Patton, 1990), this thesis demonstrated that it may
be inappropriate to generalise beyond that case. The UFCC experiences documented
in this thesis were unique to that co-operative and do not necessarily provide insights
to the evolution of other agricultural co-operatives.
Future Research
As an exploratory study, this thesis points to several areas of further research
about Australian agricultural co-operatives. The research focused on actors who had
close associations with an agricultural co-operative or the co-operative movement. It
did not widely canvass the views of agricultural co-operative members about the cooperative business model.

The proposed typology of farmers’ attitudes to

agricultural co-operatives outlined in Appendix Four deserves further research to
determine if it does capture different farmer views about the co-operative model.
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Ascertaining farmer views about the validity of the co-operative model would assist
policy makers and the peak body develop strategies to build the Western Australian
co-operative movement.
Secondly, the thesis noted a lack of agricultural industry public policy
development for the co-operative model.

Further research is required about

Australian agricultural co-operatives to provide directions for government agencies
to develop public policy encompassing the agricultural co-operative sector.
Thirdly, the research suggested that agricultural co-operatives can have a
positive impact on the social and economic well-being of rural communities
adjusting to the effects of significant agricultural industry restructuring.

This

potential role deserves further attention as a research focus.
Fourthly, this thesis did not examine the opinions of women in agriculture
about the co-operative model. Women may perceive agricultural co-operatives quite
differently from the views expressed by the male interviewees in this thesis and their
views may provide valuable insights for public policy development.
Lastly, this research revealed a deficit in basic data in Australia about the
agricultural co-operative sector. There is a dearth in aggregate information about
Western Australia’s agricultural co-operatives such as, for example, business
turnover, rebate strategies, membership size, Board of Director composition and size,
CEO remuneration strategies, the influence of co-operative values on the
development of business strategies, agricultural co-operative involvement in the
community and the economic impact of the co-operative on the community.
Collection of this information is an important research task to establish benchmarks
by which to chart the future progress of the agricultural co-operative sector in
Western Australia.
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APPENDIX 1

Background to the Thesis
In 2000, Edith Cowan University and the Western Australian Department of
Agriculture submitted a proposal to fund a PhD to the Australian Research Council.
The proposal stated that:
‘This project will examine the potential of New Generation
Co-operatives (NGCs) to contribute to the revival of Australian rural
communities. NGCs offer farmers the prospect of increased incomes
by adding value to their agricultural outputs through downstream
processing. NGCs may also provide significant flow-on benefits for
rural communities by enhancing levels of local economic activity. The
project will assist agencies such as the Industry Partner to assess the
opportunities and obstacles facing NGCs in Australia. The project
should also contribute to the development of policies and strategies
that could, where appropriate, facilitate the establishment of NGCs in
rural communities.
The proposal was the outcome of considerable attention by the Western
Australian Department of Agriculture in the mid to late 1990s about the potential of
the NGC model for the Australian agricultural industry. At the time, two emerging
agricultural co-operatives were exploring the NGC model and it was envisaged that
these organisations would serve as case studies for the empirical component of the
research.
The Australian Research Council endorsed and funded the proposal and
formal PhD research commenced in March 2001. On the basis that the research was
to be oriented towards the NGC model, a research proposal was prepared and
submitted in October 2001 to the university and subsequently endorsed by external
examiners. However, by the beginning of the second year of study it became clear
that the NGC case studies were not progressing as anticipated. One potential case
study did not choose the NGC model, and the second one was aspiring to achieve the
status of an NGC by incrementally working towards this structure over a long term
period.
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This presented difficulties for the planned empirical component of the
research as it was evident that the agriculture industry in Western Australia was not
adopting the NGC model.

In addition, an unexpected change in the Western

Australian government occurred in early 2001. The implications of this change of
government for agricultural co-operatives emerged slowly. Over time, the initial
enthusiasm in sections of the Department of Agriculture for the NGC model
increasingly drifted onto other priorities and initiatives. These events resulted in a
loss of direction in the research that took some time to assess and work through. It
was a significant conceptual leap to understand after 15 months or so that the project
was not about NGCs.
Part way through the second year of the research, the decision was made to
broaden the research from the specific NGC model to explore agricultural cooperatives in Western Australia in a broader manner. This thesis is the outcome of
this decision to undertake a wider exploratory analysis of the Western Australian
agricultural co-operative sector.
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APPENDIX 2

Evolution of Legislation for Co-operative Business Structures

Introduction
The legislative backdrop to co-operatives in Australia occurs at two levels of
government. At the Commonwealth government level, a range of broader pieces of
legislation, such as the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, the Corporations Act 2001,
and the Trade Practices Act 1974 impact upon co-operatives. Specific legislation to
facilitate co-operative incorporation and registration also exists within each
Australian State. The purpose of this discussion is to draw together a narrative of
developments, over the last decade or so, in enacting updated State co-operative
legislation for the incorporation and governance of co-operatives.
Australian experiences with co-operative legislation
The first co-operatives legislation in Australia was the Western Australian
Co-operative and Provident Societies Act 1903. Most Australian States had cooperative legislation prior to WWII, with the exception of Victoria, which did not
enact specific co-operative legislation until 1953. 183 These original examples of cooperative legislation at the State level and a specific section of the Commonwealth
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 relating to agricultural co-operatives reflect a
favourable legal environment for co-operatives in the first half of the 20th century.
During the late 1980s, discussion on co-operative legislation began to
percolate amongst the State Co-operative Federations, particularly in relation to
183 This explains why several large Victorian based agricultural co-operatives, such as Murray
Goulburn, a dairy co-operative, incorporated under their then State based Corporations Law rather
than under co-operative legislation. Although registered as corporations, these early Victorian cooperatives were structured internally as co-operatives. Akin to co-operatives registered via cooperative legislation, these organisations were able to qualify as co-operatives for taxation purposes as
the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 contained several sections specifically related to
agricultural co-operatives.
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agricultural co-operatives, about updating the existing Acts (Victoria, 1996). These
talks arose from frustration with inconsistencies in extant State-based legislation,
particularly related to the inability of co-operatives to operate across State borders,
register new members from outside the home State, overcome inconsistencies
between the co-operative principles and modern business behaviour and capital
raising issues (New South Wales, 1992).
The process for reviewing co-operative legislation formally commenced in
1990. State Ministers for Agriculture agreed to seek the support of their respective
Attorneys-General to examine existing co-operative legislation and with a view to
introduce nationally consistent legislation to enable co-operatives to operate across
State borders (Victoria, 1996). 184

New South Wales had already commenced a

review of its 1923 legislation in 1989 (New South Wales, 1992). The legislation
enacted by the NSW government in 1992 sought to address concerns identified in the
former legislation by introducing an innovative capital raising mechanism known as
a ‘co-operative capital unit’ (New South Wales Department of Fair Trading,
1997a). 185
In the period 1990 to 1996, a State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General
working party explored options for nationally consistent legislation via either
template legislation, similar common legislation or identical legislation in each State.
The working party recommended the adoption of common core provisions (CCPs) by
each State. In 1996, the Attorneys-General Standing Committee agreed that each
State and Territory sign the Consistent Co-operatives Laws Agreement to enable
them to enact co-operatives legislation containing the agreed core consistent
provisions (Victoria, 1996).
Key elements of the CCP legislation concerned a definition of active
membership and removal of non-active members; enshrining the ICA co-operative
principles; introducing the status of ‘natural person’ and removing the concept of

184 At that time in most states the co-operatives legislation fell under the portfolio of the AttorneysGeneral, in the Department of Justice. The Co-operative and Provident Societies Act 1903 was
transferred from the Western Australian Justice Department to the Department of Consumer and
Employment Protection. The Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 has been under the Consumer
Affairs portfolio for some time. In most Australian States, co-operative legislation has been reassigned
from the Attorneys-General to similar Departments of Fair Trading or Consumer Affairs.
185 Co-operative Capital Units are discussed in a following section.
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‘ultra vires’; introducing different classes of shares; voting based on membership,
and stronger regulatory mechanisms for addressing inappropriate organisational
behaviour. The CCP legislation also introduced two categories of co-operative trading and non-trading. Non-trading co-operatives were not-for-profit organisations
formed for a wider community benefit, while trading co-operatives were the
commercially oriented co-operatives, such as agricultural co-operatives. Trading cooperatives gave distributions on share capital while non-trading co-operatives did not
(Victoria, 1996). 186
The Working Party also endorsed a mechanism to clarify the relationship
between the new co-operatives CCP legislation and predecessors of the Corporations
Act 2001. This was to be achieved via a ‘roll back’ of a section of the Corporations
Act 2001 so that it did not apply to capital raising activities of co-operatives. It was
proposed that this would be enacted once each State had CCP co-operative
legislation in place (Victoria, 1996). 187
Victoria was the first State to introduce the new co-operatives legislation
based on the CCP concept. The Victorian legislation was to form the basis of new
CCP co-operatives legislation in other States (Victoria, 1996). The CCP legislation
did not include the CCU instrument contained in the New South Wales legislation.
New South Wales amended its 1992 legislation in 1997 to mirror the CCP legislation
and ensure subsequent compatibility with the proposed Corporations Act 2001
changes (New South Wales, 1995; New South Wales Department of Fair Trading,
1997b). Over the next few years, most Australian States introduced co-operatives
CCP legislation or amendments to ensure compatibility with CCP legislation.
Western Australia remained the only Australian State without new CCP based cooperatives legislation.

186 In the event the co-operative is wound up, members receive the nominal value of their shares.
187 This matter becomes more important in the later discussion on activities related to Western
Australian co-operative legislation.
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The round of legislative changes in this period resulted in the following:
•

New South Wales Co-operatives Legislation Amendment Act 1999

•

Queensland Co-operatives Act 1997

•

South Australia Co-operatives Act 1997

•

Victoria Co-operatives Act 1996

•

Tasmania Co-operatives Act 1999

The discourse in Parliamentary Debates in various Australian State
jurisdictions about introducing the new CCP legislation demonstrated the potential
appeal of the co-operative model to both sides of Australian politics. For the left, the
Labor Party, co-operatives offered a mechanism for local control and a structure to
promote democracy and a blend of social and economic goals in regional
communities.

On the right, co-operatives were consistent with neoclassical

economic theory in that they promoted enterprise and confidence in the merits of the
private sector. In both scenarios, co-operatives enabled the local community to
engage with the globalised capitalist economy. Unfortunately, this rhetoric has not
overly impacted on the development of public policy for co-operatives in these
jurisdictions.
While each State was engaged with drafting and implementing their version
of CCP legislation, another development was brewing. The objective of the decade
of CCP legislation, now enacted in most States, was to achieve some form of
consistency in co-operatives legislation. However, ongoing irregularities persisted.
The inability to enable co-operatives to trade and raise funds across State borders, to
register new members from interstate and ongoing fund raising problems, despite the
enactment of CCP legislation, continued as a major inhibitor to trading co-operative
development. (National Co-op Update, 2000). It became apparent that the original
triggers for the development of CCP legislation had not been resolved.
These legislative difficulties came to the notice of the Ministerial Council on
Consumer Affairs that established a new working party in 2001 to recommend
changes to achieve nationally consistent co-operative legislation. 188 Following
consultation with the Co-operative Federations in each State, the working party
188 Responsibility for co-operative legislation had moved during the decade of legislation reform
from the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General to the Ministerial Council of Consumer Affairs.
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reconfirmed the CCP approach as the appropriate strategy for achieving national
consistency. However, the working party agreed to amend the CCP in two areas.
Firstly, it included the New South Wales concept of CCUs (Given, 2001). To
minimise some awkward cross-State administrative mechanisms, the CCP also
incorporated principles of mutual recognition. In the longer term, the review hinted
that the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs may develop template legislation to
replace the similar style CCPs co-operative legislation (National Co-op Update,
2001).

Co-operative Capital Units (CCUs) 189
In 2001, the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs agreed to introduce a
mechanism known as Co-operative Capital Units into the CCP legislation. The
purpose of the inclusion of the CCUs into the CCP legislation was to widen the
capital raising ability of co-operatives (Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs,
2003). CCUs were first considered in the 1989 New South Wales government
review of the Co-operation Act 1923 and were subsequently incorporated into the
1992 co-operative legislation (New South Wales Department of Fair Trading,
1997a).
CCUs are a ‘hybrid’ capital raising instrument, comprising components of
both a debt and an equity instrument, falling anywhere between these two extremes.
A CCU can be defined as neither equity finance nor debt. 190 In creating a new
instrument for capital raising, the proponents recognised the risks associated with
allowing external investors to invest in a co-operative, particularly in relation to
marginalising member control and undermining co-operative principles. While the
New South Wales Department of Fair Trading believed that they had addressed this
concern, the proposed introduction of CCUs into the CCP legislation was a point of
contention for some State representatives (Given, 2004, 2001).

Concern about

corroding co-operative principles by inviting outsider investors into the co-operative
remained. This argument was countered by the New South Wales experience which
189 For further information on Co-operative Capital Units, refer to the NSW Consumer Affairs
website www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au.
190 The difference between equity finance and debt is apparent when a corporate body is wound up.
Individuals who lent funds (ie own a debt instrument) are entitled to be paid in full before the
shareholders who own the equity investment (Ford et al., 1997).
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claimed that the integrity of the co-operative principles were maintained with
appropriate legislative mechanisms (New South Wales Department of Fair Trading,
1997a).
New South Wales has over a decade of experience with CCUs. However,
CCUs have not been adopted with great enthusiasm by NSW trading co-operatives.
Less than ten NSW registered co-operatives have adopted the mechanism (Given,
2004, 2001). The focus on co-operative capital raising highlights the dominance of
this issue in the literature and public policy in Australia. 191 Yet, the minimal uptake
of CCUs demonstrates that co-operatives have resolved their capital raising issues in
alternative ways. This indicates that capital raising is not as significant a problem as
is sometimes suggested in the literature.
Nevertheless, the incorporation of the CCU mechanism in the proposed
Western Australian co-operative legislation will provide co-operatives with another
option for capital raising. The research has identified one area in which it may be a
useful tool (Booth, 2004). A proposed value adding agricultural co-operative with a
significant rural community focus has two co-operative proponents who are not
farmers. The existing co-operative legislative prohibits investors from becoming
members of the co-operative. The CCU mechanism may provide the vehicle for
non-farm community people to contribute by investing in the proposed co-operative
and potentially sharing in its benefits (Booth, 2004).
It is apparent that after more than a decade of reform in co-operative
legislation to achieve some level of uniformity, co-operatives were still confronting
problems associated with inconsistent legislation that has not delivered a cooperative friendly legislation framework. While the drive to develop CCP legislation
in each State was admirable, the outcome was that it was an inappropriate
mechanism to attain nationally consistent co-operative legislation. As each State
‘leap frogged’ to introduce CCP amendments, massaged to suit their particular State
based matters, it was unavoidable that there would be ongoing inconsistencies in the
CCP legislation.

191 See Chapter Two for a theoretical discussion on capital raising issues for agricultural cooperatives. See Chapter Eight on the UFCC approach to capital raising, which suggests that this issue
may be overstated.
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Template Legislation
The solution lay in adopting template legislation.

The September 2005

Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs meeting acknowledged that the CCP
approach was unable to ensure consistency in co-operative legislation in each State,
and replaced it with a strategy of template legislation (Ministerial Council on
Consumer Affairs, 2005). The Queensland legislation became the template model for
legislation in other Australian States.
While all this activity was occurring elsewhere, progress to enact new
legislative in Western Australia was erratic. Without CCP or template co-operative
legislation enacted in Western Australia, the proposed ‘roll back’ of the
Corporations Act 2001 to address capital raising difficulties for co-operatives,
endorsed by the Attorneys-General Standing Committee in 1996, could not be
implemented (Booth, 2004). While the delay in the Corporations Act 2001 roll back
would appear to be a major issue for each State Co-operative Federation, and that
other States would be pressuring the Western Australian government and the CFWA
to implement new legislation, it has not been a significant item in co-operative
newsletters or discussions with interviewees conducted for this research.

This

silence further suggests that the inability of co-operatives to raise capital has been
over-played by some co-operative commentators and academics.

Developments in Western Australia
Booth (2004) advised in mid 2001 that the Western Australian co-operative
bill had been drafted, using the Victorian legislation as a model. 192 He added that
while the Victorian Act had the right sentiments by incorporating the co-operative
principles, at the ‘nuts and bolts’ level it had been poorly drafted and was not
acceptable for the Western Australian co-operative movement, particularly for
commercial co-operatives. He supported his views with experiences in Victoria,
stating that newly forming commercial co-operatives in Victoria still tended to use
the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 to incorporate and built the co-operative

192 At the time, the Victorian Act was the model for other states to emulate. The Queensland Act
subsequently replaced the Victorian Act as the model for other Australian State legislation.
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principles into their Articles, rather than use the new State-based co-operatives
legislation.
In the early period of research on this project, intermittent advice from
Interviewee 678 (2003), an officer within the Department of Consumer and
Employment Protection responsible for registering co-operatives, did not progress
beyond commenting that the proposed legislation was going to be implemented at the
next sitting of Parliament. He qualified this by acknowledging that it still had to
make it onto the list of impending legislation. He expressed a view that the delay in
progressing the new Act reflected the low priority of co-operatives for the Western
Australian government.
In this phase, Interviewee 680 (2003), from the Department of Agriculture,
also advised that the draft legislation had been written and sent to the parliamentary
drafters. Interviewee 681 (2001), from the same Department, later stated that the
legislation was in the second drafting stage indicating that it had progressed
reasonably well. However, Interviewee 680 (2003) subsequently advised that it had
been ‘bumped off’ twice despite it being ready to progress further to the ‘approval to
draft’ stage. He further advised that it had been delayed so long that it now required
a Cabinet submission to get it back to the ‘approval to draft’ stage, then to present it
as a bill and then to become legislation. The see-sawing of the draft legislation over
a two year period resulted in it becoming an orphan in which no particular
Department felt it had to take responsibility for ensuring the passage of the
legislation.
In May 2003, the CFWA’s lead article in its newsletter contained an
encouraging update on the progress of updated co-operative legislation (Co-operative
Federation of Western Australia, 2003a). The item advised that the proposed cooperative bill had been placed on a priority listing ready for drafting and possible
implementation in 2004. The development was attributed to the CFWA’s gentle and
‘behind the scenes’ lobbying for the new legislation. Concurrently, as discussed
above, the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs also had the issue of cooperatives template legislation high on its agenda, which certainly was a powerful
influence in advancing Western Australia’s rather noncompliant position on updated
co-operatives legislation.
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The lack of outcry by Western Australian co-operatives about on-going
delays in enacting new legislation can partly be attributed to the efficacy of the
existing Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 legislation (Booth, 2004).

Booth

(2004) commented that this legislation, despite being 60 years old, was very flexible
and able to accommodate the unique and specific needs of each co-operative. While
the Western Australian Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 was very extensive,
Booth argued that it did not ‘prescribe’ what a co-operative had to do. As Western
Australia has less than sixty functioning co-operatives, almost every new one was a
distinctive organisation confronting a range of specific issues. The flexibility in the
existing legislation provided the scope for each new co-operative to develop its
internal systems, for example, classes of shares, share allocations and capital raising
strategies, to suit its unique circumstances. He further argued that it also contained
several of the features that the proposed CCP legislation was seeking to introduce.
These included the status of ‘natural persons’, the ability to have different classes of
shares, to form partnerships or joint ventures with non-co-operative organisations
and have a limited number of non-farm members as Board Directors, and, borrowed
from the Corporations Act, the ability to assign ‘individual property rights’ to
retained equity through a share allocation mechanism. He attributed this flexibility to
the historical development of the Act, as it was based on the former Western
Australian Corporations Law, and therefore, was essentially a piece of corporations’
law. According to Booth, the accommodating nature of the existing legislation was a
great asset to for Western Australian co-operatives.
Perhaps these features of the existing legislation meant the Western
Australian co-operative movement did not have a problem that needed fixing.
However, although the existing Western Australian legislation did not hold up the
incorporation of new co-operatives, the Western Australian government’s delay in
introducing new legislation placed an administrative burden on new co-operatives
developing their internal structures and mechanisms to comply with the existing
legislation as well as ensuring that they were not disadvantaging themselves under
the proposed legislation.
As of early 2006, Western Australia still does not have new legislation to
replace the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943, although the issue has become more
prominent in both government, the CFWA and the co-operative movement. The
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Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection
established an Industry Reference Group in 2004 with representatives from the
CFWA and co-operative businesses to work through matters that had contributed to
the slow evolution of the proposed legislation.
Although Western Australia has signed a Ministerial Council of Consumer
Affairs agreement on template legislation, it was not going to fully adopt the
Queensland template. According to Newcombe (2005), and not directly related to
the proposed co-operatives legislation, it was not politically acceptable to the Liberal
and National Parties to adopt template legislation as it gave away their right to
scrutinise proposed legislation (Newcombe, 2005).

Additionally, the Industry

Reference Group had identified several concerns with some provisions in the
template legislation. As a result, the Group determined that it was going to develop
Western Australian specific legislation.

Some of the proposed changes were

significant shifts from the template legislation, while others focused more on
operational issues for co-operatives transitioning from the existing legislation to the
proposed legislation.
When enacted, the CFWA advises that the new legislation will result in:
•
•
•
•

•
•

changes to current Western Australian co-operative accounting
practices.
new capital raising procedures by the substitution of
‘information statements’ for ‘prospectuses’.
the emergence of ‘national co-operatives’ by the removal of
legal complications on cross border membership recruitment;
increased flexibility for capital raising by the issue of
subordinated debt instruments, ‘Co-operative Capital Units’
(CCU’s), which under certain circumstances can be listed on a
stock exchange.
continuing the practice of issuing non voting classes of shares.
the introduction of a ‘non-distributing’ or ‘non-trading’ class
of co-operatives which are relevant to social and community
activities. (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia,
2005a, p 3)

The formation of the Industry Working Group reflects a growing ability of
the CFWA and the co-operative movement to lobby the Western Australian
government about issues of significance to co-operatives. Assuming that its priority
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listing is maintained, Western Australia can expect new legislation within the
foreseeable future.

The principles underpinning co-operative legislation
There is no requirement to have specific co-operative legislation, as a cooperative can be incorporated under any legal form that can accommodate the
definition and features of a co-operative in its internal statutes, such as under the
Corporations Act 2001. According to Interviewee 696, a legal academic, there are a
number of advantages in using the Corporations Act 2001 over State-based cooperative legislation. It is, he contends, easier to use this law, as more people are
familiar with it; there is a large body of literature associated with it; it is relatively
easy to form a company; and it is nationally based and underpinned by regulatory
control of Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). In contrast, he
argues, State-based co-operative legislation is not very efficient as it is not well
resourced and there are few professional advisors with the necessary knowledge of
its legal requirements. The legal academic queried the need to have State-based cooperative legislation when all the benefits of the Corporations Act were available to
co-operatives. While he acknowledged the history of the co-operative movement, he
was curious why Australian States still retained co-operative legislation.

He

recognised that there is some symbolic importance in having separate co-operative
legislation for co-operative members; however, from a legal or contracting position,
he argued that there is no real reason to have it.
Interviewee 822 (2002) agrees that the Corporations Act 2001 can
accommodate all the elements required for an agricultural co-operative, together with
the attendant advantages identified by Interviewee 696 (2002).

The only

disadvantage Interviewee 822 (2002) identified was that incorporating under this Act
removed the ability to name the resultant entity a ‘co-operative’ as only entities
incorporated under the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943
could legally use this name. Differing from Booth’s views, Interviewee 822 believed
that Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943, due to it being legislation enacted in the
1940s, lacked the flexibility and the benefits of updated amendments for corporations
available under the Commonwealth Act. Based on his experience of working with
agricultural co-operatives wishing to explore organisational structural options to
272

overcome these deficits in the Western Australian Act, but not necessarily to
corporatise, he identified a deep-seated fear by some co-operative actors towards the
Corporations Act 2001 and found it difficult to convey the advantages of using it.
He commented that solicitors working with co-operatives need to develop an
understanding of and sensitivity towards the ideological basis of agricultural cooperatives when working with actors from these organisations.
The supranational bodies developing policy guiding principles for cooperative legislation do not support this view that there is really no need for
dedicated co-operative legislation.

The International Labor Organisation (1998)

developed a framework for co-operative legislation in 1998. In the following years,
the United Nations drafted and subsequently endorsed Guidelines Aimed at Creating
a Supportive Environment for the Development of Co-operatives drawn up by
Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Co-operatives (COPAC) (United
Nations, 2001). Essentially the guidelines highlight that co-operatives should be
recognised as distinct legal entities under their own dedicated co-operatives
legislation (United Nations, 2001). The Statement on the Co-operative Identity
adopted by the International Co-operative Alliance in 1995 also proposed cooperative legislation as a key element in the co-operative identity. The United
Nations (2001) guidelines also recommend that the co-operative sector and peak
bodies participate in the drafting of co-operative legislation.
The CCP and template legislation in Australia meets most of the United
Nations guidelines for co-operative legislation. Co-operative principles were first
enshrined in the Victorian co-operatives CCP legislation in 1997. Separate legal
entity status was incorporated into the 1992 New South Wales legislation and
duplicated in the Victorian legislation. The involvement of the peak bodies in the cooperative sector has been part of the process in reviewing co-operatives legislation
from the late 1980s; indeed the review process commenced from the co-operative
sector.

Co-operatives have dedicated legislation, as for-profit enterprises have

dedicated legislation. However, the ICA identified that governments do not provide
a supportive framework for co-operatives equivalent to that provided for corporate
structures (International Co-operative Alliance, 1999). To illustrate, the level of
government support for small business development (such as the Business Enterprise
Centres and Small Business Development Centre) demonstrates the divide between
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the government support for private for-profit business structures and the level of
support for co-operative structures.

Conclusion
Chapter Six concluded that Western Australia generally lacks a public policy
framework that is favourable towards the agricultural co-operative sector. One area,
however, where the co-operative movement has been fortunate is in the continuation
of some form of legislation for co-operative businesses from the beginning of the
20th century. Across Australia, with the exception of Western Australia, legislation
for co-operatives has been updated in the last decade to reflect contemporary
conditions for co-operative businesses and to reinforce the centrality of the cooperative principles. The long process to enact revised co-operatives legislation in
Western Australia can be partly attributed to the co-operative movement’s
satisfaction with the existing legislation. However, its lack of progress also reflects
the low priority of the co-operative movement for the Western Australian
government, along with the inability of the CFWA to exert influence on behalf of the
co-operative movement in this arena.
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APPENDIX 3

Agricultural Co-operatives Study Tours and Seminars

Introduction
The purpose of this appendix is two fold. Firstly, it explores the role of study
tours and seminars in building knowledge and stimulating the adoption of the
agricultural co-operative model among actors in, or associated with, the agricultural
industry. Secondly, the discussion examines the role of government in initiating
study tours. 193
During the latter period of the Western Australian Coalition Government,
from about 1996 to 2001, the Department of Agriculture funded several study tours
to the United States and Canada to observe the New Generation Co-operative (NGC)
model. Additionally, the Department hosted a number of seminar presentations by
United States NGC proponents and academics in Western Australia. Based on
interviewees’ recollections, the following table summarises anecdotal information
about the sequence of various study tours and seminar presentations tours and
seminars.

193 Information for this section is based almost solely on field notes taken during interviewee
discussions, as very little written information about these tours or seminars has been located. Where
possible, statements of ‘fact’ have been verified by other interviews. However, the narrative may
inadvertently contain errors.
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Illustrative Outline of Study Tours and Seminars 1996-2002
Date
August
1996

Event
As part of the ‘Doing More with Agriculture’ program,
the Department of Agriculture conducted a study tour of
Western Australian agricultural industry actors to North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota to observe rural
community economic development initiatives. NGCs
were observed as a potential tool for community
development.
23 April
Professor Michael Cook delivered a seminar in Perth
1998
hosted by the Department of Agriculture on the NGC
model. A representative of a United States NGC
accompanied Professor Cook. 194
30 March
Professor Michael Cook delivered a lecture at the Hyatt
1999
Hotel in Perth on the NGC model, organised by Glen
Thompson of Global Linkages. A representative of
another United States NGC accompanied Professor Cook.
21 August-6 The Department of Agriculture conducted a study tour of
September
Western Australian agricultural industry and co-operative
1999
movement actors to North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Minnesota to specifically investigate the NGC model.
March 2001 Glen Thompson, Global Linkages, organised Professor
Michael Cook to deliver a seminar at a Sydney
conference on the NGC model.
September
The Department of Agriculture hosted a lecture in Perth
2001
by Dr Alan Frampton of a New Zealand dairy cooperative about the NGC model.
2001
The Department of Agriculture coordinated and funded a
conference in Perth for Rural Company Directors,
including agricultural co-operative Directors.
2002
The Dairy Research and Development Corporation
funded a study tour for Australian dairy industry actors of
the international dairy industry and the role of cooperatives, including NGCs. The CEO of the Challenge
Dairy Co-operative was a delegate in this tour.

Apart from a brief report to the ‘Doing More with Agriculture’ program
(Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 1998) and by a participant to his
professional association (Interviewee 689, 2002), additional written information
about these NGC focused study tours and seminars was not located. 195

194 Based on interviewee recollections, the CEOs of the South Dakota Soybean Co-operative and
North Dakota Pasta Co-operative also participated in these Perth seminars with Professor Cook.
195 The Department of Agriculture was unable to meet a request for additional information on the
sequencing of these study tours and seminars. This was attributed to the change of government in
February 2001, when much historical information was lost in the period of government hand over.
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In addition to these study tours and seminars, some interviewees also
participated in other study tours. Tours were organised and partially funded by
agricultural industry research and development corporations, such as the Dairy
Research and Development Corporation (DRDC), large co-operatives and Statutory
Marketing Authorities (SMAs), such as CBH and the Grain Pool, agribusiness
companies such as National Foods and academic institutions such as Monash
University Agribusiness Department. Unlike the Department of Agriculture study
tours; these tours had a broader focus than NGCs.
The first encounter by Western Australians with the NGC model was via the
1996 study tour to Canada and the United States (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 695,
2003). The purpose of that study tour was to consider rural community economic
development models under the ‘Doing More with Agriculture’ program, which was
part of an initiative known as Progress Rural. United States representatives exhibited
the NGC model as a very successful demonstration of rural community economic
development.
The impact of the NGC model on the delegates was clearly quite significant
as a further Department of Agriculture trip to North America was conducted in 1999
titled ‘Progress Rural Value Adding Study Tour’. The purpose of the study tours
was to observe the NGC model as an organisational structure for the commercial
development of farmers, rather than as a community economic development strategy
(Interviewee 653, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002; Interviewee 695, 2003).
The study tours stimulated ongoing interest as the Department of Agriculture
hosted two lecture tours by the United States agricultural co-operative academic,
Professor Michael Cook and an NGC Chairman, Mr Michael Warner in the same
time frame. A number of interviewees also attended these seminars on the NGC
model. These study tours and seminars were partially funded from a pool of funds
that were accumulated via the former Rural Adjustment and Finance Corporation
(RAFCOR) scheme in which funds repaid by farmers had accumulated in a trust
account to about $75 million (Interviewee 682, 2003).
The agricultural co-operative model, including the NGC model, was also
evaluated by a small group of dairy farmers from the south west of Western Australia
(Interviewee 654, 2003). These dairy farmers were seeking alternative approaches
for their industry before the anticipated deregulation of the dairy SMA. The Dairy
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Structural Adjustment Program, established to facilitate dairy industry deregulation
and administered via the Western Australian Department of Agriculture, partially
funded these tours.
Participant Observations of the Study Tours and Seminars
Participants in the study tours generally indicated that the tours were more
worthwhile than anticipated. Interviewees commented that the study tours exposed
them to new concepts that would not have occurred without direct observation of
organisational innovation in the agricultural industry of other industrialised
countries.

New relationships were developed with key people associated with

agricultural co-operatives. Awareness was created in the United States and Canada
that actors in the Western Australian agricultural industry were interested in
developing knowledge of the co-operative model, which triggered the reciprocal trips
to deliver seminars in Perth and regional Western Australia.
The interview discussions with actors from agribusiness, such as farm
management advisors, accountants and bankers, highlighted that knowledge of the
co-operative model is marginal in this advisor group. They received very limited, if
any, undergraduate training in the agricultural co-operative model and minimal
subsequent professional development on its economic contribution to the agricultural
industry. Therefore, the study tours provided this group with positive experiences of
overseas co-operative businesses. The NGC model, with its modifications to the
traditional agricultural co-operative model based on incorporating elements of the
IOF structure to address alleged deficits, appealed to this segment.
The impact of the study tours on this segment is significant.

Western

Australian farmers are highly accustomed to seeking the advice of agribusiness
advisors and as a result, the advisors can have a significant influence over business
strategies implemented by producers. By participating in the study tours or seminars,
this professional advisor segment enhanced their knowledge base and therefore
potentially, their ability to advise farmer groups on the co-operative model as a
commercial alterative.
An actor associated with an agricultural co-operative considered that the
study tours developed a strong knowledge of the NGC model and co-operative
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principles (Interviewee 652, 2003). He subsequently encouraged all the co-operative
Board members to undertake study tours of NGCs and the agricultural industry
internationally. While the cost of this may be high, Interviewee 652 (2003) believed
that it would return dividends to the co-operative, as the Board would be very clear
about the philosophy and purpose of a co-operative and the NGC variation. He
thought that developing this knowledge would ensure that the Board was not tempted
in the future to convert the co-operative to a corporate structure (Interviewee 652,
2003).
The interviewee also thought senior executive staff benefited from study
tours. The CEO of this co-operative subsequently participated in a trip to the United
States to observe the NGC model. According to Interviewee 652 (2003), the CEO
returned with a solid understanding the co-operative philosophy and what an NGC
could achieve.

The interviewee reflected that the development of the CEO

knowledge of the philosophical underpinning of co-operatives and the NGC model
was a form of insurance against potential pressure from within the organisation to
convert the co-operative into a corporation. The CEO also confirmed the advantage
of the study tours (Interviewee 654, 2003). He wrote a report to the Board of his
experiences of the NGC model in the United States and how elements could be
incorporated into the Western Australian agricultural co-operative (Interviewee 654,
2003). According to Interviewee 654 (2003), developing the intellectual capital
Board members and the CEO by participating in study tours resulted in the cooperative gaining a direct and observable benefit that was able to be translated into
an economic benefit for the broader industry.
Discussions with participants who attended the lectures presented by
Professor Michael Cook and the CEOs of NGCs indicated that these presenters were
powerfully motivating, almost evangelical, speakers who transferred considerable
enthusiasm about the NGC model to the audience (Interviewee 695, 2003). Even
after three or four years or so, participants quite readily recalled Professor Cook’s
five problems with the traditional agricultural model and how the NGC model
alleviated these difficulties (Interviewee 689, 2002).
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Knowledge Transfer
There is little doubt that the flurry of study tours and seminars concerning cooperatives, particularly the NGC model, stimulated a high level of interest in the
agricultural industry about the co-operative model.

However, over the years it

appears to not have translated into any sustained interest or action by primary
producers to duplicate the NGC model in Western Australia, possibly with the
exception of one agricultural co-operative.
To illustrate, the participants of one tour agreed that each participant would
write up issues of interest to be collated into a report (Interviewee 689, 2002).
Despite good intentions, one or two participants wrote the final report and distributed
it to tour members. 196 According to Interviewee 689 (2002), the report summarised
the tour, the features of the NGC model, factors which contributed to its success in
the United States and why it may or may not work in Western Australia.
Additionally, each participant agreed to speak at three industry forums to share
information about NGCs. However, according to the interviewee, this also did not
occur with most participants (Interviewee 689, 2002).
This research notes that the proponents of the study tours, that is, the
Department of Agriculture, did not build in a strategy for subsequent knowledge
transfer at the completion of the tours. The inability of most delegates to share their
new co-operative knowledge with the broader industry is worthy of note. From a cooperative theory perspective, it can be understood as the result of lack of a bottom up
stimulus driving the initiative of study tours to investigate the agricultural cooperative model.

Theory suggests that co-operatives are best developed when

proponents (co-operative champions) form them, as a direct response to a perceived
need and for their own benefit (Craig, 1993). A Western Australian government
agency took a leading role in initiating the study tours to observe the NGC model.
No doubt, this was well intentioned, particularly in the absence of the industry itself
evaluating co-operative strategies on response to the advancing influence of
globalisation. However, the limited action in the period following the study tours
suggests that a ‘top down’ approach does not build long-term sustainability into a
good intention.

Co-operative theory argues that it is more appropriate for

196 Unfortunately, the author was unable to locate a copy of this report.
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government agencies to respond to the request of co-operative champions to assist in
funding elements of feasibility studies, such as gathering information of overseas
experiences. Empirical evidence of the Challenge Dairy Co-operative supports this.
The Challenge Dairy Co-operative, in its formative stage, sought and received
government support to explore dairy industry best practice internationally. This
included the NGC model.

The Challenge Dairy Co-operative is the only co-

operative in Western Australia that has a direct link to the short period of cooperative study tours in the late 1990s.
Fate of Study Tours
The study tours did not continue following the election of the new Western
Australian Labor Government in February 2001. According to Interviewee 682
(2003), this was attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, he stated that the trust
fund which had funded the study tours had been depleted and even if the Coalition
Government had retained office, the funding for the study tours would have ended.
Secondly, the study tours, he considered, had a political ‘taint’ in that they were
perceived by a range of actors in the new Labor Government to be a mechanism to
recruit members to the National Party. Further, there was a perception of favouritism
about who participated on these trips. Interviewee 682 (2003) commented that the
former Coalition Minister for Agriculture, a member of the National Party, had
acknowledged this ‘perception’ of favouritism in the rural media, when publicly
defending the value of the study tours and who participated in them. According to
Interviewee 682 (2003), this ‘taint’ was confirmed when the tours were cancelled as
the only people who canvassed the incoming Minister for their reintroduction were
also members of the National Party.
Thirdly, Interviewee 682 (2003) argued that a Labor Party election
commitment allocated $1 million for an initiative to stimulate rural leadership, which
was considered to duplicate the purpose of the former study tours. Lastly, the rural
leadership funds were transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the
Department of Local Government and Regional Development. Collectively, these
factors resulted in the end of Government activity in initiating study tours to North
America about the NGC model.
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Impact on Industry Understanding of the Agricultural Co-operative Model
The study tours of NGCs and the ensuing seminars developed farmer and
government officer knowledge of a particular type of agricultural co-operative - the
NGC model. Interview discussions with some actors indicated that their knowledge
of the traditional agricultural co-operative model was imperfect. Therefore, the new
knowledge about NGCs was developed in a vacuum of any independent knowledge
of the traditional agricultural co-operative model in the first place. Even several
years after the study tours and seminars, many participants were able to identify the
shortcomings of traditional agricultural co-operatives, particularly by quoting the
five problems that Cook raised.

Unintentionally the integrity of the traditional

agricultural co-operative model was undermined by the study tours and seminars and
many participants were left with a view that the traditional agricultural co-operative
model was flawed.
Conclusion
The role of study tours in the Western Australian agricultural co-operative
story offers a number of insights. Study tours can be analysed from the perspective
of institutional capital, in that they constitute a concrete example of a government
agency committing resources to the development of agricultural co-operatives in this
State. However, as discussed at length in Chapter Six, this cannot be interpreted as
an overt public policy stance by the Department of Agriculture on agricultural cooperatives. Rather it reflects a well intentioned but ad hoc initiative promoted by
certain individuals within the Minister’s office or the Department of Agriculture.
Additionally, the Department’s initiative in planning study tours demonstrates a ‘top
down’ approach to co-operative development, contrary to co-operative theory.
The comments from interviewees demonstrate that participation in the study
tours or attending the seminars developed individuals’ knowledge of the NGC model
and its potential contribution to the economic viability of farm enterprises.
Theoretically, this new knowledge could be transferred to the Western Australian
agricultural industry and adapted to suit local conditions. However, specific NGC
knowledge, in the absence of a strong understanding of the traditional agricultural
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co-operative model, paradoxically diminished interviewee recognition of the intrinsic
value of the traditional model to Western Australian agriculture.
Lastly, the study tours facilitated the development of networks among local
farmers, agribusiness consultants, bankers, accountants, government officers and
ministerial staff and their respective counterparts in the US and Canada. These
networks represent potential opportunities to facilitate the establishment of
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia.
In conclusion, conversations with individuals who participated in the tours
demonstrate that the study tours relating to the NGC model had a concrete value for
the industry. A number of industry players and advisors were exposed to new
situations and knowledge which could be potentially transferred back to the Western
Australian agricultural industry. However, future study tours need to evolve from a
farmer need for new knowledge, rather than as a result of a government department
initiative. A strategy for exposing industry players to international agricultural cooperative initiatives needs to be developed via the agricultural industry itself, with
the support of the agricultural co-operative sector and government agencies.
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APPENDIX 4

Typology of Farmer and Agricultural Industry Actors towards the
Agricultural Co-operative Model

Interviews conducted for this thesis revealed a diversity of views concerning
the role and relevance of the agricultural co-operative model in the contemporary
agricultural industry. The following table is an interpretation of interviewee attitudes
about the agricultural co-operative model that classifies farmers into four identifiable
segments. The segments are the Free Marketeers, the Agrarians, the Pragmatists and
the Maximisers. The four segments represent a tension in world views within and
between individual producers and the institutional actors linked to agriculture about
the agricultural co-operative model. On balance, producers are more inclined to
favour the co-operative structure than their external agricultural ‘advisors’.
This framework also applies to agricultural actors who support farmers in a
professional capacity, such as agribusiness and farm management advisors,
accountants, lawyers, financiers and academics. Classifying these actors into to
these segments on the basis of their perception of the agricultural co-operative
structure may provide an insight to determining appropriate professional
development about the economic and social impacts of the agricultural co-operative
model in the present day agricultural industry.
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Typology of Agricultural Industry Actors towards the Agricultural Co-operative Model
Segment
The Free
Marketeers

The Agrarians

Position
This group tends to discount the co-operative model as out dated and old
fashioned, with no place in a market driven industry. They view the collective
approach of the co-operative structure as being at odds with individualism and as a
protective structure to shield underperforming producers. They have rejected the
model, as it is perceived as an instrument for ‘failed’ farmers who require support
of the co-operative in order to stay in the industry. Co-operatives are viewed as a
‘leg up’ for non-competitive farmers.
The sentiments expressed by this group are strongest among agribusiness
management advisors and accountants, solicitors and bankers and one peak body
agricultural industry association. Elements of this attitude are also evident among
some farmers. Farmers with this attitude are heavily influenced by economic
theory in their approach to farm business management. All actors in this group
favour orthodox economics as the basis to the development of agricultural industry
public policy.
This group comprises those who embrace the sentiments of agrarian socialism and
therefore philosophically reject the tenets of neoliberalism. This group argues that
the biophysical nature of agricultural production together with the contribution of
the industry to urban Australia demands a dedicated agricultural industry public
policy approach. The agricultural co-operative business structure is perceived by
this group as consistent with their world view, as it embraces notions of collective
behaviour to economic disadvantage. This group also favours the retention of
SMAs. Consistent with this view is a sympathy and empathy with the noneconomic and social values found within the co-operative structure.

Strategies
This group is likely to be philosophically
disinclined to listen to messages about the cooperative model. Therefore, agricultural cooperative messages will need to emphasise the
economic benefits of the model and use
economic language.
Agricultural industry business management,
legal and financial advisors need professional
development on the merits of the agricultural
co-operative model in the agricultural supply
chain.

This group is likely to respond to messages
about the ability of the co-operative model to
help individual farmers, via collective
behaviour, to counter exploitative behaviour of
multinational companies. A key secondary
message is the social benefits of the cooperative model to sustain rural communities.

The interviewees who expressed this view tend to be older farmers. It was not a
perspective expressed by non-farmers regardless of their connection to the
agricultural industry or the co-operative structure
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The Pragmatists

The Maximisers

This group comprises those who have embraced the rigours of a deregulated and
internationally trade driven industry yet pragmatically recognise the benefits of a
mutual self-help collective approach to exploit opportunities in a market driven
economy. However, the pragmatic approach of this group does not extend to deep
commitment to the underlying philosophy captured by the co-operative principles.
The mechanics but not necessarily the philosophy of the co-operative structure
tends to define this view.
The sentiments expressed by this group are not necessarily new. It is likely that
the agricultural co-operative model in Western Australia was always adopted by
farmers as a pragmatic response to an economic problem without the
embellishment of the co-operative philosophy. Therefore, the guidance to
business strategy found in the co-operative values may be overlooked. Once the
model no longer serves its purpose, members readily shift to another strategy to
meet that need. There is no sentimental attachment to the model itself.
This group is a subset of the Pragmatists group who incorporate the co-operative
values into the collective structure to create an economically powerful business
entity in a market economy. This group is also able to use the co-operative
principles to carve a competitive advantage in the market place.
The inaugural chair of UFCC, Mr Rod Madden, encapsulates this approach.

This group is likely to respond to messages
about the economic benefits, at the farm input
and the transport and marketing of
commodities, of the co-operative business
model. The co-operative values may not be
meaningful to this group.
The Board and management of agricultural cooperatives will benefit from professional
development on the ability of the co-operative
values to guide business strategy and build a
competitive edge.

This group represent those who can maximise
the benefits of the co-operative model to their
situation. The co-operative principles are
intrinsically valuable to this group as a basis to
guide business strategy. This group provides
role models to those investigating the cooperative model for their situation.
To build awareness of these co-operatives, case
studies are required as a promotional tool.
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APPENDIX 5

New Generation Co-operatives

The hybrid co-operative model, the New Generation Co-operative (NGC),
evolved during the 1990s in the Mid West of the United States. The traditional
agricultural co-operative business model was modified to incorporate elements of the
investor-owned firm (IOF) structure into the co-operative structure. NGCs also
sought to address problems attributed to the traditional co-operative model, such as
‘free rider’; ‘horizon’; ‘portfolio’; ‘control’ and ‘influence costs’ Cook (1995). 197
In contrast to most traditional agricultural co-operatives, an NGC increases
vertical integration by focusing its activities further along the supply chain. By
adding value to their own product, the NGC enables farmers to gain larger earnings
through selling processed products instead of an undifferentiated raw commodity.
As a result, farmers can collectively achieve a level of market control that they could
not harness as individuals (Stefanson et al., 1995).
The NGC model has a number of unique characteristics, although the model
can be varied to suit the specific situation to which it is applied. Stefanson et al.,
(1995) identified two key features that distinguish the model from traditional cooperatives – delivery rights and restricted membership. To allocate the delivery
rights and raise capital, shares are sold in the co-operative. Generally, the NGC
share structure has three tiers of shares: membership, equity and preferred shares
(Stefanson and Fulton, 1997).

The NGC producers can only hold membership

shares, and this category of share gives the producer the right to vote. Members also
purchase equity shares. Equity shares are the mechanism for raising the significant
capitalisation needed to construct the production or processing plants. The number
of equity shares available in each NGC is calculated by dividing the cost to establish
the plant with the amount of product required to enable it to operate at optimum
capacity. When members have purchased all the equity shares, the membership is
197 See Chapter Two for discussion of the five factors itemised by Cook (1995).
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closed. Equity shares are also allocated delivery rights (a form of two-way contract)
to the NGC: the producer commits to deliver product to the NGC as determined by
the delivery right and the NGC is committed to taking delivery of the product. The
delivery contract usually contains precise quality standards. Where a member is
unable to deliver according to the delivery contract, the NGC may alternatively
source the product and charge the cost to the member, thereby ensuring consistency
in quality and quantity of product (Stefanson and Fulton, 1997). A unique feature of
the equity shares is that they are tradeable and can appreciate (or depreciate) in value,
resulting in strong member involvement and control and the opportunity for capital
gain in shares. NGCs distribute profits to members in proportion to their patronage.
Typically, the profit generated from added-value activity is returned annually to
members as cash.
The third category of shares is preferred shares, although not all NGCs have
this feature. These shares enable investment in the NGC from non-producers, such
as local community members, thereby creating a vehicle for the community to
support and benefit from the NGC. Preferred shares do not include voting rights,
ensuring that producer-members retain control of the NGCs. To comply with the
Capper-Volstead Act, dividends on preferred shares are capped at 8% (Volkin,
1995).
NGCs have also contributed other benefits at the local community level.
Examples are economic diversification within the community by shifting into new
value added products (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Ergstrom, 1994), facilitating rural
development by providing income and employment opportunities and stabilizing of
the rural communities that foster them (Holmes et al., 2001; Stefanson et al., 1995).
However, to enable the NGC to effectively provide these multiplier benefits at the
community level, the economic success of the NGC must be its primary focus.
More than 200 NGCs were established during the 1990s in various parts of
the United States of America and Canada (Fulton, 2001) although there is now some
evidence of NGCs not succeeding in the longer term (Torgerson, 2001). While the
success of the NGC model has created much excitement, leading to the term ‘Co-op
Fever’ (Patrie, 1998), it is essential that a balanced assessment of the potential
viability of the NGC model in Australia is made. The considerable body of literature
about NGCs tends to be from an economic perspective; focusing on the model’s

288

ability to overcome the economic shortcomings of traditional co-operatives (Cook,
1995), their organisational structure (Stefanson et al., 1995), their historical
development and capacity to replicate the model in other locations (Bielik, 1999) and
to a lesser extent, their contribution to rural economic development (Fulton and
Hammond Ketilson, 1992; Holmes, Walzer, & Merrett, 2001; United States
Department of Agriculture, 2002).
The predominantly economic approach to the analysis of NGCs is no doubt
an evolution of the literature on the more traditional forms of agricultural cooperatives.

Australian work on NGCs is limited, and again the work has a

predominantly economic orientation (O’Connor and Thompson, 2001; Plunkett and
Kingwell, 2001).
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